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CHAPTER XXXVIII.

The Loyalists of America and Their Times · Egerton Ryerson — chapter 41 of 82 · ~2,654 words · public domain

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TREATMENT OF THE LOYALISTS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AFTER THE REVOLUTION.

PART I.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT--REFUSAL OF THE STATES TO COMPENSATE THE LOYALISTS.

It has been seen, by the fact stated in the last preceding chapter, that the promised recommendations of Congress to the several States, as agreed upon by the English and American Commissioners of the peace negotiations at Paris, were, as had been expected and predicted by Dr. Franklin at the time, without any result, the State Legislatures passing Acts to proscribe rather than compensate the Loyalists. In justification of these Acts, the American writers of that period, and largely down to the present time, assailed the character of the Loyalists in the grossest language of calumny and abuse; but the most respectable American writers of the present age bear testimony to the intelligence, wealth, and respectability of the Loyalists; and the fact, no longer questionable, that they sacrificed wealth, liberty, country, and chose poverty and exile, in support of their principles, has fully vindicated their character and presented their conduct in advantageous contrast with that of those who deprived them of their liberty, and largely profited by the confiscation of their immense property, while they and their families were pining in exile and want.

The only resource of the exiled and impoverished Loyalists, under such circumstances, was the Government and Parliament of the mother country to which they had so faithfully adhered, and nothing could be more honourable than the testimony borne in the British Parliament to their character and merits, and the consideration given to their wants and claims. The fifth Article of the Treaty of Paris, leaving the Loyalists to the recommendation of the Congress to the Legislatures of the several States, was severely reprobated in both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Commons, Mr. Wilberforce said that "when he considered the case of the Loyalists, he confessed he felt himself conquered; there he saw his country humiliated; he saw her at the feet of America; still he was induced to believe that Congress would religiously comply with the Article, and that the Loyalists would obtain redress from America. Should they not, this country was bound to afford it them. They must be compensated; Ministers, he was persuaded, meant to keep the faith of the nation with them."

Lord North (who had been Prime Minister during twelve years, including the war) said:

"And now let me, Sir, pause on a part of the treaty which awakens human sensibility in a very irresistible and lamentable degree. I cannot but lament the fate of those unhappy men, who, I conceive, were in general objects of our gratitude and protection. The Loyalists, from their attachments, surely had some claim to our affection. But what were not the claims of those who, in conformity to their allegiance, their cheerful obedience to the voice of Parliament, their confidence in the proclamation of our generals, invited under every assurance of military, parliamentary, political, and affectionate protection, espoused with the hazard of their lives, and the forfeiture of their properties, the cause of Great Britain? I cannot but feel for men thus sacrificed for their bravery and principles--men who have sacrificed all the dearest possessions of the human heart. They have exposed their lives, endured an age of hardships, deserted their interests, forfeited their possessions, lost their connections, and ruined their families in our cause. Could not all this waste of human enjoyment excite one desire of protecting them from a state of misery, with which the implacable resentment of the States has desired to punish their loyalty to their Sovereign and their attachment to their mother country? Had we not espoused their cause from a principle of affection and gratitude, we should, at least, have protected them to have preserved our own honour. If not tender of their feelings, we should have been tender of our own character. Never was the honour, the principles, the policy of a nation so grossly abused as in the desertion of those men, who are now exposed to every punishment that desertion and poverty can inflict, because they were not rebels."

Lord Mulgrave said: "The Article respecting the Loyalists he never could regard but as a lasting monument of national disgrace. Nor was this Article, in his opinion, more reproachful and derogatory to the honour and gratitude of Great Britain than it appeared to be wanton and unnecessary. The honourable gentleman who had made the motion had asked if those gentlemen who thought the present peace not sufficiently advantageous to Great Britain, considering her circumstances, could consent to pay the amount which another campaign (twenty millions) would have put us to, for the degree of advantage they might think we had a right to expect? In answer to this, he declared, for one, he had rather, large as the estimated sum in question was, have had it stipulated in the treaty, that Great Britain should apply it to making good the losses of the Loyalists, than that they should have been so shamefully deserted and the national honour so pointedly disgraced as it was by the fifth Article of the treaty with the United States."

