Part 20

The Defense Department and the intelligence community have not invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political and military threat to American men and women in the armed forces. Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices.

We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two years' experience in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts are rotated to new assignments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies must have a better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a national and provincial level. The analytic community's knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, and operations of militias, as well as their relationship to government security forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. personnel doesn't count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.

RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.

Recommended Iraqi Actions

The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take full responsibility for this intelligence function.

To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA should increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on the various sources of terrorism within Iraq. This center would analyze data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support groups involved in terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate intelligence-led police and military actions against them.

RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.

Appendices

Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations

The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking "fresh-eyes" assessment of Iraq emerged from conversations U.S. House Appropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf had with us. In late 2005, Congressman Wolf asked the United States Institute of Peace, a bipartisan federal entity, to facilitate the assessment, in collaboration with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the sponsoring organizations and the administration, agreed that former Republican U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and former Democratic Congressman Lee H. Hamilton had the breadth of knowledge of foreign affairs required to co-chair this bipartisan effort. The co-chairs subsequently selected the other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, all senior individuals with distinguished records of public service. Democrats included former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, former Governor and U.S. Senator Charles S. Robb, former Congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta, and Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., advisor to President Bill Clinton. Republicans included former Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court Sandra Day O'Connor, former U.S. Senator Alan K. Simpson, former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. Former CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member for a period of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense.

The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006, in a Capitol Hill meeting hosted by U.S. Senator John Warner and attended by congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle.

To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations created four expert working groups consisting of 44 leading foreign policy analysts and specialists on Iraq. The working groups, led by staff of the United States Institute of Peace, focused on the Strategic Environment, Military and Security Issues, Political Development, and the Economy and Reconstruction. Every effort was made to ensure the participation of experts across a wide span of the political spectrum. Additionally, a panel of retired military officers was consulted.

We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study Group, especially the supporting experts and staff. Our thanks go to Daniel P. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served as executive director; Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study Group; John Williams, Policy Assistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. Hamilton.

Richard H. Solomon, President United States Institute of Peace

Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University

David M. Abshire, President Center for the Study of the Presidency

John J. Hamre, President Center for Strategic and International Studies

Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions

March 15, 2006 April 11-12, 2006 May 18-19, 2005 June 13-14, 2006 August 2-3, 2006 August 30-September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad) September 18-19, 2006 November 13-14, 2006 November 27-29, 2006

Iraq Study Group Consultations

(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq)

Iraqi Officials and Representatives

*Jalal Talabani--President *Tariq al-Hashimi--Vice President *Adil Abd al-Mahdi--Vice President *Nouri Kamal al-Maliki--Prime Minister *Salaam al-Zawbai--Deputy Prime Minister *Barham Salih--Deputy Prime Minister *Mahmoud al-Mashhadani--Speaker of the Parliament *Mowaffak al-Rubaie--National Security Advisor *Jawad Kadem al-Bolani--Minister of Interior *Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi--Minister of Defense *Hoshyar Zebari--Minister of Foreign Affairs *Bayan Jabr--Minister of Finance *Hussein al-Shahristani--Minister of Oil *Karim Waheed--Minister of Electricity *Akram al-Hakim--Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs *Mithal al-Alusi--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Ayad Jamal al-Din--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Sami al-Ma'ajoon--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation *Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud--Member, Commission on National Reconciliation *Wijdan Mikhael--Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation Lt. General Nasir Abadi--Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Forces *Adnan al-Dulaimi--Head of the Tawafuq list Ali Allawi--Former Minister of Finance *Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi--representative of Moqtada al-Sadr *Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim--Shia Coalition Leader *Sheik Maher al-Hamraa--Ayat Allah Said Sussein Al Sadar *Hajim al-Hassani--Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya list *Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo--President of the Iraqi Minorities Council *Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi--Dean of the Islamic University of the Imam Al-Atham *Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili--Rafiday Al-Iraq Al-Jaded Foundation *Saleh al-Mutlaq--Leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue *Ayyad al-Sammara'l--Member of the Parliament *Yonadim Kenna--Member of the Parliament and Secretary General of Assyrian Movement *Shahla Wali Mohammed--Iraqi Counterpart International *Hamid Majid Musa--Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party *Raid Khyutab Muhemeed--Humanitarian, Cultural, and Social Foundation Sinan Shabibi--Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq Samir Shakir M. Sumaidaie--Ambassador of Iraq to the United States

Current U.S. Administration Officials

Senior Administration Officials