CHAPTER VII.. Lord Cochrane's Voyage to Chili.—His Reception At Valparaiso and

LORD COCHRANE'S VOYAGE TO CHILI.—HIS RECEPTION AT VALPARAISO AND SANTIAGO.—THE DISORGANIZATION OF THE CHILIAN FLEET.—FIRST SIGNS OF DISAFFECTION.—THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE CHILIANS AND THE SPANIARDS.—LORD COCHRANE'S FIRST EXPEDITION TO PERU.—HIS ATTACK ON CALLAO.—"DRAKE THE DRAGON" AND "COCHRANE THE DEVIL."—LORD COCHRANE'S SUCCESSES IN OVERAWING THE SPANIARDS, IN TREASURE-TAKING, AND IN ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE PERUVIANS TO JOIN IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.—HIS PLAN FOE ANOTHER ATTACK ON CALLAO.—HIS DIFFICULTIES IN EQUIPPING THE EXPEDITION.—THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT.—HIS PLAN FOR STORMING VALDIVIA.—ITS SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT.

Having accepted, in May, 1817, the offer conveyed to him by the Chilian Government through Don Jose Alvarez, Lord Cochrane's departure from England was delayed for more than a year. This was chiefly on account of the war-steamer, the Rising Star, which it was arranged to build and equip in London under his superintendence. But the work proceeded so slowly, in consequence of the difficulty experienced by Alvarez in raising the requisite funds, that, at last, Lord Cochrane, being urgently needed in South America, where the Spaniards were steadily gaining ground, was requested to leave the superintendence of the Rising Star in other hands, and to cross the Atlantic without her.

Accompanied by Lady Cochrane and his two children, he went first from Rye to Boulogne, and there, on the 15th of August, 1818, embarked in the Rose, a merchantman which had formerly been a warsloop. The long voyage was uninteresting until Cape Horn was reached. There, and in passing along the rugged coast-line of Tierra del Fuego, Lord Cochrane was struck by its wild scenery. He watched the lazy penguins that crowded on the rocks, among evergreens that showed brightly amid the imposing mass of snow, and caught with hooks the lazier sea-pigeons that skimmed the heavy waves and hovered round the bulwarks and got entangled among the rigging of the Rose. He shot several of the huge albatrosses that floated fearlessly over the deck, but was not successful in his efforts to catch the fish that were seen coming to the surface of the troubled sea. The sea was made so boisterous by rain and snow, and such a stiff wind blew from the west, that for two or three days the Rose could not double the Cape. She was forced to tack towards the south until a favourable gale set in, which carried her safely to Valparaiso.

Valparaiso was reached on the 28th of November, after ten weeks passed on shipboard. There and at Santiago, the seat of government, to which he proceeded as soon as the congratulations of his new friends would allow him, Lord Cochrane was heartily welcomed. So profuse and prolonged were the entertainments in his favour—splendid dinners, at which zealous patriots tendered their hearty compliments, being followed by yet more splendid balls, at which handsome women showed their gratitude in smiles, and eagerly sought the honour of being led by him through the dances which were their chief delight—that he had to remind his guests that he had come to Chili not to feast but to fight.

There was prompt need of fighting. The Spaniards had a strong land force pressing up from the south and threatening to invest Santiago. Their formidable fleet swept the seas, and was being organized for an attack on Valparaiso. Admiral Blanco Encalada had just returned from a cruise in which he had succeeded in capturing, in Talcuanho Bay, a fine Spanish fifty-gun frigate, the Maria Isabel; but his fleet was ill-ordered and poorly equipped, quite unable, without thorough re-organization, to withstand the superior force of the enemy. An instance of the bad state of affairs was induced by Lord Cochrane's arrival, and seemed likely to cause serious trouble to him and worse misfortune to his Chilian employers. One of the republican vessels was the Hecate, a sloop of eighteen guns which had been sold out of the British navy and bought as a speculation by Captains Guise and Spry. Having first offered her in vain to the Buenos Ayrean Government, they had brought her on to Chili, and there contrived to sell her with advantage and to be themselves taken into the Chilian service. They and another volunteer, Captain Worcester, a North American, liking the ascendancy over Admiral Bianco which their experience had won for them, formed a cabal with the object of securing Admiral Blanco's continuance in the chief command, or its equal division between him and Lord Cochrane. Nothing but the Chilian admiral's disinterested patriotism prevented a serious rupture. He steadily withstood all temptations to his vanity, and avowed his determination to accept no greater honour—if there could be a greater—than that of serving as second in command under the brave Englishman who had come to fight for the independence of Chili. Thus, though some troubles afterwards sprang from the disaffections of Guise, Spry, and Worcester, the mischief schemed by them was prevented at starting.

