The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)

Volume I: See Https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57126

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Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (italics).

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THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS VOL. II.

THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

ALFRED WILLIAM BENN

Εὑρηκέναι μὲν οὖν τινὰς τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ μακαρίων φιλοσόφων τὸ ἀληθὲς δεῖ νομίζειν· τίνες δὲ οἱ τυχόντες μάλιστα καὶ πῶς ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν σύνεσις περὶ τούτων γένοιτο ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει PLOTINUS

Quamquam ab his philosophiam et omnes ingenuas disciplinas habemus: sed tamen est aliquid quod nobis non liceat, liceat illis CICERO

In Two Volumes

VOL. II.

London Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1 Paternoster Square 1882

(The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved)

CONTENTS

THE SECOND VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.. The Stoics Pages 1-52

THE STOICS pages 1-52

I. Why the systems of Plato and Aristotle failed to secure a hold on contemporary thought, 1—Fate of the schools which they founded, 2—Revival of earlier philosophies and especially of naturalism, 3—Antisthenes and the Cynics, 4—Restoration of naturalism to its former dignity, 6.

II. Zeno and Crates, 7—Establishment of the Stoic school, 8—Cleanthes and Chrysippus, 9—Encyclopaedic character of the Stoic teaching, 9—The great place which it gave to physical science, 10—Heracleitean reaction against the dualism of Aristotle, 11—Determinism and materialism of the Stoics, 12—Their concessions to the popular religion, 14.

III. The Stoic theory of cognition purely empirical, 15—Development of formal logic, 16—New importance attributed to judgment as distinguished from conception, 16—The idea of law, 17—Consistency as the principle of the Stoic ethics, 18—Meaning of the precept, Follow Nature, 19—Distinction between pleasure and self-interest as moral standards, 20—Absolute sufficiency of virtue for happiness, 21—The Stoics wrong from an individual, right from a social point of view, 22—Theory of the passions, 23—Necessity of volition and freedom of judgment, 24—Difficulties involved in an appeal to purpose in creation, 24.

IV. The Stoic paradoxes follow logically from the absolute distinction between right and wrong, 25—Attempt at a compromise with the ordinary morality by the doctrines (i.) of preference and objection, 26—(ii.) of permissible feeling, 27—(iii.) of progress from folly to wisdom, 27—and (iv.) of imperfect duties, 27—Cicero’s De Officiis, 28—Examples of Stoic casuistry, 29—Justification of suicide, 30.

V. Three great contributions made by the Stoics to ethical speculation, (i.) The inwardness of virtue, including the notion of conscience, 31—Prevalent misconception with regard to the Erinyes, 32—(ii.) The individualisation of duty, 33—Process by which this idea was evolved, 35—Its influence on the Romans of the empire, 36—(iii.) The idea of humanity, 36—Its connexion with the idea of Nature, 37—Utilitarianism of the Stoics, 38.

VI. The philanthropic tendencies of Stoicism partly neutralised by its extreme individualism, 40—Conservatism of Marcus Aurelius, 41—The Stoics at once unpitying and forgiving, 42—Humility produced by their doctrine of universal depravity, 42—It is not in the power of others to injure us, 43—The Stoic satirists and Roman society, 44.

VII. The idea of Nature and the unity of mankind, 44—The dynamism of Heracleitus dissociated from the teleology of Socrates, 46—Standpoint of Marcus Aurelius, 46—Tendency to extricate morality from its external support, 47—Modern attacks on Nature, 48—Evolution as an ethical sanction, 49—The vicious circle of evolutionist ethics, 50—The idea of humanity created and maintained by the idea of a cosmos, 51—The prayer of Cleanthes, 52.

CHAPTER II.. Epicurus and Lucretius Pages 53-119

EPICURUS AND LUCRETIUS pages 53-119

I. Stationary character of Epicureanism, 53—Prevalent tendency to exaggerate its scientific value, 55—Opposition or indifference of Epicurus to the science of his time, 57.

II. Life of Epicurus, 58—His philosophy essentially practical, 59—The relation of pleasure to virtue: Aristippus, 60—Pessimism of Hêgêsias, 61—Hedonism of Plato’s Protagoras, 61—The Epicurean definition of pleasure, 62—Reaction of Plato’s idealism on Epicurus, 63—He accepts the negative definition of pleasure, 64—Inconsistency involved in his admissions, 65.

III. Deduction of the particular virtues: Temperance, 66—Points of contact with Cynicism, 66—Evils bred by excessive frugality, 67—Sexual passion discouraged by Epicureanism, 67—Comparative indulgence shown to pity and grief, 68—Fortitude inculcated by minimising the evils of pain, 69—Justice as a regard for the general interest, 70—The motives for abstaining from aggression purely selfish, 70—Indifference of the Epicureans to political duties, 73—Success of Epicureanism in promoting disinterested friendship, 74.

IV. Motives which led Epicurus to include physics in his teaching, 75—His attacks on supernaturalism directed less against the old Polytheism than against the religious movement whence Catholicism sprang, 76—Justification of the tone taken by Lucretius, 78—Plato and Hildebrand, 78—Concessions made by Epicurus to the religious reaction, 80—His criticism of the Stoic theology, 81.

V. Why Epicurus adopted the atomic theory, 82—Doctrine of infinite combinations, 83—Limited number of chances required by the modern theory of evolution, 84—Objections to which Democritus had laid himself open, 85—They are not satisfactorily met by Epicurus, 85—One naturalistic theory as good as another, 87—except the conclusions of astronomy, which are false, 87.

