Part 22

“Lastly, he saith, that ‘a man’s mourning more for the loss of his child than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictates of the understanding’. Yes, very much. Reason dictates that a sin committed is a greater evil than the loss of a child, and ought more to be lamented for: yet we see daily how affection prevails against the dictate of reason. That which he infers from hence, that ‘sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes’; is true as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense. The causes from whence repentance doth proceed, are God’s grace preventing, and man’s will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those inferior agents, which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace of God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And therefore the former part of his inference, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, is untrue, and altogether groundless. That is much more truly and much more properly said to be voluntary, which proceeds from judgment and from the rational will, than that which proceeds from passion and from the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all T. H.’s errors in this question is, that he acknowledgeth no efficacy but that which is natural. Hence is this wild consequence; ‘repentance hath causes’, and therefore ‘it is not voluntary’. Free effects have free causes, necessary effects necessary causes: voluntary effects have sometimes free, sometimes necessary causes.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXIII.

(a) “Supposing the last dictate of the understanding did always determine the will, yet this determination, being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from extrinsical causes, but from the proper resolution of the agent, who had now freely determined himself, makes no absolute necessity, but only hypothetical, &c.” This is the Bishop’s answer to the necessity inferred from that, that the will necessarily followeth the last dictate of the understanding; which answer he thinks is not sufficiently taken away, because the last act of the understanding is in time together with the will itself, and therefore not antecedent. It is true, that the will is not produced but in the same instant with the last dictate of the understanding; but the necessity of the will, and the necessity of the last dictate of the understanding, may have been antecedent. For that last dictate of the understanding was produced by causes antecedent, and was then necessary though not yet produced; as when a stone is falling, the necessity of touching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself. For all motion through any determined space, necessarily makes a motion through the next space, unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion; and then the stop is as necessary, as the proceeding would have been. The argument therefore from the last dictate of the understanding, sufficiently inferreth an antecedent necessity, as great as the necessity that a stone shall fall when it is already falling. As for his other answer, that “the will does not certainly follow the last dictate of the understanding, though it always ought to follow it”, he himself says it is but probable; but any man that speaks not by rote, but thinks of what he says, will presently find it false; and that it is impossible to will anything that appears not first in his understanding to be good for him. And whereas he says the will ought to follow the last dictate of the understanding, unless he mean that the man ought to follow it, it is an insignificant speech; for duties are the man’s not the will’s duties: and if he means so, then it is false; for a man ought not to follow the dictate of the understanding, when it is erroneous.

(b) “Of which I gave then three reasons. One was, that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers not a word.” There was no need of answer: for he hath very often in this discourse contradicted it himself, in that he maketh “reason to be the true root of liberty, and men to have more or less liberty, as they have more or less reason”. How then can a man leave that to liberty, when his reason can give no sentence? And for his leaving it to chance; if by chance he mean that which hath no causes, he destroyeth Providence; and if he mean that which hath causes, but unknown to us, he leaveth it to necessity. Besides, it is false that “actions may be so equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive sentence”. For though in the things to be elected there may be an exact equality: yet there may be circumstances in him that is to elect, to make him resolve upon that of the two which he considereth for the present; and to break off all further deliberation for this cause, that he must not (to use his own instance) by spending time in vain, apply neither of the plaisters, which the chirurgeon gives him, to his wound. “Another of his reasons was, because reason doth not weigh every individual action to the uttermost grain.” True; but does it therefore follow, a man gives no sentence? The will therefore may follow the dictate of the judgment, whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed. “His third reason was, because passions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment.” I confess they prevail often against wisdom, which is it he means here by judgment. But they prevail not against the dictate of the understanding, which he knows is the meaning of judgment in this place. And the will of a passionate and peevish fool doth no less follow the dictate of that little understanding he hath, than the will of the wisest man followeth his wisdom.

