Part 5

“Concerning the nameless author of the preface, who takes upon him to hang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism to invite passengers to purchase it, as I know not who he is, so I do not much heed it, nor regard either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical expressions. The Church of England is as much above his detraction, as he is beneath this question. Let him lick up the spittle of Dionysius by himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest that it is more sweet than nectar; we envy him not; much good may it do him. His very frontispiece is a sufficient confutation of his whole preface, wherein he tells the world, as falsely and ignorantly as confidently, that ‘all controversy concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared.’ Thus he accustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth and discretion, to let us see that his knowledge in theological controversies is none at all, and into what miserable times we are fallen, when blind men will be the only judges of colours. Quid tanto dignum feret hic promissor hiatu.

“There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire to advertise the reader, (b) Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book De Cive, it is true that ten years since I gave him about sixty exceptions, the one-half of them political, the other half theological, to that book, and every exception justified by a number of reasons, to which he never yet vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now desire it, for since that, he hath published his Leviathan, Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum, which affords much more matter of exception; and I am informed that there are already two, the one of our own Church, the other a stranger, who have shaken in pieces the whole fabric of his city, that was but builded in the air, and resolved that huge mass of his seeming Leviathan into a new nothing; and that their labours will speedily be published. But if this information should not prove true, I will not grudge upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that his principles are pernicious both to piety and policy, and destructive to all relations of mankind, between prince and subject, father and child, master and servant, husband and wife; and that they who maintain them obstinately, are fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts, than in any Christian or political society. So God bless us.”

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ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S EPISTLE TO THE READER.

(a) “Neither penned nor intended for the press, but privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared. The same was Mr. Hobbes’ desire at that time, as appeareth by four passages in his book, &c.”

It is true that it was not my intention to publish any thing in this question. And the Bishop might have perceived, by not leaving out those four passages, that it was without my knowledge the book was printed; but it pleased him better to take this little advantage to accuse me of want of ingenuity. He might have perceived also, by the date of my letter, 1652, which was written 1646, (which error could be no advantage to me), that I knew nothing of the printing of it. I confess, that before I received the bishop’s reply, a French gentleman of my acquaintance in Paris, knowing that I had written something of this subject, but not understanding the language, desired me to give him leave to get it interpreted to him by an English young man that resorted to him; which I yielded to. But this young man taking his opportunity, and being a nimble writer, took a copy of it for himself, and printed it here, all but the postscript, without my knowledge, and (as he knew) against my will; for which he since hath asked me pardon. But that the Bishop intended it not for the press, is not very probable, because he saith he writ it to the end “that by the ventilation of the question, truth might be cleared from mistakes;” which end he had not obtained by keeping it private.

(b) “Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book De Cive: it is true that ten years since, I gave him about sixty exceptions,” &c.

I did indeed intend to have answered those exceptions as finding them neither political nor theological, nor that he alleged any reasons by which they were to be justified. But shortly after, intending to write in English, and publish my thoughts concerning Civil Doctrine in that book which I entitled Leviathan, I thought his objections would by the clearness of my method fall off without an answer. Now this Leviathan he calleth “Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.” Words not far fetched, nor more applicable to my Leviathan, than to any other writing that should offend him. For allowing him the word monstrum, (because it seems he takes it for a monstrous great fish), he can neither say it is informe; for even they that approve not the doctrine, allow the method. Nor that it is ingens; for it is a book of no great bulk. Nor cui lumen ademptum; for he will find very few readers that will not think it clearer than his scholastic jargon. And whereas he saith there are two of our own Church (as he hears say) that are answering it; and that “he himself,” if I desire it, “will demonstrate that my principles are pernicious both to piety and policy, and destructive to all relations,” &c.: my answer is, that I desire not that he or they should so misspend their time; but if they will needs do it, I can give them a fit title for their book, Behemoth against Leviathan. He ends his epistle with “so God bless us.” Which words are good in themselves, but to no purpose here; but are a buffoonly abusing of the name of God to calumny.

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VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

FROM

ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSICAL NECESSITY.

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J. D. “Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty against necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have obtained the cause, and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I ought not to be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable necessity.”

T. H. Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer J. D.’s objections to my book De Cive in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and afterwards to examine this Discourse of Liberty and Necessity, which, because I never had uttered my opinion of it, concerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordship’s and J. D.’s desire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do. And here I present and submit it to your Lordship’s judgment.

