Lecture Xvii.

Footnote 300:

This came about in the following way: One day while A was in hypnosis she suddenly and spontaneously changed to a different hypnotic state characterized by change of facial expression, manner, speech, etc. It was afterwards recognized that this was the B personality in hypnosis. I had not before seen or heard of the B personality as such. I had only known that the subject from her own account had been in a neurasthenic condition and had been through periods of improvement and relapses. I did not suspect that these phases of improvement and relapses represented phases of personality such as was soon discovered to be the case. A few days after the B personality had appeared in hypnosis this phase spontaneously waked and alternated as it had previously done, with the A complex. But now, as the writer says, there was amnesia on the part of A for B. The explanation for this is undoubtedly to be found in the fact that a new synthesis and more complete dissociation of the B complex had taken place through the experience of hypnosis. Analogous phenomena I have observed in making experimental observations but it would take us too far away to enter into this question here.

Footnote 301:

During the first weeks of my existence as B I pledged myself to drink no wine. The promise was made under such conditions that no reasonable person could have felt bound by it. As B I realized this and felt no obligation to keep it but as A, I could not feel so, though you had assured me over and over again that I was not in honor bound.

Footnote 302:

Prince: The Dissociation of a Personality, Longmans, Green & Co.

Footnote 303:

“My Life as a Dissociated Personality,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. III, Nos. 4 and 5.

SUMMARY AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

We may now bring this study of human personality to a close, incomplete as it is. We have not by any means exhausted all the factors of personality, but, guided by practical consideration, we have at least examined the chief of its fundamentals, more particularly those which are concerned in the disturbances which general psychopathology makes the object of study. Such a study should be undertaken preparatory to that of special pathology or particular complexes of disturbances of function (the functional psychoneuroses). The aim of psychology should be to become capable of being an applied science. So far as a science is only of academic interest it fails to be of real value to the world. Physics, chemistry, astronomy, mineralogy, geology, physiology, bacteriology, botany, and many departments of zoology, etc., can be applied, and other sciences at least tend to form our notions of the universe in which we live, and thus to mould our religious, philosophical and other conceptions. Until very recent years it was an opprobium of psychology, as studied and taught, that it had not become divorced from philosophy and stood amongst the few sciences that could not be applied to practical life and was for the most part of academic interest only. Now, however, in the field of medicine psychology is fast looming to the front as of great practical interest—not the older psychology, but the new psychology of functions and mechanisms. In the field of human efficiency in the mechanical arts it is also fast becoming capable of practical application. With the above aim in view we have dealt in these lectures more particularly with those psychological activities a knowledge of which can be applied in the theory and practice of medicine. But as the laws governing the organism are general, not special, what has been found is as applicable to normal as to pathological life.

We have not attempted to enter the field of special pathology to study the psycho-pathology of special diseases. So far as this has been done it has been mainly for the purpose of seeking data. Our aim has been rather to obtain that knowledge of functions which will serve as an introduction to such medical studies. Even in this limited field there are any number of specific problems which have been scarcely more than touched upon and any one of which, by itself, would be a rich field of investigation.

It is well now, in conclusion, to make a general survey of the fields which we have tilled, and gather together into a whole, so far as possible, the results of our gleaning.

We have seen on the basis of the phenomena of memory that the “mind” includes more than conscious processes; that it includes a vast storehouse of acquired “dispositions” deposited by the experiences of life, and that these dispositions (by which mental experiences are conserved) may be regarded as chemical or physical in their nature, as sort of residua deposited (if we are asked to confine ourselves to terms of the same order) by the neural processes correlated with the conscious experiences of life. This storehouse of acquired dispositions provides the material for conscious and subconscious processes; and thus provides the wherewithal which enables the personality to be guided in its behavior by the experiences of the past. It provides the elements of memory which we know must be supplied by the mind in every perception of the environment—even the simplest—and which are required for every process of thought. Indeed throughout our review of processes and manifestations of mind, which we need not recapitulate, we have continually come upon evidences of these dispositions playing as I foretold in our first lecture an underlying and responsible part.

