SECTION II.

Contraband of War.

The general freedom of neutral commerce is subject to certain restrictions with respect to neutral commerce. Among these is the trade with the enemy in certain articles, called Contraband of War. These are generally warlike stores, and articles which are directly auxiliary to warlike purposes. Writers on this subject have made distinctions between those things useful only for the purposes of war, those which are not so, and those which are susceptible of indiscriminate use in war and peace.

All seem to agree in excluding the first class from neutral trade; and, in general, admitting the second. The chief difference is about the third class. The last kind of articles--for example, money, provisions, ships, and naval stores, according to Grotius, are sometimes lawful articles of neutral trade, and sometimes not; and the question depends upon circumstances. This is perhaps the truest ground of decision, as we shall see in subsequent illustrations.

Thus, these articles become contraband, ipso facto, if carried to a besieged town, camp, or port. So in a naval war, ships and materials for ships, are contraband, although timber and cordage may be used for other purposes, besides fitting out ships of war; and so horses and saddles are not of necessity warlike stores, except when comparing the quality, manufacture, or quantity attempted to be imported into the hostile state, with the circumstances and condition of the war, it appears (if not to be impossible) to be in the highest degree unlikely, that they should be designed for any other purposes besides the purposes of war.

Common Provisions are not Contraband in general prize law, except in the single case of being sent to a beseiged or blockaded place.

It is a modern practice, in order to remove all possible doubt as to what goods are contraband, for nations at war to enumerate them particularly in treaties or compacts with neutral states; and such treaties leave the neutral, with which they are made, at liberty to supply the enemy with all goods that are not enumerated in them. These treaties do not operate as a law; but like other treaties, are binding only between the nations that are parties to them.

The Opinions of our great English authority, Lord Stowell, on this subject, are contained in two judgments, of which the following is the substance:--

"In 1673, many unwarrantable rules were laid down by public authority respecting Contraband. It was expressly asserted by a person of great knowledge and experience in the English Admiralty, that by its practice corn, wine, and oil, were liable to be deemed contraband. In much later times, many sorts of provisions, such as butter, salted fish, and rice, have been condemned as Contraband. The modern established rule was, that generally they are not contraband, but may become so under circumstances arising out of the peculiar situation of the war, or the condition of the parties engaged in it; among the causes which tend to prevent provisions from being treated as contraband, one is that they are of the growth of the country which exports them.

"Another circumstance, to which some indulgence, by the practice of nations, is shown, is where the articles are in their native and unmanufactured state. Thus, iron is treated with indulgence, though anchors and other instruments fabricated out of it, are directly contraband. Hemp is more favourably considered than cordage; and wheat is not considered so noxious a commodity as any of the final preparations of it for human use. But the most important destination is, whether the articles are destined for the ordinary uses of life, or for military uses. The nature and quality of the port to which the articles are going, is a test of the matter of fact on which the distinction is to be applied. If the port is a general commercial port, it shall be understood that the articles were going for civil use, although occasionally a frigate or other ship of war may be constructed in that port. On the contrary, if the great predominant character of a port is that of a port of naval equipment, it shall be contended that the articles were going for military use, although, merchant ships resort to the same place, and although it is possible that the articles might have been applied to civil consumption; for it being impossible to ascertain the final application of an article, ancipitis usus, it is not an injurious rule which deduces both ways the final use from immediate destination; and the presumption of a hostile use, founded on its destination to a military port, is very much inflamed, if at the time when the articles were going, a considerable armament was notoriously preparing, to which a supply of those articles would be eminently useful."

In a later case he seems to have modified his opinion with respect to undoubted naval stores, either so by nature, or intended as such for the occasion. He says--

"The character of the port is immaterial, since naval stores, if they are to be considered as contraband, are so without reference to the nature of the port, and equally, whether bound to a mercantile port only, or to a port of military equipment. The consequences of the supply may be nearly the same in either case. If sent to a mercantile port, they may be applied to immediate use in the equipment of privateers, or they may be conveyed from the mercantile to the naval port, and there become subservient to every purpose to which they could have been applied if going directly to a port of naval equipment."