Mr. Secretary Townsend (afterwards Lord Sydney) said "he was ready to admit that many of the Loyalists had the strongest claims upon the country; and he trusted, should the recommendation of Congress to the American States prove unsuccessful, which he flattered himself would not be the case, this country would feel itself bound in honour to make them full compensation for their losses."

Mr. Burke said: "At any rate, it must be agreed on all hands that a vast number of Loyalists had been deluded by this country, and had risked everything in our cause; to such men the nation owed protection, and its honour was pledged for their security at all hazards."

The Lord Advocate said: "With regard to the Loyalists, they merited every possible effort on the part of this country."

Mr. Sheridan "execrated the treatment of those unfortunate men, who, without the least notice taken of their civil and religious rights, were handed over as subjects to a power that would not fail to take vengeance on them for their zeal and attachment to the religion and government of this country. This was an instance of British degradation not inferior to the unmanly petitions to Congress for the wretched Loyalists. Great Britain at the feet of Congress, suing in vain, was not a humiliation or a stigma greater than the infamy of consigning over the loyal inhabitants of Florida, as we had done, without any conditions whatsoever."

"The Honourable Mr. Norton said that 'Under the circumstances, he was willing to approve of the two former (European treaties with France and Spain); but on account of the Article relating to the Loyalists, he felt it impossible to give his assent to the latter."

Sir Peter Burrell said: "The fate of the Loyalists claimed the compassion of every human breast. These helpless, forlorn men, abandoned by the Ministers of a people on whose justice, gratitude, and humanity they had the best-founded claims, were left at the mercy of a Congress highly irritated against them. He spoke not from party zeal, but as an independent country gentleman, who, unconnected with party, expressed the emotions of his heart and gave vent to his honest indignation."

Sir William Bootle said: "There was one part of the treaty at which his heart bled--the Article relative to the Loyalists. Being a man himself, he could not but feel for men so cruelly abandoned to the malice of their enemies. It was scandalous; it was disgraceful. Such an Article as that ought scarcely on any condition to have been admitted on our part. They had fought for us and run every hazard to assist our cause; and when it most behoved us to afford them protection, we deserted them."

Several other members spoke to the same effect. The treaty recognizing the Independence of America could not be reversed, as an Act passed the previous session had expressly authorized the King and his Cabinet to make it; but it was denied that a treaty sacrificing the Loyalists and making the concessions involved had been authorized; in consequence of which an express vote of censure was passed by the Commons by a majority of seventeen. The Earl of Shelburne, the Prime Minister, forthwith resigned in consequence of this vote of censure, and it was nearly three months before a new Administration could be formed; and during this administrative interregnum affairs were in great confusion.

In the House of Lords, Lord Walsingham said that "he could neither think nor speak of the dishonour of leaving these deserving people to their fate with patience." Lord Viscount Townsend considered that "to desert men who had constantly adhered to loyalty and attachment, was a circumstance of such cruelty as had never before been heard of." Lord Stormont said that "Britain was bound in justice and honour, gratitude and affection, and by every tie, to provide for and protect them." Lord Sackville regarded "the abandonment of the Loyalists as a thing of so atrocious a kind, that if it had not been painted in all its horrid colours he should have attempted the ungracious task but never should have been able to describe the cruelty in language as strong and expressive as were his feelings;" and again, that "peace on the sacrifice of these unhappy subjects must be answered in the sight of God and man." Lord Loughborough said that "the fifth Article of the treaty had excited a general and just indignation, and that neither in ancient nor modern history had there been so shameful a desertion of men who had sacrificed all to their duty and to their reliance on British faith."

