Part 4

74. By what foolish teacher hast thou been instructed, that thou utterest these words "I am Brahman"? How art thou that being who is continually worshipped by Rudra and all the gods? O fool, consider it and see aright.

75. The wicked cannot understand the difference between the embodied and the Supreme Souls; the great reason for this is a mind possessed by an evil obstinacy in favour of the doctrine of Illusion; just as the tongue of those who suffer from excess of bile cannot taste the sweetness of molasses, nor the eyes of those afflicted with gutta serena or jaundice see the whiteness of a shell.

76. He by a particle of whose intellect thou, O Soul, hast been produced the foremost of intelligent beings--say not, O knave, that thou art _He_; for who but the ingrate desires to seize the seat of his Master?

77. A particle of intelligence has been deposited in thee by the supreme Lord in His mercy,--it becomes thee not, O knave, to say that therefore thou art God; just as if some evil-minded man had received elephants, horses, and infantry from the king and then set his heart on seizing his kingdom.

78. He under whose control is that mighty illusion which deceives the three worlds, He is to be recognized as the Supreme Lord, the adorable, essentially thought, existence and joy; but he who is himself always under her control like a camel drawn by a string through his nostrils, is to be recognized as the individual soul,-- vast indeed is the difference between the two!

79. Having studied the doctrines of the Sâ"nkhya, Ka.nâda, and Gautama, and the doctrine of Patañjali, the doctrines of the Mîmâ.msâ and Bha.t.tabhâskara [Footnote: Colebrooke's Essays, vol i. p. 359.], --amidst all the six current systems,--let the wise tell the final conclusion if they can as to the real nature of the supreme and the individual soul,--is it duality, or is it oneness, or is it again a oneness in duality?

80. In five of the systems I have only heard peremptorily asserted in many places the difference between the supreme and the individual souls; what is this that I hear asserted in the Vedânta system? "Plurality, unity, both,"--this is a threefold marvel! [Footnote: This is an attack on Râmânuja's system, as opposed to that of Pûr.naprajña or Madhva, cf. Sarva-daršana S. p. 52, l. 20, "What is the real truth? The real truth is plurality, unity, and both. Thus unity is admitted in saying that Brahman alone subsists in all forms as all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that one only Brahman subsists under a plurality of forms, diverse as soul and non-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the essential natures of soul, non-soul, and the Lord are different and not to be confounded." This doctrine is opposed by the followers of Madhva, see _ibid._, Pûr.naprajña-darš. p. 61, l. 11.]

81. He who is the maker of all and the Lord of the world is independent by reason of his essential independence; the individual soul is notoriously dependent; how can they say then that these two are identical?

82. There are various flavours in honey [existing distinct] through the difference of the trees [from whose flowers it is produced]; how else could it remove the three-fold disorders? [Footnote: _I.e. those affecting the three "humours" of the body, i.e. vâyu 'wind,' pitta 'bile,' and kapha_ 'phlegm.' Certain flavours of the honey counteract one disorder and others another. The Sušruta thus describes honey (vol. i. p. 185): "When cooked it removes the three-fold disorders, but when raw or sour it causes them; when used in various applications it cures many disorders; and since it is composed of many different things it is an excellent medium for mixing. But as it consists of the juices of flowers which are mutually contrary in the action, potency, and qualities of their various ingredients, and it may happen that poisonous insects may be included, it is only good as a remedy for cold diseases."] So the individual souls at the world's dissolution are absorbed in the Lord; but they do not become identified with Him, for they are again separated at the next creation.

83. There is a difference between rivers and the sea, with their respective sweet and salt water; so too God and the soul are different and possessed of distinct attributes [Footnote: In allusion to Mu.n.d. Upan. iii. 2. 8.].

84. Rivers, when joined to the sea from all sides, are not identified with it nor yet do they appear to be separate; but from the difference between salt water and sweet water [Footnote: Most of the MSS. and the Benares Pa.n.dit read _kshî roda; but the Calcutta ed. and one of the two MSS. in the Library of the Calcutta Sanskrit College read kshâroda, which seems preferable. If we read kshîroda_, the line would require to be rendered, "but from the difference between milk mixed with water and pure water," or perhaps "from the difference between the milk-ocean and the water- ocean."] there must be a real difference between them.

85. Others see not the difference when water is mixed with milk, but the swan at once separates the milk and the water [Footnote: Cf. Šakunt. šl. 155.]; so too when the souls are absorbed in the supreme Brahman, the Lord,--the faithful, who have received the Guru's words, can at once draw a difference between them.

86. Even when milk is mixed with milk and water with water, they do not become absolutely identified, for they still retain their fixed measure as before; so, when the souls through intense contemplation are absorbed in the Supreme Spirit, they do not become identified with Him; thus say the pure-minded saints.

