Select Speeches of Kossuth

Appendix I.--_extracts From a Letter to the 'daily News,' Dated

January 17th, 1852, by Sabbas Vucovics, late Minister of Justice in Hungary, in answer to_ Count Casimir Bathyanyi.

So early as the commencement of the Serbian insurrection, the popular suspicion gained ground that the insurrection had been stirred up by the secret intrigues of the court, and confidence in the truth and good faith of the King disappeared accordingly. The nation, however, still indulged the hope that a weak King, though betrayed into ambiguous proceeding, would not permit himself to be carried away into a flagrant breach of the constitution. This was the time when the King, in the opinion of the people, was kept distinct from the Camarilla. But when the Austrian ministry openly attempted to deprive Hungary of its ministries of war and finance, when the base game of the degradation and restoration of Jellachich was played, and when the Hungarian army, fighting in the name of the King against the insurrections of the Serbians and Croats, became aware that the balls of that same King thinned their ranks from the hostile camp, the nation arrived at the universal conviction that the Hapsburg dynasty were only pursuing their old absolute tendencies, and that they wanted to force Hungary into self-defence, in order, under the pretext of rebellion, to deprive it of all its constitutional rights and guarantees. It needs no proof that a loud indignation, and even hatred of the dynasty, spread far and wide in the country, in consequence of these intrigues and proceedings. In spite of this natural excitement, and of the war itself, carried on by the nation with an increasing enthusiasm of hatred of the House of Austria, no party in the country urged a declaration of déchéance or forfeiture against the dynasty. Even all the faithless acts recorded in the letter of Count Casimir Bathyanyi, and the cruelties committed in the name of that court in Lower Hungary and Transylvania, did not turn the scales in this direction. The Pragmatic Sanction was still considered as good in law; and the many precedents of our history, when the nation and its kings went to war with each other, and ultimately settled their disputes by solemn pacts confirming the constitution of the land, conveyed the notion that a reconciliation was even then not impossible.

Without these precedents and reminiscences of history, and only guided by the universal feeling of the country against the dynasty, the Hungarian parliament would have pronounced the forfeiture of the House of Austria so far back as October, 1848, when Jellachich was appointed absolute plenipotentiary of the King in Hungary, with discretionary power of life and death; or in December, 1848, when in Olmütz the succession of the Hungarian throne was changed and determined, without the concurrence of the nation through the Diet. To force the nation and its parliament to the last step in this momentous crisis, the court itself broke the dynastic tie.

This was done by the imposition of the constitution of the 4th of March, 1849, by which the House of Austria itself annihilated the Pragmatic Sanction, treating free and independent Hungary with the arrogance of a conqueror. The nation, more irritated by this act than by any preceding event, saw that the hour was come, beyond which further to defer the dethronement of the dynasty would be alike incompatible with the laws and the honour of Hungary. All the channels of public opinion, the public press, the popular meetings, and even the head quarters of the army, resounded with emphatic declarations of the impossibility of reconciliation with the dynasty. The garrison of Komorn--the most important fortress of the country--petitioned the government for the declaration of forfeiture. Most assuredly no party manoeuvres were wanted in this universal excitement, caused by the constitution of the 4th of March, to carry a parliamentary resolution of forfeiture.

When the proposition of forfeiture was made on the 14th of April, 1849, in the House of Representatives, only eight members voted against it, in a house never attended by less than from 220 to 240 members. The House of Magnates adopted this resolution without opposition. The press of all shades of opinion, though enjoying the most unlimited freedom, also declared for the resolution of the Diet. It was moreover received throughout the whole country with patriotic assent and determination. If there was a party opposed to the forfeiture, how came it that it did not hold it to be a duty to declare its opposition in the Diet or through the press?

When the intelligence of the unfortunate battle of Temeswar reached the Governor Kossuth, who was then in the fortress of Arad, he immediately summoned a council of the ministry to deliberate on measures of public safety still possible. At this council, in which all the ministers took part, it was resolved to invest Görgei, who stood alone at the head of an unconquered army, with full powers for negotiating a peace. It was, moreover, resolved to dissolve the government, which could not be carried on in any fixed place of safety under the existing circumstances. We did not, however, insert in the instrument investing Görgei with full power (and despatched to him immediately) the abdication of the government. On the same day--it was the 11th of August, 1849--Görgei declared in the presence of some of the ministers who had assembled at Csányi's (who was one of them), that he could not accept the commission because the resignation of the government was not contained in it, while he was sure that the enemy would enter into no negotiations with him, so long as Kossuth and his ministry were thought to be behind him. The ministers who were present, after a short deliberation, considering it to be their duty not to stand in the way of the negotiation which had been resolved on as necessary, accordingly sent their resignation to the governor, whom they requested to resign as well. The governor soon after sent his abdication for countersignature by these members of the ministry, and accordingly the government formally dissolved itself, after having done so de facto in the previous council of ministers. I must mention the circumstance that in the governor's instrument of abdication conditions were proscribed to Görgei, which were not inserted in the original instrument of authorization, issued by the full council. These conditions were, the preservation of the nationality and the autonomy of Hungary. Four ministers took part in this resignation of the governor, as above stated, Aulich, Csányi, Horvath, and I. Two of the ministers, Szemere and [Casimir] Bathyanyi, were absent when the formal declaration of the abdication was discussed at Csányi's residence. I have not mentioned among the ministers our late colleague, the finance minister Dushek, because his treachery, which was afterwards brought to light, excludes him from our ranks. From all these circumstances, it will be manifest how unjust the reproaches of Count Casimir Bathyanyi are, that no new cabinet council was held.

It is notorious that Görgei abused the full powers with which he was entrusted, instead of procuring the preservation of Hungary by a negotiation for peace, by an ignominious treachery to his native country. From that very moment the power conferred on him by the above-mentioned instrument, and the conditional abdication of the government, consequently and legally reverted to him who had invested him with it. To deny this, would be to recognize in the foreign rule which crushed Hungary, in consequence of that treachery, legitimate right and lawful power.

I, however, perfectly agree with the noble count, that the nation, once more restored to its constitutional existence, and free from foreign yoke, will have the unlimited right to dispose of all the affairs of the country, and consequently of the executive power. To assert a contrary opinion would be a crime against the nation. Not over a liberated nation (which, of course, would have the right to choose whom it will), but over a nation crushed by an usurping power, the claims of Kossuth, as elected Governor of Hungary, are, I submit, lawful.

Republican principles have not been proclaimed at Kossuth's dictation as the aim of our national exertions. They were, during our struggle, the well-ascertained and deep-rooted sentiment of the country, and Kossuth could only faithfully represent the proclaimed will and feeling of the nation, by inscribing them on his banner. Immediately after the declaration of independence, all the manifestations of the national will were unanimous in the desire for a republic. The ministry, which was nominated by the Governor as a consequence of that legislative act, declared in both houses of the Diet, that its efforts would be directed to the establishment of a republic. Both houses joined in this declaration, and in the government no opposition whatever was manifested against it. One of the first acts of the new government was to remove the crown from all national scutcheons, and from the great seal of Hungary. The press in all its shades developed republican principles. The new semi-official paper bore the name of The Republic. It is true that the government was only provisional, for the war continued, and the definite decision of this question depended on unforeseen circumstances. We should have preferred almost any settlement to the necessity of a subjection to the Austrian dynasty; and at the price of emancipation from that detested power, the nation would even have been prepared, for the sake of aid, to choose a king from another race; but certainly if it had been the unaided victor in the struggle, never. Monarchical government would have been for us the resort of expediency. The government of our wishes and principles was "The Republic."

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