CHAPTER VII.. That the Lawfulness of the Ceremonies Cannot Be Warranted by Any

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY ANY ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, NOR BY ANY POWER WHICH THE CHURCH HATH TO PUT ORDER TO THINGS BELONGING TO DIVINE WORSHIP.

Sect. 1. We have proved that the ceremonies cannot be warranted by the law of God. It followeth to examine whether any law of man, or power upon earth, can make them lawful or warrantable unto us.

We will begin with laws ecclesiastical, where, first of all, it must be considered well what power the church hath to make laws about things pertaining to religion and the worship of God, and how far the same doth extend itself. Dr Field’s resolution touching this question is as followeth: “Thus (saith he(876)) we see our adversaries cannot prove that the church hath power to annex unto such ceremonies and observations as she deviseth, the remission of sins, and the working of other spiritual and supernatural effects, which is the only thing questioned between them and us about the power of the church. So that all the power the church hath, more than by her power to publish the commandments of Christ the Son of God, and by her censures to punish the offenders against the same, is only in prescribing things that pertain to comeliness and order. Comeliness requireth that not only that gravity and modesty do appear in the performance of the works of God’s service that beseemeth actions of that nature, but also that such rites and ceremonies be used as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the things performed, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion.”

And after: Order requireth that there be set hours for prayer, preaching, and ministering the sacraments; that there be silence and attention when the things are performed; that women be silent in the church; that all things be administered according to the rules of discipline.

This his discourse is but a bundle of incongruities. For, 1. He saith, that the church’s power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects, is the only thing questioned between our adversaries and us about the power of the church. Now, our adversaries contend with us also about the power of the church to make new articles of faith, and her power to make laws binding the conscience, both which controversies are touched by himself.(877)

2. He saith, that comeliness requireth the use of such ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of God’s service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion. But it hath been already showed(878) that the comeliness which the Apostle requireth in the church and service of God cannot comprehend such ceremonies under it, and that it is no other than that very common external decency which is beseeming for all the assemblies of men, as well civil as sacred.

3. Whilst he is discoursing of the church’s power to prescribe things pertaining to order, contra-distinguished from her power which she hath to publish the commandments of Christ, he reckons forth among his other examples, women’s silence in the church, as if the church did prescribe this as a matter of order left to her determination, and not publish it as the commandment of Christ in his word.

4. Whereas he saith that the church hath power to prescribe such rites and ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of God’s service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion, by his own words shall he be condemned: for a little before he reprehendeth the Romanists for maintaining that the church hath power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects. And a little after he saith, that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify, assure, and convey unto men such benefits of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to cause a regard of, and a respect unto the works of God’s service, and thereby to stir up men to fervour and devotion, what is it but the working of a spiritual and supernatural effect, and the conveying unto men such a benefit of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them? In like manner, whereas he holdeth that the church hath power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to express those spiritual and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, which are or should be in men, in the very same place he confuteth himself, whilst he affirmeth that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify unto men those benefits of saving grace which God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to express such heavenly and spiritual affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, is (I suppose) to signify unto men such benefits of saving grace, as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Who dare deny it?

Sect. 2. Bishop Lindsey’s opinion touching the power of the church,(879) whereof we dispute, is, that power is given unto her to “determine the circumstances which are in the general necessary to be used in divine worship, but not defined particularly in the word.”

I know the church can determine nothing which is not of this kind and quality. But the Prelate’s meaning (as may be seen in that same epistle of his) is, that whatsoever the church determineth, if it be such a circumstance as is in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, then we cannot say that the church had no power to determine and enjoin the same, nor be led by the judgment of our own consciences, judging it not expedient, but that in this case we must take the church’s law to be the rule of our consciences. Now, by this ground which the Prelate holdeth, the church may prescribe to the ministers of the gospel the whole habit and apparel of the Levitical high-priest (which were to Judaize). For apparel is a circumstance in the general necessary, yet it is not particularly defined in the word. By this ground, the church may determine that I should ever pray with my face to the east, preach kneeling on my knees, sing the psalms lying on my back, and hear sermons standing only upon one foot. For in all these actions a gesture is necessary; but there is no gesture particularly defined in the word to which we are adstricted in any of these exercises.

