Part Iv. a Positive Theory of Social Value

CHAPTER X

VALUE AS GENERIC--THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUE

Economic value a species, coordinate with ethical, legal, aesthetic, and other values--Psychology of value, as manifested in individual experience--Values as "tertiary qualities"--When we reflectively break up the experience, values thrown from object to subject's emotional life, but this an abstraction from concrete experience--Feeling and desire in relation to value: hedonism; Ehrenfels and Davenport; Urban and Meinong--"Presuppositions" of value--Feeling and desire both phases in value, but neither is the worth-fundamental, and each may vary in intensity without affecting amount of value--Value and reality judgment: Meinong and Tarde; Urban--On structural side, feeling, desire, and "reality feeling" are all significant phases in value--But real significance of value lies in its functional aspect: the function of value is the function of motivation--Essence of value is power in motivation--For concrete experience, this power a quality of the object--Positive and negative values--Complementary values--Rival values: two cases: qualitatively compatible, and qualitatively incompatible values--In first case, quantitative marginal compromise often possible: generalization of Austrian analysis--So-called "absolute values" ("absolute" here used as in history of ethics)--No sharp lines between different sorts of values, as ethical, economic, aesthetic--Different sorts of values do not constitute self-complete, separate systems--Generalization of notion of price--Suggestions as to analogues in the field of the social values 93