CHAPTER X.. Comparison Between Three Kinds of Government

COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES.

1. A comparison of the natural state with the civil. 2. The conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects are alike. 3. The praise of monarchy. 4. The government under one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest. 5. A rejection of their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot make a city. 6. Exactions are more grievous under a popular state, than a monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects are less exposed to penalties under a monarch, than under the people. 8. The liberty of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than under a people. 9. It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not all admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: 11. In regard of eloquence: 12. In regard of faction: 13. In regard of the unstableness of the laws: 14. In regard of the want of secrecy. 15. That these inconveniences adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit. 16. The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a child. 17. The power of generals is an evident sign of the excellence of monarchy. 18. The best state of a city is that, where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance. 19. The nearer aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is; the further it keeps from it, the worse.

1. What democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy are, hath already been spoken; but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects’ peace and procuring their advantages, we must see by comparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages and disadvantages of a city in general; lest some perhaps should think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will, than to constitute any society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of civil government hath a most entire, but unfruitful liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others suffer all at another’s will. But in a constituted city, every subject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live well and quietly; and there is so much taken away from others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any man may rightly spoil or kill another; in it, none but one. Out of it, we are protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it, no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.

2. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his Politics, saith, that there are two sorts of governments; whereof the one relates to the benefit of the ruler, the other to that of the subjects. As if where subjects are severely dealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another form of government. Which opinion may by no means be subscribed to; for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same, and common both to the ruler and the subject. The damages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler. But those relate not to the government itself, being such as may happen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from the first institution of the city, they will then be truly called the inconveniences of government; but they will be common to the ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common. But the first and greatest benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he may defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects. And in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a city, namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy, both the commander and the parties commanded are equally concerned. Next, if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor, the disadvantage is as much his as theirs, who, with never so great a stock or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raise no more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power, that is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects, tending to a common peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way public treasures can be a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies and minds. For even thus the grievance would concern the ruler; nor would it arise from the ill-institution or ordination of the government, because in all manner of governments subjects may be oppressed; but from the ill-administration of a well-established government.

3. Now that monarchy, of the foresaid forms of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, hath the pre-eminence, will best appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the whole universe is governed by one God; that the ancients preferred the monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule of the gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of nations, the decrees of princes were held for laws; that paternal government, instituted by God himself in the creation, was monarchical; that other governments were compacted by the artifice of men out of the ashes of monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of kings: although, I say, these do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will pass them over.

Footnote 15:

Compacted by the artifice of men, &c.] It seems the ancients who made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say that Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention, which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire removed from its natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person; which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it; that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.

4. Some there are, who are discontented with the government under one, for no other reason but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing, that one man among so many should so far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by envy, while they see one man in possession of what all desire. For the same cause, they would judge it to be as unreasonable if a few commanded, unless they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number. For if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right, surely an aristocracy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore inequality was introduced by a general consent; this inequality, whereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is no longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the dominion of one man, attend his person, not his unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.

5. But first we must remove their opinion, who deny that to be any city at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common lord. In the ninth article of the fifth chapter, a city is defined to be one person made out of many men, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all; insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single person for the public peace and safety. And by the same article of the same chapter, one person is that, when the wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each servant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath been declared in the fifth article of the eighth chapter; so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure. It follows therefore that that must needs be a city, which is constituted by a lord and many servants. Neither can any reason be brought to contradict this, which doth not equally combat against a city constituted by a father and his sons. For to a lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature of sons; for they are both his honour and safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their lords, then children to their parents, as hath been manifested above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter.

6. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the ruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the maintaining of public ministers, building, and defending of castles, waging wars, honourably sustaining his own household, may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sons, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confess this is a grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of government, but are more tolerable in a monarchy than in a democracy. For though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one. But in a democracy, look how many demagogues, that is, how many powerful orators there are with the people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing), so many children, kinsmen, friends, and flatterers are to be rewarded. For every of them desire not only to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of themselves. A monarch may in great part satisfy his officers and friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his subjects; I mean without robbing them of any of those treasures given in for the maintenance of war and peace. In a democracy, where many are to be satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be done without the subject’s oppression. Though a monarch may promote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it; but in a democracy, all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it, because it is necessary; for else the power of them who did it, would so increase, as it would not only become dreadful to those others, but even to the whole city also.

7. Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death, which every man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself, that the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he lists on any transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath and sensuality slaughter his innocent subjects, and those who never offended against the laws. And truly this is a very great grievance in any form of government, wheresoever it happens; for it is therefore a grievance, because it is, not because it may be done. But it is the fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all the acts of Nero are not essential to monarchy; yet subjects are less often undeservedly condemned under one ruler, than under the people. For kings are only severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent counsels, or oppose them with reproachful words, or control their wills; but they are the cause that that excess of power which one subject might have above another, becomes harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge; and not all neither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy. For they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly punished. Whosoever therefore in a monarchy will lead a retired life, let him be what he will that reigns, he is out of danger. For the ambitious only suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent. But in a popular dominion, there may be as many Neros as there are orators who soothe the people. For each one of them can do as much as the people, and they mutually give way to each other’s appetite, as it were by this secret pact, spare me to-day and I’ll spare thee to-morrow, while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for monarchs to have a care, that the common weal do thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of riches, they lessened it by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerful party, without any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was usually practised in democracies. For the Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten years’ banishment on those that were powerful, merely because of their powers, without the guilt of any other crime. And those who by liberal gifts did seek the favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a kingdom. In this democracy and monarchy were even; yet differed they much in fame. Because fame derives from the people; and what is done by many, is commended by many. And therefore what the monarch does, is said to be done out of envy to their virtues; which if it were done by the people, would be accounted policy.

8. There are some, who therefore imagine monarchy to be more grievous then democracy, because there is less liberty in that, than in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the laws, that is, the commands of the people; neither in democracy, nor in any other state of government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws, few prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbidden, there could be no peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in democracy than monarchy; for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty, as the other. For although the word liberty may in large and ample letters be written over the gates of any city whatsoever, yet is it not meant the subject’s, but the city’s liberty; neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a city which is governed by the people, than that which is ruled by a monarch. But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but dominion; which yet for want of understanding they little consider. For if every man would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for himself, as is commanded by the law of nature; that same natural state would return again, in which all men may by right do all things; which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse than all kinds of civil subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to have his single freedom, the rest being bound, what does he else demand but to have the dominion? For whoso is freed from all bonds, is lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a popular, than in a monarchical state. That which deceives them, is the equal participation of command and public places. For where the authority is in the people, single subjects do so far forth share in it, as they are parts of the people ruling; and they equally partake in public offices, so far forth as they have equal voices in choosing magistrates and public ministers. And this is that which Aristotle aimed at, himself also through the custom of that time miscalling dominion liberty. (Polit. lib. vi. cap. 2.) In a popular state there is liberty by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as if no man were free out of this state. From whence, by the way, we may collect, that those subjects who in a monarchy deplore their lost liberty, do only stomach this, that they are not received to the steerage of the commonweal.

9. But perhaps for this very reason, some will say that a popular state is much to be preferred before a monarchical; because that where all men have a hand in public businesses, there all have an opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is to them who excel in such-like faculties, and seem to themselves to exceed others, the most delightful of all things. But in a monarchy, this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest part of subjects; and what is a grievance if this be none? I will tell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours; to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain trial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to hate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family: these, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial of wits, although those trials are pleasant to the eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them; unless we will say, that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in it.

10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations are less successful in great assemblies than in lesser councils. Whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a commonweal, we must not only understand matters at home, but foreign affairs too. At home, by what goods the country is nourished and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are fit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers are best to be raised and maintained; what manner of affections the subjects bear towards their prince or governors of their country; and many the like. Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring country is, and wherein it consists; what advantage or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other among themselves; and what counsel daily passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great assembly of men understand these things, being for the most part unskilful, that I say not incapable of them, what can that same number of advisers with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels, other than mere lets and impediments?

