It is the relation between the “I” and the “It” upon which we shall dwell first.
Doubtless, you will raise an objection against our intention to refer to these two regions or stages of the soul with simple pronouns, instead of giving them beautiful euphonious Greek names. However, in psychoanalysis, we prefer to remain in contact with the popular way of thinking, and attach commonplace terms to our scientific conceptions, rather than look upon such nomenclature in contempt. We do not expect to receive credit for this popularization of psychoanalytical terms, inasmuch as we are forced to do this in order to make ourselves plain to our patients who are frequently very intelligent, but not always exactly learned people.
The impersonal pronoun “It” is most appropriate for our purposes, as is plainly proved by the fact that we frequently speak of something, averring that “‘It’ came to me quite suddenly”; “‘It’ gave me a shock”; “‘It’ was stronger than I.” “C’était plus fort que moi.”
In the realm of psychology, we can only make ourselves understood by taking recourse to comparisons. This, after all, is no special peculiarity of psychology, inasmuch as other sciences also find it necessary to avail themselves of analogous expedients. These comparisons, however, must be modified time and again, as their application generally proves too limited. If you are seeking an explanation of the relation of the “I” to the “It,” it would be well to remember that the “I” serves as a foreground to the “It.” The “I” is, as it were, the outer, front layer of the “It.” We may so much more readily accept this comparison, inasmuch as layers—say, of a tree—owe their peculiar characteristics to the modifying influence of that exterior medium with which they are in contact. Thus, we visualize that the “I,” being the outer layer of the psychical apparatus, is the “It,” modified in accordance with the influence which the outer world exerts upon it.
Here you will perceive how conceptions of space apply to psychoanalysis. To all intents and purposes, the “I” is actually the front layer, the obvious, whereas the “It” is the inner layer, the hidden. To make it even more plain: The “I” is inserted between the reality of the outer world and the “It,” the latter constituting the soul proper, the essence of the soul, as it were.
“I am not going to inquire how you came to know all this. I should first like to know how this differentiation between the ‘I’ and the ‘It’ assists you in your psychoanalytical work, and why you need it.”
Your question clearly shows me how to proceed.
It is most important and extremely valuable to know that the “I” and the “It,” in many instances, greatly differ from each other. As far as the “I” is concerned, psychical activations are subject to a different rule than the one applying to the “It.” The “I” has different intentions from the “It,” availing itself of means other than those resorted to by the “It.”
Of course, much could be said in this respect, but perhaps it will be best if I give you a new comparison and a new example. Just remember the differences which developed, during the late war, between the actual front and the hinterland. We were apparently never surprised to observe that there were certain things going on at the front, utterly different from analogous developments in the hinterland, and that in the hinterland many a thing was permissible which had to be strictly prohibited at the front. In the war, the deciding factor, of course, was the proximity of the enemy. In our psychical life, the deciding factor is the proximity of the outer world. Remember that in ancient times “outside,” “strange,” “hostile,” used to be identical conceptions.
And now, the example I promised you: The “It” is never assailed by any conflicts. Within the “It,” contradiction and opposition dwell undisturbed in close proximity to each other, frequently equalizing one another by means of compromise. However, while the “It” thus remains undisturbed, the “I” cannot avoid facing conflicts, and the only way for the “I” to escape the dilemma is by renouncing some particular intention, or urge, for the benefit of the other.
The “I” is controlled by a very remarkable trend for unification, for synthesis—a characteristic utterly lacking in the “It.” The latter never manifests such unity of intention, but rather displays a tendency towards dissipation and a diversity of aims, utterly independent of one another, and without regard to each other.
“If there really is such an important hinterland of the soul, how do you explain the fact that it was never discovered before the advent of psychoanalysis?”
By this question, you are leading us back to one of your former inquiries. Let me advise you, then, that orthodox psychology blocked its own way to the “It,” by holding on tenaciously to a presumption which, in itself, seemed obviously enough but which, nevertheless, cannot be successfully sustained any more. It was presumed that all psychical activations are conscious, that consciousness is the characteristic of any psychological process, and that if there really were unconscious processes of our brain, these processes did not deserve to be termed psychological processes, having nothing at all to do with psychology proper.
“I should say that this is self-evident!”
Of course. That is exactly what all the orthodox psychologists claim. However, it is easy enough to prove that such a view is incorrect, or rather amounts to an impractical separation. Observing ourselves, we easily perceive that many of our thoughts could not have arisen unless they were induced by certain premises. However, of the preparatory stages of these thoughts, which must have been psychical, too, we are unaware, inasmuch as only the complete result enters into our consciousness. Once in a while, it may be possible for us to reconstruct the development of a thought by retrospective contemplation.
