Part 61

And winds arise when the air is rarefied by the sun, and when objects are set on fire and moving towards the sphere are borne away. Thunders and lightnings arise from heat striking the clouds. Earthquakes arise from the air above striking that which is beneath the earth; for when this is set in motion, the earth which rides on it is tossed about by it. And animals arose in the first place from moisture, and afterwards one from another; and males arise when the seed that is separated from the right side becomes attached to the right side of the womb, and females when the opposite is the case. He was in his prime in the first year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad, at the time when it is said Plato was born. They say that he became endowed with knowledge of the future.

Herm. I. G. P. 6; Dox. 652. Anaxagoras takes me aside and instructs me as follows:—Mind is the first principle of all things, and it is the cause and master of all, and it provides arrangement for what is disarranged, and separation for what has been mixed, and an orderly universe for what was disorderly.

APPENDIX

THE SOURCES OF THE FRAGMENTS.

The value of a quotation depends on two things, (1) the habit of accuracy in the person who quotes it, and (2) whether it is quoted from the original or from some intermediate source. Consequently the careful student of the early Greek philosophers, who depends wholly on quotations for his direct knowledge of these thinkers, cannot neglect the consideration of these two questions. Closely connected with the accuracy of quotations is the question as to the accuracy of later writers in the opinions which they have attributed to these thinkers. These topics I propose to consider very briefly, that the student may have at least some clue to guide him in his studies.

§ 1. We find in Plato scarcely any quotations, since the literary character of the dialogue excludes anything that might seem pedantic. There are allusions to certain phrases of Herakleitos which had already become all but proverbs:—the Herakleitean sun, the harmony of opposites, ‘all in motion’ with the example of the river; and the comparison ‘god:man::man:ape’ is also given as the teaching of Herakleitos. Similarly phrases of Anaxagoras are brought into the dialogues—‘all things were together,’ ‘νοῦς disposed all things,’ but they hardly deserve the name of quotations. Other allusions to his theory do not even suggest a quotation. The only real quotations are from Parmenides, and in two of these passages the text as read by Simplicius was corrupt and unmetrical. Simplicius quotes the same passage at one time from Plato, at another time apparently from the original, so that he enables us to correct the form of the quotation which he (or the writer from whom he drew) read in his MS. of Plato. Plato’s writings betray no particular interest in any of the pre-Sokratic thinkers except Parmenides and the Pythagorean school, nor do they convey any hint as to the value of the work of the other early thinkers. So it need not surprise us that he alludes to popular phrases and seems rather to avoid exact quotation.

§ 2. Beyond these allusions we get comparatively little light from Plato as to the teachings of his predecessors. Xenophanes is once spoken of as the founder of the Eleatic school and of its doctrine of unity. Parmenides is a far more interesting character to Plato, and the highest regard is expressed for him. When his position as to the unity of being and the non-existence of not-being is discussed, there is no reason to think that his opinions are not correctly given; but when Parmenides is introduced as a speaker, we are not to believe that he states the opinions of the real Parmenides any more than the Platonic Sokrates states the positions of the real Sokrates. Of Zeno we learn that he was skilled in the art of dialectic. Zeno’s statement of the occasion and purpose of his book is of course Plato’s deduction from the book itself. The speculations of Anaxagoras are several times mentioned. The statement that he regarded the heavenly bodies as ‘λίθοι’ is a welcome addition to our knowledge of his doctrines; and Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras’ use of his fundamental principle is most important. Of Empedokles we hear but little; the statement of his doctrine of sense-perception is a happy exception to the rule. The accuracy of Plato’s statements where they can be tested gives an added importance to what he says about the Pythagoreans. In a word all the data which we have from Plato are valuable, but these data are much fewer than we might expect.

§ 3. Both the citations from earlier philosophers and the statement of their opinions are much more frequent in the writings of Aristotle. Two of his references to the sayings of Herakleitos are not new to the reader of Plato; indeed Fr. 41 ap. Meta. 1010 a 13 is cited with direct reference to the passage where it is cited in Plato. Fr. 37, if we may accept the conjecture of Patin, is a sarcastic phrase of Herakleitos which Aristotle has introduced seriously into a theory of sense-perception. Fr. 46 and 57 are summary phrases stating the fundamental positions of Herakleitos; Fr. 51 and 55 proverbial sayings attributed to him; Fr. 59 alone has the form of a genuine quotation. It is evident that summary phrases give the philosopher’s impression, just as proverbial sayings may come through the medium of popular thought, so that neither have quite the value of direct quotation.