And further, because uno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur, by this ground the Prelate must say, that the church hath power to ordain three or four holidays every week (which ordinance, as he himself hath told us, could not stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety), for time is a circumstance in the general necessary in divine worship, yet in his judgment we are not bound by the word to any particular time for the performance of the duties of God’s worship.

By this ground we were to say, that Pope Innocent III. held him within the bounds of ecclesiastical power, when in the great Lateran council, anno 1215, he made a decree, that all the faithful of both sexes should once in the year at least, to wit, upon Easter-day, receive the sacrament of the eucharist. From whence it hath come to pass, that the common people in the church of Rome receive the sacrament only upon Easter. Now, the time of receiving the sacrament is a circumstance in the general necessary, for a time it must have, but it is not particularly defined in the word. It is left indefinite, 1 Cor. xi. 26, yet the church hath no power to determine Easter-day, either as the only time, or as the fittest time, for all the faithful of both sexes to receive the eucharist. What if faithful men and women cannot have time to prepare themselves as becometh, being avocated and distracted by the no less necessary than honest adoes of their particular callings?

What if they cannot have the sacrament upon that day administered according to our Lord’s institution? What if they see Papists confirming themselves in their Easter superstition by our unnecessary practice? Shall they swallow these and such-like soul-destroying camels, and all for straining out the gnat of communicating precisely upon Easter-day? But since time is a necessary circumstance, and no time is particularly defined, the Bishop must say more also, that the church may determine Easter-day for the only day whereupon we may receive the Lord’s supper.

Last of all, if the church have power to determine all circumstances in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, what could be said against that ancient order of solemn baptizing only at the holidays of Easter and Pentecost (whereby it came to pass that very many died unbaptized, as Socrates writeth(880))? Or, what shall be said against Tertullian’s opinion,(881) which alloweth lay men, yea, women, to baptize. May the church’s determination make all this good, forasmuch as these circumstances of the time when, and the persons by whom, baptism should be ministered, are in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word? Ite leves nugae.

Sect. 3. Camero,(882) as learned a Formalist as any of the former, expresseth his judgment copiously touching our present question. He saith, that there are two sorts of things which the church commandeth, to wit, either such as belong to faith and manners, or such as conduce to faith and manners; that both are in God’s word prescribed exserte, plainly, but not one way, because such things that pertain unto faith and manners, are in the word of God particularly commanded, whereas those things which conduce to faith and manners are but generally commended unto us. Of things that pertain to faith and manners, he saith, that they are most constant and certain, and such as can admit no change; but as for things conducing to faith and manners, he saith, that they depend upon the circumstances of persons, place, and time, which being almost infinite, there could not be particular precepts delivered unto us concerning such things. Only this is from God commended unto the church, that whatsoever is done publicly be done with order, and what privately be decent.

These things he so applieth to his purpose, that he determineth, in neither of these kinds the church hath power to make laws, because in things pertaining to faith and manners the law of our Lord Jesus Christ is plainly expressed; and in those things, wherein neither faith nor manners are placed, but which conduce to faith and manners, we have indeed a general law, not having further any particular law, for that reason alleged, namely, because this depends upon the circumstances.

Thereafter he addeth, Quid sit fides, quid sit pietas, quid sit charitas, verbo Dei demonstratur. Quid ad hæc conducat, seu reputando rem in universum, seu reputando rem quatenus singulis competit, pendet ex cognitione circumstantiarum. Jam id definire Deus voluit esse penes ecclesiam, hae tamen lege, ut quod definit ecclesia, conveniat generali definitioni Dei.

The matter he illustrates with this one example: God’s word doth define in the general that we are to fast, and that publicly; but, in the particular, we could not have the definition of the word, because there are infinite occasions of a public fast, as it is said in the schools, individua esse infinita; so that it is the church’s part to look to the occasion, and this depends upon the consideration of the circumstances. This discourse of his cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserveth certain animadversions.

Sect. 4. First, then, it is to be observed how he is drawn into a manifest contradiction; for whereas he saith, that God’s word doth exserte and diserte commend unto us generatim, such things as conduce to faith and manners, and that concerning things of this nature we have a general law in Scripture, how can this stand with that which he addeth, namely, that it is in the church’s power to define what things conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even reputando rem in universum?

