Part 64

Aet. i. 7; 302.

I keep Bywater’s numbers, though I omit some of his fragments. Such omissions are referred to in the critical notes.

Cf. Galen. Hist. Phil. 64; Dox. 626.

The text follows in the main the edition of Bergk-Hiller, Poet. Lyr. Graec., Leipzig, 1890.

Zeller, Vorsokratische Philosophie, p. 530, n. 3.

Zeller, 526, n. 1. No author is given in the context; Karsten follows Fabricius in accrediting it to Xenophanes.

Zeller, 524, n. 2. Cf. Arist. Rhet. ii. 23; 1399 b 6.

Zeller, 525, n. 2. Diog. Laer. iii. 16; Cic. de nat. Deor. i. 27.

Zeller, 525, n. 3. Cf. Diog. Laer. ix. 18; Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. i. 224.

Cf. Stob. Ecl. Phys. ii. 282, ἐκ πυρὸς γὰρ τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ τὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ, which Karsten does not assign to Xenophanes.

Zeller, 541, n. 1. Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. ii. 30.

Cf. Arist. de Coelo ii. 13; 294 a 21.

Zeller, 549, n. 2. Burnett, ‘All are free to guess.’

Bergk⁴ interprets φροντίδα by carmen.

Hiller, Deut. Litt. Zeitg., 1886, Coll. 474-475, suggests ‘(Men know the wanderings of Odysseus) from the beginning as Homer tells them, since all have learned them.’

Cf. Plutarch, Amat. p. 763 D; Is. et Os. p. 379 B.

Cf. Theod. Graec. Aff. Cur. iii. p. 49.

Two passages from the Rhet. ii. 23 are translated above, p. 78. Extracts from the book ordinarily called De Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia, and ascribed to Aristotle, are in part translated below, p. 80, n. 2 ff., in connection with the fragment of Theophrastos which covers exactly the same ground.

V. Zeller, Vorsokr. Phil. i. 513, n. 1; Diels’ Dox. p. 110; Teichmüller, Studien, p. 607.

Cf. Arist. Xen. Zen. Gorg. 977 a 23. It is natural that god should be one; for if there were two or more, he would not be the most powerful and most excellent of all.... If, then, there were several beings, some stronger, some weaker, they would not be gods; for it is not the nature of god to be ruled. Nor would they have the nature of god if they were equal, for god ought to be the most powerful; but that which is equal is neither better nor worse than its equal.

Cf. Arist. X. Z. G. 977 a 19. He adds: For even if the stronger were to come from the weaker, the greater from the less, or the better from the worse, or on the other hand the worse from the better, still being could not come from not-being, since this is impossible. Accordingly god is eternal.

Cf. Arist. X. Z. G. 977 b 6. The second part reads: But if there were several parts, these would limit each other. The one is not like not-being nor like a multiplicity of parts, since the one has nothing by which it may be limited.

Arist. X. Z. G. 977 b 13. He adds: Nothing, however, can be moved into not-being, for not-being does not exist anywhere. But if there is change of place among several parts, there would be parts of the one. Therefore the two or more parts of the one may be moved; but to remain immovable and fixed is a characteristic of not-being. The one is neither movable nor is it fixed; for it is neither like not-being, nor like a multiplicity of being.

Arist. X. Z. G. 977. Since god is a unity, he is homogeneous in all his parts, and sees and hears and has other sensations in all his parts. Except for this some parts of god might rule and be ruled by one another, a thing which is impossible. Being homogeneous throughout he is a sphere in form; for it could not be spheroidal in places but rather throughout.

Epiph. adv. Haer. iii. 9; Dox. 590.

Zeller, Vorsokr. Phil. 543, n. 1.

Zeller, Vorsokr. Phil. p. 526, n. 4; Arch. f. d. Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 1889, pp. 1-5.

Epiph. adv. Haer. iii. 9; Dox. 590.