A few days after his arrival Lord Cochrane received his commission as "Vice-Admiral of Chili, Admiral, and Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Republic." His flag was hoisted, on the 22nd of December, on board the Maria Isabel, now rechristened the O'Higgins, and fitted out as the principal ship in the small Chilian fleet. The other vessels of the fleet were the San Martin, formerly an Indiaman in the English service, of fifty-six guns; the Lautaro, also an old Indiaman, of forty-four guns; the Galvarino, as the Hecate of Captains Cruise and Spry was now styled, of eighteen guns; the Chacabuco, of twenty guns; the Aracauno, of sixteen guns; and a sloop of fourteen guns named the Puyrredon.

The Spanish fleet, which these seven ships had to withstand, comprised fourteen vessels and twenty-seven gunboats. Of the former three were frigates, the Esmeralda, of forty-four guns, the Venganza, of forty-two guns, and the Sebastiana, of twenty-eight guns; four were brigs, the Maypeu, of eighteen guns, the Pezuela, of twenty-two guns, the Potrilla, of eighteen guns, and another, whose name is not recorded, also of eighteen guns. There was a schooner, name unknown, which carried one large gun and twenty culverins. The rest were armed merchantmen, the Resolution, of thirty-six guns; the Cleopatra, of twenty-eight guns; the La Focha, of twenty guns; the Guarmey, of eighteen guns; the Fernando, of twenty-six guns, and the San Antonio, of eighteen guns. Only ten out of the fourteen, however, were ready for sea; and before the whole naval force could be got ready for service, it had been partly broken up by Lord Cochrane.

There was delay, also, in getting the Chilian fleet under sail. After waiting at Valparaiso as long as he deemed prudent, Lord Cochrane left the three smaller vessels to complete their equipment under Admiral Blanco's direction, and passed out of port on the 16th of January, with the O'Higgins, the San Martin, the Lautaro, and the Chacabuco. He had hardly started before a mutiny broke out on board the last-named vessel, which compelled him to halt at Coquimbo long enough to try and punish the mutineers. Resuming the voyage, he proceeded along the Chilian and Peruvian coast as far northward as Callao Bay, where he cruised about for some days, awaiting an opportunity of attacking the Spanish shipping there collected in considerable force.

While thus waiting he employed his leisure in observations, great and small, of the sort and in the way characteristic of him all through life. One of his rough notes runs thus:—"Cormorants resort in enormous nights, coming in the morning from the northward to Callao Bay, and proceeding along shore to the southward, diving in regular succession one after another on the fish which, driven at the same time from below by shoals of porpoises, seem to have no chance but to be devoured under water or scooped up in the large bags pendent from the enormous bills of the cormorants." "Prodigious seals," we read in another note, "inhabit the rocks, whose grave faces and grey beards look more like the human countenance than the faces of most other animals. They are very unwieldy in their movements when on shore, but most expert in the water. There is a small kind of duck in the bay, which, from the clearness of the water, can be seen flying with its wings under water in chase of small fry, which it speedily overtakes from its prodigious speed."

