Part 4

1. Could ever any rational man have thought or believed, that Mr. Glanvil, a person who pretends to such high parts, would have expressed so much weakness and impudence, as to have charged Mr. Scot with the flat denial of the existence of Witches; as he doth in these words speaking of him? and pretends this to be a Confutation of the being of Witches and Apparitions; and this he intimates in divers other places, but without any quotation, to shew where or in what words Scot doth simply deny the Being of Witches, which he doth no where maintain: so confident are many to charge others with that which they neither hold nor write.

2. Mr. Scot and Wierus do not state the Question, An sint, Whether there be Witches or not, but Quomodo sint, in what manner they act. So that their Question is only, What kind of power supposed Witches have, or do act by, and what the things are that they do or can perform: so that the state of the question is not simply of the Being of Witches, or de existentia, but only de modo existendi: wherein it is plain, that every Dispute de modo existendi, doth necessarily grant and suppose the certainty of the Existence, otherwise the Dispute of the manner of their Being, Properties, Power, or Acts would have no ground or foundation at all. As if I and another should dispute about the extent, buildings, and situation of the great City Peking in China, or about the length, breadth, and height of the great Wall dividing China from Tartary; we both do take for granted, that there is such a City, and such a Wall, otherwise our Dispute would be wild, vain, and groundless: like the two Wise-men of Gotham, who strove and argued about the driving of sheep over a bridge; the one affirming he would drive his sheep over the bridge, and the other protesting against it, and so begun, one as it were to drive, and the other to stay and stop them, when there were no sheep betwixt them. And this might be a sufficient document to Mr. Glanvil, to have been more sober, than to have charged Scot so falsely. And do not the ancient Fathers differ in their opinions circa Angelorum modum existendi, some of them holding them to be corporeal, and some incorporeal? yet both these parties did firmly hold their existence: so that this is a false and improper charge, and hath no basis to stand upon at all.

3. What man of reason and judgment could have believed, that Mr. Glanvil or Dr. Casaubon, being persons that pretend to a great share of Learning, and to be exact in their ways of arguing, would have committed so pitiful and gross a fault, as is fallacia consequentis? For if I deny that a Witch cannot flye in the air, nor be transformed or transsubstantiated into a Cat, a Dog, or an Hare, or that the Witch maketh any visible Covenant with the Devil, or that he sucketh on their bodies, or that the Devil hath carnal Copulation with them; I do not thereby deny either the Being of Witches, nor other properties that they may have, for which they may be so called: no more than if I deny that a Dog hath rugibility (which is only proper to a Lion) doth it follow that I deny the being of a Dog, or that he hath latrability? this is meer inconsequential, and hath no connexion. So if I deny that a man cannot flye by his natural abilities in the air like a Bird, nor live continually in the Sea as a fish, nor in the earth as a Worm or Mole, this doth not at all infer that I deny the existence of man, nor his other properties of risibility, rationality, or the like. But this is the learned Logick, and the clear ways of arguing that these men use.

3. A third scandal Mr. Glanvil throws upon him is this, where he saith thus: “For the Author doth little but tell odd tales and silly Legends, which he confutes and laughs at, and pretends this to be a confutation of the Being of Witches and Apparitions. In all which, his reasonings are trifling and childish; and when he ventures at Philosophy, he is little better than absurd. Dr. Casaubon, though he confesseth he had never read Scots Book, but as he had found it by chance in friends houses, or Book-sellers Shops, yet doth rank him amongst the number of his illiterate Wretches, and tells us how Dr. Reynolds did censure him and some others.” To these, though they be not much material, we shall give positive and convincing answers.

1. There is no greater sign of the weakness of a mans cause, nor his inability to defend it, than when he slips over the substance of the question in hand, and begins to fall foul upon the adverse party, to throw dirt and filth upon him, and to abuse and slander him: this is a thing very usual, but exceeding base, and plainly demonstrates the badness of their cause.

2. If Mr. Scot hath done little but told odd tales and silly Legends, Mr. Glanvil might very well have born with him; for I am sure his story of the Drummer, and his other of Witchcraft are as odd and silly, as any can be told or read, and are as futilous, incredible, ludicrous, and ridiculous as any can be. And if the tales that Scot tells be odd and silly, they are the most of them taken from those pitiful lying Witchmongers, such as Delrio, Bodinus, Springerus, Remigius, and the like, the Authors that are most esteemed with Dr. Casaubon, and other Witchmongers, of whom we shall say more hereafter.

