Part 9

All the work of maneuver is reduced to the realization of these two ideas. It is a question of applying in slightly varying circumstances the two classic studies above indicated, and one should know them perfectly.

To develop presence of mind in the noncommissioned officers and suppleness in the organization, situations analogous to those formerly used on the drill ground such as, “Cavalry to the right—in rear” should be devised.

Choose a parallel of departure and have the troops of the second line take their formation and march on the objectives designated in advance. Suddenly call out, “Enemy resistance on such a line, our first elements are stopped at such a point ... hostile machine guns in such a region.” Then everybody, infantry, machine guns, light canon, instantly take up their dispositions.

By representing the enemy and having him fire blank cartridges, one becomes accustomed to making rapid reconnaissance of resistances.

IV. PREPARATION OF THE TROOPS FOR PENETRATION.

The battle of today, since the last evolution of the war, is only a succession of assaults. The assault being the hardest and most murderous phase of the combat, before which the attack generally breaks down, we should only undertake it with assaulting troops. All troops are far from being assaulting troops; they need a well established cohesion and a special training.

In nine months of campaign, I have only twice had a company really capable of delivering the assault: that of the active regiment, which was eager to charge at whatever cost at Morhange, and that of Neuville-Saint-Vaast, toward which during the assault, I turned but twice—when we started and when I fell.

THE COHESION.

In order that an organization may be capable of reaching the enemy, it is necessary for each man to be thoroughly convinced that his neighbor will march at his side and not abandon him; he should not have to turn around to see whether his comrade is coming. This requires a solidly established cohesion. Cohesion is very difficult to obtain with the continual renewal of men and noncommissioned officers; to cement it well, the men must have lived long together and have borne the same hardships during which are strengthened the sentiments of solidarity and affection which create in the company invisible bonds, stronger than all discipline and the only ones capable of resisting the fierce egoism of the battlefield.

The company must also have been tried out by experiences severe enough for everyone to be able to estimate what his leaders and neighbors are worth under circumstances where borrowed masks fall off. Thus habit, friendship, and confidence make no difference in the appearance of a company; it is the battle alone that unveils these qualities in their full staunchness and value.

The company of the 9th of May had been in existence at least four months, that is, the last considerable reinforcements had been present about four months. We had indeed received newer recruits, but they were not sufficient to change the spirit of the company. We had lived in the Belgian trench where the material side of the situation could not have been more miserable. Without having suffered serious losses, we had been at times very roughly used, so that all the men had an idea of the trials of war.

Thus trench life is an excellent school for cohesion, but a company which moves forward directly from trench life would not be capable of attacking as we should like. Trench life is deteriorating and destroys in the mind of the man the idea that he belongs to a unit, to an organization. It should be completed by a period of exercises.

During the period of exercises, the work should be toward cohesion by establishing an exact discipline, difficult to obtain in the trenches, by punctually requiring the marks of respect, and by paying close attention to the uniform and personal appearance. All these details have a prime moral importance; nothing is more demoralizing for the soldier than to see around him his comrades badly dressed and negligent in their duty; he evidently finds at times that this is more convenient but at heart he lacks confidence because he well knows that in this troop of Bohemians, without faith or order, everyone will go his own way in the moment of danger. The daily aspect of a company, carefully uniformed and well disciplined, gives him, on the contrary, a feeling of reassurance and confidence.

“... Mais par un prompt renfort Nous nous vîmes trois mille en arrivant au port Tant à nous voir marcher en si bel équipage Les plus épouvantés reprenaient de courage.”

This is what our battalion commander often quoted to us.

Combat exercises by entire units, close-order drill, and passing in review which should always close an exercise session, contribute to develop the sentiment, which becomes blunted in the trenches, that the soldier belongs to a unit, compact and articulate.

The trench produces cohesion in the small group, the period of exercise the cohesion in the organization.

THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT.

In order to rush headlong at the enemy out in the open, where at any moment shot and shell may do its worst, one must have an exuberance of energy. This increase of courage exists only among troops who have for a long time been able to accumulate reserves of moral force. A unit that has recently made a bloody effort is incapable of delivering a furious and unlimited assault, such as we wish for. It might with trouble take a line of trenches and there hastily take cover. The supply of energy is used up quickly and comes back very slowly; the memory of the terrible dangers must be dulled. In a combat, the expenditure of energy is at once physical and nervous, but rather nervous than physical. Now the mistake is often made of thinking that an organization is in fighting condition when it has again taken on a good appearance and seems in excellent form. A few nights of sleep and a few days of good food are sufficient to restore the physique, but the nerve cells are reformed with all the slowness that is characteristic of them. How many times, some days after bloody fights which have left me weak and emaciated, have I found myself in a state of flourishing health almost shameful for a soldier, and felt at the same time a faltering courage at heart!