2. Whereas he saith that the church hath no power to make laws, neither in things belonging to faith and manners, nor in things conducing to the same; I would also see how this agreeth with that other position, namely, that it is in the power of the church to define what things do conduce to faith, piety and charity.

3. What means he by his application of order to public, and decency to private actions, as if the Apostle did not require both these in the public words of God’s service performed in the church?

4. Whereas he saith that such things as conduce to faith and manners do depend upon the circumstances, and so could not be particularly defined in the word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the general, or as they are defined in the particular. Not the first; for as they are defined in the general, they cannot depend upon changeable circumstances, and that because, according to his own tenet, the word defines them in the general, and this definition of the word is most certain and constant, neither can any change happen unto it. Wherefore (without doubt) he must pronounce this of the definition of such things in the particular. Now, to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as they are particularly defined, do depend upon circumstances, is as much as to say that circumstances depend upon circumstances. For things conducing to faith and manners, which the church hath power to determine particularly, what are they other than circumstances? Surely he who taketh not Camero’s judgment to be, that the church hath power to determine somewhat more than the circumstances (and by consequence a part of the substance) of God’s worship, shall give no sense to his words. Yet, if one would take his meaning so, I see not how he can be saved from contradicting himself; forasmuch as he holdeth that such things as pertain to faith and manners are particularly defined in the word. To say no more, I smell such things in Camero’s opinion as can neither stand with reason nor with himself.

5. God’s word doth not only define things pertaining to faith and manners, but also things conducing to the same, and that not only generally, but in some respects, and sometimes, particularly. And we take for example his own instance of fasting. For the Scripture defineth very many occasions of fasting; Ezra viii. 21; 2 Chron. xx.; Jonah iii.; Joel ii.; Acts xiii. 3; Josh. vii. 6; Judg. xx. 16; Esth. iv. 16; Ezra ix. x.; Zech. vii. From which places we gather that the Scripture defineth fasting to be used,

1. For supplication, when we want some necessary or expedient good thing.

2. For deprecation, when we fear some evil.

3. For humiliation, when, by our sins, we have provoked God’s wrath. Neither can there be any occasion of fasting whereof I may not say that either it is particularly designed in Scripture, or else that it may be by necessary consequence defined out of Scripture; or, lastly, that it is of that sort of things which were not determinable by Scripture, because circumstances are infinite, as Camero hath told us.

Sect. 5. Thus having failed by those rocks of offence, I direct my course straight to the dissecting of the true limits, within which the church’s power of enacting laws about things pertaining to the worship of God is bounded and confined, and which it may not overleap nor transgress.

Three conditions I find necessarily requisite in such a thing as the church hath power to prescribe by her laws:

1st. It must be only a circumstance of divine worship; no substantial part of it; no sacred significant and efficacious ceremony. For the order and decency left to the definition of the church, as concerning the particulars of it, comprehendeth no more but mere circumstances. Bishop Lindsey(883) doth but unskilfully confound things different when he talketh of “the ceremonies and circumstances left to the determination of the church.” Now, by his leave, though circumstances be left to the determination of the church, yet ceremonies, if we speak properly, are not.

