Part 10

(d) “Yet I have no reason to be offended at it, (meaning such contradictions), for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with himself.”

It is a contradiction, he saith, that having said that “voluntary presupposeth deliberation,” I say in another place, “that whatsoever followeth the last appetite, is voluntary, and where there is but one appetite, that is the last.” Not observing that voluntary presupposeth deliberation, when the judgment, whether the action be voluntary or not, is not in the actor, but in the judge; who regardeth not the will of the actor, where there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice; yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite, the same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it follow, a voluntary action.

This also he saith is a contradiction, that having said, “no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden,” I say afterward that “by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding.”

Again he observes not, that the action of a man that is not a child, in public judgment how rash, inconsiderate, and sudden soever it be, it is to be taken for deliberation; because it is supposed, he ought to have considered and compared his intended action with the law; when, nevertheless, that sudden and indeliberate action was truly voluntary.

Another contradiction which he finds is this, that having undertaken to prove “that children before they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect,” I say by and by after a “child may be so young as to do what he doth without all deliberation.” I yet see no contradiction here; for a child may be so young, as that the appetite thereof is its first appetite, but afterward and often before it come to have the use of reason, may elect one thing and refuse another, and consider the consequences of what it is about to do. And why not as well as beasts, which never have the use of reason; for they deliberate, as men do? For though men and beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they differ not in the nature of their deliberation. A man can reckon by words of general signification, make propositions, and syllogisms, and compute in numbers, magnitudes, proportions, and other things computable; which being done by the advantage of language, and words of general significations, a beast that hath not language cannot do, nor a man that hath language, if he misplace the words, that are his counters. From hence to the end of this number, he discourseth again of spontaneity, and how it is in children, madmen, and beasts; which, as I before resolved, I will not meddle with; let the reader think and judge of it as he pleaseth.

NO. IX.

J. D. “Secondly, (a) they who might have done, and may do, many things which they leave undone; and they who leave undone many things which they might do, are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true liberty. But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as is plain, (1 Kings iii. 11): Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He might have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did ask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did not ask. And (Acts v. 4): After it was sold, was it not in thine own power? It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retain it; and if he did retain it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do not. And we do not, what we might do. That is, we have true liberty from necessity.”

T. H. The second argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when, if they would, they might have done another. The places are two; one is in 1 Kings iii. 11, where the history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God’s hands. The other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, (Acts v. 4): After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places: that they prove that there is election, but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what they so elect.

“We have had the very same answer twice before. It seemeth that he is well-pleased with it, or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a panchreston, a salve for all sores, or dictamnum, sovereign dittany, to make all his adversaries’ weapons to drop out of the wounds of his cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will not waste the time to show any further, how the members of his distinction do cross one another, and one take away another. To make every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of another thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no election at all. But I forbear to press that at present. If I may be bold to use his own phrase, his answer looks quite another way from mine argument. My second reason was this: ‘They who may do, and might have done many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many things which they might do, are not necessitated, nor precisely and antecedently determined to what they do.’

“But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as appears evidently by the texts alleged. Therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined, nor necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of election in this argument? To what proposition, to what term doth T. H. apply his answer? He neither affirms, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of any thing contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a more pertinent answer.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. IX.

The Bishop, for the proving of free-will, had alleged this text: Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life, &c. And another, (Acts v. 4): After it was sold, was it not in thine own power? Out of which he infers, there was no necessity that Solomon should ask wisdom rather than long life, nor that Ananias should tell a lie concerning the price for which he sold his land: and my answer, that they prove election, but disprove not the necessity of election, satisfieth him not; because, saith he, (a) “they who might have done what they left undone, and left undone what they might have done, are not necessitated.”

But how doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solomon had a real power to ask long life? No doubt Solomon knew nothing to the contrary; but yet it was possible that God might have hindered him. For though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he should choose, it doth not follow, that he did not also give him the act of election. And for the other text, where it is said, that the price of the land was in Ananias’s power, the word power signifieth no more than the word right, that is, the right to do with his own what he pleased, which is not a real and natural power, but a civil power made by covenant. And therefore the former answer is sufficient, that though such places are clear enough to prove election, they have no strength at all to take away necessity.

NO. X.

J. D. “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those interrogations, and objurgations, and reprehensions, and expostulations, which we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect), but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat? (Gen. iii. 11.) And (verse 13) he saith to Eve, Why hast thou done this? And (Gen. iv. 6) to Cain, Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down? And, (Ezech. xviii. 31): Why will ye die, O house of Israel? Doth God command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat? Doth he reprehend him for doing that, which he hath antecedently determined that he must do? Doth he propose things under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and derision? Doth a loving master chide his servant because he doth not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot move, by the master’s own order, without the servant’s default or consent? They who talk here of a twofold will of God, secret and revealed, and the one opposite to the other, understand not what they say. These two wills concern several persons. The secret will of God, is what he will do himself; the revealed will of God, is what he would have us to do; it may be the secret will of God to take away the life of the father, yet it is God’s revealed will that his son should wish his life and pray for his life. Here is no contradiction, where the agents are distinct. But for the same person to command one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do another thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he must do; this were (I am afraid to utter what they are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. God’s chiding proves man’s liberty.”