J. D. “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of the necessity of all things, was April 20th, 1646. Which proceeded not out of any disrespect to him; for if all his discourses had been geometrical demonstrations, able not only to persuade, but also to compel assent, all had been one to me, first my journey, and afterwards some other trifles which we call business, having diverted me until then. And then my occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend awakening me, I set myself to a serious examination of it. We commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if they have line enough, confute themselves; and their speculatives and their practices familiarly interfere one with another. (b) The very first words of T. H.’s defence trip up the heels of his whole cause; ‘I had once resolved.’ To resolve presupposeth deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined by causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate? Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed or not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he should increase in stature. Secondly, (c) to resolve implies a man’s dominion over his own actions, and his actual determination of himself. But he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this dominion over himself; and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the second extrinsical causes, in which he makes all his actions to be determined. One may as well call again yesterday, as resolve or newly determine that which is determined to his hand already. (d) I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, considered his reasons, and conclude that he hath missed, and misled the question, that the answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in himself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore, by his favour, I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps another man reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent and well-founded. How comes this to pass? The treatise is the same, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolution is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and loose? Do they necessitate me to condemn, and necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The difference must be in ourselves, either in our intellectuals, because the one sees clearer than the other; or in our affections, which betray our understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference is in ourselves. The outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to the other resolution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolutions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total and adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect. If it be so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denied or doubted of. When all the causes have actually determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they are together in time. And the old rule is, (e) ‘whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is.’ This is no absolute necessity, but only upon supposition, that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we question whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question whether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary in sensu composito, after we have resolved and finally determined what to do; but whether they were necessary before they were determined by ourselves, by or in the precedent causes before ourselves, or in the exterior causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true liberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to be determined by another without itself.

“T. H. saith further ‘that upon your Lordship’s desire and mine, he was contented to begin with this discourse of Liberty and Necessity,’ that is, to change his former resolution. (f) If the chain of necessity be no stronger, but that it may be snapped so easily insunder; if his will was no otherwise determined without himself, but only by the signification of your Lordship’s desire and my modest entreaty, then we may easily conclude that human affairs are not always governed by absolute necessity; that a man is lord of his own actions, if not in chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord paramount of heaven and earth; and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral persuasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which otherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He that can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things, and a physical or natural determination of all causes, shall be great Apollo to me.

“Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered his opinion of this question, I suppose he intends in writing; my conversation with him hath not been frequent, yet I remember well that when this question was agitated between us two in your Lordship’s chamber by your command, he did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute necessity of all events, and for the ground of this necessity, the flux or concatenation of the second causes.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. I.

(a) “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of necessity,” &c.

His deferring the reading of my defence of necessity, he will not, he saith, should be interpreted for disrespect. ’Tis well; though I cannot imagine why he should fear to be thought to disrespect me. “He was diverted,” he saith, “by trifles called business.” It seems then he acknowledgeth that the will can be diverted by business. Which, though said on the by, is contrary I think to the main, that the will is free; for free it is not, if anything but itself can divert it.

(b) “The very first words of T. H.’s defence, trip up the heels of his whole cause, &c.”

How so? “I had once,” saith he, “resolved. To resolve presupposeth deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined without ourselves?” There is no man doubts but a man may deliberate of what himself shall do, whether the thing be impossible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility; though he cannot deliberate of what another shall do to him. Therefore his examples of the man condemned, of the man that breatheth, and of him that groweth, because the question is not what they shall do, but what they shall suffer, are impertinent. This is so evident, that I wonder how he that was before so witty as to say, my first words tripped up the heels of my cause, and that having line enough I would confute myself, could presently be so dull as not to see his argument was too weak to support so triumphant a language. And whereas he seemeth to be offended with paradoxes, let him thank the Schoolmen, whose senseless writings have made the greatest number of important truths seem paradox.

(c) This argument that followeth is no better. “To resolve,” saith he, “implies a man’s dominion over his actions, and his actual determination of himself,” &c.

If he understand what it is to resolve, he knows that it signifies no more than after deliberation to will. He thinks, therefore, to will is to have dominion over his own actions, and actually to determine his own will. But no man can determine his own will, for the will is appetite; nor can a man more determine his will than any other appetite, that is, more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when not. When a man is hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not eat; this is the liberty of the man; but to be hungry or not hungry, which is that which I hold to proceed from necessity, is not in his choice. Besides these words, “dominion over his own actions,” and “determination of himself,” so far as they are significant, make against him. For over whatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not free, and therefore a man’s actions are not free; and if a man determine himself, the question will still remain, what determined him to determine himself in that manner.

(d) “I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, considered his reasons,” &c.

This and that which followeth, is talking to himself at random, till he come to allege that which he calleth an old rule, which is this: (e) “Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. This is no absolute necessity, but only upon supposition that a man hath determined his own liberty,” &c.

If the bishop think that I hold no other necessity than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule, he neither understandeth me, nor what the word necessary signifieth. Necessary is that which is impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot possibly otherwise come to pass. Therefore necessary, possible, and impossible have no signification in reference to time past or time present, but only time to come. His necessary, and his in sensu composito, signify nothing; my necessary is a necessary from all eternity; and yet not inconsistent with true liberty, which doth not consist in determining itself, but in doing what the will is determined unto. This “dominion over itself,” and this sensus compositus, and this, “determining itself,” and this, “necessarily is when it is,” are confused and empty words.