From Xenophanes Aristotle gives two mots, which were attributed naturally enough to the poet-skeptic. There is no proof that Xenophanes was the original author of either of them.

From Parmenides four passages are quoted; strangely enough three of them are passages that had been quoted by Plato. Lines 52-53 in our texts of Aristotle repeat the same error that appears in our texts of Plato; ll. 103-105 are not so near to what seems to be the original (judged by the quotation in Simplicius) as is the Platonic version. Unless our MSS. are greatly at fault, two of the four passages were very carelessly reproduced, and we have reason to believe that they were drawn from Plato. The fourth passage, given by Aristotle and Theophrastos, has the appearance of careful quotation, though one verb has an unmetrical form in our Aristotle (where Theophrastos gives a correct form). Aristotle does not quote directly from either Zeno or Melissos.

Coming now to Empedokles, we find two extended passages which can only be regarded as genuine quotations, namely ll. 287-311 and 316-325. On the other hand several phrases (ll. 208, 326, 443) give only a general idea of the language of Empedokles. Most of the quotations consist of from one to four lines preserving their metrical form, so that they deserve the name of quotations; but their accuracy is doubtful in matters of detail. This is most clearly seen by an examination of the ten cases where the same passage is quoted twice by Aristotle, namely: lines 36-39, 104-107, 146-148, 167, 208, 244, 270-271, 330-332, 333-335. In only three of these instances (38-39, 270-271, 333-335) is the quotation identical; in the other cases there is some slight difference in the text, although commonly both versions scan correctly. An examination of the lines quoted only once in Aristotle shows very frequent deviation from the same lines as quoted by others. In two instances a line is omitted from the context (37 and 99); a case is changed, a connecting particle changed or omitted entirely, a common word is substituted for a rarer one (236-237) or an Aristotelian word for the word required by the full context (e.g. Meta. 1015 a 1), or finally only the substance of the line is given (e.g. lines 91, 92). These variations are so numerous as to justify the conclusion that the text furnished by Simplicius or by Sextus Empiricus deserves quite as much weight as that furnished by Aristotle, since the latter cares only for the thought and not at all for the exact language in which the thought had been clothed.

§ 4. In addition to these quotations we find in the writings of Aristotle a comparatively full statement of the opinions of the pre-Sokratic philosophers. Aristotle was interested in the work of his predecessors, since he rightly regarded his own system as the crowning result of partial views that had been set forth before. All that is valuable in their work he would give its place in his own philosophy, and their false or partial opinions he would controvert. Accordingly his ordinary method is to commence the discussion of a theme by stating the opinions of his predecessors and criticising them; and it is natural that the early thinkers who first set forth characteristic views with force and vigour should receive the fullest consideration, for indeed this position is still due to them in the history of philosophy.

Inasmuch as Aristotle set the fashion for later philosophic writers in collecting and criticising the opinions of earlier thinkers, it is important to form a clear conception of both the excellence and the defects of his method.

On a first examination of his statements of these opinions the student is struck by their fullness and comparative accuracy. Emminger has collected and discussed these data, and arrives at the conclusion in every instance that Aristotle’s statement is based on a use of the best materials at his command, and that it reproduces correctly the view of the philosopher in question. It is true that Emminger takes the position of an apologist. There is no doubt, however, that Aristotle was very familiar with the poems of Empedokles, the arguments of Zeno, the system of the Pythagoreans; when he cannot verify his opinions, as in the case of Thales, they are commonly introduced with a λέγεται of caution; and where the views of earlier thinkers seem to be distorted, it is generally due to one of several simple causes which we can estimate with considerable accuracy.

My own conclusion is that the data given by Aristotle are of the greatest value for the study of his predecessors, though they are to be used with caution.

Turning to the defects of the Aristotelian method, I would point out that there is apparently no little difference in the care with which Aristotle had studied the writings of his predecessors. His general attitude towards the Eleatic school is well known, and there is no evidence that he was really familiar with the works of Xenophanes or Parmenides or Melissos. The fact that three of the four quotations from Parmenides were at least suggested by Plato’s writings should not receive undue weight, yet it is certainly suggestive. Several sayings are quoted from Herakleitos, and his logic is severely criticised; we do not, however, obtain from Aristotle any conception of the real importance of Herakleitos. In fact, Aristotle does not seem at all to have understood the meaning of Herakleitos’ work, whether we are to attribute it to his inability to put himself in sympathy with so different a thinker, or to his failure to study his writings. If we had only the data from Aristotle, we should really know more of the significant work of Anaximandros than of Herakleitos.

The conception of the earlier Greek thinkers which we obtain from Aristotle’s writings is distorted along four lines.

