CHAPTER XXVII.. Of the Ways to Answer the Arguments of the Adversary.

OF THE WAYS TO ANSWER THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ADVERSARY.

An argument is answered by an opposite syllogism, or by an objection.

The places of opposite syllogisms are the same with the places of syllogisms, or enthymemes; for a rhetorical syllogism is an enthymeme.

The places of objections are four.

First, from the same. As, to the adversary that proves love to be good by an enthymeme, may be objected, that, No want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus, The love of Myrrha to her father was not good.

The second from contraries. As, if the adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an objection might be made, that then an evil man will do also evil to his friends.

The third from similitude. As thus, if the adversary say, all men that are injured do hate those that have injured them, it may be objected, that then all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.

The fourth from the authority of famous men. As when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the act, another for the drunkenness.

And forasmuch as all enthymemes are drawn from probability, or example, or from a sign fallible, or from a sign infallible: an enthymeme from probability may be confuted really, by showing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but apparently or sophistically, by showing only that it does not fall out so always; whereupon the judge thinks the probability not sufficient to ground his sentence upon. The reason whereof is this, that the judge, while he hears the fact proved probable, conceives it as true. For the understanding has no object but truth. And therefore, by-and-by, when he shall hear an instance to the contrary, and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both probable and false; and he that says a thing is probable, the meaning is, he thinks it true, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.

An enthymeme, from a fallible sign, is answered by showing the sign to be fallible.

An enthymeme from an example, is answered as an enthymeme from probability; really by showing more examples to the contrary; apparently, if he bring examples enough to make it seem not necessary.

If the adversary have more examples than we, we must make it appear that they are not applicable to the case.

An enthymeme from an infallible sign, if the proposition be true, is unanswerable.

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