CHAPTER VI.. Of the Right of Him, Whether Council or One Man

OF THE RIGHT OF HIM, WHETHER COUNCIL OR ONE MAN ONLY, WHO HATH THE SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY.

1. There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil society, nor any action to which they have not under seal consented. 2. The right of the greater number consenting, is the beginning of a city. 3. That every man retains a right to protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there is no sufficient regard had to his security. 4. That a coercive power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him also. 8. All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative power is his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and other officers of the city belongs to him. 11 Also the examination of all doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. 13. That the command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what proportion of obedience is due to him. 14. That the laws of the city bind him not. 15. That no man can challenge a propriety to anything against his will. 16. By the laws of the city only we come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. 17. The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there should not be any one endued with an absolute power. 18. The marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city be compared with a man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city, as the human soul is in relation to the man. 20. That the supreme command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents, by whose compacts it was first constituted.

1. We must consider, first of all, what a multitude of men, gathering themselves of their own free wills into society, is; namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one hath his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be proposed. And though by particular contracts each single man may have his own right and propriety, so as one may say this is mine, the other, that is his; yet will there not be anything of which the whole multitude, as a person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, this is mine, more than another’s. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as its own; but if all or more of them do agree, it will not be an action, but as many actions as men. For although in some great sedition, it is commonly said, that the people of that city have taken up arms; yet is it true of those only who are in arms, or who consent to them. For the city, which is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatsoever, therefore, is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing. Besides, in a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in that manner as hath been said, there remains that same state of nature in which all things belong to all men; and there is no place for meum and tuum, which is called dominion and propriety, by reason that that security is not yet extant, which we have declared above to be necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.

Footnote 8:

Multitude, &c.] The doctrine of the power of a city over its citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude ruled. For such is the nature of a city, that a multitude or company of citizens not only may have command, but may also be subject to command; but in diverse senses. Which difference I did believe was clearly enough explained in the first article; but by the objections of many against those things which follow, I discern otherwise. Wherefore it seemed good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to add these few things.

By multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more than one: so as a multitude of men is the same with many men. The same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one thing; namely, one multitude. But in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to each a several; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it. Wherefore a multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire right, convey right, act, have, possess, and the like, unless it be every one apart, and man by man; so as there must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as men. Wherefore a multitude is no natural person. But if the same multitude do contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for the will of all; then it becomes one person. For it is endued with a will, and therefore can do voluntary actions, such as are commanding, making laws, acquiring and transferring of right, and so forth; and it is oftener called the people, than the multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the people or multitude wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that the city which commands, wills and acts by the will of one, or the concurring wills of more; which cannot be done but in an assembly. But as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men, whether great or small, without the will of that man or assembly of men, that is understood to be done by a subjected people; that is, by many single citizens together; and not proceeding from one will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are citizens and subjects, but not a city.

2. Next, we must consider that every one of the multitude, by whose means there may be a beginning to make up the city, must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the assembly, that be received for the will of all, which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills and votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will not consent, the rest, notwithstanding, shall among themselves constitute the city without him. Whence it will come to pass, that the city retains its primitive right against the dissenter; that is, the right of war, as against an enemy.

3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth article, that there was required to the security of men, not only their consent, but also the subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary to peace and defence; and that in that union and subjection the nature of a city consisted; we must discern now in this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discussed, and stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are contained in the will of the major part, what things are necessary to peace and common defence. But first of all, it is necessary to peace, that a man be so far forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation. But care may be had, there be no just cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others; which if it be not had, no man is supposed to have submitted himself to aught, or to have quitted his right to all things, before that there was a care had of his security.

4. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a city, do covenant with the rest, either by words or writing, not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.

5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this right, the sword of justice. But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer.

6. Because, therefore, for the security of particular men, and, by consequence, for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of using the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or council; that man or council is necessarily understood by right to have the supreme power in the city. For he that by right punisheth at his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which he himself wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.

7. But in vain do they worship peace at home, who cannot defend themselves against foreigners; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against foreigners, whose forces are not united. And therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that there be some one council or one man, who hath the right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many citizens, in all dangers and on all occasions, as shall be needful for common defence against the certain number and strength of the enemy; and again, as often as he shall find it expedient, to make peace with them. We must understand, therefore, that particular citizens have conveyed their whole right of war and peace unto some one man or council; and that this right, which we may call the sword of war, belongs to the same man or council, to whom the sword of justice belongs. For no man can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the expenses of war, but he who by right can punish him who doth not obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of war as that of justice, even by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong to the chief command.

