Part 3

Hence it is necessary that a king should not be vanquished by pleasure, but that he should vanquish it; that he should not be similar to, but far excel the multitude; and that he should not conceive his proper employment to consist in the pursuit of pleasure, but rather in the acquisition of probity. At the same time also it is fit that he who has occasion to rule over others should first be able to govern his own passions.

But with respect to the desire of obtaining great property, it must be observed, that a king ought to be wealthy in order that he may benefit his friends, relieve those that are in want, and justly punish his enemies. For the enjoyment of prosperity in conjunction with virtue is most delightful. The same thing must be said concerning the transcendency of a king. For since he always surpasses others in virtue, it is fit to form a judgment of his empire with reference to virtue, and not with reference to riches, or power, or his military strength. For he possesses one of these [viz. riches] in common with any casual persons; another [viz. power] in common with irrational animals; and the last in common with tyrants. But virtue is alone the peculiarity of good men. Hence, whatever king is temperate with respect to pleasures, liberal with respect to money, and prudent and most skilful in governing, he will be in reality a king. The people, however, have the same analogy with respect to the virtues and the vices, as the parts of the human soul. For the desire of accumulating more than is fit subsists about the irrational part of the soul: for desire is not rational. But ambition and ferocity subsist about the irascible part: for this is the fervid and strenuous part of the soul. And the love of pleasure subsists about the epithymetic part: for this is the effeminate and yielding part of the soul. But injustice, which is the most perfect vice, and is of a composite nature, subsists about the whole soul. Hence it is necessary that the king should coharmonize like a lyre the city that is furnished with good laws, first establishing in himself the most just boundary and order of law, as knowing that the proper arrangement of the people, over whom divinity has given him dominion, ought to be coadapted to this boundary. It is also necessary that a good king should establish becoming positions and habits in the delivery of public orations, conducting himself politically, seriously, and earnestly, in order that he may neither appear to be rough to the multitude; nor may be contemptible; but may be agreeable and easy in his manners. He will however obtain these things, if in the first place he is venerable in his aspect and his discourse, and appears to deserve the sovereign authority which he possesses. But, in the second place, if he proves himself to be benign from his behaviour to those whom he may happen to meet, from his countenance and his beneficence. And in the third place, if he is formidable from his hatred of depravity, from the punishment which he inflicts on it, from his celerity in inflicting it, and, in short, from his skill and exercise in the art of government. For venerable gravity, being a thing which imitates divinity, is capable of causing him to be admired and honoured by the multitude. Benignity will render him pleasing and beloved. And his being formidable will cause him to be terrible to and unconquered by his enemies, and magnanimous and confident to his friends.

It is necessary, however, that his gravity should have nothing in it of an abject or vulgar nature, but that it should be admirable, and such as becomes the dignity of empire and a sceptre. Nor should he ever contend with his inferiors, or his equals, but with those that are greater than himself; and he should conceive, conformably to the magnitude of his empire, that those pleasures are the greatest which are derived from beautiful and great deeds, and not those which arise from sensual gratifications; separating himself indeed from human passions, and approximating to the Gods, not through arrogance, but through magnanimity and an invincible transcendency of virtue. Hence he should invest himself with such a gracefulness and majesty in his aspect and his reasonings, in the conceptions of his mind, in the manners of his soul, and in his actions and the motions and gesture of his body, that those who survey him may perceive that he is adorned and fashioned with modesty and temperance, and a decorous disposition. For a good king should convert to himself the souls of those that behold him, no less than the sound of a flute and harmony attract the attention of those that hear them. And thus much concerning the venerable gravity of a king.