(c) “He explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last feather: wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now the second time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for three reasons.” To me this comparison seemeth very proper; and therefore I made no scruple (though not much delighted with it, as being no new comparison) to use it again, when there was need again. For in the examination of truth, I search rather for perspicuity than elegance. But the Bishop with his School-terms is far from perspicuity. How near he is to elegance, I shall not forget to examine in due time. But why is this comparison improper? “First, because the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight: for the understanding weigheth all things, objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but itself is not weighed.” In this comparison, the objects, means, &c, are the weights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience or inconvenience is the pressure of those weights, which incline him now one way, now another; and that inclination is the will. Again, the objects, means, &c, are the feathers that press the horse, the feeling of that pressure is understanding, and his patience or impatience the will to bear them, if not too many, or if too many, to lie down under them. It is therefore to little purpose that he saith, the understanding is not weighed. “Secondly”, he says the comparison is improper, “because ordinarily, the means, circumstances, and causes concurrent, have their whole weight from the understanding; so as they do not press the horse’s back at all, until reason lay them on.” This, and that which followeth, “that my objects, agents, motives, passions, and all my concurrent causes, ordinarily do only move the will morally, not determine it naturally, so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over itself,” is all nonsense. For no man can understand, that the understanding maketh any alteration in the object in weight or lightness; nor that reason lays on objects upon the understanding; nor that the will is moved, nor that any motion is moral; nor that these words, the will hath a free dominion over itself, signify anything. With the rest of this reply I shall trust the reader; and only note the last words, where he makes me say, repentance hath causes, and therefore it is not voluntary. But I said, repentance hath causes, and that it is not voluntary; he chops in, and therefore, and makes an absurd consequence, which he would have the reader believe was mine, and then confutes it with these senseless words: “Free effects have free causes, necessary effects necessary causes; voluntary effects have sometimes free, sometimes necessary causes”. Can any man but a Schoolman think the will is voluntary? But yet the will is the cause of voluntary actions.

NO. XXIV.

J. D. “Fifthly and lastly, the divine labours to find out a way how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God. But of this I had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, in answer to a treatise against the prescience of things contingent. I shall for the present only repeat these two things. First, we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to comprehend all his actions and attributes. Secondly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do and ever shall submit to better, the readiest way to reconcile contingence and liberty with the decrees and prescience of God, and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to that presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that things future, which are not yet existent, are co-existent with God: but because the infinite knowledge of God, incircling all times in the point of eternity, doth attain to their future being, from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible being. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to this way, is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that whatsoever is in God is God; that there are no accidents in him, (for that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected); that as God is not wise, but wisdom itself, not just, but justice itself, so he is not eternal, but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that therefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisible; and therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite point, comprehending all times within itself.”

T. H. The last part of this discourse containeth his opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, otherwise than some divines have done; against whom he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he only repeateth two things. One is, that “we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it”. And I say the same; as for example, that he ought not to desert this certain truth: that there are certain and necessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive: seeing that we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evil sequels of men’s actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary.

The other thing he repeateth is, that “the best way to reconcile contingency and liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God”. The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God, irreconcilable; unless the aspect of God (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else besides God’s will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds, that we must subject them “according to that presentiality which they have in eternity”; which he says cannot be done by them that conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, but only by them that conceive it an indivisible point. To this I answer, that as soon as I can conceive eternity to be an indivisible point, or any thing but an everlasting succession, I will renounce all I have written on this subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity nunc stans, an ever abiding now; which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I never could conceive it; they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans; which I think are none. I understand as little, how it can be true that “God is not just, but justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eternity itself”: nor how he concludes thence that “eternity is a point indivisible, and not a succession”: nor in what sense it can be said, that an “infinite point,” &c, wherein is no succession, can “comprehend all times,” though time be successive.

These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore what was the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up; unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings.

And thus much in answer to his discourse; wherein I think not only his squadrons, but also his reserves of distinctions are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my reasons for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of art, in plain English.