From note-making of that sort, Lord Cochrane turned to more serious business. The batteries of Callao and of San Lorenzo, a little island in the bay which helped to form the port, mounted one hundred and sixty guns, and more than twice as many were at the command of vessels there lying-to. Direct attack of a force so very much superior to that of the Chilian fleet seemed out of the question. Therefore Lord Cochrane bethought him of a subterfuge. Learning that two North American war-ships were expected at Callao, he determined to personate them with the O'Higgins and Lautaro, and so enter the port under alien colours. It was then carnival-time, and on the 21st of February, deeming that the Spaniards were more likely to be off their guard, he proposed "to make a feint of sending a boat ashore with despatches, and in the mean time suddenly to dash at the frigates and cut them out." Unfortunately a dense fog set in, which lasted till the 28th, and made it impossible for him to effect his purpose before the carnival was over. Let the sequel be told in his own words.

"On the 28th, hearing heavy firing and imagining that one of the ships was engaged with the enemy, I stood with the flag-ship into the bay. The other ships, imagining the same thing, also steered in the direction of the firing, when, the fog clearing for a moment, we discovered each other, as well as a strange sail near us. This proved to be a Spanish gunboat, with a lieutenant and twenty men, who, on being made prisoners, informed us that the firing was a salute in honour of the Viceroy, who had that morning been on a visit of inspection to the batteries and shipping, and was then on board the brig-of-war Pezuela, which we saw crowding sail in the direction of the batteries. The fog, again coming on, suggested to me the possibility of a direct attack. Accordingly, still maintaining our disguise under American colours, the O'Higgins and Lautaro stood towards the batteries, narrowly escaping going ashore in the fog. The Viceroy, having no doubt witnessed the capture of the gunboat, had, however, provided for our reception, the garrison being at their guns, and the crews of the ships-of-war at their quarters. Notwithstanding the great odds, I determined to persist in an attack, as our withdrawing, without firing a shot, would produce an effect upon the minds of the Spaniards the reverse of that intended. I had sufficient experience in war to know that moral effect, even if the result of a degree of temerity, will not unfrequently supply the place of superior force.

"The wind falling light, I did not venture on laying the flag-ship and the Lautaro alongside the Spanish frigates, as I at first intended, but anchored with springs on our cables, abreast of the shipping, which was arranged in a half-moon of two lines, the rear-rank being judiciously disposed so as to cover the intervals of the ships in the front line. A dead calm succeeded, and we were for two hours exposed to a heavy fire from the batteries, in addition to that from the two frigates, the brigs Pezuela and Maypeu, and seven or eight gunboats. Nevertheless the northern angle of one of the principal forts was silenced by our fire. As soon as a breeze sprang up, we weighed anchor, standing to and fro in front of the batteries, and returning their fire, until Captain Guise, who commanded the Lautaro, being severely wounded, that ship sheered off and never again came within range. As, from want of wind, or doubt of the result, neither the San Martin nor the Chacabuco had ever got within fire, the flag-ship was thus left alone, and I was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attack. I withdrew to the island of San Lorenzo, about three miles distant from the forts; the Spaniards, though nearly quadruple our numbers, exclusive of their gunboats, not venturing to follow us.

"The action having been commenced in a fog, the Spaniards imagined that all the Chilian vessels were engaged. They were not a little surprised, as it again cleared, to find that their own frigate, the quondam Maria Isabella, was almost their only opponent. So much were they dispirited by this discovery that, as soon as possible after the close of the contest, their ships-of-war were dismantled, the topmasts and spars being formed into a double boom across the anchorage, so as to prevent approach. The Spaniards were also previously unaware of my being in command of the Chilian squadron. On becoming acquainted with this fact, they bestowed upon me the not very complimentary title of 'El Diablo,' by which I was afterwards known amongst them."

Two hundred and forty years before, almost to a day, Sir Francis Drake—whom, of all English seamen, Lord Cochrane most resembled in chivalrous daring and in chivalrous hatred of oppression—had secretly led his little Golden Hind into the harbour of Callao, and there despoiled a Spanish fleet of seventeen vessels; for which and for his other brave achievements he won the nickname of El Dracone. Drake the Dragon and Cochrane the Devil were kinsmen in noble hatred, and noble punishment, of Spanish wrong-doing.