1. Whether or not it was due to his failure to study certain of these thinkers, Aristotle’s comparative estimate of them is not one with which we can agree. As for Herakleitos, we can say that Aristotle assigns him a very important place in early thought, even though he gives us but little clue to what his work really was. Perhaps he overestimates the work of Anaximandros and Anaximenes because he finds in them so clear an anticipation of his own thought. Certainly he does not give due weight to the Eleatic school as a whole, and in particular to Melissos. Melissos was not a great original thinker along entirely new lines, but his work in systematising Eleatic thought was very important. Perhaps because he resembled Aristotle in what he sought to do, although from so very different premisses, he is handled with the greater disdain.

2. We may get from Aristotle a slightly distorted view of the earlier thinkers because he stated their views in the terms of his own philosophic system. The commonest philosophical terms, such as ἄπειρον, ἕν, φύσις, κενόν, τὰ ὄντα, στοιχεῖον, σῶμα, οὐσία, πάθη, slightly changed their meanings as they gradually took their place in a definite philosophical terminology. ἄρχη is regularly used by Aristotle to denote the original principle of all things which the early thinkers sought, εἶδος is used in the statement of Herakleitos’ position and of the Pythagorean philosophy: the latter a word introduced into philosophy by Plato, the former probably not used in this sense before Aristotle himself.

3. This tendency, however, is not limited to the use of philosophical terms. Aristotle states the general position of earlier thinkers from the standpoint of his own developed system. The arguments of Zeno and Melissos are thrown into logical form that he may the better criticise them. Herakleitean teachings also are stated in Aristotelian logic, and thereby lose the truth they might have had. Aristotle finds his own theory of indeterminate potential matter in Anaximandros, and it is no easy task to discern what is due to Aristotle and what to Anaximandros in the Aristotelian account. Again in the case of Parmenides we may well question the statement that his two principles were heat = fire = being, and cold = earth = not-being.

4. Finally Aristotle may be said to give a false impression of his predecessors when he assigns the probable causes for their opinions. Cf. Meta. 983 b 18, supra p. 2; Phys. 204 b 26, supra p. 10 ‘in order that other things may not be blotted out by the infinite;’ de anima 405 a 25, supra p. 58.

The mere statement of these lines, along which Aristotle may be said slightly to distort the views of his predecessors, is sufficient to put the reader on his guard; and it is comparatively easy to make allowance for them.

§ 5. The fragments of Theophrastos that remain are sufficient only to show that he studied the work of the pre-Sokratic thinkers even more carefully than Aristotle; to make any exact inferences as to his method of making quotations, however, is impossible on the basis of these fragments. Four of his quotations are also cited by Aristotle, and it is interesting to notice that in the second and the fourth of this list Theophrastos gives a text that is probably more correct than that found in our MSS. of Aristotle. The remaining quotations found in Theophrastos show a familiarity only with Empedokles. Only one of these scans correctly, and that by the change of one word, which probably was erroneously copied. Ll. 191-192 have lost some words, and ll. 423-424 are quite rewritten in prose. Apparently Theophrastos was even more careless of the form of his quotations than Aristotle, though he knows the early thinkers at first hand and can correct Aristotle’s quotations. The statement of the opinions of these thinkers by Theophrastos will be considered later in connection with the doxographic tradition.

§ 6. From the time of Aristotle to Plutarch we know comparatively little of the works of the early philosophers, or of the habit of quoting from them. There is abundant evidence, however, that they were studied; the positions and sayings of Herakleitos especially seem to have attracted much attention. The works extant under the name of Hippokrates are attributed by some writers to a period even before Aristotle. In these works there are allusions to the positions of Empedokles and Anaxagoras, and Book I of the treatise περὶ διαιτῆς contains much Herakleitean material. There is scarcely one direct quotation (cf. Fr. 60), and Bernays cannot be said to be successful in reconstructing phrases of Herakleitos from this source. The book, however, is a comparatively early witness to the work of Herakleitos, and doubly important because it is independent of that Stoic study to which is due most of our knowledge of him.

§ 7. More than the other schools that succeeded Aristotle the Stoics devoted themselves to the history of philosophy, and they were interested in Herakleitos for the same reason that Aristotle had been interested in Anaximandros, because they regarded him as a precursor in their own line of thought. Herakleitean phrases occur already in the hymn of Kleanthes to Zeus, thus showing that they had already been adopted into the Stoic phraseology. Philodemos (vii. 81) quotes Chrysippos also as giving a quotation from Herakleitos.

