Part 2

18. If Brahman were meant by these words, the power employed would not be Denotation, for their literal meaning does not apply; [Footnote: In such sentences as "That art thou," "I am Brahman," etc., the primary power of the words, _i.e. " Denotation" (abhidhâ), could not express the unconditioned Brahman destitute of all attributes; for Denotation rests upon the ordinary conventional meaning, and how could this take in an idea so far removed from ordinary experience? Nor could it be the secondary power "Indication" (laksha.nâ_), as in the well- known instance of "the herd-station on the Ganges," where the Ganges, by "indication," means the shore and not the stream. For "indication" must be based on some connexion between the primary and the indicated secondary meaning; but how can that which is "without a second" be connected with anything?] consequently it must be the second power of a word, Indication.

19. Yet if so, why should it be Indication? for this arises from some association with the primary meaning; but with what can that substance be associated which is disconnected with everything and without a second?

20. That power of a word is Indication, by which, when the primary meaning is precluded, some other meaning is indicated in connexion therewith, through some motive or through common currency; and its causes are thus three [Footnote: I suppose that these are (1) the incompatibility of the primary sense; (2) the common currency of the secondary meaning, _e.g._ when "Europe" is used to imply its inhabitants in the phrase "Europe makes war:" (3) a motive, as in "a herd-station on the Ganges," where "Ganges" is used instead of "the bank of the Ganges," in order to imply the coolness and purity of the spot].

21. Now if there is no Denotation in a phrase, how can there arise any Indication? First there should be some primary meaning precluded, and then there may be the Indication of something else.

22. Where there is no accepted Denotation, how can you there have Indication? If there is no village, how can there be a boundary?-- there is no child without a father [Footnote: Cf. the Bengali proverb _mâthâ nâi târ mâthâbyathâ_, "he has no head and yet he has a headache."]

23. "The lances enter, the swords, the bows and arrows,"--here we have Indication; for the sentence must suggest something else to complete itself, as there cannot be "entrance" in the case of an inanimate subject.

24. "A herd-station on the Ganges,"--here we have the self-sacrifice of the primary to another meaning, since the Ganges, as being in the form of water, cannot be the site of a herd-station.

25. In the example "ghî is life" there is produced the idea of sameness of form; in the example "this is life" there arises the idea of identity [Footnote: In the first ex. there is _šuddha- sâropa-laksha.nâ or "pure superimponent indication," in the second there is šuddha-sâdhyavasâna-l. or "pure introspeceptive indication," where the ghî is swallowed up in the "life." Most writers, however, disallow upachâra in šuddha-laksha.nâ_]; but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences will be produced by a metaphor,--there is not brought about a real oneness.

26. The doctrine of Identity is established with a desperate effort, and men have recourse to the power "Indication"; but there are three things which should rise to our view,--the primary meaning, the indicated meaning, and their connexion [Footnote: He seems to imply that each of these three requisites fails in the present case,-- there is no primary meaning, and still less a secondary, and there is no connexion with any other object.].

27. There is here no Denotation from the absence of conventional agreement; there is no Indication from the absence of any reason [to establish it]; by what reason, on the theory of Mâyâ, can Brahman be ever made known?

28. He is described [Footnote: He now proceeds to declare his own opinions] in the Veda by the primary power of words [Denotation] as the Maker of the Universe; and by Inference we establish the conclusion that all these things have a Maker.

29. The Vedas are a proof, the Šm.ritis are a proof; there is a being to be proved and known there in many passages; it is the great Personality which is to be made known by all the Vedas,--therefore it is this which the Veda takes as its subject.

30. True verbal testimony produces knowledge even in regard to that which is absolutely non-existent,--then how much more in regard to Brahman the Lord, the maker of all that moves or is motionless!

31. It is said, [Footnote: Taitt. Upanish. ii. 4.] "Speech retires therefrom together with the Mind,"--but this is its explanation,-- give ear: Together with the Mind Speech makes Him its object, and then retires, because His nature is not to be fathomed.

