Chapter VI.. The Anti-Racetrack Gambling Bill.

The Anti-Racetrack Gambling Bill.

Supporters of the Measure Knew What They Wanted, Drew a Bill to Meet the Requirements of the Situation and Refused to Compromise with the Machine Element - Suggestive Series of "Errors" Attended Its Passage.

Of the three principal reform measures considered by the Legislature of 1909 - the Direct Primary bill, the Railroad Regulation bill and the Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill - the last named was the only one to become a law untrimmed of its effective features. The Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill passed the Assembly, passed the Senate and was signed by the Governor precisely as it had been introduced; there was not so much as the change of a comma allowed. The result is an anti-gambling law on California statute books which if it work as well as it has in other States will prevent bookmaking and pool-selling, thus relieving horse racing of the incubus which has made the sport of kings disreputable.

Since the reform element succeeded in passing the Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill without amendment, there is widespread opinion that there was no opposition to its passage. As a matter of fact, nothing is farther from the truth. Before a legislator reached Sacramento, the pro-gambling lobby was on the ground, and continued its hold-up process until the Assembly, by a vote of 67 to 10, passed the measure, and by a vote of 57 to 19 refused to grant it reconsideration.

The writer remembers his first poll of the Senate on the anti-gambling issue, when only nineteen Senators could be safely counted for it; twenty-one were necessary for its passage. To be sure, a number of the Senators not included in the list of the nineteen who were from the beginning safe for the measure, were pledged to vote for an anti-pool selling bill, but this did not necessarily mean the effective Walker-Otis bill which had been drawn to prevent pool selling and bookmaking. Not a few unquestionably figured on voting for a bill that would place them on record as against racetrack gambling, but do racetrack gambling little or no harm.

These uncertain ones were blocked in their plan of action because the proponents of the Anti-Gambling bill knew just what they wanted to do, namely, close up poolrooms and bookmakers' booths. They took the most effective way to close them up, namely, adapted to California Constitution and criminal practice, the Hughes anti-gambling law, the adoption of which Governor Hughes forced in New York, and which in New York State had proved most effective.

The bill was drawn carefully and its backers in the Legislature and out of the Legislature let it be known that no amendment, not so much as to change a comma, would be tolerated. The measure was introduced in the Senate by Walker of Santa Clara, and in the Assembly by Otis of Alameda. It was known as the Walker-Otis bill.

This determined stand for the passage of the measure just as it had been drawn thoroughly alarmed the gambling lobby. "Reformers" who would not "compromise" proved a new experience. The machine never compromises until it is whipped. Accordingly, when public opinion demanded action on the Walker-Otis bill, the machine Senators began to talk of compromise. In fact, up to the hour of the vote on the bill in the Senate, Senator Wolfe did not stop whining compromise. In his speech against the passage of the bill, just before the final vote was taken he insisted: "There should have been a compromise measure agreed upon, a bill for which we all could have voted."

The moment before Wolfe had been warning the Senate that to pass the Walker-Otis bill would tend to wreck the Republican party in California. Just what the Walker-Otis bill had to do with Republican policies Mr. Wolfe would no doubt have difficulty in answering. But the measure did have much to do with machine policies. The machine had prevented the passage of the Anti-Gambling bill two years before, and was prepared to prevent the enactment of an effective anti-gambling law at the session of 1909. Senator Wolfe undoubtedly fell into the common error of mistaking the machine for the Republican party.

However, the spirit of no compromise which gave Senator Wolfe so much concern saved the Walker-Otis bill, and has given California an effective law. The lesson of the incident is that if effective laws are to be placed on the statute books, there can be no compromise with the machine. There was compromise with the machine in the direct primary issue, with the result that the Direct Primary law is in many respects a sham. But that is another story to be told in another chapter. The anti-machine element did not compromise with the machine on the Walker-Otis bill, with the result that an effective law was passed.

From the beginning, the anti-gambling element let it be known that no suggestion of compromise would be entertained. They announced boldly that if the machine succeeded in amending the measure, they, the anti-gambling Senators and Assemblymen, would work to prevent the passage of the amended bill. The position of these members of the Legislature who did not propose to be sidetracked by machine trickery is well illustrated by an interview with Senator Walker, which appeared in the Sacramento Bee on January 19.

"If the Hughes bill can not pass the California Legislature in the form that it was passed in New York," said Senator Walker, "I shall vote against the compromise or the amended bill. The people of California have made clear their desire that an effective anti-gambling law, such as New York enjoys, be placed on the statute books. To substitute anything else would be betrayal."

So there was no compromise with the machine on the Walker-Otis bill, and the people were not betrayed, as they were to be later in the passage of the Direct Primary bill and the, Railroad Regulation bill, where there was compromise with the machine.

When the machine found there was to be no compromise, a curious series of mishaps became the lot of the Walker-Otis bill, particularly in the Senate. The measure, when introduced, was, in the ordinary course of legislation, referred to the Senate Committee on Public Morals. But it did not reach that committee until several days after its introduction. When the discovery was made that it had not reached the committee, a sensation budded but never bloomed. The facts, however, were brought out that the measure had been reposing in the pocket of a clerk instead of going to the committee. This "error" was corrected, and the bill turned over to its proper custodians.

Then came the discovery that the bill had not been properly printed; three words had been left out of the printed bill in the State printer's office. This "error," as soon as discovered by Senator Walker, was corrected. It was declared to be "trivial." But the "trivial" typographical and clerical errors in the Direct Primary bill in the final count gave the machine its opportunity to amend the measure to machine liking. The writer has no doubt in his own mind that the machine aimed to delay the passage of the Walker-Otis bill until the end of the session, as it did the Direct Primary bill, and then amend it to suit machine purposes or defeat it altogether.

Error even attended the recording of the passage of the bill. After a measure has passed the Senate, its title must be read and approved, and an order made transmitting it to the Assembly, all of which must be recorded in the Senate journal. The printed Senate journal of February 4, however, the day the bill was passed, merely recorded the passage of the bill. Nothing appeared about its title having been read, or that it had been transmitted to the Assembly. Walker discovered this "error," and a hasty inspection of the original minutes followed. The original minutes contained the proper record as follows: "Title read and approved. Bill ordered transmitted to the Assembly." But the two sentences had been omitted from the printed journal. The patient Walker had the correction made. None of these irregularities, however, resulted in serious delay. Those behind the measure watched their opponents closely, refused utterly to treat them with the "courtesy due Senators," in fact, acted under the assumption that the gambling element would stop at nothing to defeat the bill. This watchfulness is an important although comparatively minor reason why the bill was passed.

Then came the machine's move to pass "an anti gambling bill" as a substitute for the Walker-Otis measure. Martinelli in the Senate and Butler in the Assembly had introduced an Anti-Pool Selling, Anti-Book Making bill. The measure had much to commend it but was by no means so effective as the Walker-Otis bill. As a last straw, the gambling element grasped at the Martinelli-Butler bill, and threw their influence on the side of its passage. But here they again met with the uncompromising resistance of the reform element. There was nothing left for the machine to do but make its fight on the floor of Senate and of Assembly. And the fight came on in a way and with a suddenness which brought consternation upon the machine forces.

The Walker-Otis bill is in full as follows: