Part 20

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XX.

(a) “Now again he tells us, that election is not opposite to either necessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally, or that a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent takes away the rape,” &c. If that which I have told him again, be false, why shows he not why it is false? Here is not one word of argument against it. To say, I might have said as well that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally, is no refutation, but a denial. I will not dispute with him, whether a stone thrown up move naturally or not. I shall only say to those readers whose judgments are not defaced with the abuse of words, that as a stone moveth not upwards of itself, but by the power of the external agent who giveth it a beginning of that motion; so also when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the power of some other agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the eye, is not imperceptible to reason. But because this is not proper discourse for the Bishop, and because I have elsewhere discoursed thereof expressly, I shall say nothing of it here. And whereas he says, ‘consent takes away the rape’; it may perhaps be true, and I think it is; but here it not only inferreth nothing, but was also needless, and therefore in a public writing is an indecent instance, though sometimes not unnecessary in a spiritual court. In the next place, he wonders how “a man is compelled, and yet free to do what he will”; that is to say, how a man is made to will, and yet free to do what he will. If he had said, he wondered how a man can be compelled to will, and yet be free to do that which he would have done if he had not been compelled, it had been somewhat; as it is, it is nothing. Again he says, “he who submits to an enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, or else his will is changed,” &c.: all which is true. But when he says he doth counterfeit, he doth not insinuate that he may counterfeit lawfully; for that would prejudice him hereafter, in case he should have need of quarter. But how this maketh for him, or against me, I perceive not. “There is a vast difference,” saith he, “between compelling and changing the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise; but compelled it cannot be,” &c. I say the same; the will cannot be compelled; but the man may be, and is then compelled, when his will is changed by the fear of force, punishment, or other hurt from God or man. And when his will is changed, there is a new will formed, (whether it be by God or man), and that necessarily; and consequently the actions that flow from that will, are both voluntary, free, and necessary, notwithstanding that he was compelled to do them. Which maketh not for the Bishop, but for me.

(b) “Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions, that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary, &c. So supposing a man were not in that distress, they are involuntary.” That some actions are partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is not a new, but a false opinion. For one and the same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. If therefore parts of an action be actions, he says no more but that some actions are voluntary, some involuntary; or that one multitude of actions may be partly voluntary, partly involuntary. But that one action should be partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave credit to. But to say, supposing the man had not been in distress, that then the action had been involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a man’s goods into the sea, supposing he had not been in a storm, had been an involuntary action; which is also an absurdity; for he would not have done it, and therefore it had been no action at all. And this absurdity is his own.

(c) “His other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet, is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power.” It is enough for the use I make of that instance, that a man when in the necessity of going to prison, though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being prisoner in the jail, may nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall walk or be haled thither.

(d) “Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that other passions do necessitate as much as fear. But he errs doubly,” &c. First, he says, I err in this, that I say that fear determines the rational will naturally and necessarily. And first, I answer, that I never used that term of rational will. There is nothing rational but God, angels, and men. The will is none of these. I would not have excepted against this expression, but that every where he speaketh of the will and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men’s bellies. Secondly, he offereth nothing to prove the contrary. For that which followeth: “the last and greatest of five terrible things is death; yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to a dishonest action; the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty to God,” &c.: I grant him that the greatest of five (or of fifteen, for he had no more reason for five than fifteen) terrible things doth not always necessitate a man to do a dishonest action, and that the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children, nor the lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat else, namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate them to do their duty. That the fear of God’s wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well said, and according to the text he citeth: and proveth strongly, that fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure the lesser evil.

(e) “Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam minatur:--Excuse me, O Emperor; thou threatenest men with prison, but God threatens me with hell.” This sentence, and that which he saith No. XVII, that neither the civil judge is the proper judge, nor the law of the land is the proper rule of sin, and divers other sayings of his to the same effect, make it impossible for any nation in the world to preserve themselves from civil wars. For all men living equally acknowledging, that the High and Omnipotent God is to be obeyed before the greatest emperors; every one may pretend the commandment of God to justify his disobedience. And if one man pretendeth that God commands one thing, and another man that he commands the contrary, what equity is there to allow the pretence of one more than of another? Or what peace can there be, if they be all allowed alike? There will therefore necessarily arise discord and civil war, unless there be a judge agreed upon, with authority given to him by every one of them, to show them and interpret to them the Word of God; which interpreter is always the emperor, king, or other sovereign person, who therefore ought to be obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that to shew us and interpret to us the Word of God, belongeth to the clergy; wherein I cannot consent unto him. Excuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me with that you cannot do; but the emperor threateneth me with death, and is able to do what he threateneth.