Retiring to San Lorenzo, after the fight in Callao Bay on the 28th of February, Lord Cochrane occupied the island, and from it blockaded Callao for five weeks. On the island he found thirty-seven Chilian soldiers, whom the Spaniards had made prisoners eight years before. "The unhappy men," he said, "had ever since been forced to work in chains under the supervision of a military guard—now prisoners in turn; their sleeping-place during the whole of this period being a filthy shed, in which they were every night chained by one leg to an iron bar." Yet worse, as he was informed by the poor fellows whom he freed from their misery, was the condition of some Chilian officers and seamen imprisoned in Lima, and so cruelly chained that the fetters had worn bare their ankles to the bone. He accordingly, under a flag of truce, sent to the Spanish Viceroy, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela, offering to exchange for these Chilian prisoners a larger number of Spaniards captured by himself and others. This proposal was bluntly refused by the Viceroy, who took occasion, in his letter, to avow his surprise that a British nobleman should come to fight for a rebel community "unacknowledged by all the powers of the globe." Lord Cochrane replied that "a British nobleman was a free man, and therefore had a right to assist any country which was endeavouring to re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity." "I have," he added, "adopted the cause of Chili with the same freedom of judgment that I previously exercised when refusing the offer of an admiral's rank in Spain, made to me not long ago by the Spanish ambassador in London."

Except in blockading Callao and repairing his ships little was done by Lord Cochrane during his stay at San Lorenzo. On the 1st of March he went into the harbour again and opened a destructive fire upon the Spanish gunboats, but as these soon sought shelter under the batteries, which the O'Higgins and the Lautaro were not strong enough to oppose, the demonstration did not last long. Unsuccessful also was an attempt made upon the batteries, with the aid of an explosion-vessel, on the 22nd of March. The explosion-vessel, when just within musket-range, was struck by a round shot, and foundered, thus spoiling the intended enterprise. But other plans fared better.

At the beginning of April, Lord Cochrane left San Lorenzo and proceeded to Huacho, a few leagues north of Callao. Its inhabitants were for the most part in sympathy with the republican cause, and the Spanish garrison fled at almost the first gunshot, leaving a large quantity of government property and specie in the hands of the assailants. Much other treasure, which proved very serviceable to the impoverished Chilian exchequer, was captured by the little fleet during a two months' cruise about the coast of Peru, both north and south of Callao. Everywhere, too, the Spanish cause was weakened, and the natives were encouraged to share in the great work of South American rebellion against a tyranny of three centuries' duration. "It was my object," said Lord Cochrane, "to make friends of the Peruvian people, by adopting towards them a conciliatory course, and by strict care that none but Spanish property should be taken. Confidence was thus inspired, and the universal dissatisfaction with Spanish rule speedily became changed into an earnest desire to be freed from it."

Having cruised about the Peruvian coast during April and May, Lord Cochrane returned to Valparaiso on the 16th of June. "The objects of the first expedition," he said, "had been fully accomplished, namely, to reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron should be rendered efficient; but more especially to ascertain the inclinations of the Peruvians—a point of the first importance to Chili, as being obliged to be constantly on the alert for her own newly-acquired liberties so long as the Spaniards were in undisturbed possession of Peru. To the accomplishment of these objects had been superadded the restriction of the Spanish naval force to the shelter of the forts, the defeat of their military forces wherever encountered, and the capture of no inconsiderable amount of treasure." That was work enough to be done by four small ships, ill-manned and ill-provisioned, during a five months' absence from Valparaiso; and the Chilians were not ungrateful.