The fact that brain dispositions are of one order of events (physical) while psychological processes are of another (psychical) is in no way an objection to such an interpretation, as in this antithesis we have only the old mind-matter problem—dualism, or monism, or parallelism.

We have also seen that in neural dispositions, whether acquired or innate, we have a conception of the unconscious that is definite, precise.

We have also reviewed the evidence going to show that though the main teleological function of the unconscious, so far as it represents acquired dispositions, is to provide the material for conscious memory and conscious processes, in order that the organism may be consciously guided in its reactions by experience, yet under certain conditions neurographic residua can function as a subconscious process which may be unconscious, i.e., without being accompanied by conscious equivalents. The latter were classed as a sub-order of subconscious processes. We saw reason for believing that any neurogram deposited by life’s experience can, given certain other factors, thus function subconsciously, either autonomously or as a factor in a large mechanism embracing both conscious and unconscious elements; and that this was peculiarly the case when the neurogram was organized with an emotional disposition or instinct. The impulsive force of the latter gives energy to the former and enables it to be an active factor in determining behavior. The organism may then be subconsciously governed in its reactions to the environment.

After a consideration of actions so habitually performed that they become automatic and free from conscious direction (so-called habit-reactions), of actions performed by decerebrate animals, of cerebro-spinal reflexes, and many motor activities of lower forms of animal life, we came to the conclusion that they also were performed by unconscious neural dispositions and processes, analogous to, or identical with (as the case might be) the acquired dispositions and processes correlated with conscious processes. Many of them may likewise be acquired and in a pragmatic sense intelligent. We thus were able to broaden our conception of the unconscious and its functioning, and at the same time see the further necessity of distinguishing the unconscious as a subdivision of the subconscious.

Proceeding further we found that besides subconscious processes that are distinctly unconscious, there are others which are distinctly conscious (or at least unconscious processes with conscious accompaniments) but which do not enter the focus or fringe of awareness—in other words, true subconscious ideas. These were termed coconscious as a second subdivision of the subconscious. They may include true perceptions, memories, thoughts, volition, imagination, etc. As with unconscious processes, any conserved experience of life, under certain conditions and given certain other factors, may thus function coconsciously, particularly if organized with and activated by an innate emotional disposition. So we may have subconscious processes both without and with conscious equivalents. We have also seen that coconscious processes may exhibit intelligence of a high order, and the same thing is possibly true in a less degree of unconscious processes. We found evidence showing that a conserved idea may undergo subconscious incubation and elaboration, and that subconscious processes may acquire a marked degree of autonomy, may determine or inhibit conscious processes of thought, solve problems, enter into conflicts, and in various modes produce all sorts of psychological phenomena (hallucinations, impulsive phenomena, aboulia, amnesia, dissociation of personality, etc.).

We have seen how, by the use of the experimental method of “tapping,” and by hypnotic and other procedures, that this same autonomy can be demonstrated, manifesting itself by impulsive phenomena (writing, speech, gestures, and all sorts of motor automatisms) on the one hand, and sensory automatisms (hallucinations) on the other. And we have seen that by similar procedures, in specially adapted individuals, remembrances of coconscious processes that have induced identical phenomena can be recalled. With this precise knowledge of the processes at work these automatisms were correlated with the spontaneous occurrence of the same kinds of phenomena in the psychoses and in normal conditions. Their occurrence in all sorts of pathological conditions thus becomes intelligible.

Evidence has been adduced to show that life’s experiences, and therefore acquired dispositions, tend to become organized into groups. The latter, termed for descriptive purposes neurograms, thereby acquire a functional unity; and they may become compounded into larger functioning groups, or complexes, and still larger systems of neurograms. Whether their origin is remembered or not they become a part of the personality. Such complexes and systems play an important part by determining mental and bodily behavior. Amongst other things they tend to determine the points of view, the attitudes of mind, the individual and social conscience, judgment, etc., and, as large systems, may become “sides to one’s character.” When such complexes have strong emotional tones they may set up conflicts leading to the inhibition of antagonistic sentiments, and sometimes to the contraction and even disruption of the personality. All these phenomena can be induced by the artificial creation and organization of complexes and this principle becomes an important one in therapeutics.

