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Part 20

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915 · Various — chapter 20 of 93 · ~1,359 words · public domain

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What was implied in the actual withdrawal from contact with the enemy along the Aisne will be appreciated when the conditions under which we were then situated are recalled.

In places the two lines were not one hundred yards apart, and for us no movement was possible during daylight. In some of the trenches which were under enfilade fire our men had to sit all day long close under the traverses--as are called those mounds of earth which stretch like partitions at intervals across a trench so as to give protection from lateral fire. Even where there was cover, such as that afforded by depressions or sunken roads, on the hillside below and behind our firing line, any attempt to cross the intervening space was met by fierce bursts of machine gun and shell fire.

The men in the firing line were on duty for twenty-four hours at a time, and brought rations and water with them when they came on duty, for none could be sent up to them during the day. Even the wounded could not be removed until dark.

The preliminary retirement of the units was therefore carried out gradually, under cover of darkness. That the Germans only once opened fire on them while so engaged was due to the care with which the operation was conducted, and also, probably, to the fact that the enemy were so accustomed to the recurrence of the sounds made by the reliefs of the men in the firing line and by the movement of the supply trains below that they were misled as to what was actually taking place.

What the operation amounted to on our part was the evacuation of the trenches, under carefully made arrangements with the French who had to take our place in the trenches; the retirement to the river below--in many cases down a steep slope; the crossing of the river over the noisy plank roadways of floating or repaired bridges, which were mostly commanded by the enemy's guns--and the climb up to the top of the plateau on the south side.

The rest of the move was a complicated feat of transportation which cut across some of the lines of communication of our allies; but it requires no description here. In spite of the various difficulties, the whole strategic operation of transferring the large number of troops from the Aisne was carried out without loss and practically without a hitch.

As regards the change in the nature of the fighting in which we have recently been engaged, it has already been pointed out that the operations had up till then been of a preparatory nature and that the Germans were obviously seeking to delay us by advanced troops while heavier forces were being got ready and brought up to the scene of action. It was known that they were raising a new army, consisting of corps formed of Ersatz, (supernumerary reserves), volunteers, and other material which had not yet been drawn upon, and that part of it would in all probability be sent to the western theatre, either to cover the troops laying siege to Antwerp, in case that place should hold out, or, in the event of the capture of the fortress, to act in conjunction with the besieging force in a violent offensive movement toward the coast.

After the fall of Antwerp and the release of the besieging troops there was a gradual increase in the strength of the opposition met with by us.

The resistance of the detachments--which beyond the right extreme of the German fortified line near Bethune a fortnight ago consisted almost entirely of cavalry--grew more and more determined as more infantry and guns came into the front line, until Tuesday, Oct. 20, when the arrival opposite us of a large portion of the new formations and a considerable number of heavy guns enabled the enemy to assume the offensive practically against the whole of our line at the same time that they attacked the Belgians between us and the coast.

The operations then really assumed a fresh complexion.

Since that date, up to the 25th, apart from the operations on either side of us, there has been plenty of action to chronicle on our immediate front, where some of the heaviest fighting in which we have yet been engaged has taken place, resulting in immense loss to the Germans.

On Wednesday, the 21st, the new German formations again pressed forward in force vigorously all along our line. On our right, south of the Lys, an attack on Violaines was repulsed with loss to the assailants.

On the other hand, we were driven from some ground close by, to the north, but regained it by a counter attack.

Still further north the Germans gained and retained some points.

Their total casualties to the southeast of Armentieres are estimated at over 6,000.

On the north of the Lys, in our centre, a fiercely contested action took place near La Gheir, which village was captured in the morning by the enemy and then retaken by us. In this direction the German casualties were also extremely heavy. They came on with the greatest bravery, in swarms, only to be swept away by our fire. One battalion of their 104th Regiment was practically wiped out, some 400 dead being picked up by us in our lines alone.

Incidentally, by our counter attack, we took 130 prisoners and released some forty of our own men who had been surrounded and captured, including a subaltern of artillery who had been cut off while observing from a point of vantage.

It is agreeable to record that our men were very well treated by their captors, who were Saxons, being placed in cellars for protection from the bombardment of our own guns.

On our left our troops advanced against the German 26th Reserve Corps near Passchendaele, and were met by a determined counter offensive, which was driven back with great loss. At night the Germans renewed their efforts unsuccessfully in this quarter.

At one point they tried a ruse which is no longer new. As they came up in a solid line two deep they shouted out: "Don't fire; we are the Coldstream Guards."

But our men are getting used to tricks of this kind, and the only result of this "slimness" was that they allowed the enemy's infantry to approach, quite close before they swept them down with magazine fire.

Apart from the 400 dead found near our lines in our centre, our patrols afterwards discovered some 300 dead further out in front of our left, killed by our artillery.

Thursday, the 22d, saw a renewal of the pressure against us. We succeeded, however, in holding our ground in nearly every quarter.

South of the Lys the enemy attacked from La Bassee, and gained Violaines and another point, but their effort against a third village was repulsed by artillery fire alone, the French and British guns working together very effectively. On the north of the river it was a day of minor attacks against us, which were all beaten back.

The Germans advanced in the evening against our centre and left, and were again hurled back, though they gained some of our trenches in the latter quarter. By this time the enemy had succeeded in bringing up several heavy howitzers, and our casualties were considerable.

On Friday, the 23d, all action south of the Lys on our right was confined to that of the artillery, several of the hostile batteries being silenced by our fire? In the centre their infantry again endeavored to force their way forward, and were only repulsed after determined fighting, leaving many dead on the ground and several prisoners in our hands. North of the Lys attacks at different points were repulsed.

On our left the 23d was a bad day for the Germans. Advancing in our turn, we drove them from some of the trenches out of which they had turned us on the previous evening, captured 150 prisoners, and released some of our men whom they had taken.

As the Germans retreated our guns did great execution among them.

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The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915 · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.

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