Part 7

He hath very little reason to say this. He requested me to tell him my opinion in writing concerning free-will. Which I did, and did let him know a man was free, in those things that were in his power, to follow his will; but that he was not free to will, that is, that his will did not follow his will. Which I expressed in these words: “The question is, whether the will to write, or the will to forbear, come upon a man according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power.” He that cannot understand the difference between free to do if he will, and free to will, is not fit, as I have said in the stating of the question, to hear this controversy disputed, much less to be a writer in it. His consequence, “if a man be not free to will, he is not a free nor a voluntary agent,” and his saying, “the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of the will,” is put here without proof; nor is there any considerable proof of it through the whole book hereafter offered. For why? He never before had heard, I believe, of any distinction between free to do and free to will; which makes him also say, “if the will have not power over itself, the agent is no more free, than a staff in a man’s hand.” As if it were not freedom enough for a man to do what he will, unless his will also have power over his will, and that his will be not the power itself, but must have another power within it to do all voluntary acts.

(e) “If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what a man shall will, and what he shall not will, and what he shall write, and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this power?” &c.

It is to this purpose, that all those things may be brought to pass, which God hath from eternity predetermined. It is therefore to no purpose here to say, that God and nature hath made nothing in vain. But see what weak arguments he brings next, which, though answered in that which is gone before, yet, if I answer not again, he will say they are too hot for my fingers. One is: “If the agent be determined what he shall will, and what he shall act, then he is no more free to act than he is to will;” as if the will being necessitated, the doing of what we will were not liberty. Another is: “If a man be free to act, he is much more free to will; because quod efficit tale, illud magis est tale;” as if he should say, “if I make him angry, then I am more angry; because quod efficit,” &c. The third is: “If the will be determined, then the writing is determined, and he ought not to say he may write, but he must write.” It is true, it followeth that he must write, but it doth not follow I ought to say he must write, unless he would have me say more than I know, as himself doth often in this reply.

After his arguments come his difficult questions. “If the will of man be determined without his will, or without any thing in his power, why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not?” I answer, because we desire to know, and cannot know but by their telling, nor then neither, for the most part. “Why do we represent reasons to them? Why do we pray them? Why do we entreat them?” I answer, because thereby we think to make them have the will they have not. “Why do we blame them?” I answer, because they please us not. I might ask him, whether blaming be any thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect? May we not say a horse is lame, though his lameness came from necessity? or that a man is a fool or a knave, if he be so, though he could not help it? “To what purpose did our Saviour say to the paralytic person, wilt thou be made clean, if his will were extrinsically determined?” I answer, that it was not because he would know, for he knew it before; but because he would draw from him a confession of his want. “We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; how could they help it?” I answer they could not help it. “I would have gathered your children as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not. How easily might they answer, according to T. H.’s doctrine, Alas! blame not us, our wills are not in our own power?” I answer, they are to be blamed though their wills be not in their own power. Is not good good, and evil evil, though they be not in our power? and shall not I call them so? and is not that praise and blame? But it seems the Bishop takes blame, not for the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge against him he blameth. And where he says our wills are in our power, he sees not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the will is the power; and through ignorance detecteth the same fault in St. Austin, who saith, “our will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power;” that is to say, if it were not in our will.

(f) “This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature,” &c.

This piece of eloquence is used by Cicero in his defence of Milo, to prove it lawful for a man to resist force with force, or to keep himself from killing; which the Bishop, thinking himself able to make that which proves one thing prove any thing, hath translated into English, and brought into this place to prove free-will. It is true, very few have learned from tutors, that a man is not free to will; nor do they find it much in books. That they find in books, that which the poets chant in their theatres and the shepherds in the mountains, that which the pastors teach in the churches and the doctors in the universities, and that which the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto, namely, that a man hath freedom to do if he will; but whether he hath freedom to will, is a question which it seems neither the Bishop nor they ever thought on.

(g) “No man blameth fire for burning cities, nor taxeth poison for destroying men,” &c.