When studying ideas we found that, besides sensory images, they have meaning derived from antecedent associated experiences that form the setting or context. Further evidence was adduced to show that this setting and the idea formed a psychic whole; but that often the former remained subconscious while the idea only, or the affect only, or both, emerged into the content of consciousness. The significance of this mechanism lay in the fact that it enabled us to understand the insistency of emotional ideas or obsessions. Indeed reasons have been given for holding that subconscious processes perform a part in most processes of thought.

Besides acquired dispositions, organized and, so to speak, deposited by life’s experiences, personality includes many that are innate, and therefore conditioned by inherited pre-formed anatomical and physiological arrangements of the nervous system. These function after the manner of a physiological reflex; and the theory was adopted that the emotions are the central elements in certain of such dispositions. These may therefore be called emotional dispositions or instincts. By the excitation of such emotional reflexes the organism reacts in an emotional manner to the environment.

In the organization of life’s experiences the emotional dispositions tend to become synthesized with ideas to form sentiments and therefore synthesized with the neurographic residua by which ideas are conserved. Thus, on the one hand, neurograms and systems of neurograms become organized with innate emotional dispositions, and, on the other, ideas become energized by the emotional impulsive force that carries the ideas to fruition.

As to general psycho-pathological and certain physiological phenomena, a large variety such as anxiety states, hallucinations, and automatic motor phenomena, are clearly the manifestations of automatic subconscious processes; some are the resultants of conflicts between the impulsive forces of distinctly conscious sentiments, others between those of conscious and subconscious sentiments; others are the physiological manifestation of emotional processes, conscious or subconscious. Some, indicative of losses from personality (such as amnesia, anesthesia, paralysis, altered personality, etc.), are the resultants of inhibitions or dissociations of acquired or innate dispositions, effected by the conflicting force of antagonistic factors. These resultants may or may not be associated with the excitation and dominance of complexes, or large systems of acquired dispositions. If so, moods, trance states, fugues, somnambulistic states, secondary personalities, and other hysterical states come into being. In all cases these various pathological conditions are functional derangements of the fundamental factors of a given human personality—expressions of the same mechanisms which the organism normally makes use of to adapt itself harmoniously to its own past or present experiences and to its environment.

Finally, out of the innate and acquired dispositions organized by experience to a very large extent into unitary dynamic systems human personality is constructed by the integration of these systems (and other dispositions) into a composite functioning whole. And according as certain systems acquire dominance and determine fixed and predictable reactions to the environment character traits are developed. But as personality is thus a composite, that is an integrated system of lesser systems these latter are capable of being reassembled or integrated in varying combinations into many and different composites and thus multiple personality may be formed. The forces which bring about the disintegration of the normal composite and the resynthesizing of the unitary systems into new personalities are to be found in the dynamic dispositions of conscious and unconscious mechanisms. And we have also seen that as the empirical ego is a unitary system organized by experience each personality may contain its own differentiated ego.

Viewing as a whole the phenomena we have studied, we see why it is that personality is a complex affair in that in its make-up there enter many factors, some acquired and some innate. Each of these is capable of more or less autonomy and upon their harmonious coöperation depends the successful adaptation of the personality to its environment. It is, we may say with almost literal truth, when these factors work to cross purposes that a personality ceases to be a harmonious whole; just as the individuals composing a group of persons, a football team, for example, when they fail to work together and each strives to fulfill his own purposes, cease to be a single team. Consciousness is not a unity in any sense that the term has any significant meaning beyond that which is a most banal platitude. The “unity of consciousness” seems to be a cant-expression uttered by some unsophisticated ancient philosopher and repeated like an article of faith by each successive generation without stopping to think of its meaning or to test it by reference to facts. Neither a reference to the evidence of consciousness or to its manifestations gives support to the notion of unity. The mind is rather an aggregation of potential or functioning activities some of which may combine into associative functioning processes at one time and some at another; while again these different activities may become disaggregated with resulting contraction of personality, on the one hand, and conflicting multiple activities on the other.

