CHAPTER XII.

After this, Plato adds, “He likewise commanded them to govern as much as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal, that it might not become the cause of evil to itself.” On these words Proclus observes: Of all that the one demiurgus delivers to the junior Gods, it must be admitted that there are three most beautiful boundaries, the boniform will of him that delivers, the perfect power of the recipients, and the symmetry of both these with each other. Of the demiurgic production, however, of the junior Gods themselves, three elements and these the greatest must be again surveyed, a reduction to the good, a conversion to intelligible beauty, and a liberated power sufficient to rule over all the subjects of its government. For as Phanes, himself the demiurgus of wholes, rendered the whole world as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, thus also he was willing that the second fabricators should govern the mortal animal in a way the most beautiful and the best; pouring on them indeed from intelligibles, beauty, but filling them with that boniform power and will, which he himself possessing fabricated the whole world. For thus generation also will participate of beauty and goodness, as far as it is naturally adapted to such participation, if the Gods by whom it is connected and contained, adorn it, who are themselves transcendently decorated with beauty and good.

If, however, the second demiurgi have such a nature as this, nothing evil or preternatural is generated from the celestial Gods; nor is it proper to divide the Gods in the heavens after this manner, as many do, viz. into the beneficent and malignant; for being Gods this is impossible. But the mortal animal is the cause of evil to itself. For neither disease, nor poverty, nor any thing else of this kind is evil; but the depravity of the soul, intemperance, timidity, and every vice. Of these things, however, we are the causes to ourselves. For though being impelled by others to these vices we are badly affected, yet again it is through ourselves; since we have the power of associating with the good, and separating ourselves from the bad. According to Plato, therefore, we must not think that of the Gods some are malignant and others beneficent, but we must admit that all of them are the sources to mortals of all the good which they are able to receive; and that things which are truly evils are not produced, but are only signified by them, as we have before observed. For they extend terrific appearances and signs to those who are able to see and read the letters in the universe, which the framers of mortal natures during their revolutions write by their configurations. And though some one should derive a certain evil from the motions of the celestial Gods, so as to become timid or intemperate, yet they operate in one way, and their influences are participated by souls in another. For the efflux of intellect, says Plotinus, becomes craft in him who receives the efflux badly; the gift of an elegant life becomes intemperance through a similar cause; and in short, while they produce beneficently, their gifts are participated by terrestrial natures, after a contrary manner. Hence the givers who bestow beneficently are not to be accused as the authors of evil, but the recipients who pervert their gifts by their own inaptitudes. Thus also Jupiter in Homer blames souls as in vain accusing the Gods, while they themselves are the causes of evils. For the Gods are the sources of good, and the suppliers of intellect and life, but are not the causes of any evil; since even a partial nature is not the cause of evil to its offspring. What, therefore, ought we to think concerning the Gods themselves? Is it not, that they are much more the causes of good to their productions; since with them there is power, with them there is a self-perfect nature, with them there is universal goodness, to all which evil is contrary. For in its own nature it is powerless, imperfect, and without measure.

In the next place Plato says, “At the same time he who orderly disposed all these particulars, remained in his own accustomed manner.” And Proclus observes, that Plato every where after having employed many words, summarily comprehends the multitude of them in the conclusion. For he knew that in the Demiurgus, one intellectual perception comprehends the multitude of intellectual conceptions; that one power connects many powers; and that a uniform cause collects into one union divided causes. Hence the words [prior to these], “Having, therefore, instructed souls in all these particulars,” and the words before us, “He who orderly disposed all these particulars,” lead the distinct energy of the Demiurgus to an united cause. Farther still, the word all manifests that which is consummated from all its appropriate boundaries. But the words orderly disposed, indicate the order pervading through all beings, which the Demiurgus introduced to the mundane Gods, and to partial souls; demonstrating the former to be demiurgi, but inscribing in the latter the laws of Fate. Moreover, the word remained, does not manifest station, and inflexible intellection, but an establishment in the one. For according to this, he is exempt from wholes, and is separated from the beings that intellectually perceive him. But this establishment itself is eternal, and always invariably permanent. These things, therefore, are also indicated by the words accustomed and manner; the one exhibiting sameness of permanency; but the other the peculiarity of the demiurgic stability. For manner is indicative of peculiarity; since connective is different from immutable, and both these from demiurgic permanency.