Bishop Andrews avoucheth(884) that ceremonies pertain to the church only, and to the service of God, not to civil solemnities. But so much, I trust, he would not have said of circumstances which have place in all moral actions, and that to the same end and purpose for which they serve in religious actions, namely, for beautifying them with that decent demeanour which the very light and law of natural reason requireth as a thing beseeming all human actions. For the church of Christ being a society of men and women, must either observe order and decency in all the circumstances of their holy actions, time, place, person, form, &c., or also be deformed with that disorder and confusion which common reason and civility abhorreth. Ceremonies, therefore, which are sacred observances, and serve only to a religious and holy use, and which may not, without sacrilege, be applied to another use, must be sorted with things of another nature than circumstances. Ceremonioe, “ceremonies (saith Dr Field(885)) are so named, as Livy thinketh, from a town called Cære, in the which the Romans did hide their sacred things when the Gauls invaded Rome. Others think that ceremonies are so named a carendo, of abstaining from certain things, as the Jews abstained from swine’s flesh, and sundry other things forbidden by God as unclean. Ceremonies are outward acts of religion,” &c. Quapropter etiam, saith Junius,(886) ritus et ceremonias inter se distincimus, quia in jure politico sunt imperati et solennes ritus; ceremonioe vero non nisi sacroe observationes in cultu divino appellantur. Ceremonia, saith Bellarmine,(887) proprie et simpliciter sic vocata, est externa actio quoe non aliunde est bona et laudabilis, nisi quia fit ad Deum colendum. From which words Amesius(888) concludeth against him, that he, and others with him, do absurdly confound order, decency, and the like, which have the same use and praise in civil things which they have in the worship of God, with religious and sacred ceremonies. Yet Dr Burges(889) rejecteth this distinction betwixt circumstances and ceremonies, as a mere nicety or fiction. And would you know his reason? “For that (saith he) all circumstances (I mean extrinsical) which incur not the substance of the action, when they are once designed or observed purposely in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, they are then ceremonies.” If this be not a nicety or fiction, I know not what is. For what means he here by a matter? An action sure, or else a nicety. Well, then, we shall have now a world of ceremonies. When I appoint to meet with another man at Berwick, upon the 10th day of May, because the place and the day are purposely designed in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, namely, to my meeting with the other man, for talking of our business, therefore the town of Berwick, and the 10th day of May, must be accounted ceremonies. To me it is nice, that the Doctor made it not nice, to let such a nicety fall from his pen.

When I put on my shoos in reference to walking, or wash my hands in reference to eating, am I using ceremonies all the while? The Doctor could not choose but say so, forasmuch as these circumstances are purposely designed and observed in reference to such matters, of whose substance they are not.

Sect. 6. 2d. That which the church may lawfully prescribe by her laws and ordinances, as a thing left to her determination, must be one of such things as were not determinable by Scripture, on that reason which Camero hath given us, namely, because individua are infinita. We mean not in any wise to circumscribe the infinite power and wisdom of God, only we speak upon supposition of the bounds and limits which God did set to his written word, within which he would have it contained, and over which he thought fit that it should not exceed. The case being thus put, as it is, we say truly of those several and changeable circumstances which are left to the determination of the church, that, being almost infinite, they were not particularly determinable in Scripture; for the particular definition of those occurring circumstances which were to be rightly ordered in the works of God’s service to the end of the world, and that ever according to the exigency of every present occasion and different case, should have filled the whole world with books. But as for other things pertaining to God’s worship, which are not to be reckoned among the circumstances of it, they being in number neither many, nor in change various, were most easily and conveniently determinable in Scripture. Now, since God would have his word (which is our rule in the works of his service) not to be delivered by tradition, but to be written and sealed unto us, that by this means, for obviating Satanical subtility, and succouring human imbecility, we might have a more certain way for conservation of true religion, and for the instauration of it when it faileth among men,—how can we but assure ourselves that every such acceptable thing pertaining any way to religion, which was particularly and conveniently determinable in Scripture, is indeed determined in it; and consequently, that no such thing as is not a mere alterable circumstance is left to the determination of the church?

Sect. 7. 3d. If the church prescribe anything lawfully, so that she prescribe no more than she hath power given her to prescribe, her ordinance must be accompanied with some good reason and warrant given for the satisfaction of tender consciences. This condition is, alas! too seldom looked unto by law-makers, of whom one fitly complaineth thus:—

Lex quamvis ratio Ciceroni summa vocetur, Et bene laudetur lex que ratione probatur, Invenies inter legistas raro logistas: Moris et exempli leges sunt juraque templi.

But this fashion we leave to them who will have all their anomalies taken for analogies. It becometh not the spouse of Christ, endued with the spirit of meekness, to command anything imperiously, and without a reason given.

Ecclesioe enim est docere primum, tuin proescribere, saith Camero.(890) And again: Non enim dominatur cleris, nec agit cum iis quos Christus redemit, ac si non possent capere quod sit religiosum, quid minus.