J. D. (a) “That poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any divines, but in way of examination of a French treatise, which your Lordship’s brother did me the honour to show me at York. (b) My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. Such a truth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsical determination: a truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world. And therefore, though I be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists together with God’s eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. But T. H.’s opinion, of the absolute necessity of all events by reason of their antecedent determination in their extrinsical and necessary causes, is no such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without probable grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world. Neither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so obscure, or so transcendent above the reach of reason, as the eternal decrees of God are. And therefore in both these respects, he cannot challenge the same privilege. I am in possession of an old truth, derived by inheritance or succession from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not able to clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my possession until a better title were showed for another. He is no old possessor, but a new pretender, and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs: not by weak and inconsequent suppositions or inducements, such as those are which he useth here, of ‘praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the memory of good and evil sequels and events’; which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessitate the will: nor by uncertain and accidental inferences, such as this; ‘the memory of praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us’ (he should say, dispose us) ‘to elect what we elect; but the memory of these things is from the sense, and the sense from the operation of the external objects, and the agency of external objects is only from God; therefore all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary’. (c) To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this sorite, it is just like that old sophistical piece: He that drinks well sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt lives well; therefore he that drinks well lives well.

(d) “In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the eternal prescience and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency. And this I set down in as plain terms as I could, or as so profound a speculation would permit: which is almost wholly misunderstood by T. H., and many of my words wrested to a wrong sense. As first, where I speak of the aspect of God, that is, his view, his knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest to him from eternity, (Heb. iv. 13, all things are naked and open to his eyes), and this not discursively, but intuitively, not by external species, but by his internal essence; he confounds this with the will and the decrees of God; though he found not the word aspect before in this discourse, he might have found prescience. (e) Secondly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that ‘liberty and the decrees of God are irreconcilable.’ If I have said any such thing, my heart never went along with my pen. No, but his reason why he chargeth me on this manner is, because I have maintained that ‘liberty and the absolute necessity of all things’ are irreconcilable. That is true indeed. What then? ‘Why,’ saith he, ‘necessity and God’s decrees are all one.’ How all one? That were strange indeed. Necessity may be a consequent of God’s decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. (f) But to cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time; yet not all after the same manner, but according to the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures, which he doth not destroy by his decree; some he acteth, with some he co-operateth by special influence, and some he only permitteth. Yet this is no idle or bare permission; seeing he doth concur both by way of general influence, giving power to act; and also by disposing all events necessary, free, and contingent to his own glory. (g) Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I ‘allow all men to be of his opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans, or how eternity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting succession’. But I have given no such allowance. I know there are many other ways proposed by divines, for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of God with the liberty and contingency of second causes; some of which may please other judgments better than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could comprehend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able, in respect of our weakness, to understand the certain manner or reason of it. I know the loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it; and yet I know not how it comes to have such a power.

“But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section is, whether eternity be an indivisible point, as I maintain it; or an everlasting succession, as he would have it. According to his constant use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, but pleads against it from his own incapacity. ‘I never could conceive,’ saith he, ‘how eternity should be an indivisible point.’ I believe, that neither we nor any man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do these inferior things. The nearer that anything comes to the essence of God, the more remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make potentialities, and successive duration, and former and later, or a part without a part, as they say, to be in God? Because we are not able to understand clearly the divine perfection, we must not therefore attribute any imperfection to him.

(h) “He saith moreover, that ‘he understands as little how it can be true which I say, that God is not just but justice itself, not eternal but eternity itself.’ It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading School-divines or metaphysicians, if he make faculties or qualities to be in God really distinct from his essence. God is a most simple or pure act, which can admit no composition of substance and accidents. Doth he think, that the most perfect essence of God cannot act sufficiently without faculties and qualities? The infinite perfection of the Divine essence excludes all passive or receptive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is by any accidents. The attributes of God are not divers virtues or qualities in him, as they are in the creatures; but really one and the same with the Divine essence, and among themselves. They are attributed to God to supply the defect of our capacity, who are not able to understand that which is to be known of God under one name, or one act of the understanding.