32. "Brahman is not to be made the object of mind or of words," [Footnote: Cf. the Ka.tha Up. vi. 12, "The soul is not to be reached by speech nor by the mind nor by the eye."]--from this saying it is understood that he is only to be declared by Revelation, Revelation has no faltering action [Footnote: For _skhaladgati, cf. Kâvyaprakâša_, ii. 16.].

33. "He who is versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the highest Brahman," [Footnote: This line is quoted from Šruti in the Maitri Upanishad, vi. 22.]--surely such words of inspired sages are not mistaken babble.

34. Assuredly the conventional meaning of the words "existent," "thought," and "joy" applies to Brahman, just as the words "pot," "cloth," etc., refer to those particular objects.

35. The perception of the conventional meaning of words is aroused by the dialogue of the orderer and the ordered; and afterwards by insertion and omission the child becomes thoroughly skilled in the use of the words. [Footnote: Cf. Sâhityadarpa.na, ii. "On the old man's saying, when giving directions to the middle-aged man," etc. The Sâhitya D. uses the terms _âvâpoddhârau, the Siddhântamuktâvalî (p. 80) uses âvâpodvâpan_].

36. So through hearing the words of the teacher and repeated study of the šâstras the conventional meaning of such words as Brahman, etc., is assuredly produced in the pupil.

37. This earth must surely have had a maker; for its having the nature of an effect is a sign, just as we see to be the case in pots, etc.

38. If it is established that the supreme Lord is the maker, then his having a body follows as a matter of course [Footnote: This is one of the tenets of Râmânujas as well as Pûr.naprajñas.]; for in all effects, as pots and the like, the maker is seen to have a body and not to be bodiless.

39. [The objector urges] "If the supreme Lord has a body, then he will be like to beings such as we are; there cannot be a maker without an intermediate agency [Footnote: The _vyâpâra or intermediate agency is defined as taj-janyatve sati taj-janya- janako hi vyâpâra.h_],--I see no difference whatever."

40. But great is the difference which is declared to exist between the Adorable Lord and men working with spades, sickles, ploughshares, and hands; these are helpless in the six waves [Footnote: Compare the memorial line, _Šokamohau jarâm.rityû kshutpipâse sha.dûrmaya.h_.] (of human infirmity,) and wearied with the burden of labour,--He effects everything by a mere motion of his brow.

41. The Master can make, not make [Footnote: With this curious use of _akartum (extending the analogy of such forms as akurvan, ak.ritvâ, etc.) cf. Theognis, 621: {Greek: pas tis ploúsion ándpa tíei atíei dè penixrón_}. Cf. Shilleto, Cambridge Journ. of Philology, 1876, p. 161.], and alter; hence one may learn that vast is the interval between the two.

42. If the body is called the site of enjoyment, it is well known that this definition will hold good (even in this highest case [Footnote: Could _loke_ mean that it will hold good "of the world" as his body?]),--there is nothing deficient but everything is present in the Lord's body [Footnote: Cf. "Whose body nature is and God the soul."], since He is the husband of Lakshmî.

43. "Every body is influenced by deserts,"--if this universal law is accepted, then He who is the Maker of all must be impelled [to create the world] by the deserts which dominate over beings like us [Footnote: _I.e._ he creates the world to give their deserts to the different souls.]

44. "Every body must be non-eternal,"--this is a general law, yet still Κvara's body may be eternal; for earth is everywhere seen to be non-eternal, while in the form of its atoms it is eternal.

45. One must not say, "why should the desert of one attach itself to another?" For it was in consequence of the respective merits and demerits of the elephant and the crocodile that the holder of the discus made all haste to interfere in the battle [Footnote: The objector urges "why should our good or evil deserts oblige God to act in a certain way?" He answers by referring to the well-known legend given in the Bhâgavata Purâ.na, viii. ch. 2-4. A certain king, named Indradyumna, became an elephant through Agastya's curse. One day, while drinking in a lake, he was seized by a crocodile, and the struggle lasted for a thousand years. At last, in despair, he prayed to Vish.nu, who came down mounted on Garu.da and killed the crocodile. Thus we see that, although in one sense the deserts of one being cannot attach themselves to another, still they must cause certain actions in another being, or it would be impossible that each should receive its due reward or punishment.]