11. Another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long-continued speech; and to gain the more esteem from his auditors, he polishes and adorns it with the best and smoothest language. Now the nature of eloquence is to make good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, honest and dishonest, appear to be more or less than indeed they are; and to make that seem just which is unjust, according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which for the most part are erroneous. Neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the passions of their minds to whom they speak; whence it happens, that opinions are delivered not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind. Nor is this fault in the man, but in the nature itself of eloquence, whose end, as all the masters of rhetoric teach us, is not truth (except by chance), but victory; and whose property is not to inform, but to allure.

12. The third reason why men advise less successfully in a great convent is, because that thence arise factions in a commonweal; and out of factions, seditions and civil war. For when equal orators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches, the conquered hates the conqueror and all those that were of his side, as holding his council and wisdom in scorn, and studies all means to make the advice of his adversaries prejudicial to the state: for thus he hopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself. Furthermore, where the votes are not so unequal, but that the conquered have hopes, by the accession of some few of their own opinion, at another sitting to make the stronger party, the chief heads do call the rest together; they advise a part how they may abrogate the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what order each man shall speak, that the same business may again be brought to agitation; that so what was confirmed before by the number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of no effect to them, being negligently absent. And this same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people, is commonly called a faction. But when a faction is inferior in votes, and superior, or not much inferior in power, then what they cannot obtain by craft and language, they attempt by force of arms; and so it comes to a civil war. But some will say, these things do not necessarily, nor often happen. He may as well say, that the chief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.

13. It follows hence, that when the legislative power resides in such convents as these, the laws must needs be inconstant; and change, not according to the alteration of the state of affairs, nor according to the changeableness of men’s minds, but as the major part, now of this, then of that faction, do convene. Insomuch as the laws do float here and there, as it were upon the waters.

14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience; that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to any effect; and their power and will is as soon known abroad, as to the people itself commanding at home.

15. These inconveniences, which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies, do so far forth evince monarchy to be better than democracy, as in democracy affairs of great consequence are oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a monarchy. Neither can it easily be done otherwise. For there is no reason why every man should not naturally mind his own private, than the public business, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing to his mother. But if the people in a democracy would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the nomination of magistrates and public ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the ministration; then it must be confessed, that in this particular democracy and monarchy would be equal.

16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence, namely, because the government itself, or the administration of its affairs, are better committed to one than many; or on the other side, to many than to some few. For government is the power, the administration of it is the act. Now the power in all kinds of government is equal; the acts only differ, that is to say, the actions and motions of a commonweal, as they flow from the deliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that the conveniences or inconveniences of any government depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on his officers; and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal may be well governed, although the monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with the public offices and charges. And that which is said, woe to the land whose king is a child, doth not signify the condition of a monarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance of a kingdom, that the king being a child, it often happens, that many by ambition and power intruding themselves into public councils, the government comes to be administered in a democratical manner; and that thence arise those infelicities, which for the most part accompany the dominion of the people.

17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute monarchy is the best state of government, that not only kings, but even those cities which are subject to the people or to nobles, give the whole command of war to one only; and that so absolute, as nothing can be more. Wherein, by the way, this must be noted also; that no king can give a general greater authority over his army, than he himself by right may exercise over all his subjects. Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the camps. But what else are many commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened with arms and men against each other; whose state, because not restrained by any common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may pass between them, is to be accounted for the state of nature; which is the state of war.

18. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of ourselves to be subject to some man or council, we cannot on better condition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon our safety and welfare; and this then comes to pass, when we are the inheritance of the ruler. For every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance. But the lands and monies of the subjects are not only the prince’s treasure, but their bodies and wildy minds. Which will be easily granted by those, who consider at how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued; and how much easier it is for men to procure money, than money men. Nor do we readily meet with any example that shows us when any subject, without any default of his own, hath by his prince been despoiled of his life or goods, through the sole licentiousness of his authority.

19. Hitherto we have compared a monarchical with a popular state; we have said nothing of aristocracy. We may conclude of this, by what hath been said of those, that that which is hereditary, and content with the election of magistrates; which transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which simply imitates the government of monarchs most, and the people least of all; is for the subjects both better and more lasting than the rest.

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