“Furthermore he saith, that ‘he understands not how I conclude from hence, that eternity is an indivisable point, and not a succession’. (i) I will help him. The Divine substance is indivisible; but eternity is the Divine substance. The major is evident, because God is actus simplicissimus, a most simple act; wherein there is no manner of composition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and accidents, nor of parts, &c; and by consequence no divisibility. The minor hath been clearly demonstrated in mine answer to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men that whatsoever is in God, is God.

“Lastly, he saith, he conceives not ‘how it can be said, that an infinite point, wherein is no succession, can comprehend all time which is successive’. I answer, that it doth not comprehend it formally, as time is successive; but eminently and virtually, as eternity is infinite. To-day all eternity is co-existent with this day: to-morrow all eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow: and so in like manner with all the parts of time, being itself without parts. He saith, ‘he finds not these phrases in the Scripture’. No, but he may find the thing in the Scripture, that God is infinite in all his attributes, and not capable of any imperfection.

“And so to show his antipathy against the Schoolmen, that he hath no liberty or power to contain himself when he meets with any of their phrases or tenets, he falls into another paroxism or fit of inveighing against them; and so concludes his answer with a plaudite to himself, because he had defeated both my squadrons of arguments and reserves of distinctions

Dicite Io pæan, et Io bis dicite pæan.

“But because his eyesight was weak, and their backs were towards him, he quite mistook the matter. Those whom he saw routed and running away, were his own scattered forces.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY, NO. XXIV.

(a) “That poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any divines, but in way of examination of a French treatise, &c”. This is in reply to those words of mine, “this discourse containeth his opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, otherwise than some divines have done, against whom he had formerly written a treatise”. If the French treatise were according to his mind, what need was there that the examination should be written? If it were not to his mind, it was in confutation of him, that is to say, written against the author of it: unless perhaps the Bishop thinks that he writes not against a man, unless he charge him with blasphemy and atheism, as he does me.

(b) “My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner.” To this I answered, that it was true; and as he alleged it for a reason why he should not be of my opinion, so I alleged it for a reason why I should not be of his. But now in his reply he saith, that his opinion is “a truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world. And therefore, though he be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how this liberty of will consists with God’s eternal prescience and decrees, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest.” But why should he adhere to it, unless it be manifest to himself? And if it be manifest to himself, why does he deny that he is able to comprehend it? And if he be not able to comprehend it, how knows he that it is demonstrable? Or why says he that so confidently, which he does not know? Methinks that which I have said, namely, that “that which God foreknows shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, and at the same time that he foreknew it should be; but that which cannot but be, is necessary; therefore what God foreknows, shall be necessarily, and at the time foreknown”: this I say looketh somewhat liker to a demonstration, than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove free will. Another reason why I should be of his opinion, is that he is “in possession of an old truth derived to him by inheritance or succession from his ancestors”. To which I answer, first, that I am in possession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason. Secondly, that whereas he knoweth not whether it be the truth that he possesseth, or not; because he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with God’s prescience and decrees; I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of necessity not only agrees with, but necessarily followeth from the eternal prescience and decrees of God. Besides, it is an unhandsome thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession from his ancestors; for our ancestors, the first Christians, derived not therefore their truth from the Gentiles, because they were their ancestors.

(c) “To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this sorite, it is just like an old philosophical piece: he that drinks well, sleeps well; he that sleeps well, thinks no hurt; he that thinks no hurt, lives well; therefore he that drinks well, lives well.” My argument was thus: “election is always from the memory of good and evil sequels; memory is always from the sense; and sense always from the action of external bodies; and all action from God; therefore all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are from God, and consequently necessary”. Let the Bishop compare now his scurrilous argumentation with this of mine; and tell me, whether he that sleeps well, doth all his lifetime think no hurt.