(f) “Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action, between force and fear, &c. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away, &c.” I know not to what point of my answer this reply of his is to be applied. I had said, the actions of men compelled are, nevertheless, voluntary. It seems that he calleth compulsion force; but I call it a fear of force, or of damage to be done by force, by which fear a man’s will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will before. Force taketh away the sin, because the action is not his that is forced, but his that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion; because, in this case, a man electeth the less evil under the notion of good. But his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced, and of Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the text, be instances of compulsion, and yet the damsel and Tamar be both innocent. In that which immediately followeth, concerning how far fear may extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answered. I perceive in it he hath some glimmering of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It is true, that just fear dispenseth not with the precepts of God or nature; for they are not dispensable; but it extenuateth the fault, not by diminishing anything in the action, but by being no transgression. For if the fear be allowed, the action it produceth is allowed also. Nor doth it dispense in any case with the law positive, but by making the action itself lawful; for the breaking of a law is always sin. And it is certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive precepts, though with the loss of their lives, unless the right that a man hath to preserve himself make it, in case of a just fear, to be no law. “The omission of circumcision was no sin,” he says, “whilst the Israelites were travelling through the wilderness.” It is very true, but this has nothing to do with compulsion. And the cause why it was no sin, was this: they were ready to obey it, whensoever God should give them leisure and rest from travel, whereby they might be cured; or at least when God, that daily spake to their conductor in the desert, should appoint him to renew that sacrament.

(g) “I will propose a case to him,” &c. The case is this. A servant is robbed of his master’s money by the highway, but is acquitted because he was forced. Another servant spends his master’s money in a tavern. Why is he not acquitted also, seeing he was necessitated? “Would,” saith he, “T. H. admit of this excuse?” I answer, no: but I would do that to him, which should necessitate him to behave himself better another time, or at least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example.

(h) “He talks much of the motives to do, and the motives to forbear, how they work upon and determine a man; as if a reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second causes,” &c. May not great things be produced by second causes, as well as little; and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball? But the Bishop can never be driven from this, that the will hath power to move itself; but says it is all one to say, that “an agent can determine itself,” and that “the will is determined by motives extrinsical”. He adds, that “if there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent nor extrinsical necessitation at all”. I say indeed, the effect is not produced before the last dictate of the understanding; but I say not, that the necessity was not before; he knows I say, it is from eternity. When a cannon is planted against a wall, though the battery be not made till the bullet arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while the bullet was going to it, if the wall stood still: and if it slipped away, the hitting of somewhat else was necessary, and that antecedently.

(i) “All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause.” Yes, when the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause; and so anything else is what he will have it. But nothing is determined by itself, nor is there any man in the world that hath any conception answerable to those words. But “motives,” he says, “determine not naturally, but morally”. This also is insignificant; for all motion is natural or supernatural. Moral motion is a mere word, without any imagination of the mind correspondent to it. I have heard men talk of a motion in a court of justice; perhaps this is it which he means by moral motion. But certainly, when the tongue of the judge and the hands of the clerks are thereby moved, the motion is natural, and proceeds from natural causes; which causes also were natural motions of the tongue of the advocate. And whereas he adds, that if this were true, then “not only motives, but reason itself and deliberation were vain”; it hath been sufficiently answered before, that therefore they are not vain, because by them is produced the effect. I must also note, that oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in instead of mine, those terms of his own, which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity; as here he makes me to say, that which I did never say, “special influence of extrinsical causes”.

(k) “He saith, that ‘the ignorance of the true causes and their power, is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity.’ No such thing, but just the contrary.” If he understand the authors which he readeth upon this point, no better than he understands what I have here written, it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the question. I said not, that when we consider the causes of things, but when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity. “No such thing,” says the Bishop, “but just the contrary; the more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the liberty,” &c. Is there any doubt, if a man could foreknow, as God foreknows, that which is hereafter to come to pass, but that he would also see and know the causes which shall bring it to pass, and how they work, and make the effect necessary? For necessary it is, whatsoever God foreknoweth. But we that foresee them not, may consider as much as we will, and understand as clearly as we will, but are never the nearer to the knowledge of their necessity; and that, I said, was the cause why we impute those events to liberty, and not to causes.

