PROPOSITION: and judgment, 118.
PROTAGORAS, 226.
PRUDENCE: ethical status of, as a virtue, 246.
PYTHAGOREANS, THE: their logical position, 216; use of experiment, 216.
PSYCHICAL: distinguished from physical, 25; Lotze's view of impression as barely, 27, 28, 30; view criticised, 31-4, 41, 42; two meanings of, 38 note; psychical mechanism, 31; idea as, 53; problem of logical and, 54 and note, 64; activity of thought also made, by Lotze, 77 and note; subjective result, 84; (see Impression).
PSYCHOLOGY: and logic, 14-16, 26, 63, 64, 153, 154, 184, 185, 192 ff., 345, 348; principle of, functional, 229, 230; genesis of, 280, 281; logical value of functional, 293.
PSYCHOLOGISTS' FALLACY, 37.
PURPOSE: logical importance of, 4, 9, 10, 13, 15, 20, 35, 58, 76, 80, 154; logical aspects of, Study XI; in an idea, 347 ff.; in judgment, 353 ff.; in criterion of truth and error, 361 ff.; origin of, as idea, 373 ff.; as method, 377; (see End, Reconstruction).
QUALES: of sensation, 55, 56, 60 note.
QUALITIES: primary and secondary, 221.
QUESTION: and judgment, 97, 114 ff.
RATIONALISM: criticised, 156 ff., 188 ff., 298 ff.
RATIONALITY: of world, 206.
REALITY: as constructed by thought, 94 ff., 104; as developing, 126; as including fact and idea, 108, 110, 125, 382; as independent of thought, 85, 87 ff., 104; as subject of subject, 88 ff.; popular criterion of, 105 ff.; possibility of knowledge of, 91 ff., 102 ff., 125; for the individual, 94 ff., 103, 112, 224 ff.; as relative to judging, 149; as given in sensation, 160; "perception" and "recognition" coefficients of, 263-7, 277; these present in ethical and economical experience, 267-9; apprehension of, emotional, 263; scope of complete conception of, 235, 340; degrees of, 340; Platonic conception of, 343 ff.; Royce's conception of, 348; as related to fact and idea, 379 ff.; (see Fact, Truth, Validity).
REASON, SUFFICIENT: principle of, 206.
RECONSTRUCTION: the function of thinking, 38, 40, 46, 75, 76, 85; effect of denying this, 47, 71, 72; data and, 49 ff.; in judgment, 154, 291, 295, 299, 311, 312, 346, 347; (see Habit, Stimulus, Tension).
REFERENCE: as social, 74; problem of reference of ideas, 82 ff.; as meaning, 97 ff.; functional conception of, 113; paradox of, 99; idea as, 129.
REFLECTION: as derived, 1-12; naïve, 3, 9; subject-matter of, 7, 8; logic and, 3, 18, 23; versus constitutive thought, 43-8; distinguished, 255; general nature of, 269; end not always explicit in, 270; outcome of, statable in terms of end or means, 272; (see Judgment, Thought).
REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT, 134.
REPRESENTATION: as one of the two functions of an idea, 345, 347 ff., 372; significance of, in ideal reconstruction, 376.
RESPONSE: failure of, and origin of judgment, 154.
RESTLESSNESS: as source of reflection and purpose, 374 ff.; (see Tension).
RHETORIC: origin of, 203, 204.
"RIGHT" (see "Good").
ROYCE, JOSIAH: referred to, 76 note, 147; theory of ideas discussed, 346-82; quoted, 347, 348, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 362, 364, 366 note, 368, 370, 371, 374, 379, 380, 381.
SATISFACTION: pause of, as marking attainment of truth, 362 ff.
SCHILLER, F. C. S., 327 note, 345 note.
SCIENCE: relation to naïve experience, 10, 11; its historic stages, 11, 12; distinction of logical procedure from epistemology, 13; same history as philosophy, 21, 22.
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