Their gratitude, however, was not strong enough to make them zealous co-operators in his schemes for their benefit. Lord Cochrane was eager to start upon another expedition, in which he hoped for yet greater success. But for this were needed preparations which the poverty and mismanagement of the Chilian Government made almost impossible. He asked for a thousand troops with which to facilitate a second attack on Callao. This force, certainly not a large one, was promised, but, when he was about to embark, only ninety soldiers were ready, and even then a private subscription had to be raised for giving them decent clothing instead of the rags in which they appeared. For the assault on Callao, also, an ample supply of rockets was required. An engineer named Goldsack had gone from England to construct them, and, that there might be no stinting in the work, Lord Cochrane offered to surrender all his share of prize-money. The offer was refused; but, to save money, their manufacture was assigned to some Spanish prisoners, who showed their patriotism in making them so badly that, when tried, they were found utterly worthless. There were other instances of false economy, whereby Lord Cochrane's intended services to his Chilian employers were seriously hindered. The vessels were refitted, however, and a new one, an American-built corvette, named the Independencia, of twenty-eight guns, was added to the number.

After nearly three months' stay at Valparaiso, he again set sail on the 12th of September, 1819. Admiral Blanco was his second in command, and his squadron consisted of the O'Higgins, the San Martin, the Lautaro, the Independencia, the Galvarino, the Araucano, and the Puyrredon, mounting two hundred and twenty guns in all. There were also two old vessels, to be used as fireships.

The fleet entered Callao Roads on the 29th of September. On this occasion there was no subterfuge. On the 30th Lord Cochrane despatched a boat to Callao with a flag of truce, and a challenge to the Viceroy to send out his ships—nearly twice as strong as those of Chili in guns and men—for a fair fight in the open sea. The challenge was bluntly rejected, and an attack on the batteries and the ships in harbour was then planned. On the 1st of October, the smaller vessels reconnoitred the bay, and there was some fighting, in which the Araucano was damaged. Throughout the night of the 2nd, a formidable attack was attempted, in which the main reliance was placed in the Goldsack rockets; but, in consequence of the treacherous handling of the Spanish soldiers who had filled them, they proved worse than useless, doing nearly as much injury to the men who fired them as to the enemy. Only one gunboat was sunk by the shells from a raft commanded by Major Miller, who also did some damage to the forts and shipping. On the night of the 4th, Lord Cochrane amused himself, while a fireship was being prepared, by causing a burning tar-barrel to be drifted with the tide towards the enemy's shipping. It was, in the darkness, supposed to be a much more formidable antagonist, and volleys of Spanish shot were spent upon it. On the following evening a fireship was despatched; but this also was a failure. A sudden calm prevented her progress. She was riddled through and through by the enemy's guns, and, rapidly gaining water in consequence, had to be fired so much too soon that she exploded before getting near enough to work any serious mischief among the Spanish shipping.

By these misfortunes Lord Cochrane was altogether disheartened. The rockets, on which he had chiefly relied, had proved worthless, and, one fireship having been wasted, he did not care to risk the loss of the other. He found too that the Spaniards, profiting by the warning which he had previously given, had so strengthened their booms that it was quite impossible, with the small force at his command, to get at them or to reach the port. His store of provisions, also, was nearly exhausted, and the fresh supply promised from Chili had not arrived. He therefore reluctantly, for the time, abandoned his project for taking Callao.

He continued to watch the port for a few weeks, however, hoping for some chance opportunity of injuring it; and, in the interval, sent three hundred and fifty soldiers and marines, under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles and Major Miller, in the Lautaro, the Galvarino, and the remaining fireship, commanded by Captain Guise, to attack Pisco and procure from it and the neighbourhood the requisite provisions. This was satisfactorily done; but the sickness of many of his men caused his further detention at Santa, whither he had gone from Callao. On the 21st of November the sick were sent to Valparaiso, in the charge of the San Martin, the Independencia, and the Araucano. With the remaining ships, the O'Higgins, the Lautaro, the Galvarino, and the Puyrredon, Lord Cochrane proceeded to the mouth of the River Guayaquil. There, on the 28th of the month, he captured two large Spanish vessels, one of twenty and the other of sixteen guns, laden with timber, and took possession of the village of Puna. At Guayaquil there was another delay of a fortnight, owing to a mutiny attempted by Captains Guise and Spry, whose treacherous disposition has already been mentioned.