8. But because the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it follows, that the judgment of its right use pertains to the same party; for if the power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgment, who could not execute his commands; or, if he executed them by the power of another, he himself is not said to have the power of the sword, but that other, to whom he is only an officer. All judgment therefore, in a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.

9. Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like; which every man esteems according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another’s, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life. But those rules and measures are usually called the civil laws, or the laws of the city, as being the commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city. And the civil laws (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chief authority in the city, for direction of the future actions of his citizens.

10. Furthermore, since the affairs of the city, both those of war and peace, cannot possibly be all administered by one man or one council without officers and subordinate magistrates; and that it appertaineth to peace and common defence, that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into neighbouring councils, prudently to wage war, and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and in peace.

11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the laws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist him, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than for him that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of eternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the citizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but that the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey for fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one, whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme power, have also this right; that he both judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught.

Footnote 9:

Judge what opinions, &c. There is scarce any principle, neither in the worship of God nor in human sciences, from whence there may not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others. But though such dissensions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove no hindrance to the public peace. Of these kinds of opinions, therefore, I have not spoken in this place. There are certain doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted, they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the city, and that by right they may, nay ought, to oppose and fight against chief princes and dignities. Such are those which, whether directly and openly, or more obscurely and by consequence, require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed. I deny not but this reflects on that power which many, living under other government, ascribe to the chief head of the Church of Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, out of that Church, bishops require in their’s to be given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens, under pretence of religion, do challenge to themselves. For what civil war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from, or was nourished by this root? The judgment therefore of doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not, and if they be repugnant, the power of prohibiting them to be taught, I do here attribute to the civil authority. For since there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those things which belong to its peace and defence, and it is manifest that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its peace; it follows necessarily, that the examination of those opinions, whether they be such or not, must be referred to the city; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.

12. Last of all, from this consideration, that each citizen hath submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it follows manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must not be punished. For as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish him naturally, so neither can he punish him by right, who by right hath not sufficient power.

13. It is most manifest by what hath been said, that in every perfect city, that is, where no citizen hath right to use his faculties at his own discretion for the preservation of himself, or where the right of the private sword is excluded; there is a supreme power in some one, greater than which cannot by right be conferred by men, or greater than which no mortal man can have over himself. But that power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a man, we call absolute. For whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the city, that he can, unpunished, do any thing, make laws, judge controversies, set penalties, make use at his own pleasure of the strength and wealth of men, and all this by right; truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted. This same may be confirmed by experience, in all the cities which are or ever have been. For though it be sometimes in doubt what man or council hath the chief command, yet ever there is such a command and always exercised, except in the time of sedition and civil war; and then there are two chief commands made out of one. Now, those seditious persons who dispute against absolute authority, do not so much care to destroy it, as to convey it on others: for removing this power, they together take away civil society, and a confusion of all things returns. There is so much obedience joined to this absolute right of the chief ruler, as is necessarily required for the government of the city, that is to say, so much as that right of his may not be granted in vain. Now this kind of obedience, although for some reasons it may sometimes by right be denied, yet because a greater cannot be performed, we will call it simple. But the obligation to perform this grows not immediately from that contract, by which we have conveyed all our right on the city; but immediately from hence, that without obedience the city’s right would be frustrate, and by consequence there would be no city constituted. For it is one thing if I say, I give you right to command what you will; another, if I say, I will do whatsoever you command. And the command may be such, as I would rather die than do it. Forasmuch, therefore, as no man can be bound to will being killed, much less is he tied to that which to him is worse than death. If therefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not bound to do it. For though I deny to do it, yet the right of dominion is not frustrated; since others may be found, who being commanded will not refuse to do it; neither do I refuse to do that, which I have contracted to do. In like manner, if the chief ruler command any man to kill him, he is not tied to do it; because it cannot be conceived that he made any such covenant. Nor if he command to execute a parent, whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the law; since there are others who being commanded will do that, and a son will rather die than live infamous and hated of all the world. There are many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be done by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed by these, and refused by those; and this without breach of that absolute right which was given to the chief ruler. For in no case is the right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by right given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is, against God.