The doctrine of the English Admiralty Court, as to provisions becoming contraband, was adopted by the Government in the instructions given to their cruisers, on the 8th June, 1793, directing them to stop all vessels laden wholly, or in part, with corn, flour, or meal, bound for France, and to send them into a British port to be purchased by Government; or to be released on condition that the master should. give security to dispose of his cargo in the ports of some country in amity with his Britannic Majesty. This was resisted by the Neutral Powers, Sweden, Denmark, and especially the United States.

This order was justified upon the ground, that by the modern law of nations, all provisions are to be considered as contraband, and as such liable to confiscation, wherever depriving an enemy of these supplies is one of the means intended to be employed for reducing him to terms. The actual situation of France, (it was said,) was notoriously such, as to lead to the employing this mode of distressing her by the joint operations of the various powers engaged in the war; and the reasonings of the text writers applying to all cases of this sort were more applicable to the present case, in which the distress resulted from the unusual mode of war adopted by the enemy himself, in having armed almost the whole laboring class of the French nation, for the purpose of commencing and supporting hostilities against almost all European Governments; but this reasoning was most of all applicable to a trade, which was in a great measure carried on by the then actual rulers of France, and was no longer to be regarded as a mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an immediate operation of the very persons who had declared war, and were then carrying it on against Great Britain.

This reasoning was resisted by the neutral powers--Sweden, Denmark, and especially the United States. The American Government insisted, that when two nations go to war, other nations who choose to remain at peace, retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures, and ordinary vocations; to carry the produce of their industry for exchange to all countries, belligerent or neutral, (as usual;) to go and come freely without injury or molestation; in short, that the war, (amongst other) should be for neutral purposes, as if it did not exist; the only exceptions being trade in implements of war, or to a place blockaded by its enemy. That there were sufficient treaties to decide what were implements of war. Corn, flour, and meal, were not of the class of contraband.

The result of this controversy was a treaty with the United States in 1794. It confined contraband to military and naval stores; and with respect to provisions not generally contraband, it was agreed,

"That whenever such articles became contraband by the Law of Nations, and should for that reason be seized, the same should not be confiscated, but the owners thereof should be speedily and completely indemnified; and the captors, or in their default, the Government under whose authority they act, should pay to the masters or owners of such vessels the full value of all such articles, with a reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight, and also the demurrage incident to such detention."

The instructions of June, 1793, had been revoked previously to the signature of this treaty; but before its ratification, the British Government issued, in April, 1795, an order in council, instructing its cruizers to stop and detain all vessels laden wholly, or in part, with corn, flour, meal, and other provisions, and bound to any port in France, and to send them to such ports as might be most convenient, in order that such corn, &c., might be purchased on behalf of Government.

This last order was subsequently revoked, and the question of its legality became the subject of discussion in a mixed commission, constituted under the treaty, to decide upon the claims of American citizens, by reason of irregular or illegal seizures of their vessels and cargoes, under the authority of the British Government.

A full indemnification was allowed by the commissioners, under the 7th article of the Treaty of 1794, to the owners of vessels and cargoes seized under the orders in council, as well for the loss of a market as for the other consequences of their detention.

It was, however, urged on the part of the United States, that the 18th article of the Treaty of 1794, manifestly intended to leave the question where it was before, namely, that when the law of nations, existing at the time the case arises, pronounces the articles contraband, they may for that reason be seized; when otherwise, not so. Each party was thus left free to decide what was contraband in its own courts of the law of nations, leaving any false appeal to that law to the usual remedy of reprisals and war.

Since the ratification of this treaty, we have a decision of Lord Stowell, in 1799, on this very subject, in the case of the Haabet, which, however, arose on a question of insurance.