Not till the middle of December was he able to escape from the troubles brought upon him by others, and to return to work worthy of his great name and character. Then, however, sending one of his ships, with the prizes, to Valparaiso, and leaving two others to watch the Peruvian coast, he started, with only his flag-ship, upon an enterprise as brilliant in conception and execution as any in his whole eventful history. "The Chilian people," he said, "expected impossibilities; and I. had for some time been revolving in my mind a plan to achieve one which should gratify them, and allay my own wounded feelings. I had now only one ship, so that there were no other inclinations to consult; and I felt quite sure of Major Miller's concurrence where there was any fighting to be done. My design was, with the flag-ship alone, to capture by a coup de main the numerous forts and garrison of Valdivia, a fortress previously deemed impregnable, and thus to counteract the disappointment which would ensue in Chili from our want of success at Callao. The enterprise was a desperate one; nevertheless, I was not about to do anything desperate, having resolved that, unless I was fully satisfied as to its practicability, I would not attempt it. Rashness, though often imputed to me, forms no part of my composition. There is a rashness without calculation of consequences; but with that calculation well-founded, it is no longer rashness. And thus, now that I was unfettered by people who did not second my operations as they ought to have done, I made up my mind to take Valdivia, if the attempt came within the scope of my calculations."

Valdivia was the stronghold and centre of Spanish attack upon Chili from the south, just as were Lima and Callao on the north. To reach it Lord Cochrane had to sail northwards along the coast of Peru and Chili to some distance below Valparaiso. This he did without loss of time, to work out an excellent strategy which will be best understood from his own report of it.

"The first step," he said, "clearly was to reconnoitre Valdivia. The flag-ship arrived on the 18th of January, 1820, under Spanish colours, and made a signal for a pilot, who—as the Spaniards mistook the O'Higgins for a ship of their own—promptly came off, together with a complimentary retinue of an officer and four soldiers, all of whom were made prisoners as soon as they came on board. The pilot was ordered to take us into the channels leading to the forts, whilst the officer and his men, knowing there was little chance of their finding their way on shore again, thought it most conducive to their interests to supply all the information demanded, the result being increased confidence on my part as to the possibility of a successful attack. Amongst other information obtained was the expected arrival of the Spanish brig Potrillo, with money on board for the payment of the garrison.

"As we were busily employing ourselves in inspecting the channels, the officer commanding the garrison began to suspect that our object might not altogether be pacific, a suspicion which was confirmed by the detention of his officer. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon us from the various forts, to which we did not reply, but, our reconnoissance being now complete, withdrew beyond its reach. Two days were occupied in reconnoitring. On the third day the Potrillo hove in sight, and she, being also deceived by our Spanish colours, was captured without a shot, twenty thousand dollars and some important despatches being found on board."

That first business having been satisfactorily achieved, Lord Cochrane proceeded to Concepcion, there to ask and obtain from its Chilian governor, General Freire, a force of two hundred and fifty soldiers, under Major Beauchef, a French volunteer. In Talcahuano Bay, moreover, he found a Chilian schooner, the Montezuma, and a Brazilian brig, the Intrepido. He attached the former to his service, and accepted the volunteered aid of the latter. With this augmented but still insignificant force, very defective in some important respects, he returned to Valdivia. "The flag-ship," he said, "had only two naval officers on board, one of these being under arrest for disobedience of orders, whilst the other was incapable of performing the duty of lieutenant; so that I had to act as admiral, captain and lieutenant, taking my turn in the watch—or rather being constantly on the watch—as the only available officer was so incompetent."

"We sailed from Talcahuano on the 25th of January," the narrative proceeds, "when I communicated my intentions to the military officers, who displayed great eagerness in the cause—alone questioning their success from motives of prudence. On my explaining to them that, if unexpected projects are energetically put in execution, they almost invariably succeed in spite of odds, they willingly entered into my plans.

