Part 19

One morning as I was watching the behavior of the animals in the several cages, I noticed Tiny dressing with her teeth a wounded finger. It had evidently been bitten by one of the other animals, in all probability either by Jimmie or Gertie. Tiny was trimming away the loose bits of skin very neatly and cleansing the wound. After working at this task for a few minutes, she quickly climbed up to the shelf near the top of her cage, and by rushing to the partition wire between the two cages, she lured Gertie to an attempted attack on her. Gertie sprang up to the partition, placed her hands on it, with the fingers projecting through the meshes, and attempted to seize Tiny's fingers with her teeth. But the latter was too quick for her, and withdrawing her hands, like a flash seized in her teeth the middle finger of Gertie's left hand. She then bit it severely and with all her might, at the same time pulling and twisting violently, often placing the entire weight of her body on the finger. Her sharp teeth cut to the bone, and it was impossible for the larger and stronger monkey to tear away. For several seconds this continued, then Gertie succeeded in escaping, whereupon she at once retreated to the opposite end of her shelf and proceeded to attend to her injured finger. She cried, wrung her hands, and from time to time placed the finger in her mouth as though in an effort to relieve the pain. By this time Jimmie's attention had been attracted by the disturbance and he rushed up to the shelf, and facing Gertie, watched her intently for a few seconds. The look of puzzled concern on his face was most amusing. Apparently he felt dimly that something in which he should have intelligent interest was going on, but was unable wholly to understand the situation. After watching Gertie for a time and trying to discover what she was doing, which was rendered difficult by her tendency to turn away from him, in order to shield her injured finger, he rushed over to the wire partition and made strenuous efforts to seize Tiny with his hands and teeth. But although she continued close to the partition and often crowded against it with face and hands flattened on the wires, he was not able to get hold of her, and after a few vain attempts he returned to his mate, and again with evident solicitousness and the most troubled expression, watched her wringing her hands and chewing or sucking at her injured finger. Shortly he again returned to the partition and renewed his attempts to seize the young monkey. Thus he went back and forth from one place of interest to the other several times, but being unable to achieve anything at either point, he finally gave up and returned to his breakfast on the floor of the cage.

I report this incident fully because the behavior of Jimmie was in marked contrast with the usual behavior of the monkeys. Selfishness seemed everywhere dominant, while clear indications of sympathetic emotions were rare indeed. The above is undoubtedly the best evidence of anything altruistic that I obtained.

It is possible that Tiny's action was retaliatory, but although it is practically certain that either Gertie or Jimmie inflicted the wound on her finger, I of course cannot be sure that the spirit of revenge stirred her to punish Gertie so severely. Jimmie's part in the whole affair is, however, perfectly intelligible from our human point of view, and there seems no reason to doubt that he did experience something like a feeling of sympathy with his mate, coupled with a feeling of resentment or anger against Tiny.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF IDEATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN MONKEYS AND APES

It is my purpose in this section to indicate the relations of my work on monkeys and apes to that of other investigators. Although throughout the report I have used freely the psychological terms idea and ideation, it has been my aim to describe the behavior of my animals rather than to interpret it or speculate concerning its accompaniments. Certain acts I have designated as ideational simply because they seemed to exhibit the essential features of what we call ideational behavior in man. Further study may, and probably will, modify my opinion concerning this matter. It is of prime importance to analyze ideational behavior so that it may be accurately described and satisfactorily defined in terms of its distinguishing characteristics. I had hoped to be able to present a tentative analysis in this report, but the results of my efforts are so unsatisfactory that I do not feel justified in publishing them.

The terms idea and ideation have been used to designate contents of consciousness which are primarily representative. Nowhere have I attempted to indicate different types or grades of ideational behavior and nowhere have I found it necessary to emphasize differences between image and idea. In general, the acts which I have called ideational have been highly adaptive, and the learning processes in connection with which they have appeared have differed strikingly from those of the selective sort in their abruptness of appearance.

