Part 33

TEMPTATION: ethical, 238, 301; economic, 305.

TENSION: as stimulus to thought, 37, 38, 49, 50, 53, 70, 85; in relation to constitution of sensory datum, 53, 58, 59, 70; constitution of meaning as distinct from fact, 75, 85, 154, 237-46, 250, 251, 255, 291-5, 374 ff.; (see Purpose, Reconstruction).

THALES: his [Greek: archê], water, 209; in relation to deduction, 212, 214.

THOUGHT: forms of, 58 ff.; as modes of organizing data, 63; three kinds according to Lotze, 68, 69; as positing and distinguishing, 69; validity of its function, 76-82; of its products, 82-5; instrumental character, 78-82; as discriminating sensory qualities, 200-202; (see Judgment, Reflection).

TIME: as involved in judgment, 120 ff.

TRANSCENDENTALISM, 29, 43-8.

TRENDELENBURG, A.: view of judgment, 147.

TRUTH: criterion of, 84; Bosanquet's conception of, 105; popular criterion of, 105 ff.; and purpose, Study XI; representational versus teleological view of, 341 ff.; criterion of, 361 ff.; (see Objectivity, Validity).

UEBERWEG: view of judgment, 147.

UNIFORMITY: of nature, 206.

UNITY: of the world, 207.

UNIVERSAL: first and second according to Lotze, 56, 59, 69; ideas as, 97 ff., 113; judgment as, 136; Mr. Royce's treatment of, 354 ff.; necessity and, 357.

VALIDITY: of thought, 7, 8; relation to genesis, 14, 15; test, 17, 18; defines content of thought, 24; problem of, Study IV; Lotze's dilemma regarding, 71-85; of bare object of thought, 72-6; of activity of thought, 76-82; of product of thought, 82-5; (see Objectivity, Reality, Truth).

VALUE: Lotze's distinction of, from existence, 28, 29; view criticised, 31, 41, 45; organized, of experience, 42-8; determined in and by a logical process, 233; nature of consciousness of, 273, 333-5; function of consciousness of, 335-7; properly mediate and functional in character, 338-40.

VALUATION (see also Ethical judgment, Economic judgment): includes only ethical and economic types of judgment, 227, 236, 338-40; general account of process of, 272, 295; reconstructive of self as well as of reality, 312.

VENN, JOHN: origin of hypothesis, 169.

"WARRANT": consciousness of, accompanies purely factual as well as valuational judgment processes, 276, 277; the constitutive feature of survey of factual conditions, 278, 279.

WELTON, J.: origin of hypothesis, 171.

WHEWELL, WILLIAM, 163; view of sensations and ideas, 164, 165; of induction, 165; a certain agreement between him and Mill, 166.

WIESER, F. VON, 335 note 2.

WILL: as related to thought, 366 note; (see Activity, End, Purpose).

WUNDT, W.: view of judgment, 147; view of mathematical induction, 173; formation and proof of hypothesis, 177 ff.; distinction between supposition and hypothesis, 178 ff.

"WRONG" (see "Bad").

XENOPHANES: his logical position, 216.

ZENO: his dialectic, 214.

FOOTNOTES

Logic (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 10, 11. Italics mine.

See ANGELL, "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, Vol. III (1903), Part II, pp. 61-6, 70-72.