Part 20

a. The final cause has been seen to be the purpose of Universal Nature. b. The efficient cause cannot be (i) the Earth, (ii) the Water, (iii) the Air or Fire, (iv) the heaven of the Moon, (v) the Planets, nor (vi) the Primum Mobile:

Therefore it must be ascribed to the heaven of the Fixed Stars (for this has variety hi efficiency, as is seen in the various constellations), and in particular to those Stars of the Northern Hemisphere which overhang the dry land.

(x) First objection: Why is the projecting continent then, not circular, since the motion of these stars is circular?

Answer: Because the material did not suffice for so great an elevation.

(y) Second objection: Why is this elevation in this particular place?

Answer: Because God whose ways are inscrutable, willed it so.

We should therefore desist from examining too closely the reasons, which we can never hope to fathom.

D. Refutation of the original arguments: Reason 1. Invalid because Earth and Water are spheres with the same center. Reason 2. Invalid because of the external influence of Universal Nature, counteracting the internal influence of Particular Nature. Reason 3. Invalid because it is sphericity of the sea and not the lowness of the land which interferes with one's view at sea. Reason 4. Invalid because Water does not flow to the tops of mountains, but ascends thither in the form of vapors. Reason 5. Invalid because Water imitating the moon in one respect, need not imitate it in all.

This brief obviously illustrates much more than the form of the mediaeval Disputation. It leaves one in no doubt as to the difference between the natural science of the Middle Ages and that of our own time. It also illustrates the weakness of the scholastic method when applied to questions which modern science would settle by experiment. The argument abounds in misstatements of fact, the conclusion is incorrect, and the "reasoning" by which it is reached can be described, from the modern point of view, only as grotesque. The weakness of the method was recognized by Roger Bacon so early as the thirteenth century. The growing recognition of its futility finds repeated expression in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, notably in the New Method (Novum Organum) of Francis Bacon.

Like the scholastic method and the worship of Aristotle, the Disputation fell into disrepute because of the extravagant lengths to which it was carried. The following sarcastic criticism by the Spanish scholar, Juan Luis Vives (1462-1540), is one illustration of the growing revolt of his times against it:

Disputations, also, to no slight degree have blinded judgment. They were instituted originally (but only among young men) to stimulate mental vigor, often torpid, and to make young men keener in their studies, so that they might either conquer or not be conquered, and also that the instruction received from their teachers might be more deeply impressed upon them.

Among men, or older persons, there was a kind of comparison of opinions and reasons, not aimed at victory but at unravelling the truth. The very name testifies that they are called disputations because by their means the truth is, as it were, pruned or purged [dis = apart; puto = to prune, or to cleanse]. But after praise and reward came from listeners to the one who seemed to have the best ideas, and out of the praise often came wealth and resources, a base greed of distinction or money took possession of the minds of the disputants, and, just as in a battle, victory only was the consideration, and not the elucidation of truth. So that they defended strenuously whatever they once had said, and overthrew and trampled upon their adversary.

Low and sordid minds such as with drooping heads look solely at such trivial and ephemeral results, regarded as of small consequence the great benefit that results from study:--namely probity or knowledge of truth; and these two things they did not regard with sufficient acuteness nor did they comprehend their great value, but they sought the immediate reward of money or popular favor.

And so, in order to get a greater return for their labor, they admitted the populace to their contests like the spectators of a play brought out at the theatre. Then, as one might expect when the standard is lowered, the philosopher laid aside his dignified, venerable character, and put on his stage dress that he might dance more easily: the populace was made spectator, umpire, and judge, and the philosopher did that which the flute player does not do on the stage,--he suited his music, not to his own ideas and to the Muses, as his old teacher advises, but wholly to the circle of onlookers and the crowd whence distinction and gain was likely to come back to the actors.

There was no need of real, solid teaching (at least, not in the opinion of those who are going to learn); but pretence and dust were thrown in the eyes of the crowd. So the one plain road of obtaining the truth was abandoned; six hundred ways of pretending were made, by which each strove for what suited himself, especially since there is nothing made so ugly as to lack a sponsor.

Not only did the populace flock to this opinion--that the object of learning is to dispute, just as it is the object of military life to fight--but the public unanimity swept away the veterans, the triarii [the more experienced soldiers who were placed in the third line] as it were, of the scholastic campaign (but these have no more ability and judgment than the dregs of the people), so that they regard him as superfluous and foolish who would call them back to mental activity and character and that quiet method of investigation, philosophy. [They think that] there is no other fruit of studies save to keep your wits about you and not give way to your adversary, either to attack him boldly or to bear up against him, and shrewdly to contrive by what vigor, by what skill, by what method of supplanting, he may be overturned. Therefore under this beautiful scheme, surpassing all others, it was the plan to break in the boy immediately and train him constantly; they began disputing as soon as they were born and ceased only at death. The boy brought to school, is bidden to dispute forthwith on the first day and is already taught to quarrel, before he can yet speak at all. So also in Grammar, in the Poets, in the Historians, in Logic, in Rhetoric, in absolutely every branch. Would any one wonder what they can find to do in matters that are perfectly open, very simple and elementary? There is nothing so transparent, so limpid that they do not cloud it over with some petty question as if ruffled by a breeze. It is [thought] characteristic of the most helpless stupidity, not to find something which you may make obscure by most intricate measures and involve in very hard and rigid conditions, which you may twist and twist again. For you may simply say: "Write to me,"--here comes a question, if not from Grammar then from Logic, if not from Logic then from Physics,--"What motions are made in writing?" Or, from Metaphysics, "Is it substance or quality?"