Tertullian’s testimony(891) is known: Nulla lex, &c. “No law (saith he) owes to itself alone the conscience of its equity, but to those from whom it expects obedience. Moreover, it is a suspected law which will not have itself to be proved, but a wicked law, which not being proved, yet beareth rule.”

It is well said by our divines,(892) that in rites and ceremonies the church hath no power “to destruction, but to edification;” and that the observation of our ecclesiastical canons “must carry before them a manifest utility.”(893) Piis vero fratribus durum est, subjicere se rebus illis quas nec rectas esse nec utiles animadvertunt.(894) If here it be objected, that some things are convenient to be done, therefore, because they are prescribed by the church, and for no other reason. For example, in two things which are alike lawful and convenient in themselves, I am bound to do the one and not the other, because of the church’s prescription. So that, in such cases, it seemeth there can be no other reason given for the ordinance of the church but only her own power and authority to put to order things of this nature.

I answer, that even in such a case as this, the conveniency of the thing itself is anterior to the church’s determination; anterior, I say, de congruo, though not de facto, that is to say, before ever the church prescribe it, it is such a thing as (when it falleth out to be done at all) may be done conveniently, though it be not (before the church’s prescribing of it) such a thing as should and ought to be done as convenient. Which being so, we do still hold that the conveniency of a thing must always go before the church’s prescribing of it; go before, I mean, at least de congruo. Neither can the church prescribe anything lawfully which she showeth not to have been convenient, even before her determination.

Sect. 8. These things being permitted, I come to extract my projection, and to make it evident that the lawfulness of the controverted ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law; and this I prove by three arguments:—

1st. Those conditions which I have showed to be required in that thing which the church may lawfully prescribe by a law, are not quadrant nor competent to the cross, kneeling, surplice, holidays, &c.

For, 1. They are not mere circumstances, such as have place in all moral actions, but sacred, mystical, significant, efficacious ceremonies, as hath been abundantly shown in this dispute already. For example, Dr Burges(895) calleth the surplice a religious or sacred ceremony. And again,(896) he placeth in it a mystical signification of the pureness of the minister of God. Wherefore the replier(897) to Dr Mortoune’s Particular Defence saith well, that there is a great difference betwixt a grave civil habit and a mystical garment.

2. It cannot be said that these ceremonies are of that kind of thing which were not determinable by Scripture; neither will our opposites, for very shame, adventure to say that things of this kind, to which cross, kneeling, &c., do belong, viz., sacred significant ceremonies, left (in their judgment) to the definition of the church, are almost infinite, and therefore could not well and easily be determined in Scripture.

Since, then, such things as are not mere circumstances of worship can neither be many nor various (as I said before), it is manifest that all such things were easily determinable in Scripture.

3. Our ceremonial laws are not backed with such grounds and reasons as might be for the satisfying and quieting of tender consciences, but we are borne down with Will and authority; whereof I have said enough elsewhere.(898)

Sect. 9. 2d. If the ceremonies be lawful to us because the law and ordinance of the church prescribes them, then either the bare and naked prescription of the church, having no other warrant than the church’s own authority, makes them to be thus lawful; or else the law of the church, as grounded upon and warranted by the law of God and nature. Not the first; for divines hold,(899) legem humanum ferri ab hominibus, cum ratione procedunt ab illis aliis antegressis legibus. Nam legis humanae regula proxima est duplex. Una innata quam legem naturalem dicimus, altera inspirata, quam divinam, &c. Ex his ergo fontibus lex humana procedit: hoec incunabila illius à quibus si aberrat, lex degener est, indigna legis nomine. We have also the testimony of an adversary; for saith not Paybody himself,(900) “I grant it is unlawful to do in God’s worship anything upon the mere pleasure of man?”

If they take them (as needs they must) to the latter part, then let them either say that the ceremonies are lawful unto us, because the church judgeth them to be agreeable to the law of God and nature, or because the church proveth unto us, by evident reasons, that they are indeed agreeable to these laws. If they yield us the latter, then it is not the church’s law, but the church’s reasons given for her law, which can warrant the lawfulness of them unto us, which doth elude and elide all that which they allege for the lawfulness of them from the power and authority of the church.