VI. Materialism and the denial of a future life, 88—Epicurus tries to argue away the dread of death, 89—His enterprise inconsistent with human nature, 90—The belief in future torments is the dread of death under another form, 92—How the prospect of death adds to our enjoyment of life, 93—Its stimulating effect on the energies, 94—The love of life gives meaning and merit to courage, 95.

VII. The Epicurean theory of sensation and cognition, 95—Negative character of the whole system, 98—Theory of human history: the doctrine of progressive civilisation much older than Epicurus, 98—Opposition between humanism and naturalism on this point, 99—Passage from a drama of Euphorion, 99.

VIII. Lucretius: his want of philosophic originality, 100—His alleged improvements on the doctrine of Epicurus examined, 101—His unreserved acceptance of the Epicurean ethics, 103—In what the difference between Lucretius and Epicurus consists, 103—Roman enthusiasm for physical science, 104—Sympathy of Lucretius with early Greek thought, 105—The true heroine of the De Rerum Naturâ, 105—Exhibition of life in all its forms, 106—Venus as the beginning and end of existence, 106—Elucidation of the atomic theory by vital phenomena, 107—Imperfect apprehension of law: the foedera Naturai and the foedera fati, 108—Assimilation of the great cosmic changes to organic processes, 110—False beliefs considered as necessary products of human nature, 111—and consequently as fit subjects for poetic treatment, 112—High artistic value of the De Rerum Naturâ, 113—Comparison between Lucretius and Dante, 113.

IX. Merits and defects of Epicurus: his revival of atomism and rejection of supernaturalism, 114—His theory of ethics, 115—His contributions to the science of human nature, 116—His eminence as a professor of the art of happiness, 116—His influence on modern philosophy greatly exaggerated by M. Guyau, 117—Unique combination of circumstances to which Epicureanism owed its origin, 119.

CHAPTER III.

THE SCEPTICS AND ECLECTICS: GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ROME pages 120-194

I. Philosophic embassy from Athens to Rome, 120—Lectures of Carneades on Justice versus Expediency, 121—Public and private morality in Rome: position of Cato, 122—His motion for the dismissal of the embassy, 123—Carneades and Plato, 123.

II. Different meanings of the word scepticism, 123—False scepticism as an ally of orthodoxy, 125—Vein of doubt running through Greek mythology, 126—Want of seriousness in Homer’s religion, 127—Incredulous spirit shown by some of his characters, 127—Similar tendency in Aeschylus and Herodotus, 128—Negative and sceptical elements in early Greek thought, 128.

III. Protagoras the true father of philosophical scepticism, 129—The three theses of Gorgias, 130—Sceptical idealism of the Cyrenaic school, 132—Scepticism as an ally of religion with Socrates and Plato, 133—The Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Timaeus, 134—Synthesis of affirmation and negation in metaphysics and in dialectics, 135—Use of scepticism as a moral sanction by the Megarians, 136.

IV. Life and opinions of Pyrrho, 137—Denial of first principles: present aspect of the question, 139—Practical teaching of Pyrrho, 140—Encouragement given to scepticism by the concentration of thought on human interests, 141—Illogical compromise of Epicurus, 143—Parasitic character of the sceptical school, 143.

V. Origin of the New Academy, 144—Character and position of Arcesilaus, 145—The Stoic theory of certainty, 146—Criticism of Arcesilaus: his method of infinitesimal transitions, 147—Systematic development and application of the Academic principle by Carneades, 148—His analysis of experience, 149—His attack on syllogistic and inductive reasoning, 150—His criticism of the Stoic and Epicurean theologies, 151—Sceptical conformity to the established religion, 153—Theory of probable evidence as a guide to action, 154—A priori reasoning of the ancient sceptics, 155—Their resemblance in this respect to modern agnostics, 156—and also in their treatment of ethics, 157—Obedience to Nature inculcated by Carneades, 158.

VI. Return of Greek thought to the Sophistic standpoint, 158—Obstacles to a revival of spiritualism, 159—Platonising eclecticism of the Academy: Philo and Antiochus, 160—Approximation of Stoicism to Aristotle’s teaching, 162—General craving for certainty and stability in philosophy, 163.

VII. Sudden paralysis of the Greek intellect, 165—Probable influence of the new Latin literature, 165—Adaptation of Greek philosophy to Roman requirements, 166—Increased prominence given to the anti-religious side of Epicureanism, 167—Its ethics ill-suited to the Roman character, 168—Growing popularity of Stoicism: Panaetius and Posidonius, 168—It is temporarily checked by the influence of the Academy, 169.

VIII. Academic eclecticism of Cicero, 170—His attempted return to the principles of Socrates, 171—Natural instinct as the common ground of philosophy and untrained experience, 172—Practical agreement of the different ethical systems, 173—The weakness of Cicero’s character favourable to religious sentiment, 173—His theological position, 174—Contrast between Cicero and Socrates, 175.

IX. The ideas of Nature, reason, and utility, 176—Meaning and value which they possessed for a Roman, 177—Cynic tendencies of Roman thought, 178—Influence exercised by the younger Cato in favour of Stoicism, 179—The philosophy of natural law as illustrated in Roman poetry, 180—Stoic elements in the Aeneid, 181—The Roman love of simplification and archaism, 182—Cynicism of Juvenal, 183.

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