87. There are certain disputants, sunk in a sea of false logic, addicted to an evil way, filled with a hundred imaginations of idle babble, deceived themselves and deceiving the world,--all that they say, "I am Brahman and all this visible universe also is Brahman,"-- is now shown clearly to be an empty desire.

88. If I and all this universe were Brahman, then there would be an identity between thee and me; then thy wealth, sons, and wife would be mine, and mine would be thine, for there would be no distinction between us.

89. And how then could there be injunction or prohibition, since all are one, and there is no distinction of caste? If the doctrine of non-duality be thus held to be established, then what offence has the Buddhist committed?

90. "The Soul is different from the elements, the senses, the internal organ, and primary matter, and also from that which is called the individual,"--thus has it been declared of old by Kapila to his mother in the third book of the Bhâgavata [Footnote: Bhâg. Pûr. iii. 28. 41.] (Purâ.na).

91. Those who study the path pointed out by the teacher, resting upon a foundation of naught, and maintain with an empty understanding that all is void and that all the recognized deities are naught,--how can many words be uttered about them, for language fails in a topic of naught; naught indeed is their wisdom, and their fruit shall be also mostly naught.

92. There are words uttered by Vyâsa in the Bhârata condemning this doctrine of the nothingness of all things [Footnote: The name _šûnyavâda is generally applied to Buddhism; here it is applied by way of reproach to the Vedânta, which is called in the Padma-purâ.na "secret Buddhism" (prachchhanna.m Bauddham_)]; "their bodies are composed of the quality of darkness, and verily darkness shall be their end;" [Footnote: Mahâbh. xii. 9690.]

93. These words which were uttered of old by Kapila in the presence of the sage Syûmarašmi [Footnote: This dialogue occurs in Mahâbh. xii. 9604, ff.], were afterwards recounted by Vyâsa in the Bhâ.rata.

94. This theory of theirs concerning a void of qualities in Him who is the ocean of qualities [Footnote: The Râmânujas and the Mâdhvas deny that the Supreme Being is _nirgu.na_,--thus there is a quotation in the Sarva Daršana S. p. 64. "Vâsudeva is the supreme Brahman, endowed with auspicious attributes" (cf. p. 69, l. 18; p. 73, l. 2)], --it is but like the blind hurrying of sheep after the ewe that leads them! Having made a separate commentary of their own on the Sûtras they deceive those who follow their doctrine.

95. All these qualities, sovereignty, creation, and the like, eternally belong to the Supreme Lord; how then can He be "without qualities" who is thus "possessed of qualities"? he theory of a void of qualities is mere disputation.

96. The adorable one possesses knowledge, volition, and creative power; how then can he be destitute of qualities? or, if he is destitute of qualities, how can he be set forth by the Vedas? How can the absence of qualities be predicated of the sea of qualities, and yet all remonstrance be silent? Ponder it well in thine own mind, and then determine what is right.

97. A substance without attributes, like the sky-flower, is not admitted either in the Veda or in the world; if the knowledge of such a thing were derived from the Veda, the Veda itself would then cease to be an authority.

98. [The Vedântin may reply] "The bunch of Darbha grass [Footnote: This is the _prastara or bundle of sacred grass, which plays an important part in the sacrificial ritual, cf. Taittirîya S. i. 7. 4, "yajamâna.h prastara.h," where Sâya.na remarks, "yajamânavad yâgasâdhanatvât prastare yajamânatvopachâra.h._" This description of the grass as the sacrificer is really only meant as metaphorical praise, since the actual attributes of the sacrificer are evidently absent from the grass. (Cf. Mîmâ.msâ Sûtras, i. 4. 23.)] is said to be the sacrificer, as it is the means of performing the sacrifice; [as the Darbha grass is understood by this description,] even though the attributes thus ascribed are not found in it, so is Brahman understood when we ascribe certain qualities [as 'truth,' etc., even though these qualities are precluded in a being without qualities]."

99. [I answer] A thorough Vedântin like thee does not accept any where the existence of qualities or that which possesses qualities; but if imagined qualities are done away with [by deeper insight], real qualities are nowhere done away with [Footnote: Clearer insight abolishes imagined attributes, as _e. g. the supposed snake in the rope; but real attributes remain untouched, and we hold Brahman's attributes to be real.--I read abâdha.h_ in I. 2.].

100. If Brahman is understood to be destitute of qualities, then "truth," etc., will not be applicable to Him; but, if so, there arises a contradiction in such passages [of Šruti] as "he is the truthful," etc. [Footnote: I do not know where this passage occurs, but the kindred word _satyadharman_ is applied to several deities in the Rigveda.]

101. When the existence of such a thing as a quality is admitted, we can imagine it in something else [Footnote: The Vedântins hold that nothing exists besides Brahman; and yet, although they thus deny the existence of any other thing or quality, they hold that certain qualities are imagined to exist in him, forgetting that only one who has seen silver can imagine _rajatatva_ in nacre.]; but to imagine that nacre is silver, we must first know clearly what silver is.