And these boys are hearing the first rudiments of Logic who were only yesterday, or the day before, admitted to the school. So they are to be trained never to be silent, but vigorously to assert whatever comes uppermost lest they may seem at any time to have given in. Nor is one dispute a day enough, nor two, like a meal. At lunch they dispute, after lunch they dispute, at dinner they dispute, after dinner they dispute. Do they do these things to learn, or to cook a new dish? They dispute at home, they dispute away from home. At a banquet, in the bath, in the tepidarium, at church, in the city, in the fields, in public, in private, in all places and at all times they dispute.

Courtesans in charge of a panderer do not wrangle so many times, or gladiators in charge of a trainer do not fight so many times for a prize as these do under their teacher of philosophy. The populace, not self-restrained and serious, but fickle, barbarous, pugnacious, is wonderfully tickled with all this as with a mock battle. So there are very many exceedingly ignorant men, utterly without knowledge of literature in any form, who take more pleasure in this form of show than in all else; and the more easily to win the fight, they employ a quick and prompt mode of fighting and deliver a blow every second, as it were, in order the more speedily to use up their foe. They neither assail their adversary with uninterrupted argument nor can they endure prolonged talk from him. If by way of explaining himself he should begin to enlarge, they raise the cry: "To the point! To the point! Answer categorically!" Showing how restless and flippant their minds are who cannot stand a few words....

To such a degree did they go that instead of a settlement based on the strongest arguments, such as drove them into their absurdities, they considered it sufficient to say: "I admit it, for it follows from my own conclusion," and the next step is: "I deny it. Prove it. I will defend it appropriately." For he who "defends appropriately" (in their own words), no matter by what incongruous admissions and concessions, is held to be a learned man and best adapted to disputation, that is, to the apex of all knowledge.

(c) The Examination

The examination, as an exercise leading to a degree, is one phase of modern educational practice which comes from mediaeval universities. The system of examinations grew up slowly. Generalization is difficult owing to the differences in practice in various universities, but broadly speaking the student who took a Master's or Doctor's degree in any Faculty passed through the three stages of Bachelor, Licentiate, and Doctor, and at each stage underwent some form of examination. The examination for the License (to teach anywhere) seems to have been the most formidable of the three; that for the Doctorate being mainly ceremonial. In general, the examination tested the candidate's knowledge of the books prescribed, and his power of public debate.

The statutes of Bourges (c. 1468-1480) thus describe the requirements and the manner of procedure of examinations for the License in Arts:

Likewise we have decreed that before any one comes to the grade of License he must have heard four other books of Physics, three books "On the Heavens," two of "On Generation," the first three of "On Meteors," three "On the Soul," "On the Memory," "On the Length and Brevity of Life," with the first six books of "Metaphysics" and the first six on "Ethics" with a part of Euclid, and with the book "On the Sphere" [by John Sacrobosco].

Likewise we have decreed that candidates must respond twice openly and in public, and there may be five at most in one day and in the same debate; yet four will be sufficient. And when they respond they must pay, each his own chairman, a scudo of gold.

Likewise we have determined that, when this has been done, the Faculty shall appoint four Masters who have already been Masters for three years and who do not have [the candidates] that year as pupils under their own special direction; and they shall test the sufficiency of all the candidates. And the said committee shall take oath that they will accept those who are eligible and will reject those who are ineligible.

Likewise we have decreed that, when this has been done, on the report of said committee, over their seals manual faithfully transmitted, the Chancellor shall arrange the candidates in the order assigned to them by said committee, always putting the better men and those who are eligible ahead of the others, in order that the opportunity of studying well may be given to the students and that no one may suffer harm from his position.

Likewise we have decreed that before proceeding to license the candidates themselves, the assembled Faculty of Arts shall ordain four Masters, other than the first, who shall examine in assigned groups the said candidates in their own persons. And if they do not find them to be such as the first examiners reported that they found them, they shall report to the Faculty, pointing out the deficiency that the Faculty may have knowledge of the mistake of the first committee. If it finds that they made a mistake it shall have authority to correct their errors by changing the positions [of the names on the list] and by rejecting them entirely if they seem ineligible.

Likewise we have decreed that when their approval or disapproval has been settled by the said second examiners, they shall place their candidates according to proper order in one list sealed with their own seals, and shall deliver it, under enclosure, to the Chancellor, and it shall not be lawful for him to change the order but he shall license them in the order set down in the list.