And further, if any such reasons be to be given forth for the ceremonies, why are they so long kept up from us? But if they hold them at the former, thereupon it will follow, that it shall be lawful for us to do every thing which the church shall judge to be agreeable to the law of God and nature, and consequently to all the Jewish, popish, and heathenish ceremonies, yea, to worship images, if it happen that the church judge these things to be agreeable to the law of God and nature.

It will be answered (I know), that if the church command anything repugnant to God’s word we are not bound to do it, nor to receive it as lawful, though the church judge so of it; but otherwise, if that which the church judgeth to be agreeable to the law of God and nature (and in that respect prescribeth) be not repugnant to the word of God, but in itself indifferent, then are we to embrace it as convenient, and consonant to the law of God and nature, neither ought we to call in question the lawfulness of it.

But I reply, that either we must judge a thing to be repugnant or not repugnant to the word, to be indifferent or not indifferent in itself, because the church judgeth so of it, or else because the church proveth unto us by an evident reason that it is so. If the latter, we have what we would; if the former, we are just where we were: the argument is still set afoot; then we must receive everything (be it ever so bad) as indifferent, if only the church happen so to judge of it; for quod competit alicui qua tale, &c. So that if we receive anything as indifferent, for this respect, because the church judgeth it to be so, then shall we receive everything for indifferent which the church shall so judge of.

Sect. 10. 3d. The church is forbidden to add anything to the commandments of God which he hath given unto us, concerning his worship and service, Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32; Prov. xxx. 6; therefore she may not lawfully prescribe anything in the works of divine worship, if it be not a mere circumstance belonging to that kind of things which were not determinate by Scripture.

Our opposites have no other distinctions which they make any use of against this argument, but the very same which Papists use in defence of their unwritten dogmatical traditions, namely, that additio corrumpens is forbidden, but not additio perficiens: that there is not alike reason of the Christian church and of the Jewish; that the church may not add to the essential parts of God’s worship, but to the accidentary she may add.

To the first of those distinctions, we answer, 1. That the distinction itself is an addition to the word, and so doth but beg the question.

2. It is blasphemous; for it argueth that the commandments of God are imperfect, and that by addition they are made perfect.

3. Since our opposites will speak in this dialect, let them resolve us whether the washings of the Pharisees, condemned by Christ, were corrupting or perfecting additions. They cannot say they were corrupting, for there was no commandment of God which those washings did corrupt or destroy, except that commandment which forbiddeth men’s additions. But for this respect our opposites dare not call them corrupting additions, for so they should condemn all additions whatsoever. Except, therefore, they can show us that those washings were not added by the Pharisees for perfecting, but for corrupting the law of God, let them consider how they rank their own ceremonial additions with those of the Pharisees. We read of no other reason wherefore Christ condemned them but because they were doctrines which had no other warrant than the commandments of men, Matt. xv. 9; for as the law ordained divers washings, for teaching and signifying that true holiness and cleanness which ought to be among God’s people, so the Pharisees would have perfected the law by adding other washings (and more than God had commanded) for the same end and purpose.

Sect. 11. To the second distinction, we say that the Christian church hath no more liberty to add to the commandments of God than the Jewish church had; for the second commandment is moral and perpetual, and forbiddeth to us as well as to them the additions and inventions of men in the worship of God. Nay, as Calvin noteth,(901) much more are we forbidden to add unto God’s word than they were. “Before the coming of his well-beloved Son in the flesh (saith John Knox),(902) severely he punished all such as durst enterprise to alter or change his ceremonies and statutes,—as in Saul, (1 Kings xiii.; xv.) Uzziah, Nadab, Abihu, (Lev. x.) is to be read. And will he now, after that he hath opened his counsel to the world by his only Son, whom he commandeth to be heard, Matt, xvii.; and alter that, by his holy Spirit speaking by his apostles, he hath established the religion in which he will his true worshippers abide to the end,—will he now, I say, admit men’s inventions in the matter of religion? &c., 2 Cor. xi.; Col. i.; ii. For this sentence he pronounceth: ‘Not that which seemeth good in thy eyes shalt thou do to the Lord thy God, but that which the Lord thy God commanded thee, that do thou: Add nothing unto it, diminish nothing from it,’ Deut. iv. 12. Which, sealing up his New Testament, he repeateth in these words: ‘That which ye have, hold till I come,’ ” &c., Rev. ii.

