CHAPTER XXXIII.

Having therefore discussed the theory pertaining to the celestial and sublunary Gods, it now remains that we ascend to the summit or monad of all the mundane Gods, Bacchus, in whose divinity they all subsist and are rooted, similarly to the fixed stars in the inerratic sphere. For after this manner, every monad analogously contains its co-ordinate multitude.

Bacchus therefore, is the mundane intellect, from which the soul and body of the world are suspended. With respect however, to intellect it is necessary to observe that one kind is imparticipable and total; another is participable indeed but essentially so; and a third is participable, and subsists as a habit. All intellects unconnected with soul belong to the first kind. The mundane intellect, and the intellects of all the mundane Gods and beneficent dæmons, rank in the second division. And to the third class such intellects as ours belong. This deity also is the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators of things, by whom he is said in divine fables to have been torn in pieces; because the mundane soul which participates of this divinity, and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, and through them distributed into every part of the universe. Plato in the Cratylus says of this divinity “that he is the giver of wine; and that οινος wine may most justly be denominated οιονους because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it before.” On which words Proclus in his MS Scholia on that dialogue observes as follows: “The young man Cratylus appears to inquire about our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small importance, and on this account he is silenced by Socrates. And he does not indeed pay attention to the occult, but only to the last and mundane progressions of the Gods.” These indeed, the wise man venerates, though as he says, they are sports, through these Gods [Bacchus and Venus] being lovers of sport. For as he says of the terminations of the other Gods, that they are terrible, and that they avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as for instance, that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, till she has entirely subverted them, their houses and cities;--in like manner, he venerates the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce γλυκυθυμια sweetness of sensation; every where purifying our conceptions concerning the Gods, and preparing us to understand that all things look to the best end, whatever it may be. For because the terminations of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and alleviate corporeal molestation, on this account the Gods the causes of these things, are φιλοπαιγμονες lovers of sport. Hence, of statues, they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation, but others austere, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously to the mundane allotments of the Gods.

But theologists frequently call Bacchus wine, from the last of his gifts, as for instance, Orpheus,

Οινου παντα μελη κοσμῳ λαβε, και μοι ενεικε.

i.e. “Take all the members of Wine [that are distributed] in the world, and bring them to me.” If however the God is thus denominated, certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well as his last; so that Socrates now looking to this calls the God διδοινυσος, beginning from wine, which as we have said manifests all the powers of Bacchus. Thus also in the Phædrus, Socrates calls Love in common great, both that which is divine, and that which is a lover of body. By this epithet wine therefore, we must understand that the peculiarity of a partial intellect, is in common presented to our view. For the word οιουν such as, is nothing else than intellectual form separated from a total intellect, and in consequence of this becoming participated, particular and alone. For an all-perfect intellect is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable sameness: but a partial and participated intellect, is indeed all things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or mercurial form. This therefore, the peculiarity of which is to be separated from the rest, wine indicates, signifying an intellect such as, and particular. (σημαινων τον οιον και τινα νουν)

Since, therefore, every partial fabrication is suspended from the Dionysiacal or Bacchic monad, which distributes participated mundane intellects from total intellect, (or that intellect which ranks as a whole) many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their proper wholenesses; on this account theologists call both this God and all his fabrications wine. For all these are the progeny of intellect. And some things participate of the partial distribution of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. Wine therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them; in body indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an intellectual energy and fabrication. For in the laceration of Bacchus by the Titans, the heart of the God is said to have alone remained undistributed, i.e. the indivisible or impartible essence of intellect.

With respect to the mundane soul which is the immediate participant of this Bacchic intellect, the composition of it is most accurately delivered by Plato in the Timæus, and admirably unfolded by Proclus in his Commentaries on that dialogue. For full information therefore on this subject I refer the reader to those works; and shall only summarily observe at present that there are five genera of being, from which all things after the first being are composed; viz. essence, permanency, motion, sameness, and difference. For every thing must possess essence; must abide in its cause, from which also it must proceed, and to which it must be converted; must be the same with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time different from others, and distinguished in itself. But Plato for the sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of the mundane soul, viz. essence, sameness, and difference; for the other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. When therefore Plato says, “that from an essence impartible, and always subsisting according to sameness of being, and from a nature divisible about bodies, the demiurgus mingled from both a third form of essence, having a middle subsistence between the two,”--by the impartible essence he means intellect, and by the nature which is divisible about bodies, a corporeal life. Hence the mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. We must not however suppose that when the soul is said to be mingled from these two, the indivisible and divisible natures are consumed in the mixture, as is the case when corporeal substances are mingled together; but we must understand that the soul is of a middle nature between these, so as to be different from each, and yet a participant of each. In short, the intellect participated by soul, is called by Plato impartible; but the nature which is divisible about bodies is the corporeal-formed life proceeding from the mundane soul, and which has the relation of splendour to it. For intellect is analogous to the sun; soul, to the light proceeding from the sun; and a divisible life to the splendour proceeding from light.

Proclus observes on the above cited words of Plato, that they are conformable to the Orphic traditions. “For, says he, Orpheus does not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual order, but according to him there are certain natures superior to this appellation, in the same manner as others are superior to other names. For king and father are not adapted to all the divine orders. Where, therefore, according to Orpheus, shall we first survey the impartible, in order that we may understand the divine conception of Plato? Orpheus therefore establishes one demiurgus of every divisible fabrication, analogous to the one father who generates the total fabrication, and from him produces the whole intellectual mundane multitude, the number of souls, and corporeal compositions. And this one demiurgus indeed (i.e. Bacchus) generates all these unitedly; but the Gods that surround him, divide and separate his fabrications. Orpheus however says, that all his other fabrications were distributed into parts by the Gods whose characteristic is of a dividing nature; but that his heart alone was preserved impartible, through the providence of Minerva. For since he gives subsistence to intellects, souls and bodies; but souls and bodies indeed, receive in themselves an abundant division and distribution into parts, intellect remaining united and indivisible, being all things in one, and comprehending total intelligibles in one intellection;--this being the case, he says that the intellectual essence alone, and the intellectual number was saved entire by Minerva. For says he,

The intellectual heart alone was left,

directly calling it intellectual.

If therefore the impartible heart is intellectual, it will evidently be intellect and an intellectual number; not indeed every intellect, but the mundane; for this is the impartible heart, since the divided God was also the fabricator of this. Orpheus therefore calls the impartible essence of Bacchus intellect. But he denominates the life which is divisible about body, which is physical, and pregnant with seeds, the genitals of the God. And he says that Diana who presides over all the generation in nature, and is the midwife of physical productive principles, extends these genitals, distributing as far as to subterranean natures, the prolific power of the God. But all the remaining body of Bacchus was, he says, the psychical essence, this also being divided into seven parts. For they divided all the seven parts of the boy, says the theologist, speaking of the Titans; just as Timæus divides the soul into seven parts. And perhaps Timæus, when he says that soul is extended through the whole world, will remind the followers of Orpheus of the Titannic division, through which soul is not only spread round the universe like a veil, but is also extended through it. Very properly therefore, does Plato call the essence which is proximately above soul, an impartible essence. And in short, he thus denominates the intellect which is participated by soul, following the Orphic fables, and wishing to be as it were an interpreter of what is said in the mysteries.” And thus much concerning Bacchus, or the monad of the mundane Gods.