It remains, therefore, for us to adduce the Parmenides as a witness of the doctrine concerning these gods. For Plato in that dialogue most clearly delivers the one peculiarity of them. For after the progression of the assimilative orders, in which the similar and dissimilar shine forth to the view from intellectual sameness and difference, at one time indeed according to analogy, but at another according to a generation which is different [from that of the other orders], and difficult to be surveyed, he demonstrates that the one touches and does not touch, both itself and other things. For all the divine genera after the demiurgic monad double their energies or they are naturally adapted to energize both towards themselves, and other things, posterior to themselves, rejoicing in progressions, being subservient to the providence of secondary natures, through the will of their father, and calling forth his supernatural, impartible, and all-perfect production, and communicating the streams of it to secondary natures. Does not, therefore, this contact and division with things subordinate, represent to us the liberated peculiarity? For to touch, is an indication of alliance with us, and of a co-arranged providence. But again, not to touch, is an indication of a transcendency exempt and separate from mundane natures. In what has been before said, therefore, we have demonstrated that a thing of this kind pertains to the genus of the liberated Gods, who at one and the same time come into contact with celestial natures, and are expanded above them, and proceed to all things with an unrestrained energy, and free from all habitude. On this account also, we have placed the Fates in the supercelestial order. For Socrates says that they touch the [celestial] circulations; and in the Cratylus he asserts that the mundane Core (or Proserpine) who associates with Pluto, and administers the whole of generation, comes into contact with a mutable essence, and that through this contact she is called Pherephatta.
Farther still, in the Phædo, teaching us what the mode of the cathartic life of souls is, he says “that the soul when it does not associate with the body, comes into contact with being.” Through all these particulars, therefore, he indicates that contact is the work of an inseparable providence, and of a co-arranged administration; but that the negation of contact is the business of a prefecture, separate, unrestrained, and exempt from the subjects of government. The one, therefore, which touches and does not touch other things, is conjoined with other things, and established above them. Hence, at one and the same time it is allotted the power of things established above the world, and of mundane natures. For being in the middle of both, it comprehends in one the divided peculiarities of the extremes. And moreover, it touches, and does not touch itself prior to other things; because there are in it multitude, a separation of wholeness, and the parts of wholeness, and a union collective of all the multitude. For if it has proceeded from its principles, and if it energizes partibly, it is various and multiform. For every progression diminishes indeed, the powers of the proceeding natures, but increases the multitude which is in them, and if it has not entirely proceeded, the uniform nature of its essence shines forth to the view, at one and the same time, with the multitude it contains. This genus of Gods, therefore, is co-arranged with the mundane Gods, and transcends the subjects of its government. It is also liberated, being separated from things which are perfectly divided. Hence, if it is one and multitude, producing indeed into secondary natures the many rivers of the fountains, but surpassing partible allotments, it will at one and the same time touch and not touch itself. On account of its separate union indeed, it is not in want of contact; but on account of its progression into multitude, it touches itself. “For it comprehends many things in itself, and touches itself, so far as it is in itself,” says Parmenides. In short, so far as it is without contact, it is separate; but so far as it proceeds from itself, and is again established in itself, it touches itself. And so far indeed, as it is in other things, it comes into contact with other things; but so far as it is uncoarranged with others, and so far as it has not a co-ordinate number in them, it is separated from them. At one and the same time therefore, this genus of Gods is uniform and multiplied, and is uniformly varied. It also abides and proceeds, and is participated by more imperfect natures, and is imparticipable, existing prior to them. All these particulars, however, are the elements of the supercelestial order, presenting to our view an hypostasis mingled from perfectly divided peculiarities. And thus much concerning the essence and hyparxis of these Gods, which Parmenides exhibits to us in the above citation.
It is necessary, however, to assume from the things placed before us, the causes of the generation of these Gods. Since it is demonstrated, therefore, that these divinities are according to union itself beyond all partible separation, and contact, they will have their progression from the one. For union is thence derived to all things, from the first unity, which is exempt from all multitude, and all division. But in consequence of their having pre-assumed the power of touching themselves, according to a subsistence in self they derive their existence from the unpolluted Gods. For the subsistence in self in the first of the intellectual fathers, was the symbol of a cause inflexible, and which immutably sustains multitude from secondary natures. If, therefore, this one touches itself, on account of a subsistence in self, it establishes multitude in the one, and contains parts in wholeness, on account of undefiled power in progression. And in the intellectual fathers, indeed, a subsistence in self primarily shines forth to the view, and comprehends contact causally, as was demonstrated to us through the first hypothesis. But in the liberated Gods, a subsistence in self is according to participation. Contact, however, is in this one according to essence, and is consubsistent with the multitude it contains.
Farther still, [the one] being in other things touches other things; but not being co-arranged with them according to any common number, it is separated from them. By this, therefore, Parmenides appears indeed to form his reasoning from a subsistence in another; since that the one touches itself, was before demonstrated, through a subsistence in itself. It is, however, wonderful that a subsistence in another is, in the first progression, superior to a subsistence in self, but in the participation of the liberated Gods is subordinate to a subsistence in self. For we say, that for a thing to come into contact, and be co-arranged with other things, is in every respect more imperfect than for it to convert multitude to itself. We must, therefore, say that the liberated Gods have their progression from the demiurgic and the assimilative order. Hence Parmenides does not say that the one is in another thing, but in other things. But other things are primarily suspended from the [demiurgic] monad; but secondarily from the assimilative Gods. The liberated Gods, therefore, from thence receive their subsistence in others. For the demiurgic one being same and different, imparts to them sameness and union exemptly. But the assimilative one illuminates them with a separate similitude. But the one of the liberated Gods subsists now with others, so far as it is co-arranged with them, and proximately presides over them. Again, however, because it differs from the mundane unities, it is allotted the whole of its appropriate number exempt from others. And thus other things participating of no number which is common with this one, cannot proximately participate of it. Hence the progression to the liberated Gods, is from the first causes, and from causes that are arranged near to them. For their progression is from the one; since as the one is exempt from intelligibles, thus also the liberated Gods are exempt from sensibles. And their progression is likewise from the undefiled order. For they have not the disencumbered from any other source than that of immutable power, and the demiurgic cause. Being likewise generated from the assimilative Gods, they receive a communion with other things, and from themselves they are established above others. For they establish their appropriate number above the subsistence of other things. And thus much concerning these Gods may be assumed from the Parmenides. But we have elsewhere accurately explained the several particulars relating to them, and there is no occasion to write the same things in the present treatise [as we have there written].
The Six Books of Proclus, the Platonic Successor, on the Theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.