"On the night of the 29th, we were off the island of Quiriquina, in a dead calm. From excessive fatigue in the execution of subordinate duties, I had lain down to rest, leaving the ship in charge of the lieutenant, who took advantage of my absence to retire also, surrendering the watch to the care of a midshipman, who fell asleep. Knowing our dangerous position, I had left strict orders that I was to be called the moment a breeze sprang up; but these orders were neglected. A sudden wind took the ship unawares, and the midshipman, in attempting to bring her round, ran her upon the sharp edge of a rock, where she lay beating, suspended, as it were, upon her keel; and, had the swell increased, she must inevitably have gone to pieces.

"We were forty miles from the mainland, the brig and schooner being both out of sight. The first impulse, both of officers and crew, was to abandon the ship, but, as we had six hundred men on board, whilst not more than a hundred and fifty could have entered the boats, this would have been but a scramble for life. Pointing out to the men that those who escaped could only reach the coast of Arauco, where they would meet nothing but torture and inevitable death at the hands of the Indians, I with some difficulty got them to adopt the alternative of attempting to save the ship. The first sounding gave five feet of water in the hold, and the pumps were entirely out of order. Our carpenter, who was only one by name, was incompetent to repair them; but, having myself some skill in carpentry, I took off my coat, and by midnight, got them into working order, the water in the meanwhile gaining on us, though the whole crew were engaged in baling it out with buckets.

"To our great delight, the leak did not increase, upon which I got out the stream anchor and commenced heaving off the ship; the officers clamoured first to ascertain the extent of the leak; but this I expressly forbade, as calculated to damp the energy of the men, whilst, as we now gained on the leak, there was no doubt the ship would swim as far as Valdivia, which was the chief point to be regarded, the capture of the fortress being my object, after which the ship might be repaired at leisure. As there was no lack of physical force on board, she was at length floated; but the powder magazine having been under water, the ammunition of every kind, except a little upon deck and in the cartouche-boxes of the troops, was rendered unserviceable; though about this I cared little, as it involved the necessity of using the bayonet in our anticipated attack; and to facing this weapon the Spaniards had, in every case, evinced a rooted aversion."

The O'Higgins, thus bravely saved from wreck, was soon joined by the Intrepido and the Montezuma, and these vessels being now most fit for action, as many men as possible were transferred to them, and the O'Higgins was ordered to stand out to sea, only to be made use of in case of need. The Montezuma now became the flag-ship, and with her and her consort Lord Cochrane sailed into Valdivia Harbour on the 2nd of February.

"The fortifications of Valdivia," he said, "are placed on both sides of a channel three quarters of a mile in width, and command the entrance, anchorage, and river leading to the town, crossing their fire in all directions so effectually that, with proper caution on the part of the garrison, no ship could enter without suffering severely, while she would be equally exposed at anchor. The principal forts on the western shore are placed in the following order:—El Ingles, San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo, Alto, and Corral Castle. Those on the eastern side are Niebla, directly opposite Amargos, and Piojo; whilst on the island of Manzanera is a strong fort mounted with guns of large calibre, commanding the whole range of the entrance channel. These forts and a few others, fifteen in all, would render the place in the hands of a skilful garrison almost impregnable, the shores on which they stand being inaccessible by reason of the surf, with the exception of a small landing-place at Fort Ingles.

"It was to this landing-place that we first directed our attention, anchoring the brig and schooner off the guns of Fort Ingles on the afternoon of February the 3rd, amidst a swell which rendered immediate disembarkation impracticable. The troops were carefully kept below; and, to avert the suspicion of the Spaniards, we had trumped up a story of our having just arrived from Cadiz and being in want of a pilot. They told us to send a boat for one. To this we replied that our boats had been washed away in the passage round Cape Horn. Not being quite satisfied, they began to assemble troops at the landing-place, firing alarm-guns, and rapidly bringing up the garrisons of the western forts to Fort Ingles, but not molesting us.

"Unfortunately for the credit of the story about the loss of the boats, which were at the time carefully concealed under the lee of the vessels, one drifted astern, so that our object became apparent, and the guns of Fort Ingles, under which we lay, forthwith opened upon us, the first shots passing through the sides of the Intrepido and killing two men, so that it became necessary to land in spite of the swell. We had only two launches and a gig. I directed the operation in the gig, whilst Major Miller, with forty-four marines, pushed off in the first launch, under the fire of the party at the landing-place, on to which they soon leaped, driving the Spaniards before them at the point of the bayonet. The second launch then pushed off from the Intrepido, while the other was returning; and in this way, in less than an hour, three hundred men had made good their footing on shore.

