CHAPTER VI.

P. 145, § 80. Goethe; the reference is to Werke, ii. 268 (Natur und Kunst):

Wer Groszes will, muß sich zusammenraffen: In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister, Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben.

Such 'limitation' of aim and work is a frequent lesson in Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre, e.g. i. ch. 4. 'Many-sidedness prepares, properly speaking, only the element in which the one-sided can act.... The best thing is to restrict oneself to a handi-work.' And i. ch. 12: 'To be acquainted with and to exercise one thing rightly gives higher training than mere tolerableness (halfness) in a hundred sorts of things.' And ii. ch. 12: 'Your general training and all establishments for the purpose are fool's farces.'

P. 147, § 81. Cf. Fichte, Werke, ii. 37. 'Yet it is not we who analyse: but knowledge analyses itself, and can do so, because in all its being it is a for-self (Für:sich),' &c.

P. 149, § 81. Plato, the inventor of Dialectic. Sometimes on the authority of Aristotle, as reported by Diog. Laert. ix. 25, Zeno of Elea gets this title; but Hegel refers to such statements as Diog. Laer,', ii. 34 τρίτον δὲ Πλάτων προσέθηκε τὸν διαλεκτικὸν λόγον, καὶ ἐτελεσιουργῆσε φιλοσοφίαν.

Protagoras. But it is rather in the dialogue Meno, pp. 81-97, that Plato exhibits this view of knowledge. Cf. Phaedo,72 E, and Phaedrus, 245.

Parmenides; especially see Plat. Parmen. pp. 142, 166; cf. Hegel, Werke, xi v. 204.

With Aristotle dialectic is set in contrast to apodictic, and treated as (in the modern sense) a quasi-inductive process (Ar. Top. Lib. viii.): with the Stoics, dialectic is the name of the half-rhetorical logic which they, rather than Aristotle, handed on to the schoolmen of the Middle Ages.

P. 150, § 81. The physical elements are fire, air, earth, and water. Earthquakes, storms, &c, are examples of the 'meteorological process.' Cf. Encyclop. §§ 281-289.

P. 152, § 82. Dialectic; cf: Werke, v. 326 seqq.

P. 154, § 82. Mysticism; cf. Mill's Logic, bk. v, ch. 3, § 4: 'Mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of the mind's own faculties, to mere ideas of the intellect; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in the world without.' Mill thus takes it as equivalent to an ontological mythology--probably a rare use of the term.