3. For Mr. Glanvil to give general accusations without particular proofs, as to say Scots reasonings are trifling and childish, and when he ventures at Philosophy, he is little better than absurd, do plainly manifest the mans malice, and discover his weakness: For dolus versatur in universalibus, and no man ought to be condemned without particular and punctual proof, as to the time, place, and all other circumstances, which Mr. Glanvil could not do, and therefore he only gives general calumniations without ground; and if Scot were little better than absurd, then he the better agrees with Mr. Glanvil, whose Platonical Whimseys are as absurd as any, as we shall sufficiently prove hereafter.

4. Dr. Casaubon must needs have been highly elevated with the desire of censuring, when he would condemn a man without reading his Book, or serious weighing the force of his arguments, this concludes him of vast weakness, and of great perversness of mind, as all rational men may judge; for in effect it is this, Scot is an illiterate Wretch, and his Book full of errors, but I never read it, but as I have looked upon it at a friends house, or a Book-sellers Shop: is not this a wretched ground whereupon to build so wretched a foundation, as thereby to judge him an illiterate Wretch? And to censure him by the report of others, is as unjust, weak, and childish as the former; and though Dr. Reynolds were a learned man, it doth not appear for what particular point or errour he censured Scot, and therefore is but a general and groundless charge, sheltred under the colour of Dr. Reynolds reputation, an evidence, in Reason and Law, of no weight or validity.

5. For Dr. Casaubon to rank him amongst illiterate Wretches, is against the very Rule of the Law of Nature, that teaches all men, that they should not do that to another, which they would not have another to do unto them. And sure Dr. Casaubon would not have another to judge and condemn him for an illiterate Wretch, and therefore, he ought not to have condemned Mr. Scot to be so. And as it is against the Law of Nature, so it is contrary to the rules of modesty and morality to give a man such stigmatizing titles: nay it is even against the rules of good manners and civil education, but that some men think that it is lawful for them to say any thing, and that nothing what they say doth misbeseem them. And lastly, how far it is against the Rules of Christianity and Piety, let all good Christians judge.

6. The falsity of this foul scandal is manifest in both the particulars therein couched. 1. For Mr. Scot was a learned and diligent person, as the whole Treatise will bear witness; he understood the Latine Tongue, and something of the Greek, and for the Hebrew, if he knew nothing of it, yet he had procured very good helps, as appeareth in his expounding the several words that are used in the Scriptures for supposed Witches and Witchcraft; as also his quoting of divers of the Fathers, the reformed Ministers, and many other Authors besides, which sufficiently prove that he was not illiterate. 2. And that he was no wretched person, is apparent, being a man of a good Family, a considerable Estate, a man of a very commendable government, and a very godly and zealous Protestant, as I have been informed by persons of worth and credit, and is sufficiently proved by his Writing.

I have not been thus tedious to accumulate these instances of men that have been censured, for opposing vulgar opinions, or writing of abstruse Subjects, as circumstantial only, or for a flourish, but meerly as they are introductive, necessary, and pertinent to the purpose I intend in this Treatise, as I shall make manifest in these Rules or Observations following, and shall add sufficient reasons to confirm the same.

1. That the generality of an opinion, or the numerousness of the persons that hold and maintain it, are not a safe and warrantable ground to receive it, or to adhere unto it: nor that it is safe or rational to reject an opinion, because they are but few that do hold it, or the number but small that maintain it. And this I shall labour to make good by these sure and firm arguments following.

1. Because the Scriptures tell us thus much: Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil. And that there are many deceivers: For many shall come in my Name, saying, I am Christ, and shall deceive many. And woe unto you, when all men shall speak well of you: for so did their fathers to the false Prophets. From whence it is plain, that first we are to consider and be assured, that the matter be not evil; for if it be, we are not at all to be swayed with the multitudes that follow it, or that uphold it: so if the opinion be evil, erroneous, or false, we ought not to receive it, or adhere unto it, though never so many do hold or maintain it. So that in truth and substance, we are not at all to consider, whether there be few or many that hold it, but simply, whether it be true or not. For as Plato tells us: Neq; id considerandum quid dixerit, sed utrum verè dicatur nec ne. For the multitude have been by all good Authors and Learned men always esteemed the most erroneous, as Seneca saith: Quærendum non quod vulgo placet, pessimo veritatis interpreti. And Lactantius teaches us this: Vulgus indoctum pompis inanibus gaudet, animisq; puerilibus spectat omnia, oblectatur frivolis, nec ponderare secum unamquamq; rem potest. And our Saviour gives us a proof and instance of the errour of the multitude, and that in matter of fact. Did not almost all the Jews under divers Kings Raigns applaud and approve of the doctrine and opinions of the false Prophets, though utterly erroneous? insomuch that Elijah said, that he only was left of the true Prophets, though the false ones were many and numerous. So that the Rule is proved to be true, both by the precept and example of the Scriptures.

