Part 28

1. It ensures that our strategic nuclear forces will be equivalent to those of the Soviet Union and that deterrence against nuclear war will be maintained; 2. It upgrades our forces so that the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to deter the outbreak of war, conventional or nuclear, in Europe; 3. It provides us the ability to come quickly to the aid of friends and allies around the globe; 4. And it ensures that our Navy will continue to be the most powerful on the seas.

STRATEGIC FORCES

We are strengthening each of the three legs of our strategic forces. The cruise missile production which will begin next year will modernize our strategic air deterrent. B-52 capabilities will also be improved. These steps will maintain and enhance the B-52 fleet by improving its ability to deliver weapons against increasingly heavily defended targets.

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine force. Four more POSEIDON submarines backfitted with new, 4,000 mile TRIDENT I missiles began deployments in 1980. Nine TRIDENT submarines have been authorized through 1981, and we propose one more each year.

The new M-X missile program to enhance our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force continues to make progress. Technical refinements in the basing design over the last year will result in operational benefits, lower costs, and reduced environmental impact. The M-X program continues to be an essential ingredient in our strategic posture, providing survivability, endurance, secure command and control and the capability to threaten targets the Soviets hold dear.

Our new systems will enable U.S. strategic forces to maintain equivalence in the face of the mounting Soviet challenge. We would however need an even greater investment in strategic systems to meet the likely Soviet buildup without SALT.

STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

This Administration's systematic contributions to the necessary evolution of strategic doctrine began in 1977 when I commissioned a comprehensive net assessment. From that base a number of thorough investigations of specific topics continued. I should emphasize that the need for an evolutionary doctrine is driven not by any change in our basic objective, which remains peace and freedom for all mankind. Rather, the need for change is driven by the inexorable buildup of Soviet military power and the increasing propensity of Soviet leaders to use this power in coercion and outright aggression to impose their will on others.

I have codified our evolving strategic doctrine in a number of interrelated and mutually supporting Presidential Directives. Their overarching theme is to provide a doctrinal basis, and the specific program to implement it, that tells the world that no potential adversary of the United States could ever conclude that the fruits of his aggression would be significant or worth the enormous costs of our retaliation.

The Presidential Directives include:

PD-18: An overview of our strategic objectives PD-37: Basic space policy PD-41: Civil Defense PD-53: Survivability and endurance for telecommunications PD-57: Mobilization planning PD-58: Continuity of Government PD-59: Countervailing Strategy for General War.

These policies have been devised to deter, first and foremost, Soviet aggression. As such they confront not only Soviet military forces but also Soviet military doctrine. By definition deterrence requires that we shape Soviet assessments about the risks of war, assessments they will make using their doctrine, not ours.

But at the same time we in no way seek to emulate their doctrine. In particular, nothing in our policy contemplates that nuclear warfare could ever be a deliberate instrument for achieving our own goals of peace and freedom. Moreover, our policies are carefully devised to provide the greatest possible incentives and opportunities for future progress in arms control.

Finally, our doctrinal evolution has been undertaken with appropriate consultation with our NATO Allies and others. We are fully consistent with NATO's strategy of flexible response.

FORCES FOR NATO

We are greatly accelerating our ability to reinforce Western Europe with massive ground and air forces in a crisis. We are undertaking a major modernization program for the Army's weapons and equipment, adding armor, firepower, and tactical mobility.

We are prepositioning more heavy equipment in Europe to help us cope with attacks with little warning, and greatly strengthening our airlift and sealift capabilities.

We are also improving our tactical air forces, buying about 1700 new fighter and attack aircraft over the next five years, and increasing the number of Air Force fighter wings by over 10 percent.

We are working closely with our European allies to secure the Host Nation Support necessary to enable us to deploy more quickly a greater ratio of combat forces to the European theater at a lower cost to the United States.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

As we move to enhance U.S. defense capabilities, we must not lose sight of the need to assist others in maintaining their own security and independence. Events since World War II, most recently in Southwest Asia, have amply demonstrated that U.S. security cannot exist in a vacuum, and that our own prospects for peace are closely tied to those of our friends. The security assistance programs which I am proposing for the coming fiscal year thus directly promote vital U.S. foreign policy and national security aims, and are integral parts of our efforts to improve and upgrade our own military forces.

More specifically, these programs, which are part of our overall foreign aid request, promote U.S. security in two principal ways. First, they assist friendly and allied nations to develop the capability to defend themselves and maintain their own independence. An example during this past year was the timely support provided Thailand to help bolster that country's defenses against the large numbers of Soviet-backed Vietnamese troops ranged along its eastern frontier. In addition, over the years these programs have been important to the continued independence of other friends and allies such as Israel, Greece, Turkey and Korea. Second, security assistance constitutes an essential element in the broad cooperative relationships we have established with many nations which permit either U.S. bases on their territory or access by U.S. forces to their facilities. These programs have been particularly important with regard to the recently-concluded access agreements with various countries in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions and have been crucial to the protection of our interests throughout Southwest Asia.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES

We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are threatened.

The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible: They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support. Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance.

Among the specific initiatives we are taking to help us respond to crises outside of Europe are:

The development of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft with intercontinental range; the design and procurement of a force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades; the procurement of fast sealift ships to move large quantities of men and material quickly from the U.S. to overseas areas of deployment; increasing training and exercise activities to ensure that our forces will be well prepared to deploy and operate in distant areas.

In addition, our European allies have agreed on the importance of providing support to U.S. deployments to Southwest Asia.