The unconscious, representing as it does all the past experiences of life that have been conserved, is not limited to any particular type of experiences; nor are the subconscious and conscious processes to which it gives rise more likely to be determined by any particular antecedents, such as those of childhood, as some would have us believe. Nor are these motivated by any particular class of emotional instincts or strivings of human personality. The instincts and other innate dispositions which are fundamental factors are, as we have seen, multiform, and any one of them may provide the motivating force which activates subconscious as well as conscious processes. Impelled by any one or combination of these instincts unconscious complexes may undergo subconscious incubation and in the striving to find expression may work for harmony or, by conflict with other complexes, for discord.

Having grasped the foregoing general principles governing the functioning mechanisms of the mind, we are prepared to undertake the study of the more particular problems of everyday life and of special pathology.

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Footnote 304:

In most universities to-day Psychology is classed as a department of Philosophy! How long is this attitude to be continued?

INDEX OF NAMES

Footnote 305:

See Addendum to index on page 654.

Barrows, Ira, 213. “B. C. A.”, 159, 302. Bergson, viii. Bicknel, 428, 429, 430, 431. Bidder and Schmidt, 427. Bogen, 429, 430. Breuer, J., 69.

Cade and Latarjet, 428. Cannon, W. B., 426, 428, 432, 439, 452, 453. Charcot, 77, 526. Coriat, I. H., 76, 145.

De la Paz, D., 432. Dickenson, C. Lowe, 19.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 330.

Féré, Ch., 423, 433, 436. Flournoy, Th., 304. Foster, M., 233, 242. Freud, Sigmund, 45, 71, 196, 203, 221, 509. Fullerton, G. S., 309.

Goltz, F., 232. Gurney, Edmund, 62, 157.

Haldane, (Lord), 307. Hartmann, 250, 251. Herbart, 250, 251. Hilton, 453. Hoernlé, R. F., 322, 325. “Mrs. Holland,” 22. Hornborg, 427, 428, 429.

James, William, 223, 224, 260. Janet, Pierre, 56, 62, 77, 157, 252, 281, 317, 364, 485, 498, 499, 500, 501, 506, 509, 526. Johnson, (Miss) Alice, 22, 62. Jung, C. J., 425, 437.

Kant, 250, 251.

Leibnitz, 250, 251. Loeb, J., 232, 233, 236. Lucretius, 309.

McDougall, William, 241, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 455, 456, 458. Meltzer, S. J., 123. Morgan, Lloyd, 234, 237, 238, 241. Mosso, 423. Myers, Frederick W. H., 251.

Pawlow, J. P., 139, 235, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431. Peterson, Frederick, 106, 425, 437, 481. Pilgrim, C. W., 81.

Ribôt, Th., 133, 144. Rignano, Eugenio, 127. Robertson, T. Brailsford, 124, 125, 127, 514. Rothmann, Von M., 232, 234. Rumbold, Horace, 223.

Schäfer, E. A., 232. Schilling, 250. Schrader, Max E. G., 232, 234, 235, 236. Semon, Richard, 131. Shand, 267, 449. Sharp, Elizabeth A., 297. Sherrington, C. S., 231, 234, 237. Shohl, A. T., 432. Sidgwick, Mrs. Henry, 62. Sidis, Boris, 75, 104, 145, 183, 315. Sidis and Kalmas, 104, 437, 438. Sidis and Nelson, 104, 438.

Tallentyre, 271. Titchener, E. B., 316, 321. Turquan, Joseph, 274.

Umber, 427.

Verrall, (Mrs.), 21. Vigouroux, A., 436.