In reply, Lord Shelburne, the Prime Minister, frankly admitted that the Loyalists were left without better provision being made for them "from the unhappy necessity of public affairs, which induced the extremity of submitting the fate of their property to the discretion of their enemies;" and he continued: "I have but one answer to give the House--it is the answer I gave my own bleeding heart--a part must be wounded, that the whole of the empire may not perish. If better terms could be had, think you, my lords, that I would not have embraced them? I had but the alternative either to accept the terms proposed or continue the war." The Lord Chancellor held that the stipulations of the treaty were "specific," and said: "My own conscious honour will not allow me to doubt the good faith of others, and my good wishes to the Loyalists will not let me indiscreetly doubt the disposition of Congress, since the understanding is that all these unhappy men shall be provided for; yet, if it were not so, Parliament could take cognizance of their case, and impart to each suffering individual that relief which reason, perhaps policy, certainly virtue and religion, required."

Such were the sentiments of members in both Houses of Parliament, and of both parties, as to the character and merits of the Loyalists. But there were no prospects of the States compensating them for their losses. Indeed, this idea was entertained by Lord Shelburne himself, and that compensation would have to be made to the Loyalists by Parliament when, in the speech above quoted, he said that "without one drop of blood spilt, and without one-fifth of the expense of one year's campaign, happiness and ease can be given to them in as ample a manner as these blessings were ever in their enjoyment." This was certainly a very low and mercenary view of the subject. It was one thing for the Loyalists to have their rights as British subjects maintained while they were obeying the commands of the King and maintaining their allegiance to the empire, and another thing for them to become pensioners upon the bounty of the British Parliament, to be paid in pounds, shillings, and pence for the rights and privileges which should have been secured to them by national treaty as British subjects. The House of Commons had adopted a resolution against continuing the American war for the purpose of enforcing the submission of the colonies; but it had not resolved against continuing the war to protect the rights and property of British subjects in the colonies. A campaign for this purpose, on the refusal of the American Commissioners to recognize what was sanctioned by the laws and usages of nations, would have been honourable to the British Government, would have been popular in England, and would have divided America; for there were many thousand "Whigs" in America, who believed in the equity of treating the Loyalists after the war as all others were treated who conformed to the laws, as has been the case in Holland, Ireland, and Spain. England was then mistress of the seas, held New York, Charleston, Rhode Island, Penobscot, and other military posts, and could soon have induced the Americans to do what their Peace Commissioners at Paris had refused to do--place British subjects in America upon the same footing as to property that they possessed before the war, and that they possess in the United States at this day. England could have easily and successfully refused granting to the United States a foot of land beyond the limits of the thirteen colonies, and thus have secured those vast western territories now constituting the larger part of the United States, and retained the garrisons of New York, Rhode Island, and Charleston as guarantees until the stipulated conditions in regard to the Loyalists should be fulfilled. A joint Commission in America could have settled upon equitable grounds all disputed claims in much less time than the six years occupied by a Parliamentary Commission in examining into and deciding upon the individual claims of Loyalist claimants. If the war to reduce the colonies to absolute submission had been unpopular in England, the peace upon the terms submitted to by the English Commissioners and the Ministry was equally unpopular. If England had been wrong in its war of coercion against the revolting colonists, was she not equally wrong, and more than wrong, in abandoning to their enemies those who had abided faithful to her laws and commands? The language of the speeches of members of both Houses of Parliament, above quoted, is as just as it is severe; although much could be and was said in justification of the policy of the Government in promoting peace upon almost any terms, seeing that England was at war with the three most powerful naval nations of Europe, besides that in America.

The fallacy of the argument employed by the advocates of the treaty, that the Americans would honourably fulfil the recommendations of Congress, was illustrated by the following facts:

"The province of Virginia, a short time before the peace, had come to an unanimous conclusion 'that all demands or requests of the British Court for the restoration of property confiscated by the State were wholly impossible; and that their delegates should be instructed to move Congress that they should direct the deputies for adjusting peace not to agree to any such restitution.'"

The State of New York resolved, "That it appears to this Legislature that divers of the inhabitants of this State have continued to adhere to the King of Great Britain, after these States were declared free and independent, and persevered in aiding the said king, his fleets and armies, to subjugate the United States to bondage: Resolved, That as on the one hand the scales of justice do not require, so on the other the public tranquillity will not permit, that such adherents who have been attainted should be restored to the rights of citizens, and that there can be no reason for restoring property which has been confiscated or forfeited."

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