Part 18

The artillery has up to now played so great a part in the war that a few general remarks descriptive of the methods of its employment by the enemy are justified. Their field artillery armament consists of 15-pounder quick-fire guns for horse and field batteries of divisions and there are, in addition, with each corps three to six batteries of 4.3-inch field howitzers and about two batteries of 5.9-inch howitzers. With an army there are some 8.2-inch heavy howitzers.

The accuracy of their fire is apt at first to cause some alarm, more especially as the guns are usually well concealed and the position and the direction from which the fire is proceeding are difficult of detection. But accurate as is their shooting, the German gunners have on the whole had little luck, and during the past three weeks an astonishingly small proportion of the number of shells fired by them have been really effective.

Quite the most striking feature of their handling of the artillery is the speed with which they concentrate the fire upon any selected point. They dispense to a great extent with the method of ranging known by us as bracketing, especially when acting on the defensive, and direct their fire by means of squared maps and the telephone. Thus, when the target is found, its position on the map is telephoned to such batteries as it is desired to employ against that particular square.

In addition to the guns employed to fire on the targets as they are picked up, others are told off to watch particular roads, and to deal with any of the enemy using them.

Both for the location of targets and the communication of the effect of the fire, reliance is placed on observation from aeroplanes and balloons and on information supplied by special observers and secret agents, who are sent out ahead or left behind in the enemy's lines to communicate by telephone or signal. These observers have been found in haystacks, barns, and other buildings well in advance of the German lines. Balloons of the so-called sausage pattern remain up in the air for long periods for the purpose of discovering targets, and until our aviators made their influence felt by chasing all hostile aeroplanes on sight the latter were continually hovering over our troops in order to register their positions and to note where the headquarters, reserves, gun teams, &c., were located.

If suitable targets are discovered the airman drops a smoke ball directly over it or lets fall some strips of tinsel, which glitter in the sun as they slowly descend to the earth. The range to the target is apparently ascertained by those near the guns by a large telemeter, or other range finder, which is kept trained on the aeroplane, so that when the signal is made the distance to the target vertically below is at once obtained. A few rounds are then fired, and the result is signalled back by the aviator according to some prearranged code.

VII.

*A Fight in the Clouds.*

From Friday the 9th of October until Monday the 12th so little occurred that a narrative of the events can be given in a few words. There has been the usual sporadic shelling of our trenches which has resulted in but little harm, so well dug in are our men, and on the night of the 10th the Germans made yet a fresh assault, supported by artillery fire, against the point which has all along attracted most of their attention.

The attempt was again a costly failure toward which our guns were able to contribute with great effect.

Details have been received of an exciting encounter in midair. One of our aviators on a fast scouting monoplane sighted a hostile machine. He had two rifles, fixed one on either side of his engines, and at once gave chase, but lost sight of his opponent among the clouds. Soon, however, another machine hove into view which turned out to be a German Otto biplane, a type of machine which is not nearly so fast as our scouts. Our officer once again started a pursuit. He knew that owing to the position of the propeller of the hostile machine he could not be fired at when astern of his opponent. At sixty yards range he fired one rifle without apparent result. Then as his pace was carrying him ahead of his quarry he turned round, and, again coming to about the same distance behind, emptied his magazine at the German.

The latter began at once to descend as if either he or his machine were hit, and shutting off his engine and volplaning to free his hands, the pursuer recharged his magazine. Unfortunately it jammed, but he managed to insert four cartridges and to fire them at his descending opponent, who disappeared into a cloud bank with dramatic suddenness. When the British officer emerged below the clouds he could see no sign of the other. He, therefore, climbed to an altitude of some 7,000 feet and came to the conclusion that the German must have come to earth in the French lines.

The French airmen, too, have been very successful during the last three days, having dropped several bombs among the German cavalry and caused considerable loss and disorder, and having by similar means silenced a battery of field howitzers.

The German anti-aircraft guns recently have been unusually active. From their rate of fire they seem to be nearly automatic, but so far they have not had much effect in reducing the air reconnoissances carried out by us.