Footnote 10:

Absolute.] A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion, and the citizens oppose it not. For, in the gathering together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a city; and even the unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet monarchy is no less a city than democraty; and absolute kings have their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided but not recalled. But it appears not to most men, how a city is contained in the person of a king. And therefore they object against absolute command: first, that if any man had such a right, the condition of the citizens would be miserable. For thus they think; he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts it his only happiness, that he is not already spoiled and killed. But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one or some few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it justly, that is, without breach of the natural laws and injury against God. And therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which princes take. Next, if he could justly do it, or that he made no account of his oath, yet appears there no reason why he should desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied, but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly. But grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the injuries of others; which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to oppress all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that human affairs cannot be without some inconvenience. And this inconvenience itself is in the citizens, not in the government. For if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command, that is to say, could they live according to the laws of nature, there would be no need at all of a city, nor of a common coercive power. Secondly, they object, that there is no dominion in the Christian world absolute. Which, indeed, is not true; for all monarchies, and all other states, are so. For although they who have the chief command, do not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the city; the reason of that is, not the defect of right in them, but the consideration of their citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their right; and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.

14. Neither can any man give somewhat to himself; for he is already supposed to have what he can give himself. Nor can he be obliged to himself; for the same party being both the obliged and the obliger, and the obliger having power to release the obliged, it were merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself; because he can release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this is already actually free. Whence it is plain, that the city is not tied to the civil laws; for the civil laws are the laws of the city, by which, if she were engaged, she should be engaged to herself. Neither can the city be obliged to her citizen; because, if he will, he can free her from her obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills; for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the city; the city therefore is free when she pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free. But the will of a council, or one who hath supreme authority given him, is the will of the city: he therefore contains the wills of all particular citizens. Therefore neither is he bound to the civil laws; for this is to be bound to himself; nor to any of his citizens.

15. Now because, as hath been shown above, before the constitution of a city all things belonged to all men; nor is there that thing which any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same right, claim as his own; for where all things are common, there can be nothing proper to any man; it follows, that propriety received its beginning when cities received their’s, and that that only is proper to each man, which he can keep by the laws and the power of the whole city, that is, of him on whom its chief command is conferred. Whence we understand, that each particular citizen hath a propriety to which none of his fellow-citizens hath right, because they are tied to the same laws; but he hath no propriety in which the chief ruler (whose commands are the laws, whose will contains the will of each man, and who by every single person is constituted the supreme judge) hath not a right. But although there be many things which the city permits to its citizens, and therefore they may sometimes go to law against their chief; yet is not that action belonging to civil right, but to natural equity. Neither is it concerning what by right he may do who hath the supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be done; and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong judgment.

Footnote 11:

Propriety received its beginning, &c.] What is objected by some, that the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of cities, was found in fathers of families, that objection is vain; because I have already declared, that a family is a little city. For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father himself. But the fathers of divers families, who are subject neither to any common father nor lord, have a common right in all things.

Footnote 12:

What by right he may do, &c.] As often as a citizen is granted to have an action of law against the supreme, that is, against the city, the question is not in that action, whether the city may by right keep possession of the thing in controversy, but whether by the laws formerly made she would keep it; for the law is the declared will of the supreme. Since then the city may raise money from the citizens under two titles, either as tribute, or as debt; in the former case there is no action of law allowed, for there can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute; in the latter it is allowed, because the city will take nothing from its citizens by fraud or cunning, and yet if need require, all they have, openly. And therefore he that condemns this place, saying, that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free themselves from their debts, he does it impertinently.

16. Theft, murder, adultery, and all injuries, are forbid by the laws of nature; but what is to be called theft, what murder, what adultery, what injury in a citizen, this is not to be determined by the natural, but by the civil law. For not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but only another man’s goods, is theft; but what is our’s, and what another’s, is a question belonging to the civil law. In like manner, not every killing of a man is murder, but only that which the civil law forbids; neither is all encounter with women adultery, but only that which the civil law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an injury, where the promise itself is lawful; but where there is no right to make any compact, there can be no conveyance of it, and therefore there can no injury follow, as hath been said in the second chapter, Article 17. Now what we may contract for, and what not, depends wholly upon the civil laws. The city of Lacedæmon therefore rightly ordered, that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught, should go unpunished; for it was nothing else but to make a law, that what was so acquired should be their own, and not another’s. Rightly also is that man everywhere slain, whom we kill in war or by the necessity of self-defence. So also that copulation which in one city is matrimony, in another will be judged adultery. Also those contracts which make up marriage in one citizen, do not so in another, although of the same city; because that he who is forbidden by the city, that is, by that one man or council whose the supreme power is, to contract aught, hath no right to make any contract, and therefore having made any, it is not valid, and by consequence no marriage. But his contract which received no prohibition, was therefore of force, and so was matrimony. Neither adds it any force to any unlawful contracts, that they were made by an oath or sacrament; for those add nothing to the strengthening of the contract, as hath been said above, Chap. II. Art. 22. What therefore theft, what murder, what adultery, and in general what injury is, must be known by the civil laws; that is, the commands of him who hath the supreme authority.