Here again he is upon his arguments from blame, which I have answered before; and we do as much blame them as we do men. For we say fire hath done hurt, and the poison hath killed a man, as well as we say the man hath done unjustly; but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of poison, because we cannot make them ask forgiveness, as we would make men to do when they hurt us. So that the blaming of the one and the other, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evil action done by them, is the same in both; but the malice of man is only against man.

(h) “No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun.”

He may as well say, no man halts which cannot choose but halt; or stumbles, that cannot choose but stumble. For what is sin, but halting or stumbling in the way of God’s commandments?

(i) “The question then is not, whether a man be necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or forbear. But, saving the ambiguous acceptions of the word free, the question is plainly this,” &c.

This question, which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set down verbatim and allowed: and it is the same with mine, though he perceive it not. But seeing I did nothing, but at his request set down my opinion, there can be no other question between us in this controversy, but whether my opinion be the truth or not.

(k) “So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was extrinsically and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse,” &c.

That which he saith in the preface is, “that if he be not free to write this discourse, he ought not to be blamed; but if he be free, he hath obtained the cause.”

The first consequence I should have granted him, if he had written it rationally and civilly; the latter I deny, and have shown that he ought to have proved that a man is free to will. For that which he says, any thing else whatsoever would think, if it knew it were moved, and did not know what moved it. A wooden top that is lashed by the boys, and runs about sometimes to one wall, sometimes to another, sometimes spinning, sometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible of its own motion, would think it proceeded from its own will, unless it felt what lashed it. And is a man any wiser, when he runs to one place for a benefice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the world with writing errors and requiring answers, because he thinks he doth it without other cause than his own will, and seeth not what are the lashings that cause his will?

NO. IV.

J. D. “And so to fall in hand with the question without any further proems or prefaces, by liberty, I do neither understand a liberty from sin, nor a liberty from misery, nor a liberty from servitude, nor a liberty from violence, but I understand a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessitation; that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability and determination to one; whether it be of exercise only, which the Schools call a liberty of contradiction, and is found in God and in the good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of specification and exercise also, which the Schools call liberty of contrariety, and is found in men endowed with reason and understanding, that is, a liberty to do and not to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared,” &c.

T. H. In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and says, he means not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from violence, but from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and determination to one. It had been better to define liberty, than thus to distinguish; for I understand never the more what he means by liberty. And though he says he means liberty from necessitation, yet I understand not how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what else is the question between us, but whether such a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other distinctions, as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil, but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist, as he saith it doth in God and Angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

J. D. (a) “It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to be distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities, but either sophisters or bunglers. Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus, deceitful men do not love to descend to particulars; and when bad archers shoot, the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes opposed to the slavery of sin and vicious habits, as (Romans vi. 22): Now being made free from sin. Sometimes to misery and oppression, (Isaiah lviii. 6): To let the oppressed go free. Sometimes to servitude, as (Leviticus xxv. 10): In the year of jubilee ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the land. Sometimes to violence, as (Psalms cv. 20): The prince of his people let him go free. Yet none of all these is the liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity, that is, a determination to one, or rather from necessitation, that is, a necessity imposed by another, or an extrinsical determination. These distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which comes nearer the essence of it, than T. H.’s roving definition, as we shall see in due place. And though he say that ‘he understands never the more what I mean by liberty,’ yet it is plain, by his own ingenuous confession, both that he doth understand it, and that this is the very question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from all necessitation and extrinsical determination to one. Which being but the stating of the question, he calls it amiss ‘the taking of the question.’ It were too much weakness to beg this question, which is so copious and demonstrable. (b) It is strange to see with what confidence, now-a-days, particular men slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, and classic authors of former ages, as if they were not worthy to unloose the shoe-strings of some modern author, or did sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, until some third Cato dropped down from heaven, to whom all men must repair, as to the altar of Prometheus, to light their torches. I did never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the pulpit declare against School Divinity to his equally ignorant auditors. It is but as the fox in the fable, who, having lost his own tail by a mischance, would have persuaded all his followers to cut off theirs, and throw them away as unprofitable burthens. But it troubles me to see a scholar, one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to forget himself as to style School-learning no better than a plain jargon, that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian language, like the chattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreds, or delight in abstruse expressions, yet certainly this distinction of liberty into liberty of contrariety and liberty of contradiction, or which is all one, of exercise only, or exercise and specification jointly, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he useth it.

“Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of things. Therefore to be able to choose both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of specification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power. Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now a man is not only able to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able both to do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the good angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty of God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal the liberty of man comes short in the intention of the power. Man is not so free in respect of good only, as God or the good angels, because (not to speak of God, whose liberty is quite of another nature) the understandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is cleared from all darkness.

“And where T. H. demands, how it is possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is obvious and easy, referendo singula singulis, rendering every act to its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God and good and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. IV.

He intendeth here to make good the distinctions of liberty of exercise, and liberty of contradiction; liberty of contrariety, and liberty of specification and exercise. And he begins thus:

(a) “It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, or of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to be distinguished,” &c.

I know not what art it is that giveth this rule. I am sure it is not the art of reason, which men call logic. For reason teacheth, and the example of those who only reason methodically, (which are the mathematicians), that a man, when he will demonstrate the truth of what he is to say, must in the first place determine what he will have to be understood by his words; which determination is called definition; whereby the significations of his words are so clearly set down, that there can creep in no ambiguity. And therefore there will be no need of distinctions; and consequently his rule of art, is a rash precept of some ignorant man, whom he and others have followed.

The Bishop tells us that liberty is sometimes opposed to sin, to oppression, to servitude; which is to tell us, that they whom he hath read in this point, are inconsistent in the meaning of their own words; and, therefore, they are little beholden to him. And this diversity of significations he calls distinctions. Do men that by the same word in one place mean one thing, and in another another, and never tell us so, distinguish? I think they rather confound. And yet he says, that “these distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which cometh nearer the essence of it, than T. H.’s roving definition;” which definition of mine was this: “liberty is when there is no external impediment.” So that in his opinion a man shall sooner understand liberty by reading these words, (Romans vi. 22): Being made free from sin; or these words, (Isaiah lviii. 6): To let the oppressed go free; or by these words, (Leviticus xxv. 10): You shall proclaim liberty throughout the land, than by these words of mine: “liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion.” Also he will face me down, that I understand what he means by his distinctions of liberty of contrariety, of contradiction, of exercise only, of exercise and specification jointly. If he mean I understand his meaning, in one sense it is true. For by them he means to shift off the discredit of being able to say nothing to the question; as they do that, pretending to know the cause of every thing, give for the cause of why the load-stone draweth to it iron, sympathy, and occult quality; making they cannot tell, (turned now into occult), to stand for the real cause of that most admirable effect. But that those words signify distinction, I constantly deny. It is not enough for a distinction to be forked; it ought to signify a distinct conception. There is great difference between duade distinctions and cloven feet.

(b) “It is strange to see with what confidence now-a-days particular men slight all the Schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of former ages,” &c.

This word, particular men, is put here, in my opinion, with little judgment, especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned. Does the Bishop think that he himself is, or that there is any universal man? It may be he means a private man. Does he then think there is any man not private, besides him that is endued with sovereign power? But it is most likely he calls me a particular man, because I have not had the authority he has had, to teach what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am no more particular than he; and may with as good a grace despise the Schoolmen and some of the old Philosophers, as he can despise me, unless he can shew that it is more likely that he should be better able to look into these questions sufficiently, which require meditation and reflection upon a man’s own thoughts, he that hath been obliged most of his time to preach unto the people, and to that end to read those authors that can best furnish him with what he has to say, and to study for the rhetoric of his expressions, and of the spare time (which to a good pastor is very little) hath spent no little part in seeking preferment and increasing of riches; than I, that have done almost nothing else, nor have had much else to do but to meditate upon this and other natural questions. It troubles him much that I style School-learning jargon. I do not call all School-learning so, but such as is so; that is, that which they say in defending of untruths, and especially in the maintenance of free-will, when they talk of liberty of exercise, specification, contrariety, contradiction, acts elicite and exercite and the like; which, though he go over again in this place, endeavouring to explain them, are still both here and there but jargon, or that (if he like it better) which the Scripture in the first chaos calleth Tohu and Bohu.