Waterman, G. A., 169, 209. Wells and Forbes, 438. Wright, W. S., 432.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

=Absent-minded acts=, conservation of, 50. =Affective states=, suppression of, by conflict, 455. =Affects=, see =Emotion=. as conative force of ideas, 448. linking of, to ideas fundamental for the pathology of the psychoneuroses, 449. =Amnesia=, continuous, 76; episodic, 69; epochal, 74. from conflict, 71, 508–518. theory of, following emotion, 509–514. different forms of, following emotion, 514–517. =Anxiety neurosis=, emergence of emotion from a subconscious idea in, 382, 526. =Association neuroses=, 279, 527. =Association psychoses=, 278.

=Bashfulness= as resultant of emotional conflict, 520. =Behavior=, acquired and instinctive, 237, 238; conscious and unconscious, 230.

=Coconscious=, the meaning of the, 247–254. =Coconscious= ideas, 168, 249, 254. images, 169–171, 178, 208, 210, 374–376. =Coconscious= processes, auto-analysis of the content of, 171, 176. =Complex= of ideas, definition of a, 265. =Complexes= (systematized), dissociated, as phases of multiple personality, 299–302. emotional, 267; organization of emotional, 267–274. systematized, 283: Subject systems, 284; alternation of, 288; in dissociated personality, 288. Chronological systems, 290; differentiated by amnesia, 290–294. Mood systems, 294; regarded as a “side to one’s character,” 295; illustrated by William Sharp, 296. unconscious, organization of, in hypnotic and other dissociated conditions, 302–306; in pathological states, 305; in psychotherapeutics, 288–289, 304; underlying the individual, social, civic and national conscience, public opinion, Sittlichkeit, etc., 307. =Conflict=, from conative force of emotion, 71, 454. between conscious and subconscious sentiments, 460, 467–480; in pathological conditions, 478; under experimental conditions, 470–478. =Conflict= between emotional impulses, 454; and sentiments, 455. between two subconscious processes, 480. general phenomena of, 488: contraction of field of consciousness and personality, 489–492; the hysterical state, 492; systematized dissociation, 492–504; systematized anesthesia, 492; contracted personality, 496; change of sentiments, 497; alternation of personality, 501; multiple personality, 502; amnesia, 508–517; subconscious traumatic memories, 517; mental confusion, 519–521; bashfulness, 520; self-consciousness, 521. suppression of instincts and affective states by, 454–458. =Confusion= (mental), as resultant of emotional conflicts, 519; theory of, 520. =Conservation=, meaning of, 12. a residuum of experience, 87. considered as psychological residua, 110; as coconscious ideas, 111; as an undifferentiated psyche, 115; as physical residua, 117; as neural dispositions, 117. evidence of, furnished by automatic writing, 15; abstraction, 24; hypnosis, 31; hallucinatory phenomena, 39; dreams, 43. =Conservation=, of absent-minded acts, 50 of forgotten artificial states, 62; (hypnosis, 62). of forgotten dreams and somnambulisms, 59. of forgotten experiences of normal life, 15. of forgotten pathological states, 68 (amnesia, 68; deliria, 79; fugues, 75; intoxications, 80; multiple personality, 77). of inner life, 85. of subconscious perceptions, 52.

=Decerebrate Animal=, behavior of, 231. intelligent behavior of, 240. =Dissociation=, due to conflict, 71, 469, 472–475, 480, 487, 488, 492–504. amnesia following, 508. effected by subconscious processes, 504. laws of cleavage of personality in, 504–508. systematized, 492–504; principle involved, 493. =Dreams=, as a type of hallucinatory phenomena, 222. physiological after-phenomena, 101. subconscious process underlying, 196–213. symbolism in, 200, 202.