(l) “Lastly, he tells us, that the will doth choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of necessity. If he intend no more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burning is of the fire &c., he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for the question is not now of the elective power, in actu primo, &c.” Here again he makes me to speak nonsense. I said, “the man chooseth of necessity”; he says I say, “the will chooseth of necessity”. And why: but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, and say as he does here, that “election is the act of the will”. No: election is the act of a man, as power to elect is the power of a man. Election and will are all one act of a man; and the power to elect, and the power to will, one and the same power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded by the use of calling by the name of will, the power of willing in the future; as they also were confounded, that first brought in this senseless term of actus primus. My meaning is, that the election I shall have of anything hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire, that now is and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it hereafter: or to use his own terms, the will hath no more power to suspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its burning: or rather more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend his will, than the fire to suspend its burning. Which is contrary to that which he would have, namely, that a man should have power to refuse what he wills, and to suspend his own appetite. For to refuse what one willeth, implieth a contradiction; the which also is made much more absurd by his expression. For he saith, the will hath power to refuse what it wills, and to suspend its own appetite: whereas the will, and the willing, and the appetite is the same thing. He adds that “even the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth”. He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine. For I imagine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence, I may truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; and of that which shall not burn then, (for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter thrown into it, as in the case of the three children), that it is necessary it shall not burn.

(m) “Two things are required to make an effect necessary: first that it be produced by a necessary cause, &c.: secondly, that it be necessarily produced, &c.” To this I say nothing, but that I understand not how a cause can be necessary, and the effect not be necessarily produced.

(n) “My second reason against this distinction of liberty from compulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, &c.” By this second reason, which he says is new, and demonstrates, &c, I cannot find what reason he means. For there are but two, whereof the latter is in these words: “Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools; there is a double act of the will; the one more remote, called imperatus, &c.; the other act is nearer, called actus elicitus,” &c. But I doubt whether this be it he means, or no. For this being the resolution of the Schools, is not new; and being a distinction only, is no demonstration; though perhaps he may use the word demonstration, as every unlearned man now-a-days does, to signify any argument of his own. As for the distinction itself, because the terms are Latin, and never used by any author of the Latin tongue, to shew their impertinence I expounded them in English, and left them to the reader’s judgment to find the absurdity of them himself. And the Bishop in this part of his reply endeavours to defend them. And first, he calls it a trivial and grammatical objection, to say they are improper and obscure. Is there anything less beseeming a divine or a philosopher, than to speak improperly and obscurely, where the truth is in question? Perhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth, but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate. It is not the universal current of divines and philosophers, that giveth words their authority, but the generality of them who acknowledge that they understand them. Tyrant and præmunire, though their signification be changed, yet they are understood; and so are the names of the days, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday. And when English readers not engaged in School divinity, shall find imperate and elicit acts as intelligible as those, I will confess I had no reason to find fault.

But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this argument of his; ‘he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not necessitate the will to evil’. This argument is not to be found in this No. XX., to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference concerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force me to say that God is the cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the Scripture, non est malum, quod ego non feci. I shall say what Micaiah saith to Ahab, (1 Kings xxii. 23): Behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into the mouth of all these thy prophets. I shall say that that is true, which the prophet David saith (2 Sam. xvi. 10): Let him curse; because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David. But that which God himself saith of himself (1 Kings xii. 15): The king hearkened not to the people, for the cause was from the Lord: I will not say, least the Bishop exclaim against me; but leave it to be interpreted by those that have authority to interpret the Scriptures. I say further, that to cause sin is not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some higher power; but to use so unseemly a phrase, as to say that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth, I can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his. Luther says, we act necessarily; necessarily by necessity of immutability, not by necessity of constraint: that is in plain English, necessarily, but not against our wills. Zanchius says, (Tract. Theol. cap. VI. Thes. I.): The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, that there is no necessity of our sinning; but in this, that there is no constraint. Bucer (Lib. de Concordia): Whereas the Catholics say, man has free will, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom from necessity. Calvin (Inst. cap. II. sec. VI.): And thus shall man be said to have free will, not because he hath equal freedom to do good and evil, but because he does the evil he does, not by constraint, but willingly. Monsr. du Moulin, in his Buckler of the Faith (art. IX): The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will. Witness the devils, who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely without constraint. And the Synod of Dort: Liberty is not opposite to all kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed opposite to the necessity of constraint: but standeth well enough with the necessity of infallibility. I could add more: for all the famous doctors of the Reformed Churches, and with them St. Augustin, are of the same opinion. None of these denied that God is the cause of all motion and action, or that God is the cause of all laws; and yet they were never forced to say, that God is the cause of sin.

