Part 22

Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.

What! (I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?

At any rate I try to do so (he replied).

And how, in Heaven's name (I asked), do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?

Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I daresay, you will simply laugh at me.

Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is grander still, a kingly being. Once more, therefore, I protest: A man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far from it, but of the highest praise.

i.e. {arkhikos} includes (1) {despotikos}, i.e. an arbitrary head of any sort, from the master of one's own family to the {turannos kai despotes} (Plat. "Laws," 859 A), despotic lord or owner; (2) {basilikos}, the king or monarch gifted with regal qualities.

Thus, then, I reason, Socrates (he answered): The lower animals are taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another instance: Young dogs, however far inferior to man in thought and language, can still be taught to run on errands and turn somersaults, and do a host of other clever things, precisely on this same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason; only make it plain to him "it is his interest to obey." Or if they happen to be slaves, the more ignoble training of wild animals tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much from them. But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise, since some natures hunger after praise no less than others crave for meats and drinks. My practice then is to instruct those whom I desire to appoint as my bailiffs in the various methods which I have found myself to be successful in gaining the obedience of my fellows. To take an instance: There are clothes and shows and so forth, with which I must provide my workfolk. Well, then, I see to it that these are not all alike in make; but some will be of better, some of less good quality: my object being that these articles for use shall vary with the service of the wearer; the worse man will receive the worse things as a gift, the better man the better as a mark of honour. For I ask you, Socrates, how can the good avoid despondency seeing that the work is wrought by their own hands alone, in spite of which these villains who will neither labour nor face danger when occasion calls are to receive an equal guerdon with themselves? And just as I cannot bring myself in any sort of way to look upon the better sort as worthy to receive no greater honour than the baser, so, too, I praise my bailiffs when I know they have apportioned the best things among the most deserving. And if I see that some one is receiving preference by dint of flatteries or like unworthy means, I do not let the matter pass; I reprimand my bailiff roundly, and so teach him that such conduct is not even to his interest.

{oukoun}. "This, then, is my major premiss: the dumb animal..." (lit. "the rest of animals").

{ta kunidia} possibly implies "performing poodles."

{te gnome... te glotte}, i.e. mental impression and expression, "mind and tongue."

Or, "to run round and round and turn heels over head." Al. "dive for objects."

"Logic, argument." Or, "a creature more compliant; merely by a word demonstrate to him..."

Cf. Plat. "Rep." 591 C.

See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," "Lacedaemon," p. 196 foll.

See "Cyrop." passim.

{ergastersi}, Xenophontic for the common Attic {ergatais}. See Hold. ad loc. for similar forms, and cf. Rutherford, "New Phrynichus," 59.

Cf. Aristot. "Oecon." i. 5 (where the thesis is developed further).

XIV

Soc. Well, then, Ischomachus, supposing the man is now so fit to rule that he can compel obedience, is he, I ask once more, your bailiff absolute? or even though possessed of all the qualifications you have named, does he still lack something?

Or, "that discipline flows from him;" al. "he presents you with obedient servants."

Lit. "will he still need something further to complete him?"

Most certainly (replied Ischomachus). One thing is still required of him, and that is to hold aloof from property and goods which are his master's; he must not steal. Consider, this is the very person through whose hands the fruits and produce pass, and he has the audacity to make away with them! perhaps he does not leave enough to cover the expenses of the farming operations! Where would be the use of farming the land by help of such an overseer?

What (I exclaimed), can I believe my ears? You actually undertake to teach them virtue! What really, justice!

Isch. To be sure, I do. but it does not follow therefore that I find all equally apt to lend an ear to my instruction. However, what I do is this. I take a leaf now out of the laws of Draco and again another out of the laws of Solon, and so essay to start my household on the path of uprightness. And indeed, if I mistake not (he proceeded), both those legislators enacted many of their laws expressly with a view to teaching this branch of justice. It is written, "Let a man be punished for a deed of theft"; "Let whosoever is detected in the act be bound and thrown in prison"; "If he offer violence, let him be put to death." It is clear that the intention of the lawgivers in framing these enactments was to render the sordid love of gain devoid of profit to the unjust person. What I do, therefore, is to cull a sample of their precepts, which I supplement with others from the royal code where applicable; and so I do my best to shape the members of my household into the likeness of just men concerning that which passes through their hands. And now observe--the laws first mentioned act as penalties, deterrent to transgressors only; whereas the royal code aims higher: by it not only is the malefactor punished, but the righteous and just person is rewarded. The result is, that many a man, beholding how the just grow ever wealthier than the unjust, albeit harbouring in his heart some covetous desires, is constant still to virtue. To abstain from unjust dealing is engrained in him.

Cobet, "Pros. Xen." cf. Plut. "Solon," xvii. {proton men oun tous Drakontos nomous aneile k.t.l.} "First, then, he repealed all Draco's laws, except those concerning homicide, because they were too severe and the punishments too great; for death was appointed for almost all offences, insomuch that those that were convicted of idleness were to die, and those that stole a cabbage or an apple to suffer even as villains that committed sacrilege or murder" (Clough, i. 184). See Aul. Gell. "N. A." xi. 13.

"The branch of justice which concerns us, viz. righteous dealing between man and man."

For this sense of {tous egkheirountas} cf. Thuc. iv. 121; "Hell." IV. v. 16. Al. {dedesthai tous egkheirountas kai thanatousthai en tis alo poion} (Weiske), "let the attempt be punished with imprisonment"; "let him who is caught in the act be put to death."