Part 7

The truth about this question is that man should follow that which he himself has thought out but anyhow it should not be the view which may deny the fundamental principle altogether. For this would be denying its existence. Such a belief leads to infidelity, on account of a distinct knowledge of this condition being given to man, both by religion and by human reason, which is all based upon the eternal nature of the soul. If it be said whether there is any argument or information in the Law about this eternal nature of the soul, we would say that it is found in the Quran itself. God says, “God taketh unto himself the souls of men at the time of their death; and those which die not He also taketh in their sleep.” In this verse sleep and death have been placed upon the same level, on account of the change in its instrument, and in sleep on account of a change in itself. For had it not been so it would not have come to its former condition after awakening. By this means we know that this cession does not effect its essence, but was only attached to it on account of change in its instrument. So it does not follow that with a cessation of the work of the instrument, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is only a cessation of work, so it is clear that its condition should be like that of sleep. As someone has said that if an old man were to get the eyes of the young, he would begin to see like him.

This is all that we thought of in an exposition of the beliefs of our religion, Islam. What remains for us is to look into things of religion in which interpretation is allowed and not allowed. And if allowed, then who are the people to take advantage of it? With this thing we would finish our discourse.

The things found in the Law can be divided into five kinds. But in the first place, there are only two kinds of things: indivisible and the divisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind which is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The second is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant but is only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds. First, the meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that they can only be known by the far-fetched and compound analogies, which cannot be understood, but after a long time and much labour. None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot be known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by this far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former: they can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is just what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is merely an illustration, but what it is the example of is difficult to comprehend. The fourth kind is quite opposite to the former. The thing of which it is an example, is easily understood; while it is difficult to know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first kind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are far-fetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are well-grounded in knowledge; and an exposition of it is not fit for any but the learned. The interpretation of its opposite--that which can be understood on both the sides--is just what is wanted, and an exposition of it is necessary. The case of the third kind is like the case of the above. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the difficulty for the common people to understand it: it only incites the people to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet; “The black stone is God’s action on Earth,” etc. etc. That which can be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know of which it is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular persons and learned men. Those who understand that it is only an illustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be understood by the well-established learned men; or the illustration should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding. This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds.

The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book, Al Tafriga bainal Islam wal Zindiga. It should be understood that one thing has five existences which he calls by the name of essential (Zati); sensual (Hissi); rational (Agli); imaginative (Khayali) and doubtful (Shilbhi). So at the time of doubt it should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called essential then an illustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also included the following traditions of the Prophet, “Whatever the earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven and hell.” “Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a garden of paradise;” and “The earth will eat up the whole of a man except the extremity of the tail.” All these, it can easily be known are but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate, it is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary in this case to give an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This kind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but when used irrelevantly it is wrong. Abu Hamid has not decided about the occasion when both the sides of the question--the illustration and the illustrated--be both far-fetched and difficult to understand. In this case there would apparently be a doubt, but a doubt without any foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many places in our present book against the Mutakallimun, Asharites and the Mutazalites.

The fourth kind of occasion is quite opposite to the former. In this it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated. In the interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: about those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such and such a thing; but they doubt whether it is an illustration at all. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of the views which they hold about its being an illustration at all. It is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the illustrated. For these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when disclosed are denied by the common people, Such has been the case with the Sufis, and those learned men who have followed them. When this work of interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between these occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion, at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with unbelief. All this is pure ignorance of the purpose of the Law.

From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult portions of the Law and Traditions are to be explained or not. These are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated.

The purpose of our writing this book is now completed. We took it up because we thought that it was the most important of all purposes--connected with God and the Law.

FOOTNOTES

Transcriber’s Notes

The cover image was created by the transcriber, and is placed in the Public Domain. Obvious typographical errors and variable spelling were corrected. Quran reference formatting has been made uniform to e.g. “Quran xxv, 60.” The following corrections have been made to the text:

Page Original New ---------------------------------------------------------------- 14 cogniscance cognisance 28 heavena heavens 30 concensus consensus 53 cogniscance cognisance 60 necessarry necessary 60 shonld should 60 interpretes interprets 64 Qnran Quran 67 tbe the 69 Mutazalites Mutazilites 71 Mutakallimum Mutakallimun 76 he be 91 upo upon 97 nevertheles nevertheless 98 nonexistent non-existent 129 no not 135 s is 137 controvertialist controversialist 143 Mutakalimun Mutakallimun 147 bows bows’ 161 Quran Quran xxx, 28. [Footnote 46] 162 Quran Quran xxxv, 41. [Footnote 47] 166 ii 10 [Footnote 51] 174 Maati Maali 186 by be 193 Quran Quran vi, 103. [Footnote 66] 194 th the 198 imposible impossible 207 excep except [Footnote 67] 219 beeause because 222 pre-arranged prearranged 244 there-of thereof 251 repeatsd repeated 251 appearence appearance 257 Qnran Quran [Footnote 93] 259 distingished distinguished 261 Quran LIVI Quran liv, 262 Quarn Quran [Footnote 102] 265 Mutazlites Mutazilites 265 intellegible intelligible 266 perfom perform 266 use us 269 YXVII XXVII [Footnote 108] 270 things things: 274 [Removed duplicate footnote 111. Numbers of the subsequent footnotes corrected.] 276 [Removed second, unused footnote anchor] 277 alsays always 277 in an 278 thay they 278 their there 278 there their 279 Injusitce Injustice 280 [Added footnote anchors, footnotes on next page] 282 [Added footnote anchors] 282 Quran, XXXV, 9 [Removed footnote, as no matching quran quote was found in the text] 283 [Added footnote anchors] 285 in-spite in spite 285 [Added footnote anchor] 286 contradictary contradictory 286 Crertor Creator 286 attributd attributed 289 131 Quran, XXX, 14. 131 Quran, XXXII, 14. 292 that That 293 theoratical theoretical 295 that is, ... world; [Removed duplicate part] 296 mirsery misery 296 possiblities possibilities 299 divded divided 300 enternal eternal 300 reilgious religious 304 farfetched far-fetched 305 than then 306 occassion occasion 306 irrelevently irrelevantly 306 Mutazalites Mutazilites 307 man men 308 interperetation interpretation