To try to attack with troops already dejected or insufficiently recovered is to march to meet a certain and bloody defeat. It is sufficient to see the troops with which the attempts to break through at Neuville in the month of June were made and their result, known in advance by the discouraged officers. The almost destroyed regiments that had made the magnificent attacks of May 9 and had occupied the conquered ground under the worst bombardments until the 25th, had been reorganized with dispirited officers and noncommissioned officers, and were the sorriest soldiers that one could see—men recalled after having been formerly rejected, incompletely instructed, and of rather mediocre spirit. The few survivors of the splendid days of May, instead of being exalted by the memory of these exploits, had retained the memory of the massacre which had left them almost alone among their former officers and two hundred comrades. Two weeks rest and a new attack with the painful result which covered the famous regiments with unmerited shame; companies hesitating to leave their trenches, officers obliged to drive their men, the slaughter of abandoned noncommissioned officers.

Therefore do not attack except with troops that have not made a bloody effort for a long time and who have been able to recuperate their supply of energy.

The second condition under which troops attack without thought of sparing themselves is when they truly feel that the action in which they are going to engage is worth the immense sacrifice of life. Each man down to the most humble feels conscious that his existence is of inestimable value, that it represents many efforts, many troubles, and many affections. The infantry soldier has so many and many occasions to die that he only gives himself up to it on real occasions, and this calm and conscientious self-denial which irritates those who would like to find the troops ever responsive to their orders is of a supreme grandeur. When one has seen the death and suffering of the soldier at close range, one ties to him as to one’s self and does not expose him for every whim. The soldier understands this thoroughly, and when he is told that it is “pour la Patrie,” he then goes in for all he is worth, and so it is that the chief who has not stormed and fumed in vain is rewarded for his wisdom.

The coming of the generals who know how to talk to the men who will meet their death with simplicity and conviction, has a profound and decisive influence on the open-hearted mass of infantrymen. Handling soldiers was formerly the greatest accomplishment of commanders, who did not confine themselves to the brief and abstract formulas of their orders. Today as formerly, the word of the great chief, rational and assured, is graven in ineffaceable letters in the hearts of the combatants. Beyond the chief, the soldier clearly sees his native country, whose supreme will still claims the sacrifice, and in himself he feels his courage harden.

Toward the 15th of April, returning from Belgium, our regiment passed in review before General F—, our former Corps Commander, who assembled the officers and said to them: “We are going to attempt another maneuver ..., the waiting has come to an end, we are going after them ..., we have today cannon and ammunition in abundance, we will crush their shelters, we will destroy their machine guns.... Then the infantry will be launched and will crush them; after the first ones, there will be others ..., then others ...; if we do not succeed, we shall have no one to blame but ourselves.” These words sank into the hearts of the company officers, and they repeated them with conviction to their soldiers, and the latter heard them so well that they surpassed all that could have been expected; they are not the ones whom General F— might blame.

Thus the troops see clearly the object, but the moral preparation would be insufficient if the man felt himself incapable of accomplishing it. Each day the officers should instil in the troops the idea of the effort and show them how it may be realized; there are even questions concerning the instinct of preservation that it is well to bring into play. Thus instead of fearing the ordeal, the man little by little gets accustomed to the idea of facing it.

It remains now to complete and exalt the offensive spirit by an intense period of appropriate exercises. Trench life has a tendency to kill the offensive spirit of the troops. They think only of protecting themselves, they are always under cover, they circulate in the boyaux, and all this creates a horror of the open ground. Daily experiences, such as not being able to show one’s head without running the risk of receiving a bullet in the face, create a very acute sensation of danger. They dare no longer stir, and to attack the terrible trenches of the enemy which one cannot look at even for a second seems a mad and irrealizable project. The service in the trenches creates terror of the hostile trench.

The Man Must Be Put into Forward Movement

Make him run, jump, and rush in the open spaces; let him get intoxicated with air and movement; the attitude creates the mentality. As soon as he has lost the habit of hanging his head and hunching his back, he has also lost his exaggerated prudence and the fear of unsheltered spaces.