A striking feature of our line--to use the conventional term which so seldom expresses accurately the position taken up by an army--is that it consists really of a series of trenches not all placed alongside each other, but some more advanced than others, and many facing in different directions. At one place they run east and west along one side of a valley. At another almost north and south up some subsidiary valley. Here they line the edge of woods, and there they are on the reverse slope of a hill, or possibly along a sunken road, and at different points both the German and the British trenches jut out like promontories into what might be regarded as the opponents' territory.

Though both sides have moved forward at certain points, and withdrawn at others, no very important change has been effected in their dispositions, in spite of the enemy's repeated counter attacks. These have been directed principally against one portion of the position won by us, but in spite of the lavish expenditure of life they have not so far succeeded in driving us back.

The situation of the works in the German front line as a whole has been a matter of deliberate selection, for they have had the advantage of previous reconnaissance, being first in the field.

Behind the front they now have several lines prepared for a step-by-step defense. Another point which might cause astonishment to a visitor to our intrenchments is the evident indifference displayed to the provision of an extended field of frontal rifle fire, which is generally accepted as being one of the great requirements of a defensive position. It is still desirable, if it can be obtained without the usually accompanying drawback of exposure to the direct fire of hostile artillery, but experience has shown that a short field of fire is sufficient to beat back the infantry assaults of the enemy, and by giving up direct fire at long or medium ranges and placing our trenches on the reverse slope of a hill or behind the crest, it is in many places possible to gain shelter from the frontal fire of the German guns, for the men are well trained in musketry and under good fire control, and the dead ground beyond the short range from their position has comparatively small terrors.

Many of the front trenches of the Germans equally lack a distant field of fire, but if lost they would be rendered untenable by us by the fact that they would be exposed to a fire from the German guns in the rear and to cross-rifle fire from neighboring works.

The extent to which cross-fire of all kinds is employed is also remarkable. Many localities and areas along the Aisne are not swept from the works directly in front of them, but are rendered untenable by rifle fire from neighboring features or by that of guns that are out of sight. So much is this the case that among these hills and valleys it is a difficult matter for troops to find out whence they are being shot at.

There is a perpetual triangular duel. A's infantry can see nothing to shoot at, but are under fire from B's guns. The action of B's guns then brings upon them the attention of some of A's artillery waiting for a target, the latter being in their turn assailed by other batteries. And so it goes on. In a wooded country in spite of aeroplanes and balloons smokeless powder has made the localization and identification of targets a matter of supreme difficulty.

VIII.

*The Men in the Trenches.*

On the firing line the men sleep and obtain shelter in dug-outs they have hollowed or cut under the sides of the trenches. These refuges are raised slightly above the bottom of the trench, so as to remain dry in wet weather. The floor of the trench also is sloped for purposes of draining. Some of the trenches are provided with overhead cover which gives protection from the weather as well as from shrapnel balls and splinters of shells. Considerable ingenuity has been exercised by the men in naming these shelters. Among the favorite designations are the "Hotel Cecil," the "Ritz Hotel," the "Billet-Doux Hotel," and the "Rue Dormir."

On the road barricades also are to be found boards bearing this notice: "This way to the Prussians."

Obstacles of every kind abound, and at night each side can hear the enemy driving pickets for entanglements, digging trous-de-loup, or working forward by sapping. In some places obstacles have been constructed by both sides so close together that some wag suggested that each side provide working parties to perform this fatigue duty alternately, inasmuch as the work of the enemy is now almost indistinguishable from ours, and serves the same purpose.

Quarries and caves, to which allusion already has been made, provide ample accommodation for whole battalions, and most comfortable are these shelters which have been constructed in them. The northern slopes of the Aisne Valley fortunately are very steep, and this to a great extent protects us from the enemy's shells, many of which pass harmlessly over our heads, to burst in the meadows along the river bank.

At all points subject to shell fire access to the firing line from behind is provided by communication trenches. These are now so good that it is possible to cross in safety a fire-swept zone to the advance trenches from billets in villages, bivouacs in quarries, or other places where the headquarters of units happen to be.