"The right of taking possession of provisions is no peculiar claim of this country; it belongs generally to belligerent nations: the ancient practice of Europe, or at least of several maritime states of Europe, was to confiscate them entirely. A century has now elapsed since this claim has been asserted by some of them. A more mitigated practice has prevailed in later times, of holding such cargoes subject only to a right of pre-emption; that is, to a right of purchase, upon a reasonable compensation, to the individual whose property is thus diverted. This claim on the part of the belligerent cannot go beyond cargoes avowedly bound to the enemy's ports, or suspected on just grounds to have a concealed destination of that kind. The neutral can only expect a reasonable compensation. He cannot look to the price he would obtain in the enemy's port. An enemy, distressed by famine, may be driven by his necessities to pay a famine price; but it does not follow that the belligerent, in the exercise of his rights of war, is to pay the price of distress."

"It is a mitigated exercise of war, on which any purchase is made; and no rule has established that such a purchase shall be regulated exactly on the same terms of profit which would have followed the adventure, if no such exercise of war had intervened; it is a reasonable indemnification, and a fair profit, that is due, reference being had to the price originally paid by the exporter, and the expenses he has incurred."

Transporting the Enemy's Forces, subjects a Neutral Vessel to confiscation, if captured by the opposite belligerent. Sir Wm. Scott says, in the leading case on this subject--

"That a vessel hired, by the enemy, for the conveyance of military persons is to be considered as a transport, subject to condemnation, has been in a recent case, held by this Court, and on other occasions. What is the number of military persons that shall constitute such a case it may be difficult to define. In the former cases there were many, in the present they are fewer in number; number alone is an insignificant circumstance in the considerations on which the principles of law on this subject are built; since fewer persons of high quality and character may be of more importance than a much greater number of persons of lower condition. To send out one veteran general of France to take command of the forces at Batavia might be a much more noxious act than the conveyance of a whole regiment. The consequences of such assistance are greater, and therefore it is what the belligerent has a stronger right to prevent and punish. In this instance the military persons are three, and there are besides two other persons who were going to be employed in civil capacities in the Government of Batavia. *** It appears to me, on principle, to be but reasonable that, whenever it is of sufficient importance to the enemy that such persons should be sent out on the public service, and at the public expense, it should afford equal ground of forfeiture against the vessel that may be let out for a purpose so intimately connected with hostile operations. The fact of the vessel having been pressed into the enemy's service does not exempt her. The master cannot aver that he was an involuntary agent."

Carrying the Despatches of the Enemy is also a ground of condemnation.

"In the transmission of Despatches may be conveyed the entire plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the plans of the other belligerent, in the world. It is a service, therefore, which, in whatever degree it exists, can only be considered in one character--as an act of the most hostile nature. The offence of fraudulently carrying despatches in the service of the enemy being greater than other contraband, some other penalty has to be affixed. The confiscation of the noxious article would be ridiculous when applied to Despatches. There would be no freight dependent on their transportation. The vehicle (i.e. the ship) in which they are carried must, therefore, be forfeited."

The Despatches of an Ambassador or other Public Minister of the Enemy, resident in a neutral country, are an exception to this rule, being the despatches of persons who are in a peculiar manner the favourite object of the Law of Nations, residing in the neutral country for the purpose of preserving peace and the relations of amity between that state and their own government.

The ambassador of the enemy may be stopped on his passage, but when he has arrived in the neutral country, he becomes a sort of middleman, and is entitled to peculiar privileges.

Under the present Law of Nations, a Contraband Cargo cannot affect the ship; the carrying of contraband articles is attended only with loss of freight and expenses, except where the ship belongs to the owner of the contraband cargo, or where the simple misconduct of carrying a contraband cargo has been connected with some malignant and aggravating circumstances.

The aggravation of fraud justifies additional Penalties; thus, the carriage of contraband with a false destination, will work a condemnation of the ship as well as the cargo; the false destination being intended to defeat the right of pre-emption. Generally, false papers will extend the taint of contraband to the vessel.

It is also an established rule, that the transfer of contraband by a neutral, from one port of a country to another, where it is required for the purposes of war, is subject to be treated in the same manner as an original importation into the country itself.

Generally, the proceeds of the Return Voyage cannot be taken. From the moment of quitting port on a hostile destination, indeed, the offence is complete, and it is not necessary to wait till the goods are actually endeavouring to enter the enemy's port; but beyond that, if the goods are not taken in delicto, and in actual prosecution of such a voyage, the penalty is not now generally held to attach.