Part 10

We may readily imagine the feeling of disappointed chagrin and passion that stirred to its depths the strong nature of Jackson, when the intelligence quickly came to him across the river of the disaster to Morgan's command, and of its retreat toward New Orleans, followed by the enemy. It was in this tumult of passion and excitement that the report of Morgan, followed by that of Patterson, was brought to him, imputing the cause of defeat and disaster to the cowardly retreat of the Kentucky detachment. Under the promptings of these incidents of the day, Jackson's report to the Secretary of War was made, in which the words of censure were so unjustly employed. Jackson must have informed Morgan on the evening of the seventh that he would reinforce him with five hundred armed soldiers. When Colonel Davis reported to Morgan, one hour before daylight, the arrival of the Kentucky contingent, the latter was expecting five hundred men to reinforce him. Had this been done, the Kentucky troops and Major Arnaud's one hundred and fifty Louisianians would have made the forces sent to the front to check the advance of the British under Colonel Thornton over six hundred men. Such a force, well officered, would probably have held the enemy in check, fallen back in good order, and made a stubborn fight on the line of battle. But there was only one third the Kentucky force expected; and when Major Arnaud's command retreated, there was but this contingent of one hundred and seventy Kentucky militia left to resist the advance of one thousand British veterans, and to meet their main assault on the center and right of the long line of battle. It made its march from New Orleans at midnight, and was reported to General Morgan before daybreak. These facts give a more intelligible view of the plan of battle arranged by this officer. It was undoubtedly marred and broken up by the unforeseen incidents mentioned, unfortunately for General Morgan and for the American cause. Commodore Patterson, in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, five days after the battle, makes the force of Kentucky militia that gave way before the British four hundred men, more than double the real number; thus showing the error prevalent.

When the facts came out that General Adair had secured the four hundred stand of city arms for his own immediate command with which Jackson had designed to arm the reinforcement for General Morgan, the incident was naturally very irritating to the Commander-in-chief. It was imputed as a cause, in part, of the defeat and disaster on the right bank. Jackson seems to have complained to Adair that the latter ought to have known of his order to call out the detachment of five hundred Kentuckians in time, and of his intention to arm them in the city. Adair replied that the order came to General Thomas, in chief command of the Kentuckians, lying ill in camp, while he was busily engaged in New Orleans and at the front, preparing his own command for battle next day; that he did not know of the intention of Jackson to use the city arms until too late to repair the mistake. It made up a chapter of accidents and errors, happening with best intentions. As for the little body of Kentucky militia, who were made sensationally notorious, where there was honor and fame for no one, poorly armed and wearied with fasting and a heavy all-night march, they did as well as troops could do. It is doubtful if any one hundred and seventy troops in Jackson's army would have done better. Unsupported, and attacked and flanked by four times their own number, no troops could have held their ground longer.

In the possession of Judge William H. Seymour, of New Orleans, is an original letter of Major Latour, addressed to General Morgan in anticipation of the publication of his "Historical Memoirs of the War of 1812-15," advising him that he would give an account also of the military situation and battle on the west bank, as he viewed them; and inviting any statement from General Morgan in his own vindication that he might choose to make. This letter is not printed in the history, but was seen and copied by the author, through the courtesy of Judge Seymour, who is a lineal descendant of a sister of Andrew Jackson. A diligent inquiry was made by the writer of this monograph for a copy of General Morgan's report, and also of letters or documents from him in vindication of his course in the affairs mentioned. If any such are in print, or otherwise preserved, the author did not succeed in finding them, to his regret.

NEW ORLEANS, LA., April, 1815. TO GENERAL DAVID MORGAN.

Sir: I send you herewith a copy of the publication that I am preparing for the press, upon the last campaign, relating to the transaction that took place on the right bank, on the 8th of January.

As I am of opinion that you are to bear the blame of our disgrace on that part of our defense, I thought myself in duty bound, as a man of honor, to participate to you what I wrote on the subject previous to my putting it to the press. What I have stated is, I believe, strictly true; however, sir, you are in a situation to furnish me with such observations as may tend to rectify what should not be printed, in its true light.

Be persuaded, sir, that I have no enmity against you; on the contrary, as a private citizen, I have the regard for you that I think you deserve. Then I hope you will not take my conscientious caution in a bad part, and that you will direct to me in Philadelphia, where I am departing for in a day or two, anything you will choose to write for your vindication. It will find room in the appendix, at all events, should it be founded upon proper authorities.

I remain, sir, your most respectful servant,

A. LACARRIERE LATOUR.

Incidental prominence has been given to this episode of the battle of the eighth, on the west bank of the river, far beyond its real merits as an event of the military operations around New Orleans. Worse panic and confusion resulted among the American militia at Bladensburg, in front of Washington, and at other places, during the War of 1812-15, and passed into history without unusual criticism, as incidents common to warfare. But the injustice done to the little band of Kentucky militia, imputing to them cowardly conduct, on the part of some of the highest officials of the army, aroused a spirit of indignant protest that echoed far and wide, and would not down. Had it not been for the misleading report of General Morgan, followed by that of Commodore Patterson, and prompting that of General Jackson to the Secretary of War, saying that "the Kentuckians ingloriously fled," and imputing blame to no other party, the incident of the battle and defeat would have been mentioned and passed without comment.