It is only from later writers, however, that we can ascertain how much Herakleitos was studied in this period. Apparently collections were made of his sayings, which soon displaced the more complete form of his writings. Indeed, it is hard to prove that his book existed at all in later times, although Sextus Empiricus quotes a passage of some length which is considered to be the beginning of the work. Further, the works of at least some Stoic writers must have abounded in quotations from Herakleitos. In the writings of Philo there are numerous allusions to sayings of Herakleitos; and the Stoic context, the connection with Stoic ethics, as well as Philo’s general interest in the Stoic school, make it probable that he finds his Herakleitos in his Stoic sources. But while Philo is thus an important witness to the study of Herakleitos among the Stoics, he is of little value in reconstructing the text of the Ephesian philosopher. The carelessness of his method of quotation is shown by the form in which he gives three lines of Empedokles (48-49, 386). To seven fragments of Herakleitos (1, 22, 24, 46, 56, 64, 70) Philo makes a mere allusion; in another series of instances (10, 67, 69, 79, 80, 82) a phrase, often a single word, of Herakleitos is worked into the context. Fr. 68 and 85 are quoted very carelessly, and 76 and 89 have assumed a form very different from that which they originally had. Commonly the name of the author (Herakleitos) is not given.

Cicero quotes Herakleitos 113 in Greek without the author’s name, and translates 114 carefully; Bywater, p. x, suggests that he found the latter in somebody’s de exilio commentatio. Returning to the Stoic school, we find in Seneca an accurate translation of Herakleitos 77 and 81, so that we are inclined to trust his version of 120. What seems to be Herakleitos 113, however, is assigned to Demokritos in an expanded form. The epistles attributed to Herakleitos belong to approximately this period, and are interesting only as additional evidence to the study of Herakleitos by Stoic philosophers. Stobaeos quotes several Herakleitean phrases from Musonius. Fr. 20 and 69 are given only in substance, a phrase from 114 is worked into the context, and 75 is quoted in a later form. Fr. 75 as well as 27 and 67 is found in the second and third books of Clement’s Paedagogos, books which draw largely from Musonius. The use of Herakleitean material by Lucian, especially in his Vitarum auctio, ch. xiv., is doubtless based on a Stoic source, as is indicated by the work ἐκπύρωσις. We may conclude this survey of Stoic writers with Marcus Aurelius. In his writings we find bare allusion to Herakleitos 2, 5, 20, 73, and perhaps to 97; a word or two of 34, 84, and 98 are worked into the text; while 25, 69, 90, 93, 94 are half quoted in the text. Apparently all are allusions to, or abbreviated citations of, sentences with which the reader was supposed to be familiar. It is wholly improbable that citations made in this manner were drawn from the book itself; rather they seem to point to a collection of ‘sayings’ of Herakleitos which must have been quite generally known. Unless such a collection is assumed, they must be regarded as phrases which were familiar to all because they were so often quoted. The former hypothesis seems to me the more tenable.

§ 8. We find in Plutarch one of the principal sources of our fragments. Nearly fifty fragments of Herakleitos are quoted more or less fully in his writings. Many of these quotations consist of a single phrase containing perhaps only a word or two of the original writer, so that they are not of much value for purposes of reconstruction. Sometimes the citation is given in Plutarch’s own words; sometimes there is only a careless allusion, as to Fr. 41, 43, and 120. Even when we seem to have a real quotation, it may be expanded, as in the case of Fr. 108 ap. Moral. 143 D compared with Moral. 644 F, or Fr. 31 ap. Moral. 98 D as compared with Moral. 957 A. So I am inclined to regard Fr. 11, 22, and 44 as having been expanded by Plutarch. We cannot therefore place much reliance on the form of Plutarch’s quotations from Herakleitos. As to the source of these quotations we should notice that two of them (Fr. 41 and 45) had been mentioned by Plato, and others (38, 41, 43, and 105) by Aristotle; it is probable that Plutarch quotes these because they were familiar to the readers of Plato and Aristotle. Fr. 20, 22, 24, 25, 34, 44, 75, and 85 occur in Stoic writers, and Plutarch himself refers 91 to the Stoics. Fr. 45-56 are made Stoic in Plutarch by the addition of the word κόσμου (defining ἁρμονίη) which does not appear e.g. in Plato; and Fr. 19, 20, 74, 75, and 87 have a decided Stoic colouring. Thus we may suspect that about half the quotations from Herakleitos were drawn from Stoic sources. On the other hand 78 with its context seems to be based on a considerable passage of Herakleitos, and 11, 12, and 127 have the appearance of careful quotation.