T. H. To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but one answer.

J. D. (a) “Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, the one drawn from the truth of God, the other from the justice of God, the one from his objurgations and reprehensions, the other from his judgments after life, did require distinct answers. But the plain truth is, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in this whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is contained, No. XII: ‘That which he does is made just by his doing; just, I say, in him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the same, if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is unjust.’ (b) I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad as the words intimate and as I apprehend, that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is truth itself, and to justify feigning and dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of his power and the absoluteness of his dominion. And therefore, by his leave, I must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this argument also. He tells us, that he was not surprised. Whether he were or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, that either he is not provided, or that his cause admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingeniously, when they met with a difficult knot which they could not untie, to put it upon Elias: Elias will answer it when he comes.

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. X.

The Bishop argued thus: “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are those interrogations we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect), but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations?” Here putting together two repugnant suppositions, either craftily or (be it spoken with all due respect) ignorantly, he would have men believe, because I hold necessity, that I deny liberty, I hold as much that there is true liberty as he doth, and more, for I hold it as from necessity, and that there must of necessity be liberty; but he holds it not from necessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. His expostulations were, first, Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? Secondly, Why hast thou done this? Thirdly, Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down? Fourthly, Why will ye die, O house of Israel? These arguments requiring the same answer which some other do, I thought fit to remit them to their fellows. But the Bishop will not allow me that. For he saith,

(a) “Certainly, distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, &c. did require distinct answers.”

I am therefore to give an account of the meaning of the aforesaid objurgations and expostulations; not of the end for which God said, Hast thou eaten of the tree, &c., but how those words may be taken without repugnance to the doctrine of necessity. These words, Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat, convince Adam that, notwithstanding God had placed in the garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his will to obedience of God’s commandment concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own will as to do it. Whereby is signified, that a mortal man, though invited by the promise of immortality, cannot govern his own will, though his will govern his actions; which dependence of the actions on the will, is that which properly and truly is called liberty. And the like may be said of the words to Eve, Why hast thou done this? and of those to Cain, Why art thou wroth? &c. and to Israel, Why will ye die, O house of Israel? But the Bishop here will say die signifieth not die, but live eternally in torments; for by such interpretations any man may answer anything. And whereas he asketh, “Doth God reprehend him for doing that which he hath antecedently determined him that he must do?” I answer, no; but he convinceth and instructeth him, that though immortality was so easy to obtain, as it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it but by pardon, and by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ: nor is there here any punishment, but only a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original mortality, where death was no punishment but a gift of God. In which mortality he lived near a thousand years, and had a numerous issue, and lived without misery, and I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the immortality which then he lost. Nor in all this is there any plotting secretly, or any mockery or derision, which the Bishop would make men believe there is. And whereas he saith, that “they who talk here of a twofold will of God, secret and revealed, and the one opposite to the other, understand not what they say:” the Protestant doctors, both of our and other Churches, did use to distinguish between the secret and revealed will of God; the former they called voluntas bene placiti, which signifieth absolutely his will, the other voluntas signi, that is, the signification of his will, in the same sense that I call the one his will, the other his commandment, which may sometimes differ. For God’s commandment to Abraham was, that he should sacrifice Isaac, but his will was, that he should not do it. God’s denunciation to Nineveh was, that it should be destroyed within forty days, but his will was, that it should not.

(b) “I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad, as the words intimate, and as I apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is truth itself,” &c.

What damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is this? God, I said, might command a thing openly, and yet hinder the doing of it, without injustice; but if a man should command a thing to be done, and then plot secretly the hinderance of the same, and punish for the not doing it, it were injustice. This it is which the Bishop apprehends as an imputation of falsehood to God Almighty. And perhaps if the death of a sinner were, as he thinks, an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; not accusing him of injustice, because whatsoever he doth is therefore just because done by him; but of little tenderness and love to mankind. And this expostulation will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of all things be granted or denied. For it is manifest that God could have made man impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or forgive him if he please; and therefore, if he please not, the expostulation is as reasonable in the cases of liberty as of necessity.

NO. XI.

J. D. “Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the same objects, the same dictates of the understanding. But, quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi; the greatest opposers of our liberty, are as earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these supposed impediments take away true liberty.”

T. H. The fourth argument is to this effect: “If the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi.” That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action, (that he may no longer doubt of my meaning), is the sum of all those things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God.

But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the things known, and not they on it.