=Emotion=, see =Affects=. amnesia, as resultant of, 514–517. emergence of, from subconscious ideas, 382–386, 387–388, 391, 485. general psychopathology of, 440–442. James-Lange theory of, 423, 453. physiological manifestations of, 423; changes in circulation, 424; modifications of volume and action of heart, 424; of respiratory apparatus, 426; of glandular secretions, 426; of the functions of the digestive glands, 426; of the movements of the stomach and intestines, 426; of salivary secretion, 431; of secretion of ductless glands, 431; of pupils, 433; of muscular system, 433; the psycho-galvanic reflex, 435. physiological symptoms of, caused by subconscious ideas, 377–381. phenomena of, due to subconscious processes, 103. provides the impulsive force of an instinct, 447; one of chief functions of, 451. psycho-physiological schema of manifestations of emotion, 441; physiological mimicry of disease, 442. sensory accompaniments of, 453. =Emotion=, sensory disturbances caused by, 438. the central psychical element in an innate reflex process, 446. the conative function of, 451, 452–460; discharge of force in three directions, 452. =Emotions=, as the prime-movers of all human activity, 450; organization of, with ideas essential for self-control, etc., 451, 458. primary and compound, 446. =Emotional discharge= from subconscious processes, evidence for, 481. =Emotional reactions=, acquired, do not always involve subconscious processes, 418.

=Fanatics=, 279. =Fear neurosis= due to subconscious ideas, 379. =Feeling=, may emerge from subconscious complexes, 383–386. =Fixed idea= (imperative), 278–279. =Fringe (of consciousness)=, considered as a subconscious zone, 338–352; as a twilight zone, 341; consists of definite, real elements, 342; ultramarginal or coconscious zone, 343–352. content of the, 342–352; only recovered by memory, 340, 353. effect of attention in shifting the content of focus and, 340, 353. =Fringe (of consciousness)=, meaning of ideas may be in the, 352–360.

=Glycosuria=, due to emotion, 432.

=Hallucinations=, see =Visions=. as the emergence of secondary sensory images of subconscious ideas, 182–183, 204, 209–210, 315. =Hysterical attacks=, as recurrent complexes, 280, 282; laughter and crying due to subconscious processes, 379.

=Idea=, a composite of sign and meaning, 325. =Idea and Meaning=, the problem of, 311. =Ideas=, content of, includes “Meaning,” 321-331. setting of, 321, 330. =Images=, of perception, either in the focus of attention or in the fringe, 330, 340. =Images, secondary=, in perception, 82–183, 313; dissociation of, 318–321; from subconscious ideas, 204, 209, 315–321, 375, 413. =Instinct and Intelligence=, 240. =Instinct=, McDougall’s conception of an, 446. as an emotional disposition, 447, 467. =Instinctive process=, three aspects of an, 446. =Instincts=, conduct determined by, 458; suppression of, by conflict, 454–458; may be lasting, 460–467. difference between consequences of repression of, and of sentiments, 467–469. =Intelligence=, 240. and instinct, 240. a pragmatic question, 241. conscious and unconscious, 240–246.

“=Meaning=,” as a part of the content of ideas, 321–331. as determined by a subconscious process, 361. as the conscious elements of a larger subconscious complex, 360–362, 363. derived from the setting, 321, 330. may be in the fringe of consciousness, 352–360, 363. must be in consciousness, 339. the problem of, 311. =Melancholia=, depressive feeling in, as emergence from a subconscious complex, 386. =Memory=, as a process, 1; of registration, conservation and reproduction, 2, 134. conscious, a particular type, 3; without recollection, 144. physiological, 3, 135, 229, 238. psycho-physiological, 138. significance of theory of, 257–264. subconscious, 84, 151, 517. unconscious, 137. =Memories, automatic=, 267; outbreak of, 274; as hysterical attacks, 280; as obsessions, 271, 278, 280; as a phobia, 269. =Monism=, doctrine of, 246.

=Neurograms=, 109, 131. as organized systems of neurons, 121. as physiological dispositions, 131. as subconscious processes, 150–157.

=Obsessions=, clinical characteristics of, 278. four types of, 373. type A, purely physical disturbances caused by subconscious ideas, 374–381. type B, emotion plus physical disturbances, 381–386; as “anxiety neurosis,” 382. type C, emotion plus physical disturbances, plus idea, 387–410. type D, idea, meaning, emotion and physical disturbance, 410–415. inability to voluntarily modify, 415. therapeutics of, 416. the setting in, 372.