(o) “‘They who invented this term of actus imperatus, understood not’, he saith, ‘any thing what it signified.’ No? Why not? It seemeth to me, they understood it better than those who except against it. They knew there are mental terms, which are only conceived in the mind, as well as vocal terms, which are expressed with the tongue, &c.” In this place the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in philosophy, which is this; that he thinketh, when he repeateth the words of a proposition in his mind, that is, when he fancieth the words without speaking them, that then he conceiveth the things which the words signify: and this is the most general cause of false opinions. For men can never be deceived in the conceptions of things, though they may be, and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or appellations, different from those which are commonly used and constituted to signify their conceptions. And therefore they that study to attain the certain knowledge of the truth, do use to set down beforehand all the terms they are to express themselves by, and declare in what sense they shall use them constantly. And by this means, the reader having an idea of every thing there named, cannot conceive amiss. But when a man from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the thing signified, but only of the sound and of the letters whereof the word is made, which is that he here calleth mental terms, it is impossible he should conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; as he doth here, when he says, “that when Tarquin delivered his commands to his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did it by mental terms”; as if to strike off the head of a poppy, were a mental term. It is the sound and the letters, that maketh him think elicitus and imperatus somewhat. And it is the same thing that makes him say, for think it he cannot, that to will or choose, is drawn, or allured, or fetched out of the power to will. For drawing cannot be imagined but of bodies; and therefore to will, to speak, to write, to dance, to leap, or any way to be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be drawn, much less to be drawn out of a power, that is to say, out of an ability; for whatsoever is drawn out, is drawn out of one place into another. He that can discourse in this manner in philosophy, cannot probably be thought able to discourse rationally in any thing.

(p) “His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into elicit and imperate, is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith he, ‘have been as easily said in English, a voluntary action?’ Yes it might have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor as properly.” He says, actus imperatus is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the command of the will. I say, when a man opens and shuts his eyes according to his will, that it is a voluntary action; and I believe we mean one and the same thing. Whether of us speak more properly or more truly, let the reader judge.

(q) “But his mistakes are so thick, &c., I will do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, &c.” This is nothing but Tohu and Bohu.

NO. XXI.

J. D. “The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, the astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty to the motions of heaven, to the aspects and ascensions of the stars:

----Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni, Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti.

“I stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes swimming beside them in the rivers, yet believe they see those which are in heaven; who promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat for themselves. The stars at the most do but incline, they cannot necessitate.

“Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion and temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home to a necessity. Socrates, and many others, by assiduous care have corrected the pernicious propensions, which flowed from their temperatures.”

T. H. In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone is able to produce any effect without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura. Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.

J. D. “Towards the latter end of my discourse, I answered some specious pretences against liberty. The two first were of the astrologer and the physician: the one subjecting liberty to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies; the other to the complexions of men. (a) The sum of my answer was, that the stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate the will: to which all judicious astronomers and physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not dissent from it. So as to this part, there needs no reply.

(b) “But whereas he mentions a ‘great paradox of his own, that there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natura’; I can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions, as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as great an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of the new world. And as to this paradox in particular, I meddle not with natural actions, because the subject of my discourse is moral liberty. But if he intend not only the kinds of things, but every individual creature, and not only in natural but voluntary actions, I desire to know how Prester John, or the great Mogul, or the king of China, or any one of so many millions of their subjects, do concur to my writing of this reply. If they do not, among his other speculations concerning this matter I hope he will give us some restrictions. It were hard to make all the negroes accessary to all the murders that are committed in Europe.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXI.

There is not much in this part of his reply that needeth animadversion. But I must observe, where he saith, (a) “the sum of my answer was, that the stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate the will:” he answereth nothing at all to me, who attribute not the necessitation of the will to the stars and complexions, but to the aggregate of all things together that are in motion. I do not say, that the stars or complexions of themselves do incline men to will; but when men are inclined, I must say that that inclination was necessitated by some causes or other.