(d) “In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed my own private opinion, how it might be made appear that the eternal prescience and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency, &c.” If he had meant by liberty, as other men do, the liberty of action, that is, of things which are in his power to do which he will, it had been an easy matter to reconcile it with the prescience and decrees of God; but meaning the liberty of will, it was impossible. So likewise, if by contingency he had meant simply coming to pass, it had been reconcilable with the decrees of God; but meaning coming to pass without necessity, it was impossible. And therefore though it be true he says, that “he set it down in as plain terms as he could”, yet it was impossible to set it down in plain terms. Nor ought he to charge me with misunderstanding him, and wresting his words to a wrong sense. For the truth is, I did not understand them at all, nor thought he understood them himself; but was willing to give them the best interpretation they would bear; which he calls wresting them to a wrong sense. And first, I understood not what he meant by the aspect of God. For if he had meant his foreknowledge, which word he had often used before; what needed he in this one place only to call it aspect? Or what need he here call it his view? Or say that all things are open to the eyes of God not discursively, but intuitively; which is to expound eyes in that text, Hebr. iv. 13, not figuratively but literally, nevertheless excluding external species, which the Schoolmen say are the cause of seeing? But it was well done to exclude such insignificant speeches, upon every occasion whatsoever. And though I do not hold the foreknowledge of God to consist in discourse; yet I shall be never driven to say it is by intuition, as long as I know that even a man hath foreknowledge of all those things which he intendeth himself to do, not by discourse, but by knowing his own purpose; saving that man hath a superior power over him, that can change his purpose; which God hath not. And whereas he says, I confound this aspect with the will and decrees of God, he accuseth me wrongfully. For how could I so confound it, when I understood not what it meant?

(e) “Secondly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that ‘liberty and the decrees of God are irreconcileable’”. And the reason why I do so is, because he maintained that liberty and the absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable. If liberty cannot stand with necessity, it cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which decrees necessity is a consequent. I needed not to say, nor did say, that necessity and God’s decrees are all one: though if I had said it, it had not been without authority of learned men, in whose writings are often found this sentence, voluntas Dei, necessitas rerum.

(f) “But to cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time, yet not all after the same manner, but according to the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures; which he doth not destroy by his decree: some he acteth.” Hitherto true. Then he addeth: “with some he co-operateth by special influence; and some he only permitteth; yet this is no idle or bare permission”. This is false. For nothing operateth by its own original power, but God himself. Man operateth not but by special power, (I say special power, not special influence), derived from God. Nor is it by God’s permission only, as I have often already shown, and as the Bishop here contradicting his former words confesseth. For to permit only, and barely to permit, signify the same thing. And that which he says, that God concurs by way of general influence, is jargon. For every concurrence is one singular and individual concurrence; and nothing in the world is general, but the signification of words and other signs.

(g) “Thirdly, he chargeth me, that ‘I allow all men to be of his opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans, or how eternity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting succession.’ But I have given no such allowance.” Surely if the reason wherefore my opinion is false, proceed from this, that I conceive not eternity to be nunc stans, but an everlasting succession, I am allowed to hold my opinion till I can conceive eternity otherwise: at least he allows men not till then to be of his opinion. For he hath said, “that the main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to that way of his, is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and not one indivisible point”. As for the many other ways which he says are “proposed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of God with the liberty and contingency of second causes”, if they mean such liberty and contingency as the Bishop meaneth, they are proposed in vain; for truth and error can never be reconciled. But “however,” saith he, “though a man could comprehend none of all these ways, yet we must remember that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able to understand the reason of it.” For “he knows,” he says, “the loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it, and yet he knoweth not how it cometh to have such a power.” I know the load-stone hath no such attractive power; and yet I know that the iron cometh to it, or it to the iron; and therefore wonder not, that the Bishop knoweth not how it cometh to have that power. In the next place he saith, I bring nothing to prove that eternity is not an indivisible point, but my own incapacity “that I cannot conceive it”. The truth is, I cannot dispute neither for nor against (as he can do) the positions I understand not. Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that is (in English) power, and successive duration; for such attributes are often given to it in the Scripture.