Part 22

Kratylos, 401 D. According to Herakleitos all things are in motion and nothing abides. Cf. 402 A, and frag. 41; also 412 D, 440 C.

Plato also alludes to fragments 32, 45, 98-99.

Aristotle: Topica i. 11, 104 f 21. All things are in motion, according to Herakleitos.

Top. viii. 5; 155 f 30. Wherefore those that hold different opinions, as that good and bad are the same thing, as Herakleitos says, do not grant that the opposite cannot coexist with itself; not as though they did not think this to be the case, but because as followers of Herakleitos they are obliged to speak as they do.

Phys. i. 2; 185 b 19. But still, if in the argument all things that exist are one, as a cloak or a himation, it turns out that they are stating the position of Herakleitos; for the same thing will apply to good and bad, and to good and not-good, so that good and not-good, and man and horse, will be the same; and they will not be arguing that all things are one, but that they are nothing, and that the same thing applies to such and to so much.

Phys. iii. 5; 205 a 3. As Herakleitos says that all things sometime become fire.

De coelo i. 10; 279 b 16. And others in their turn say that sometimes combination is taking place, and at other times destruction, and that this will always continue, as Empedokles of Agrigentum, and Herakleitos of Ephesos.

De anima i. 2; 405 a 25. And Herakleitos also says that the first principle is soul, as it were a fiery exhalation, of which all other things consist; for it is the least corporeal and always in a state of flux, and the moving is known by the moving; and he agreed with most thinkers in holding that things are in motion.

De part anim. i. 5; 645 a 17. And as Herakleitos is reported to have said to strangers who wanted to meet him, who stopped when they entered and saw him getting warm by an oven—for he bade them enter boldly, since, said he, gods are here—so should one enter upon the investigation of each of the animals without timidity, as there is in them all something natural and beautiful.

Met. i. 3; 984 a 7. Hippasos of Metapontum and Herakleitos of Ephesos call fire the first cause. Cf. 996 a 9, 1001 a 15.

Met. iii. 3; 1005 b 24. For it is impossible for any one to postulate that the same thing is and is not, as some think Herakleitos says.

Met. iii. 5; 1010 a 13. V. Frag. 41-42, supra.

Met. iii. 7; 1012 a 24. For the word of Herakleitos, that all things are and are not, seems to make all things true.

Met. x. 5; 1062 a 32. For one might ask Herakleitos himself after this manner and speedily compel him to agree that it is never possible for opposite statements to be true about the same things. Cf. 1063 b 24.

Met. xii. 4; 1078 b 12. For the doctrine of ideas is held by its supporters because they are convinced by Herakleitos’s words in regard to the truth, viz., that all things perceived by the senses are always in a state of flux; so that if there is to be a science and a knowledge of anything, it is necessary to assume the existence of other objects in nature besides those that are perceived by sense, for there can be no science of things in a state of flux.

Eth. ii. 3; 1105 a 8. It is harder to fight against pleasure than against anger, as Herakleitos says.

Eth. vii. 3; 1146 b 30. For some believe their opinions no less strongly than what they know by scientific procedure; and Herakleitos is an example of this.

Eth. viii. 2; 1155 b 4. And Herakleitos says that opposition unites, and that the most beautiful harmony results from opposites, and that all things come into being through strife.

Eth. x. 5; 1176 a 6. As Herakleitos says, an ass would prefer refuse to gold, for natural food is sweeter to asses than gold.

Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 129. According to Herakleitos we become intelligent when we get this divine reason by breathing it in, and in sleep we are forgetful, but on waking we gain our senses again. For in sleep since the pores of the senses are closed, the mind in us is separated from what is akin to it in what surrounds us, and its connection through pores is only preserved like a sort of root; and being cut off it loses its former power of memory; but when we wake it peeps out through the pores of sense as through little doors, and entering into connection with what surrounds us it regains the power of reason.

PASSAGES REFERRING TO HERAKLEITOS IN THE ‘DOXOGRAPHISTS.’

Ar. Did. Epit. 39, 2; Dox. 471. Zeno as well as Herakleitos says that the soul is a perceptive exhalation. The latter desiring to make it clear that souls always gain mental faculties by giving forth exhalations, likened them to rivers; and these are his words: (Fr. 42) ‘Other and yet other waters are flowing on upon those who step in the same rivers.’

Sim. in Phys. 6 r; Dox. 475. (Theophrastos says) Hippasos of Metapontum and Herakleitos of Ephesos teach that the one is moved and limited, but they make fire the first principle and derive all things from fire by condensation and rarefaction, and again they resolve them into fire since this one thing is the essential nature underlying their appearance; for Herakleitos says that all things are transformations of fire [πυρὸς ἀμοιβὴν], and he finds a certain order and definite time in the changes of the universe according to a fated [εἱμαρμένην] necessity.

Theoph. de Sens. 1; Dox. 499. The followers of Anaxagoras and Herakleitos say that men perceive by the presence in themselves of the opposite quality.

Phil. de Piet. 14, 25; Dox. 548. (Chrysippos) in his third book says that the universe is one of the beings endowed with sense, fellow-citizen with men and gods, and that strife and Zeus are the same thing, as Herakleitos says.

Hipp. Phil. 44; Dox. 558. Herakleitos the Ephesian, a philosopher of the physical school, was always lamenting, charging all men with ignorance of the whole of life, but still he pitied the life of mortals. For he would say that he himself knew all things, but that other men knew nothing. His language agrees quite well with that of Empedokles when he says that strife and love are the first principles of all things, and that god is intelligent fire, and that all things enter into a common motion and do not stand still. And as Empedokles said that the whole region occupied by man is full of evils, and that the evils extend from the region about the earth as far as the moon but do not go farther, inasmuch as all the region beyond the moon is purer, so also it seemed to Herakleitos.

Epi. adv. Haer. iii. 20; Dox. 591. Herakleitos the Ephesian, son of Blyson, said that fire is the source of all things, and that all things are resolved into fire again.

Galen, His. Phil. 62; Dox. 626. Herakleitos says that the sun is a burning mass, kindled at its rising, and quenched at its setting.