"The most difficult task, the capture of the forts, was to come. The only way in which the first, Fort Ingles, could be approached, was by a precipitous path, along which the men could only pass in single file, the fort itself being inaccessible except by a ladder, which the enemy, after being routed by Major Miller, had drawn up.

"As soon as it was dark, a picked party, under the guidance of one of the Spanish prisoners, silently advanced to the attack. This party having taken up its position, the main body moved forward, cheering and firing in the air, to intimate to the Spaniards that their chief reliance was on the bayonet. The enemy, meanwhile, kept up an incessant fire of artillery and musketry in the direction of the shouts, but without effect, as no aim could be taken in the dark.

"Whilst the patriots were thus noisily advancing, a gallant young officer, Ensign Vidal, got under the inland flank of the fort, and, with a few men, contrived to tear up some pallisades, by which a bridge was made across the ditch. In that way he and his small party entered and formed noiselessly under cover of some branches of trees, while the garrison, numbering about eight hundred soldiers, were directing their whole attention in an opposite direction.

"A volley from Vidal's party convinced the Spaniards that they had been taken in flank. Without waiting to ascertain the number of those who had outflanked them, they instantly took to flight, filling with a like panic a column of three hundred men drawn up behind the fort. The Chilians, who were now well up, bayoneted them by dozens as they attempted to gain the forts; and when the forts were opened to receive them the patriots entered at the same time, and thus drove them from fort to fort into the Castle of Corral, together with two hundred more who had abandoned some guns advantageously placed on a height at Fort Chorocomayo. The Corral was stormed with equal rapidity, a number of the enemy escaping in boats to Valdivia, others plunging into the forest. Upwards of a hundred fell into our hands, and on the following morning the like number were found to have been bayoneted. Our loss was seven men killed and nineteen wounded.

"On the 5th, the Intrepido and Montezuma, which had been left near Fort Ingles, entered the harbour, being fired at in their passage by Fort Niebla, on the eastern shore. On their coming to an anchor at the Corral, two hundred men were again embarked to attack Forts Niebla, Carbonero, and Piojo. The O'Higgins also appeared in sight off the mouth of the harbour. The Spaniards thereupon summarily abandoned the forts on the eastern side; no doubt judging that, as the western forts had been captured without the aid of the frigate, they had, now that she had arrived, no chance of successfully defending them.

"On the 6th, the troops were again embarked to pursue the flying garrison up the river, when we received a flag of truce, informing us that the enemy had abandoned the town, after plundering the private houses and magazines, and with the governor, Colonel Montoya, had fled in the direction of Chiloe. The booty which fell into our hands, exclusive of the value of the forts and public buildings, was considerable, Valdivia being the chief military depôt in the southern side of the continent. Amongst the military stores were upwards of 50 tons of gunpowder, 10,000 cannon-shot, 170,000 musket-cartridges, a large quantity of small arms, 128 guns, of which 53 were brass and the remainder iron, the ship Dolores —afterwards sold at Valparaiso for twenty thousand dollars—with public stores sold for the like value, and plate, of which General Sanchez had previously stripped the churches of Concepcion, valued at sixteen thousand dollars." Those prizes compensated over and over again for the loss of the Intrepido, which grounded in the channel, and the injuries done to the O'Higgins on her way to Valdivia.

But the value of Lord Cochrane's capture of this stronghold was not to be counted in money. By its daring conception and easy completion the Spaniards, besides losing their great southern starting-point for attacks on Chili and the other states that were fighting for their freedom, lost heart, to a great extent, in their whole South American warfare. They saw that their insurgent colonists had now found a champion too bold, too cautious, too honest, and too prosperous for them any longer to hope that they could succeed in their efforts to win back the dependencies which were shaking off the thraldom of three centuries.