“Most probably, our attention had been diverted so that we missed observing the development of the thought in the making, so to speak.”
That’s just an obvious excuse!—insufficient to obscure the fact that quite frequently psychical activations—and often highly complicated ones, too—may occur in our soul life without our becoming actually aware of them. Alas, you may be ready to accept the hypothesis that just a little more or less of your “attention” may prove sufficient to transmute a non-psychical action into a psychical one. But why squabble? The existence of unconscious thoughts has been proven in hypnotic experiments, time and again, to the satisfaction of everybody.
“I don’t wish to deny that, and I actually believe I am now beginning to understand you at last. What you are terming the ‘I’ is the Conscious while the ‘It’ describes the so-called Subconscious, which is so much discussed just now. But why, pray, this masquerade of new terms, if I may ask?”
This is no masquerade, inasmuch as other terms cannot be employed here properly. Besides, let me ask you not to substitute literature for science. If somebody refers to the Subconscious, I don’t know whether he is alluding to it as a stratum, that is, something dwelling in the soul beneath the Conscious, or whether he refers to it as to quality, that is, another consciousness, a subterranean one, so to say. To be sure, the greatest probability seems to be that anybody juggling such terms is himself not at all sure of what he really means. The only permissible differentiation is one between Conscious and Unconscious.
Nevertheless, it would be a severe error to believe that a differentiation between Conscious and Unconscious would be analogous to a differentiation between the “I” and the “It.” It would be too wonderful, if it were as simple as all that, and it would be easy going for our theory then. But, it is not so simple! Correct only is that everything that occurs within the “It” is and remains unconscious, and that only activities of the “I” may become conscious. However, not all these activities are conscious, nor are they always conscious, nor do they necessarily have to become conscious. Parts of the “I” may remain permanently unconscious.
The penetration into Consciousness of a psychical process is quite complicated. I cannot avoid demonstrating to you—dogmatically once more—what our hypothesis is in this respect. You will remember that the “I” is the outer, peripheral layer of the “It.” We now assume that on this outermost surface of the “I,” there is a peculiar device, a system, an organ if you wish, by whose exclusive actuation that phenomenon is created which we call Consciousness. This organ may be actuated from the outside—that is, our sensory nerves may convey to it sensations of an outer world—as well as from the inside, where first it may perceive the sensations from the “It” and, later on, the processes of the “I.”
“This is getting worse and worse, and more and more beyond my understanding. Did you not invite me to discuss with you the question of whether or no, medically trained laymen should be permitted to apply psychoanalysis? Why, then, all these ramblings of vague and dark theories, whose correctness you will be unable to prove to me?”
Only too well do I realize that I cannot convince you. As that would be beyond all possibilities, I have, therefore, surrendered such intentions. Even when instructing our own disciples in the theory of psychoanalysis, we always observe how little impression we make on them in the beginning. They accept the analytical teachings with just as much equanimity as any other abstractions which have been fed to them. Some of them may have the earnest desire to be convinced, but there is no trace that they ever really are convinced.
We demand that anyone who intends to analyse somebody else, should first submit to an analysis. Only if in the course of this “self-analysis”—as it is usually incorrectly called—a disciple experiences the truth of psychoanalytical teachings on his own body—or rather on his own soul—then, and only then, he gains those convictions which later on will guide him in his work as an analyst.
How, then, may I expect to convince you, Mr. Referee, of the correctness of our theories, especially as I can only give you an incomplete, abbreviated, and, therefore, none too lucid outline of psychoanalytical teachings, without your being able to corroborate it through your own experiences?
But such is not my intention at all! We are not discussing here the question of whether psychoanalysis is sense or nonsense, nor whether the premises of psychoanalysis are correct or full of grave fallacies. I am simply presenting our theories to you, because in this way it seems easiest to me to explain to you what is the real essence of psychoanalysis, what are its premises in reference to individual patients, and just what the treatment is that is administered to them. In this way, the problem of lay-analyses is projected in a striking light. If you have followed me up to now, you may rest assured that the worst is over and that from now on, everything will be much more comprehensible to you.
And now let me pause for a moment.
“I expect that, on the basis of psychoanalytical theories, you will explain to me how the development of a nervous ailment may be conceived!”
The Problem of Lay-Analyses · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.