Extremely interesting and valuable definitions of ideation and discussions of the characteristics of different sorts of ideas in the light of original observations on monkeys have been presented by Thorndike (1901, pp. 1, 2; 1911, p. 174); Kinnaman (1902, p. 200); and Hobhouse (1915, p. 270). As these authors have contributed importantly to our knowledge of the behavior of monkeys, their discussions of the meaning of terms are especially valuable. Serviceable definitions are to be found, also, in Romanes (1900), Morgan (1906), Washburn (1908), and Holmes (1911).

Evidences of Ideation in Monkeys

Aside from anecdotal and traveller's notes on the behavior of monkeys and apes we have only a scanty literature. In fact, the really excellent articles on the behavior and mental life of these animals may be counted on one's fingers; and not more than half of these are experimental studies. I shall, in this brief historical sketch, neglect entirely the anecdotal literature, since my own work is primarily experimental, and since its results should naturally be compared with those of other experimenters.

Thorndike (1901), the American pioneer in the application of the experimental method to the study of mind in animals, published the first notable paper on the psychology of monkeys. His results force the conclusion that "free ideas" seldom appear in the monkey mind and have a relatively small part in behavior. That the species of Cebus which he observed exhibits various forms of ideation he is willing to admit. But he insists that it is of surprisingly little importance in comparison with what the general behavior of monkeys as known in captivity and as described by the anecdotal writers have led us to expect. It is important to note, however, that Thorndike's observations were limited to Cebus monkeys which, as contrasted with various old world types, are now considered of relatively low intelligence.

In many respects the most thoroughgoing and workmanlike experimental study of monkeys is that of Kinnaman (1902), who has reported on the study of various forms of response in P. rhesus. He presents valuable data concerning the learning processes, sensory discrimination, reaction to number, and to tests of imitation. His results indicate a higher level of intelligence than that discovered by Thorndike, but this is almost certainly due to difference in the species observed. Kinnaman goes so far as to say "We have found evidence, also, of general notions and reasoning, both of low order" (p. 211).

The contribution of Hobhouse (1915) to our knowledge of the mental life of monkeys, although in a measure experimental, is based upon relatively few and unsystematic observations as contrasted with those of Thorndike and Kinnaman. It appears, however, that Hobhouse's experiments were admirably planned to test the ideational capacity of his subjects, and one can not find a more stimulating discussion of ideation than that contained in his "Mind in Evolution." The results of his tests made with a P. rhesus monkey are similar to those of Kinnaman, for almost all of them indicate the presence and importance of ideas.

Watson (1908) in tests of the imitative ability of P. rhesus saw relatively little evidence of other than extremely simple forms of ideation. But in contrast with his results, those obtained by Haggerty (1909), in a much more extended investigation in which several species of monkey were used, obtained more numerous and convincing evidences of ideation in imitative behavior. Although this author wholly avoids the use of psychological terms, seeking to limit himself to a strictly objective presentation of results, it is clear from an unpublished manuscript (thesis for the Doctorate of Philosophy, deposited in the Library of Harvard University) that he would attribute to monkeys simple forms of ideational experience.

Witmer (1910) reports, in confirmation of Haggerty's results, intelligently imitative behavior in P. irus.

The work of Shepherd (1910) agrees closely, so far as evidences of ideation are concerned, with that of Thorndike. He obviously strives for conservatism in his statements concerning the adaptive intelligence of his monkeys, all of which belonged to the species P. rhesus. At one point he definitely states that they exhibit ideas of a low order, or something which corresponds to them. Satisfactory evidences of reasoning he failed to obtain.

Franz's (1907, 1911) studies of monkeys, unlike those mentioned above, have for their chief motive not the accurate description of various features of behavior but instead knowledge of the functions of various portions of the brain. His results, therefore, although extremely interesting and of obvious value to the comparative psychologist, throw no special light upon the problem of ideation.

The investigation by Hamilton (1911) of reactive tendencies in P. rhesus and irus yielded preeminently important data concerning complex behavior. For the ingenious quadruple-choice method devised by this observer showed that mature monkeys exhibit fairly adequate types of response. As Hamilton's interest centered in behavior, he did not discuss ideation, but this does not prevent the comparison of his data with those of the present report, and the agreement of his findings with my own is obvious.