2. If we consider the generality of Mankind, either in respect of their inclinations and dispositions, or their breeding and education, we shall not find one of an hundred, either by nature inclined, or by education fitted and qualified to search forth and understand the truth. And then if there be an hundred to one drowned in ignorance and errors, and so few fitted to understand the truth of things either divine or natural, then it must needs follow, that it is not safe to embrace or adhere to an opinion, because of the great number of those that hold or maintain it, but rather to stick to the smaller number; though neither simply ought to be regarded, but truth it self.

3. Again, if we consider those numbers, that either by nature are inclined, or by education trained up in Learning, to enable them to judge rightly betwixt truth and truth-likeliness, how few of these that prove any thing excellent in those parts of Learning wherein they are bred, we may easily see the verity of this Rule sufficiently proved, that it is not safe to embrace or adhere to an opinion, because the numbers are great that hold or maintain it.

4. If the multitude that hold the opinions, whether of spiritual or natural things were to be followed, meerly because of the great numbers that hold them: then if we look and consider the Writings of the best Geographers, Travellers, and Navigators, we should either be of the opinions of the Pagans, who are the most numerous part of Mankind, or the Mahumetans, which are many in respect of the paucity of Christians. And then what horrid, blasphemous, idolatrous, impious, and diabolical opinions must we receive and hold, both concerning God, Angels, the Creation, and the most of the operations that are produced by Nature? So that the arguments of Dr. Casaubon and Mr. Glanvil, drawn from the universality of the opinion, and the great multitudes of those that hold it, are vain and groundless.

5. If the comparison I use be thought too large, and the rule be put only as to the greater part of the Learned that are in Europe, yet it will hold good, that the greatest part of the Learned are not to be adhered to, because of their numerousness; nor that the rest are to be rejected, because of their paucity. For it is known sufficiently, that a Bishop of Mentz was censured and excommunicated for holding that there were Antipodes, by some hundreds of those that were accounted learned and wise: so that it is plain, that the greater number may be in the errour, and those that are few be in the right. And did not the greatest number of the Physicians in Europe altogether adhere to the Doctrine of Galen, though now in Germany, France, England, and many other Nations the most have exploded it? And was not the Aristotelian Philosophy embraced by the greatest part of all the Learned in Europe? And have not the Cartesians and others sufficiently now manifested the errours and imperfections of it, and especially the endeavors of the honourable and learned Members of the Royal Society here in England, and the like Societies beyond Seas by their continual labour and vigilancy about Experiments, made the errours and defects of it obvious to all inquisitive persons? So that multitude, as multitude, ought not to lead or sway us, but truth it self.

6. If to all this we add, that truth in it self is but one; for unum and verum are convertibles, and that errour or falsity is various and manifold, and that there may be a thousand errours about one particular thing, and yet but one truth; it will necessarily follow, the greatest number holding an opinion, cannot be safe to be followed because of their multitude, and the reason is errour, is manifold, truth but one.

2. It is not safe nor rational to receive or adhere to an opinion because of its Antiquity; nor to reject one because of its Novelty. And this we shall make good from and by these following reasons.

1. Because there is no opinion (especially about created things) but it hath once been new; and if an opinion should be rejected meerly because of novelty, then it will follow, that either all opinions might have been rejected for that very reason, or that novelty is no safe ground only, why an opinion should be opposed or rejected.

