Essay 1, _on the Origin and Nature of Ethical Sentiment_.

(p. 9). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, London, 1751.

(p. 9). Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 81 seq. Collected Works, vol. i. p. 124 seq.

(p. 9). This comparison with logic should be my best defence against the charge of placing Herbart’s doctrine in a false light. Were the logical criterion to consist in judgments of taste experienced on the appearance of thought-processes in accordance with or opposition to rule, it would then, in comparison with what it actually is (the internal self-evidence of a process in accordance with rule) have to be called external. Similarly Herbart’s criterion of ethics is rightly characterized as external, however loudly Herbartians may insist that in the judgment of taste which arises spontaneously on the contemplation of certain relations of will, an inner superiority regarding these relations is recognizable.

(p. 10). In his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant enunciates his Categorical Imperative in the following forms: “Act only in accordance with that maxim which you can at the same time will should become a universal law,” and “Act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to be raised to a universal law.”

In the Critique of Practical Reason it runs “Act so that the maxim of your will could on each occasion be valid as a universal legislative principle,” i.e. as Kant himself explains, in such a way that the maxim, when raised to a universal law, does not lead to contradictions and consequent self-abrogation. The consciousness of this fundamental law was, for Kant, a fact of pure reason, thereby proclaiming itself to be legislative (sic volo sic jubeo). Beneke has already observed (Grundlinien der Sittenlehre, vol. ii. p. xviii., 1841; cf. his Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, a counterpart to Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1822) that it is nothing more than a “psychologische Dichtung,” and to-day no one able to judge is any longer in doubt concerning it. It deserves to be noted that even philosophers like Mansel, who have the highest reverence for Kant, admit that the Categorical Imperative is a fiction and absolutely untenable.

The Categorical Imperative has at the same time another and not less serious defect, i.e. that even when admitted, it leads to no ethical conclusions. Kant fails, as Mill (Utilitarianism, chap. i.) rightly says “in an almost grotesque fashion” to deduce what he seeks. His favourite example of a deduction, by which he illustrates his manner of procedure not only in his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten but also in the Critique of Practical Reason is as follows: May a person, he asks, retain for himself a possession which has been entrusted to him without a receipt or other acknowledgment? He answers, No. For he thinks, were the opposite maxim to be raised to a law, nobody, under such circumstances, would entrust anything to anybody. The law would then be without possibility of application, therefore impracticable and so self-abrogated.

It may easily be seen that Kant’s argumentation is false, indeed absurd. If, in consequence of the law, certain actions ceased to be practised, the law exercises an influence; it therefore still exists and has in no way annulled itself. How ridiculous would it appear if the following question were treated after an analogous fashion: “May I yield to a person who desires to bribe me?” Yes, since, were I to think of the opposite maxim as raised to a universal law, then nobody would seek any longer to bribe another; therefore the law would be without application, therefore, impracticable, and so self-abrogated.

(p. 11). Cf. J. S. Mill, System of Deductive and Inductive Logic, vol. iv. chap. iv. section vi. (towards the end); vol. vi. chap. ii. section iv. and elsewhere, e.g. in his Utilitarianism, Essays on Religion, and in his article on Comte and Positivism,