Wherefore, whilst Hooker saith,(903) that Christ hath not, by positive laws, so far descended into particularities with us as Moses with the Jews; whilst Camero saith,(904) Non esse disputandum ita, ut quoniam in vetere Testamento, de rebus alioqui adiaphoris certa fuit lex, &c., id in novo Testamento habere locum; and whilst Bishop Lindsey saith,(905) that in the particular circumstances of persons by whom, place where, time when, and of the form and order how, the worship and work of the ministry should be performed, the church hath power to define whatsoever is most expedient, and that this is a prerogative wherein the Christian church differeth from the Jewish synagogue, they do but speak their pleasure in vain, and cannot make it appear that the Christian church hath any more power to add to the commandments of God than the synagogue had of old.

It is well said by one:(906) “There were many points of service, as sacrifices, washings, anniversary days, &c., which we have not; but the determination of such as we have is as particular as theirs, except wherein the national circumstances make impediment.” For one place not to be appointed for the worship of God, nor one tribe for the work of the ministry among us, as among them, not because more power was left to the Christian church for determining things that pertain to the worship of God than was to the Jewish, but because the Christian church was to spread itself over the whole earth, and not to be confined within the bounds of one nation as the synagogue was.

Sect. 12. Let us then here call to mind the distinction which hath been showed betwixt religious ceremonies and moral circumstances; for as touching moral circumstances, which serve for common order and decency in the worship of God, they being so many and so alterable, that they could not be particularly determined in Scripture, for all the different and almost infinite cases which might occur, the Jewish synagogue had the same power for determining things of this nature which the church of Christ now hath. For the law did not define, but left to be defined by the synagogue, the set hours for all public divine service,—when it should begin, how long it should last, the order that should be kept in the reading and expounding of the law, praying, singing, catechising, excommunicating, censuring, absolving of delinquents, &c., the circumstances of the celebration of marriage, of the education of youth in schools and colleges, &c.

But as for ceremonies which are proper to God’s holy worship, shall we say that the fidelity of Christ, the Son, hath been less than the fidelity of Moses, the servant? Heb. iii. 2, which were to be said, if Christ had not, by as plain, plentiful, and particular directions and ordinances, provided for all the necessities of the Christian church in the matter of religion, as Moses for the Jewish; or if the least pin, and the meanest appurtenance of the tabernacle, and all the service thereof, behooved to be ordered according to the express commandment of God by the hand of Moses, how shall we think, that in the rearing, framing, ordering, and beautifying of the church, the house of the living God, he would have less honour and prerogative given than to his own well-beloved Son, by whom he hath spoken to us in these last days, and whom he hath commanded us to hear in all things? Or that he will accept, at our hands, any sacred ceremony which men have presumed to bring into his holy and pure worship, without the appointment of his own word and will revealed unto us? Albeit the worship of God and religion, in the church of the New Testament, be accompanied without ceremonies, numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione proestantissimis (as Augustine speaketh of our sacraments,(907)) yet we have in Scripture, Eph. i. 18, no less particular determination and distinct direction for our few, easy, and plain ceremonies, than the Jews had for their many heavy and obscure ones.

Sect. 13. As for the third distinction, of adding to the accidentary parts of it, I remember that I heard in the logics, of pars essentialis or physica, and pars integralis or mathematica; of pars similaris and pars dissimilaris; of pars continua and pars discreta; but of para accidentaria heard I never till now. There is (I know) such a distinction of pars integralis, that it is either principalis and necessaria, or minus principalis and non necessaria; but we cannot understand their pars cultus accidentaria to be pars integralis non necessaria, because, then, their distribution of worship into essential and accidentary parts could not answer to the rules of a just distribution, of which one is, that distributio debet exhaurire totum distributum. Now, there are some parts of worship which cannot be comprehended in the foresaid distribution, namely, partes integrales necessarioe. What then? Shall we let this wild distinction pass, because it cannot be well nor formally interpreted? Nay, but we will observe their meaning who make use of it; for unto all such parts of worship as are not essential (and which they are pleased to call accidentary), they hold the church may make addition, whereunto I answer, 1. Let them make us understand what they mean by those essential parts to which the church may add nothing, and let them beware lest they give us an identical description of the same.