2. Antiquity and Novelty are but relations quoad nostrum intellectum, non quoad naturam; for the truth, as it is fundamentally in things extra intellectum, cannot be accounted either old or new. And an opinion, when first found out and divulged, is as much a truth then, as when the current of hundreds or thousands of years have passed since its discovery. For it was no less a truth, when in the infancy of Philosophy it was holden, that there was generation and corruption in Nature, in respect of Individuals, than it is now: so little doth Time, Antiquity, or Novelty alter, change, confirm, or overthrow truth; for veritas est temporis filia, in regard of its discovery to us or by us, who must draw it forth è puteo Democriti. And the existence of the West-Indies was as well before the discovery made by Columbus as since, and our ignorance of it did not impeach the truth of its being, neither did the novelty of its discovery make it less verity, nor the years since make it more: so that we ought simply to examine, whether an opinion be possible or impossible, probable or improbable, true or false; and if it be false, we ought to reject it, though it seem never so venerable by the white hairs of Antiquity; nor ought we to refuse it, though it seem never so young, or near its birth. For as St. Cyprian said: Error vetustatis est vetustas erroris.

3. In regard of Natural Philosophy, and the knowledge of the properties of created things, and the knowledge of them, we preposterously reckon former Ages, and the men that lived in them, the Ancients; which in regard of production and generation of the Individuals of their own Species are so; but in respect of knowledge and experience, this Age is to be accounted the most ancient. For as the learned Lord Bacon saith: “Indeed to speak truly, Antiquitas seculi, juventus mundi,” Antiquity of time is the youth of the World. Certainly our times are the ancient times, when the World is now ancient, and not those which we count ancient, ordine retrogrado, by a computation backward from our own times; and yet so much credit hath been given to old Authors, as to invest them with the power of Dictators, that their words should stand, rather than admit them as Consuls to give advice.

3. It is not safe nor rational to resolve to stick to our old imbibed opinions, nor wilfully to reject those that seem new, except we be fully satisfied, from indubitable grounds, that what we account old is certainly true, and what we reckon to be new is undoubtedly false. And this will appear to be a truth, partly from the weakness of their arguments, that seem utterly to condemn all recession from ancient opinions, as vain, foolish, and unnecessary; as also from other positive reasons.

1. Some give the reason why they will not recede from an opinion that their Predecessors held; for that their Forefathers were as wise, if not wiser than they. But this, if strictly considered, is very lame and defective; for their Predecessors were but men, and so were liable both to active and passive deception, and were not exempted from the common frailty of Mankind, who are all subject to errours. And therefore, unless they were assured that their Ancestors in former Ages, held the certain and undoubted grounds of truth, it is nothing of reason in them, but meer perversness of will, rather obstinately errare cum patribus, than to learn to follow the truth with those that are coetaneous with them, which is foolish and irrational. Further, there are more helps now, and means to attain the knowledge of Verity, than were in the days when their Ancestors lived, and it must be a kind of the greatest madness to shut their eyes, that the light of truth may not appear unto them.

2. This kind of reasoning hath no more of reason in it, than if one should say, that because his Grandfather and great Grandfather were blind or lame, therefore they will be so too: or that their Ancestors never learned the Greek or Latine Tongues, nor to write or read, neither will they learn any more than they did: or that their Predecessors were ill husbands and unthrifts, and that therefore they will continue the same courses: or that because their Forefathers followed drunkenness and luxury, therefore they will continue the same cariere of vices, as many of our debauched persons do now adays, having no better reasons to alledge for their exorbitant and vicious courses, but what the Prophet condemned, The fathers have eaten sowr grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge.

3. How far would they run back to state the beginning of their Ancestors? If as far as their first Originals, then they must all be Savages, Barbarians, and Heathens. And if they state it distant from their first Originals, then their Predecessors had the same reason to have continued, as those did that preceded them. But if their Ancestors varied from, and left the steps and opinions of those that went before them, then if they will do as their Ancestors did, they must leave their courses and opinions, as they had done of those that preceded them.

4. Some say they cannot recede from the opinions of their Predecessors, because it would be a shame and disgrace unto them. But that which we call shame and disgrace consists in the opinion of others, and we ought not to receive errour, or reject truth, by reason of the censures or opinions of others: Si de veritate scandalum sumitur, utilius permittitur nasci scandalum, quàm veritas relinquatur. And to leave an errour to entertain truth, is so far from being a shame and a disgrace, that there cannot be a greater honour or glory: for errare humanum est, sed in errore perseverare belluinum ac diabolicum est.

4. Those effects that seem strange and wonderful, either in respect of Art or Nature, require much diligence truly to discover and find out their causes; and we ought not rashly to attribute those effects to the Devil, whose causes are latent or unknown unto us: and that for these grounds.