CHAPTER XXXIX.

After the Gods, it is necessary in the next place to consider the order of divine souls, who are deified by always participating of the Gods. This order, Plato in the Parmenides denies of the one as follows: “Does it appear that the one can be either older or younger, or be of the same age? What should hinder? If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself, or with another, it would participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted the one does not participate. We have asserted so. And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How therefore being such, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any thing? It can in no respect. The one therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not therefore, be impossible that the one should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not that which is older, always older than the younger? What then? Hence that which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. How do you say? Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in becoming to be different from another, when it is already different, but that it should be now different from that which is different, have been from that which was, and will be from that which is to be hereafter. But from that which is becoming to be different, it ought neither to have been, nor to be hereafter, nor to be, but to subsist in becoming to be different, and no otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is becoming to be older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in becoming to be younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to subsist in becoming to be in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in becoming to be, should be, have been, and be hereafter. For these are necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of these passions belongs to the one. None. Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist in any time. It does not indeed according to the decisions of reason.”

Plato having proceeded, says Proclus, as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a consequent order from the one, through the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to the one, from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from the one the divine essence itself, which first participates of the Gods, and receives their progression into the world; or, to speak more accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its subsistence from the monad of beings, both true being, and that which is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being; in like manner from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful so to speak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendency, every divine number subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said, is to show that the one is exempt from, and therefore produces this essence.

And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind, and this by showing that the one does not participate of time. For it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which are measured by time. The one also is better than, and is beyond intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent; but it is demonstrated that the one neither stands still, nor is moved. Hence through these things, the three hypostases which rank as principles, viz. the one, intellect, and soul, become known to us. But that the one is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides demonstrates by showing in the first place, that it is neither older nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of these; so that by showing that the one is exempt from these which happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that the one has no connexion with time. This, however, is incredible to the many, and appeared so to the physiologists prior to Plato, who thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any thing which time does not measure. For, as they were of opinion that all things are in place, in consequence of thinking that all things are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, so they thought that all things subsist in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is immoveable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itself place, but motion time. As, therefore, it was demonstrated that the one is not in place, because it is not in another, and on this account is incorporeal,--in like manner through these arguments it is also shown that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not soul, nor any thing else which requires and participates of time, either according to essence or according to energy.

And here it is well worthy our observation that Parmenides no longer stops at the dyad as in the former conclusions, but triadically enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. the older, the younger, and the possession of the same age, though he might have said dyadically, of an equal age, and of an unequal age, as there the equal and the unequal. But there indeed having previously introduced the dyad, he passes from the division of the unequal to the triadic distribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of things multitude is most apparent, and a division into parts, as Timæus says, whom Parmenides, in what is now said imitating, begins indeed from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For, the older and the younger, and the possession of the same age, are doubled, being divided into itself and relation to another. That the triad, indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order is not immanifest. For the triple nature of soul, consisting of essence, same and different, and its triple power, which receives its completion from the charioteer and the two horses, as we learn from the Phædrus, evince its alliance with the triad; and its essence being combined from both these shows its natural alliance with the hexad.

It is likewise necessary to observe, that as the discourse is about divine souls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, Time according to its first subsistence pertains to these souls,--not that which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and without habitude; and this is the Time which is now denied of the one. All the periods of souls, their harmonious motions about the intelligible, and their circulations, are measured by this Time. For it has a supernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to soul, or in whatever other manner it may be said to subsist. This Time also is indeed essentially an intellect, as we have before observed; but it is the cause to divine souls, of their harmonic and infinite motion about the intelligible, through which these likewise are led to the older and to the same age: and this in a twofold respect. For the older in these with respect to themselves takes place, so far as with their more excellent powers they enjoy in a greater degree the infinity of Time, and participate it more abundantly. For they are not filled with similar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their powers, but with some more, and with others less. But that is said to be older which participates more of time. That which is older in these divine souls with respect to other things is effected, so far as some of these receive the whole measure of Time, and the whole of its extension proceeding to souls, but others are measured by more partial periods. Those therefore are older, whose period is more total, and is extended to a longer time. They may also be said to be older and at the same time younger with respect to themselves, by becoming hoary as it were above, through extending themselves to the whole power of Time, but juvenile beneath, by enjoying Time more partially. But, as with respect to others, they may be said to be older and at the same time younger according to a diminution of energy. For that which has its circulation measured by a less period is younger than that whose circulation is measured by a more extended period.

Again, among things co-ordinate, that which has the same participation and the same measure of perfection with others may be said to be of the same age with itself and others. But every divine soul, though its own period is measured according to one Time, and that of the body which is suspended from it according to another, yet it has an equal restitution to the same condition; itself always according to its own Time, and its body also according to its time. Hence, again, it is of the same age with itself and its body, according to the analogous. By thus interpreting what is now said of the one, we shall accord with Plato in the Timæus, who there evinces that Time is the measure of every transitive life, and who says that soul is the origin of a divine and wise life through the whole of time. And we shall also accord with his assertion in the Phædrus, that souls see true being through Time, because they perceive temporally and not eternally.

Farther still, Plato here demonstrates that the one is neither older nor younger than itself, or another. For it was necessary to show that the one is beyond every divine soul, prior to other souls, in the same manner as it is demonstrated to be prior to true beings, and to be the cause of all things. Hence, since it is the cause of every divine soul, so far as these derive their subsistence as well as all beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it necessary to show that the one is beyond the order of deified souls. For these souls so far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cause; so far as they are essences they originate from being; and so far as they have the form of unity, they are derived from the one; receiving their subsistence from this, so far as each is a multitude consisting of certain unities, and of these as elements.

Again, that which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion from the same to the same, to which both the beginning and the end are the same, and the motion is unceasing, every thing in it being both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, participates of time periodically: and so far as it departs from the beginning it becomes older, but so far as it approaches to the end it becomes younger. For becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to its proper beginning. But that which becomes nearer to its beginning becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end becomes younger, the same also according to the same becoming older; for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is older. That to which the beginning therefore is one thing, and the end another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to which the beginning and the end are the same, is in no respect older than younger, but as Plato says, at the same time becomes younger and older than itself. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, if it becomes both older and younger than itself, is circularly moved. But divine souls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and the time of their proper motion is periodical.