2. That there are many parts of God’s worship which are not essential, yet such as will not suffer any addition of the church: for proof whereof I demand, Were all the ceremonies commanded to be used in the legal sacraments and sacrifices essential parts of those worships? No man will say so. Yet the synagogue was tied to observe those (and no other than those) ceremonies which the word prescribed. When Israel was again to keep the passover, it was said, Num. ix. 3, “In the fourteenth day of this month at even, ye shall keep it in his appointed season, according to all the rites of it, and according to all the ceremonies of it, shall ye keep it.” And again, ver. 5, “According to all that the Lord commanded Moses, so did the children of Israel.” Ritibus et ceremoniis divinitus institutis, non licuit homini suo arbitrio aliquid adjicere aut detrahere, saith P. Martyr.(908)

Sect. 14. 3. If those accidentary parts of worship, which are commanded in the word, be both necessary to be used necessitate praecepti, and likewise sufficient means fully adequate and proportioned to that end, for which God hath destinated such parts of his worship as are not essential (which must be granted by every one who will not accuse the Scripture of some defect and imperfection), then it followeth that other accidentary parts of worship, which the church addeth thereto, are but superfluous and superstitious.

4. I call to mind another logical maxim: Sublata una parte, tolitur totum. An essential part being taken away, totum essentiale is taken away also. In like manner, an integrant part being taken away, totum integrum cannot remain behind. When a man hath lost his hand or his foot, though he be still a man physically, totum essentiale, yet he is not a man mathematically, he is no longer totum integrale. Just so if we reckon any additions (as the cross, kneeling, holidays, &c.) among the parts of God’s worship, then put the case, that those additions were taken away, it followeth that all the worship which remaineth still will not be the whole and entire worship of God, but only a part of it, or at the best, a defective, wanting, lame, and maimed worship.

5. I have made it evident that our opposites make the controverted ceremonies to be worship,(909) in as proper and peculiar sense as anything can be, and that they are equalled to the chief and principal parts of worship, not ranked among the secondary or less principal parts of it.

6. Do not our divines condemn the addition of rites and ceremonies to that worship which the word prescribeth, as well as the addition of other things which are thought more essential? We have heard Martyr’s words to this purpose.

Zanchius will have us to learn from the second commandment,(910) in externo cultu qui Deo debetur, seu in ceremonus nihil nobis esse ex nostro capite comminiscendum, whether in sacraments or sacrifices, or other sacred things, such as temples, altars, clothes, and vessels, necessary for the external worship; but that we ought to be contented with those ceremonies which God hath prescribed.

And in another place,(911) he condemneth the addition of any other rite whatsoever, to those rites of every sacrament which have been ordained of Christ, Si ceremoniis cujusvis sacramenti, alios addas ritus, &c. Dr Fulk pronounceth,(912) even of signs and rites, that “we must do in religion and God’s service, not that which seemeth good to us, but that only which he commandeth,” Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32.

And Calvin pronounceth generally,(913) Caenam domini rem adeo sacrosanctam esse, ut ullis hominum additamentis eam conspurcare sit nefas.

Sect. 15. And thus have we made good our argument, that the lawfulness of the ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law. If we had no more against them this were enough, that they are but human additions, and want the warrant of the word. When Nadab and Abihu offered strange fire before the Lord, and when the Jews burnt their sons and their daughters in the valley of the son of Hinnon, howsoever manifold wickedness might have been challenged in that which they did, yet if any would dispute with God upon the matter, he stoppeth their mouths with this one answer: “I commanded it not, neither came it into my heart,” Lev. x. 1; Jer. vii. 31. May we, last of all, hear what the canon law itself decreeth:(914) Is qui praeest, si praeter voluntatem Dei, vel praeter quod in sanctis Scripturis evidenter praecipitur, vel dicit aliquid, vel imperat, tanquam falsus testis Dei, aut sacrilegus habeatur.