=Parallelism=, doctrine of, 246. =Perception=, a synthesis of primary and secondary images, 312–321. may include affects, 330. =Personalities, subconscious=, value of, for study of mental mechanisms, 160. =Personality=, as survival of antecedent experiences, 306–310. dissociated, 299–302. includes conserved but forgotten experiences of hypnotic states, 66. multiple, 299–302. =Phobia=, see =Obsessions=. as an automatism, 269. of steeples (case), 389–410; of fainting (case), 355–360; of insanity (case), 411–414. =Psycho-galvanic phenomenon=, induced by subconscious processes, 103. nature of, 435–438. a phenomenon of emotion, 435. as evidence of subconscious emotional discharge, 481–484. =Psycholeptic attack=, as an organized complex, 282. =Psychoneuroses=, symptomatic structure of, 521–528; the hysterical attack, 524; the dissociated personality, 525; the subconscious fixed idea, 526; the anxiety state, 526; an obsession, 527; an association neurosis, 527. =Psychotherapeutics=, based on organization of complexes, 288–289; in hypnosis, 304. by the organization of unconscious settings of ideas, 368–372, 416. =Psychotherapeutics= of obsessions, 416. =Physiological Dispositions=, innate and acquired, 230, 231. in the spinal animal, 231. in the decerebrate animal, 231. determinants of conscious and unconscious behavior, 230.

=Recollection=, 143. a more perfect kind of conscious memory, 144. =Reflection=, subconscious processes underlying, 225–228. =Religious conversion= (sudden), 193, 223. =Reproduction=, dissimilarity of types in abstraction and automatic writing, 27. realistic, 32. =Residua=, as neural dispositions, 119. chemical and physical theories of, 122; analogy with anaphylaxis, 123; theory of auto-catalysis, 124–127; of nervous accumulators, 127–129. =Residual Processes=, underlying automatic motor phenomena, 88; hallucinations, 90; post-hypnotic phenomena, 96; dreams, 98; physiological bodily disturbances, 101.

=Self-consciousness=, as resultant of emotional conflict, 521. =Sentiment=, definition of a, 449; as an organized system of emotional dispositions centered about an idea, 449–450. difference between the consequences of repression of an instinct and of a, 467–469. =Sentiments=, essential for self-control and regulation of conduct, 451; in absence of, emotional life would be chaos, 451; suppression of, by conflict, 454–458. repression of, may lead to the formation of pathological subconscious states, 461. “=Settings=,” theory of, 311; practical application to everyday life, 331–337. not sharply defined groups of ideas, 421. as part of an unconscious complex and a subconscious process, 361, 363, 367; inadequacy of analysis as a method of proof, 364, 368; synthetic methods, 365; therapeutic application of, 368–372; in obsessions, 372–386, 387–415. =Subconscious, The=, demarcation between, and the conscious, 419; difficulties of interpretation by clinical methods, 220; in applied psychology, 213–228. meanings of, 247–254; three classes of facts included in, 253. special problems of, 162. subdivisions of, x, 14, 253. =Subconscious=, emotional discharge shown by psycho-galvanic reaction, 481–484. ideas, 249–254. intelligence, 150, 153, 163, 164, 177–180, 187, 188; underlying spontaneous hallucinations, 188–195; underlying dreams, 196–213; comparable to a coconscious personality, 211–212. mathematical calculations, 96, 167, 169–171, 177–179. perception, 52. performance of post-hypnotic phenomena, 168, 171. personality, 159; value of, for study of mind, 159–160. process, definition of a, 156. processes, evidence for, 151, 163; validity of memory as evidence for, 176; actuality, intrinsic nature, and intelligence of, 164; as coconscious, 157; as unconscious, 161; conditions required for proof of, 164–166; as determinants of behavior, 153, 163; of the meanings of ideas, 361, 363; of physical symptoms, 377; intrinsic nature of, 157, 163, 164; underlying artificial visual hallucinations, 180–187; spontaneous visual hallucinations, 188–195; underlying dreams, 196–213. =Subconscious= self, 256. solution of problems, 171–176. =Symbolism=, in dreams, 200, 202; in visions, 222.

