Part 2

The Afridis are said to possess 25,000 to 30,000 fighting men, and if it be assumed that two-thirds of these have breech loading rifles, and that the whole mass is unlikely to attack any, one, or even two columns, the largest hostile gathering that a British detachment may expect to meet is 6000-8000 men, of whom 4500-5500 may be well armed.

A column of 4500 disciplined troops need not therefore fear reverse.

The composition of a column is regulated by the topography of the area of operations, but the following example will show how the allotment of troops may be determined.

As basis for calculation a mixed brigade organised for independent action may be taken. To these troops may be added a squadron of Silladar cavalry, if the country is suitable to its action, and a mountain battery, which, together with the infantry, form a handy force of the three arms.

But the column is still weak in infantry, on which the brunt of the fighting will necessarily fall, and possesses no technical troops for road-making, etc.

Both requirements may be fulfilled by the addition of a pioneer battalion, or, since some hold that sappers and miners are more economical than pioneers, a battalion, of British infantry, or of Gurkhas, and a company of sappers and miners may be included.

It now only remains to give the troops an ammunition column, the necessary staff, certain additional medical, and administrative details, and the force--one infantry brigade organised for independent action, one squadron, one mountain battery, one British battalion, one company sappers and miners, etc.--will be complete, and adequate for its purpose.

FOOTNOTES:

MARCHES AND PROTECTION.

A body of troops moving in an enemy's country is liable to be attacked at any time, and from any direction, and must, therefore, always take measures for the protection of its front, flanks, and rear.

In warfare in civilised and highly developed countries, when the enemy's object is rather to defeat the fighting force than to harry the convoy, and when troops can march on broad frontages, the protection given by bodies of cavalry with horse artillery, flung far to front and flanks, and supported, if necessary, by infantry, is usually adequate.

But when the line of march leads along a single file track, winding through narrow valleys, and over rugged mountains, when the column, compared to its strength, occupies an inordinate length of roadway, and is therefore especially vulnerable to flank attack, and when the enemy, or at any rate a portion of his warriors, prefer plunder of baggage to pitched battles, other measures to safeguard the force must be taken.

Flankguards can rarely make their way over the steeply scarped hills enclosing the North West Frontier valleys, and since the advanced guard can, in such conditions, effect no more than the clearance of the valley in which it is moving, it becomes necessary to adopt a sedentary form of protection for the flanks of the force. This consists of picquets, posted along the route, in localities commanding approaches to the roadway, or from which the enemy can fire on the column.

These picquets, together with the advanced and rear guards, secure the movement of the remaining troops; they are, as a rule, found by the units composing the advanced guard, and withdraw under the supervision, and if necessary with the assistance of the rear guard.

The order of march of a column, in border, as in other campaigns, is conditioned by the proximity, strength, and probable action of the enemy, by the topography of the district to be traversed, by the object to be attained, and by the composition of the force.

The first duty of the staff officer to whom is confided the drafting of orders for a march, will therefore be, by personal observation, and from intelligence and other reports, to find out as much as possible of the country, and of the enemy's dispositions and probable tactics. Armed with this information he will be in a position to arrange the order of march of his column according to the circumstances of the case.

When the enemy, for instance, is in force in the vicinity, and his actions, such as throwing up of entrenchments, harassing camp in large numbers, imply that he will offer vigorous resistance to the advance, it is probable that the baggage and supply column will be best parked, under sufficient guard, either in the camp, or in some other locality easy of defence, whilst the remainder move off, in preparatory formation for action.

If the clansmen are reported to be inclined to dispute the advance in force, but are some distance from the camp, the most suitable order of march may be deduced as follows.

The enemy being in strength, the column should move in compact formation, and deliberately, the advanced guard being pushed only so far forward as to secure the troops from surprise, and as few road picquets sent out as may be, in order that the fighting force may be reduced as little as possible.

The method of posting and withdrawing picquets will not materially differ from that which will be described later.

The tribesmen being known to be in force and prepared to resist, it follows that the bulk of the fighting men must be at the head of the column; and as the advanced guard will be near the remainder, it need be only sufficiently numerous to insure that the duties of protection are adequately performed.

Suppose the tribesmen five miles distant, and that, as a rough basis for calculation, two companies can secure about one-and-a-half to two miles of roadway; then about three companies will be required for picquetting.

If three companies be added for other purposes, the advanced guard infantry should be of sufficient strength.

The advanced guard will require a proportion of technical troops for road making and repair, and for this purpose two companies of pioneers, or the bulk of a company of sappers and miners may be allotted.

Cavalry are not, it is considered, in place with an advanced guard moving in an enclosed and intricate country, nor, since the main body will be close behind, need any special medical details be included.

Whether artillery should be allotted is a more open question. In favour of placing guns with the advanced guard, it can be argued that they may be of assistance in clearing the hills to be occupied by picquets or vanguard; against their inclusion it may be urged that artillery ammunition will necessarily be scarce, owing to the difficulty of carriage, and should only be employed when an advantageous opportunity for inflicting loss occurs, but that advanced guard commanders are prone to make too much use of their guns.

On the whole, when the advanced guard is not far from the main body, it would seem that the inclusion of guns in the former is unnecessary.

The organisation and order of march of the main body may be as under.