CHAPTER XII. Motives or Springs of Action As Subjects of Moral Judgment

MOTIVES OR SPRINGS OF ACTION AS SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT

1. It has been held by several moralists that the “Universal Conscience” judges primarily not of Rightness of acts, but of Rank of Motives. 362-365

2. If, however, we include the Moral Sentiments among these motives, this latter view involves all the difficulties and perplexities of the former, yet it is paradoxical to omit these sentiments. 365-367

3. But even if we leave these out, we still find very little agreement as to Rank of Motives: and there is a special difficulty arising from complexity of motive. Nor does Common Sense seem to hold that a “higher” motive--below the highest--is always to be preferred to a “lower.” 367-372