=Unconscious, The=, 229; as a storehouse of neurograms, 149. as a fundamental of personality, 254–264. has dynamic functions, 262. the meanings of the, 149, 247–254. =Unconscious=, calculations, 178; intelligence, 187, 210–211. complex as the setting of ideas, 361-363. complexes, organization of, 265; definition of, 265. ideas, 249-254.

=Visions=, see =Hallucinations=. as the emergence of secondary visual images of subconscious ideas, 182–3, 204, 209–210, 315, 413. crystal, 42. subconscious processes underlying normal, 222. symbolism in, 222.

=Will=, McDougall’s theory of the, 458. =Word-association= reactions and the principle of conflict, 481.

ADDENDUM: NAMES AND SUBJECTS

=Character= as distinguished from Personality, 533.

=McDougall, Wm.=, 538, 602, 625. =Mental Conflicts=, mechanisms of, 582. =Multiple personality=, the psychogenesis of, 545; product of two processes and secondary growth, 546. Case of B. C. A., 551; autobiography, 556; conflicts between sentiments and rebellious thoughts, 567, 579, 583; growth of rebellious thoughts into the larger B complex and the later B personality, 569, 577–579, 584, 587, 596–598; unification of the same in the second ego, 570. The B complex, 584, 587; manifestations of the B complex in alterations of character and conduct, 587–592, 616. The B personality, 593; the eruption of the B personality from “shock” (conflict), 593, 601; the evolution of the B personality, 596–598, 601; “shock” as a defense reaction, 599; analysis of the “shock” 601; the B personality as a reversion to youth, 602–612; characteristics of the B personality, 603. The A personality, 614; eruption of the same by “shock,” 614; characteristics of the A personality, 612, 614, 619–621; mechanisms of the “shock” reaction, 621–624. Dissociation and repression of emotional instincts from the A and B personalities, 624–627. Reintegration of the two personalities into one normal whole, 632.

=Personality=, structure and dynamic elements of, 529; definition of, 532; primary and secondary units of its structure, 535.

=Self=, the conception of, 541. =Sentiments=, structure of, 537; the self-regarding sentiments, 538; conflicts between sentiments in the case of B. C. A., 583. =Shand, Alexander F.=, 535, 602.

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Transcriber’s Note

The unmatched ‘)’ at 95.1 ‘recorded subconsciously, coconsciously).’, has no simple resolution, based on the grammar and punctuation, and has been left as-is.

There appears to be a confusion of quotation marks at 282.15. The final phrase contains an opening double quote, which is belied by a short single-quoted phrase just above, and the final footnote referring to Janet’s text.

The labels on the two graphs in the image on p. 425 were chopped and have been added.

Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.

xvii.31 The B Personal[l/it]y Replaced. 56.28 [(]tactile, visual, etc.) Added. 97.23 to say that it[ is] plain Inserted. 138.30 process is conserved and repoduced Inserted. 150.12 out of the unconscious.[”] Removed. 155.1 devoid of abtruseness, Inserted. 187.8 post[ /-]hypnotic Replaced. 210.13 coconscious or unconscious Removed. 214.10 is apt to meet with difficulties[.] Added. 223.27 and His Times[,] Sir Horace Rumbold Added. 231.21 that various co[o/ö]perative movements Replaced. 258.19 [o/a]bnormal mental conditions Replaced. 280.10 [5/4]. Hysterical attacks. Misnumbered. 436.23 che[x/z] les mélancoliques Replaced. 470.19 inhibition of consciousnes Added. 504.18 to the subconscous conflicts Inserted. 525.3 deposited in the unconcious Inserted. 598.24 particularly anger and disgust[;/,] Replaced. 600.11 whether the “shock[”] was a defense Added. 649.29 [con-]considered as a subconscious zone Removed.