My work contrasts sharply with that briefly mentioned above in that I applied systematically and over a period of several months an experimental method suited to reveal problem solving ability. Previously, the so-called problem or puzzle-box method had been used as a means of testing for the presence of ideas. For this I substituted the multiple-choice method. One of the chief advantages of this new method is the possibility of obtaining curves of learning for the solution or attempted solution of relational problems of varying difficultness. I am confident that these curves of learning will prove far more valuable than such data as are yielded by the puzzle-box method.

The Pithecus monkeys, which I studied intensively, yielded relatively abundant evidences of ideation, but with Thorndike I must agree that of "free ideas" there is scanty evidence; or rather, I should prefer to say, that although ideas seem to be in play frequently, they are rather concrete and definitely attached than "free." Neither in my sustained multiple-choice experiments nor from my supplementary tests did I obtain convincing indications of reasoning. What Hobhouse has called articulate ideas, I believe to appear infrequently in these animals. But on the whole, I believe that the general conclusions of previous experimental observers have done no injustice to the ideational ability of monkeys. It is clearly important, however, that we always should take into account the species of animal observed, for unquestionably there are extreme differences in mental development among the monkeys.

As I view my results in the light of their relations to earlier work, I am strongly impressed with the importance of the use of improved methods for the study of complex behavior. The delayed reaction method of Hunter, the quadruple-choice method of Hamilton, and my multiple-choice method offer new and promising approaches to forms of activity which thus far have been only superficially observed.

The ability exhibited by Skirrl to try a method out and then to abandon it suddenly is characteristic of animals high in intelligence. Most of the problems which I presented to my animals would be rated as difficult by psychologists, for as a rule they involved definite relations and demanded on the part of the subject both perception of a particular relation and the ability to remember or re-present it on occasion.

I was greatly surprised by the slow progress of the monkeys toward the solution of these problems. It had been my supposition that they would solve them more quickly than any lower type of mammal, but as a matter of fact they succeeded less well than did pigs. Their behavior throughout the work proved that of far greater significance for the experimenter than the solution of a problem is definite knowledge of the modes of behavior exhibited from moment to moment, or day to day. This is true especially of those incidental or accidental modes of response which so frequently appeared in connection with my work that I came to look upon them, the surprises of each day, as my chief means of insight.

Evidences of Ideation in Apes

Reliable literature of any sort concerning the behavior and mental life of the anthropoid apes is difficult to find, and still more rare are reports concerning experimental studies of these animals. There are, it is true, a few articles descriptive of tests of mental ability, but even these are scarcely deserving of being classed as satisfactory experimental studies of the psychology of the ape. I have the satisfaction of being able to present in the present report the first systematic experimental study of any feature of the behavior of an anthropoid ape.

Among the most interesting and valuable of the descriptions which may be classed among accounts of tests of mental ability is Hobhouse's (1915) study of the chimpanzee. The subject was an untrained animal, so far as stated, of somewhat unsatisfactory condition because of timidity. Nevertheless, Hobhouse was able to obtain from him numerous and interesting responses to novel situations, some of which may be safely accepted as evidences of ideation of a fairly high order.

Similar in method and result to the work of Hobhouse is that of Haggerty (unpublished thesis for the Doctorate of Philosophy, deposited in the Library of Harvard University). Haggerty's tests of the ability of young orang utans and chimpanzees to solve simple problems and to use tools in various ways yielded results which contrast most strikingly with those obtained in his experimental study of the imitative tendency in monkeys. His observations, had he committed himself to anything approaching interpretation, doubtless would have led him to conclusions concerning the ideational life of these animals very similar to those of Hobhouse.

Koehler, working in the Canary Islands, has, according to information which I have received from him by letter, made certain experiments with orang utans and chimpanzees similar to those of Hobhouse and Haggerty. His results I am unable to report as I have scanty information concerning them. They are, presumably, as yet unpublished.

In his laboratory at Montecito, California, Hamilton has from time to time kept anthropoid apes, but without special effort to investigate their ideational behavior. He has most interesting and valuable data concerning certain habits and instincts, all as yet unpublished.