Footnote 13:

That they were made by an oath or sacrament, &c.] Whether matrimony be a sacrament, (in which sense that word is used by some divines), or not, it is not my purpose to dispute. Only I say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together, that is, granted by the civil law, whether it be a sacrament or not, is surely a legitimate marriage; but that copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage, since it is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract. There were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jews, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those who permit no such contracts but by a law that they shall never be broke, wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the city hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because matrimony is a sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the temple, to bless, or, if I may say so, to consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the office of clergymen; all the rest namely, who, when, and by what contracts marriages may be made, pertains to the laws of the city.

17. This same supreme command and absolute power, seems so harsh to the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them; which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what human nature and the civil laws are; and partly also through their default, who, when they are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to their own lust. That they may therefore avoid this kind of supreme authority, some of them will have a city well enough constituted, if they who shall be the citizens’ convening, do agree concerning certain articles propounded, and in that convent agitated and approved, and do command them to be observed, and punishments prescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them. To which purpose, and also to the repelling of a foreign enemy, they appoint a certain and limited return, with this condition, that if that suffice not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not in a city thus constituted, that the assembly who prescribed those things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly continue, or from time to time have a certain day and place of meeting, that power will be perpetual. But if they wholly dissolve, either the city dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of war: or else there is somewhere a power left to punish those who shall transgress the laws, whosoever or how many soever they be that have it; which cannot possibly be without an absolute power. For he that by right hath this might given, by punishments to restrain what citizens he pleaseth, hath such a power as a greater cannot possibly be given by any citizens.

18. It is therefore manifest, that in every city there is some one man, or council, or court, who by right hath as great a power over each single citizen, as each man hath over himself considered out of that civil state; that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited only by the strength and forces of the city itself, and by nothing else in the world. For if his power were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater power. For he that prescribes limits, must have a greater power than he who is confined by them. Now that confining power is either without limit, or is again restrained by some other greater than itself; and so we shall at length arrive to a power, which hath no other limit but that which is the terminus ultimus of the forces of all the citizens together. That same is called the supreme command; and if it be committed to a council, a supreme council, but if to one man, the supreme lord of the city. Now the notes of supreme command are these: to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, to know and judge of all controversies, either by himself, or by judges appointed by him; to elect all magistrates, ministers, and counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by right can do some one action, which is not lawful for any citizen or citizens to do beside himself, that man hath obtained the supreme power. For those things which by right may not be done by any one or many citizens, the city itself can only do. He therefore that doth those things, useth the city’s right; which is the supreme power.

19. They who compare a city and its citizens with a man and his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the city is in relation to the whole city, such as the head is to the whole man. But it appears by what hath been already said, that he who is endued with such a power, whether it be a man or a court, hath a relation to the city, not as that of the head, but of the soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man hath a will, that is, can either will or nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the city hath a will, and can either will or nill. A court of counsellors is rather to be compared with the head, or one counsellor, whose only counsel (if of any one alone) the chief ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to counsel, as the soul’s is to command.

20. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with the other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken: perhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away. Which inference, if it were true, I cannot discern what danger would thence by right arise to the supreme commanders. For since it is supposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other; if any one of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he is bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me, do that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not to do. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine against the supreme power. Wherefore there is no fear for rulers in chief, that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority. If, notwithstanding, it were granted that their right depended only on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion under pretence of right. For subjects being called either by the command of the city, or seditiously flocking together, most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part; which in truth is false. For it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from civil institution: and is then only true, when that man or court which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them; and will have the major part of voices, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed, to be as effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who is chief, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his right; unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his government. Now, because most men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of citizens only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole city; it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly of citizens by the votes of the greater number. But though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars, yet its right depends not on that obligation only; there is another tie also towards him who commands. For each citizen compacting with his fellow, says thus: I convey my right on this party, upon condition that you pass yours to the same: by which means, that right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man or council for the common benefit. Wherefore what by the mutual contracts each one hath made with the other, what by the donation of right which every man is bound to ratify to him that commands, the government is upheld by a double obligation from the citizens; first, that which is due to their fellow-citizens; next, that which they owe to their prince. Wherefore no subjects, how many soever they be, can with any right despoil him who bears the chief rule of his authority, even without his own consent.

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