THE COVERT RETREAT OF THE BRITISH.

The battles of the eighth were decisive of the campaign, and of the War of 1812-15, so far as military operations were concerned. The British had been beaten in generalship and beaten upon the field of battle, until they were made to feel and to confess to defeat so crushing as to leave no hope of retrieving disaster. Within fifteen days after landing, they had sustained losses equal to one third of their entire army of invasion. With prestige gone and spirit broken, and their ranks shattered, there was but one thing left to do. To cover their retreat and get safely back to their ships before the broken remnants of their army were made to capitulate by surrender became a matter of gravest concern. The situation is set forth in the following official letter to the Secretary of War:

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, January 19, 1815.

Sir: Last night, at 12 o'clock, the enemy precipitately decamped and returned to his boats, leaving behind him, under medical attendance, eighty of his wounded, fourteen pieces of heavy artillery, and a quantity of ammunition. Such was the situation of the ground he abandoned, and that through which he retired, protected by canals, redoubts, intrenchments, and swamps on his right and the river on his left, that I could not, without great risk, which true policy did not seem to require, much annoy him on his retreat.

Whether it is the purpose of the enemy to renew his efforts at some other point, or not, I can not certainly determine. In my own mind, however, there is little doubt that his last exertions have been made in this quarter, at least for the present season. In this belief I am strengthened by the prodigious losses he has sustained at the position he has just quitted, and by the failure of his fleet to pass Fort St. Philip. His loss on this ground, since the debarkation of his troops, as stated by the last prisoners and deserters, and as confirmed by many additional circumstances, must have exceeded four thousand men. We succeeded on the 8th, in getting from the enemy about one thousand stand of arms of various kinds.

Since the action of the 8th, the enemy have been allowed but very little respite, my artillery from both sides of the river being constantly employed until the hour of their departure, in annoying them. They were permitted to find no rest.

I am advised by Major Overton, who commands at Fort St. Philip, in a letter of the 18th, that the enemy having bombarded his fort for nine days, with thirteen-inch mortars, without effect, had on the morning of that day retired. I have little doubt that he would have sunk their vessels had they attempted to run by.

Do not think me too sanguine in the belief that Louisiana is now clear of the enemy. I need not assure you, however, that wherever I command, such a belief shall never occasion any relaxation in the measures for resistance. I am but too sensible that while the enemy is opposing us, is not the most proper time to provide for them. On the 18th, our prisoners on shore were delivered to us, an exchange having been agreed to. I shall have on hand an excess of several hundred.

I have the honor to be, &c., ANDREW JACKSON, Commander-in-Chief.

The losses to the American army, in the five battles fought from the twenty-third of December to the eighth of January, inclusive, are summarized in the report of the Adjutant-general, which we give:

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, Jan'y 16, 1815.

Sir: I enclose for the information of the War Department, a report of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under Major-general Jackson, in the different actions with the enemy since their landing.

ROB'T BUTLER, Adjutant-General.

BATTLE. KILLED. WOUNDED. MISSING. December 23d 24 115 74 December 28th 9 8 None. January 1st 11 23 None. January 8th 13 39 19 ----- ------ ----- 57 185 93

A total of three hundred and thirty-five men. This includes the killed, wounded, and missing in the two battles on the eighth.

Our English authorities are so marked with exaggerations and discrepancies as to numbers in either army, and also as to losses and casualties, that they are unreliable. There is with nearly all their writers, and in the reports of their officers, a disposition to minimize numbers on their own side, and to overstate those on the side of the Americans. This was no doubt due to a sense of mortified pride and deep chagrin over their repeated defeats and final expulsion from the country, under humiliations such as English armies and navies had rarely before known in history. General Jackson was not far wrong in estimating the entire losses of the British, during the two weeks of invasion, at more than four thousand men. If the large number who deserted from their ranks after the battles of the eighth of January be included, the excess would doubtless swell the numbers much above four thousand. Their killed, wounded, and missing on the eighth approximated three thousand. So decimated and broken up were their columns that they dared not risk another battle.

REPULSE OF THE BRITISH FLEET BEFORE FORT ST. PHILIP.

On the first of January, Major W.H. Overton, in command of Fort St. Philip, which guards the passage of the Mississippi River from its mouth for the protection of New Orleans, received information that the enemy intended to capture or pass the fort, to coöperate with their land forces threatening the city. On the seventh, a fleet of two bomb-vessels, one sloop, one brig, and one schooner appeared and anchored below the fortification and began an attack. For nine days they continued a heavy bombardment from four large sea-mortars and other ordnance, but without the effect they desired. Making but little impression toward destroying the fort, and fearing to risk an attempt finally to pass our batteries, the fleet withdrew on the morning of the eighteenth, and passed again into the Gulf. Our loss in this affair was but two killed and seven wounded. During the nine days of attack the enemy threw more than one thousand bombs from four ten-and thirteen-inch mortars, besides many shells and round shot from howitzers and cannon.