But I shall now endeavour to speak of his benignity. Universally, therefore, every king will be benign, if he is just, equitable, and beneficent. For justice is a connective and collective communion, and is alone that disposition of the soul which adapts itself to those that are near to us. For as rhythm is to motion, and harmony to the voice, so is justice to communion; since it is the common good of those that govern, and those that are governed, because it coharmonizes political society. But equity and benignity are certain assessors of justice; the former indeed softening the severity of punishment; but the latter extending pardon to less guilty offenders. It is necessary, however, that a good king should give assistance to those that are in want of it, and be beneficent. But his assistance should be given not in one way only, but in every possible way. And it is requisite to be beneficent, not looking to the magnitude of honour, but to the manner and deliberate choice of him by whom honour is conferred. It is likewise necessary that a worthy king should so conduct himself towards all men as to avoid being troublesome to them, but especially towards men of an inferior rank and of a slender fortune: for these, like diseased bodies, can endure nothing of a troublesome nature. Good kings, indeed, have dispositions similar to those of the Gods, and which especially resemble those of Jupiter, the ruler of all things. For he is venerable and honourable, through transcendency and magnitude of virtue. He is benign, because he is beneficent, and the giver of good; and hence he is said by the Ionic poet [Homer] to be the father of men and Gods. He is also terrible and transcendent, because he punishes the unjust, and reigns and rules over all things. But he carries thunder in his hand, as a symbol of his formidable excellence. From all these particulars, therefore, it is requisite to remember that a kingdom is a God-resembling thing.

FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

It is requisite that a king should be a wise man: for thus he will be honoured analogously to the first God, of whom also he will be an imitator. For this god is by nature the first king and potentate; but a king is so by birth and imitation. And the former rules in the universe, and in the whole of things; but the latter in the earth. The former also governs all things eternally, and has a never-failing life, possessing wisdom in himself; but the latter acquires science through time. But a king will imitate the first God in the most excellent manner, if he acquires magnanimity, gravity, and the want of but few things; exhibiting to his subjects a paternal disposition. For on this account especially, the first God is conceived to be the father both of Gods and men, because he is mild to every thing which is in subjection to him, and never ceases to govern with providential regard. Nor is he alone satisfied with being the maker of all things, but he is the nourisher, the preceptor of every thing beautiful, and the legislator to all things equally. Such also ought the king to be who rules over men on the earth. Nothing however is beautiful which is deprived of a king and a ruler. But it is not possible for a king or a ruler [properly so called] to exist without wisdom and science. He, therefore, who is a wise man and a king, will be an imitator, and a legitimate minister of God.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

That the nature of every animal is adapted to the world, and to the things contained in the world, appears to me to be evident from many arguments. For every animal thus conspiring [into union and consent], and having such a colligation of its parts, it follows a series which is most excellent, and at the same time necessary, through the attractive flux of the universe about it, which is effective of the general ornament of the world, and the peculiar permanency of every thing which it contains. Hence it is called κοσμος kosmos, and is the most perfect of all animals. But in its parts, which are many, and naturally different, a certain animal excels; both from its native alliance to the world, and from participating of divinity in a greater degree. [And in the nature, indeed, of the God who is eternal, the stars called planets are comprehended, forming the first and the greatest series]. But in the sublunary region, where bodies move in a right line, the nature of demons has its subsistence. And in the earth, and with us, the most excellent nature is man; but the most divine is a king, who surpasses other men in the common nature: in his tabernacle, indeed, [i.e. in his body], resembling other men, as being generated from the same matter, but fashioned from the best of artificers, who fabricated him, by using himself as the archetype. Hence, in a certain respect, a king is one and alone; being the production of the supernal king, with whom he is always familiar: but being beheld by his subjects in his kingdom as in a splendid light. For a kingdom is judged and proved to resemble the eagle, the most excellent of winged animals, which looks undazzled at the sun. And a kingdom is, indeed, analogous to the sun, because it is divine; and through excess of splendour cannot be seen without difficulty, except by genuine eyes. For the numerous splendours which surround it, and the dark vertigos which it produces in those who survey it, as if they had ascended into a foreign altitude, evinces that their eyes are spurious. But those who can fitly arrive thither, on account of their familiarity with, and alliance to it, are able to use it properly. A kingdom, therefore, is a thing pure, genuine, uncorrupted, and through transcendency, most divine; and difficult to be acceded to by man. Hence it is necessary that he who is established in it should be naturally most pure and pellucid [in his soul], in order that he may not obscure by his stains that which is most splendid; as some persons defile the most sacred places, and the impure pollute those they may happen to meet. But it is requisite that a king, who associates with men, should participate of an undefiled nature, and should know how much more divine both himself and his qualifications are than other things; and from the exemplars to which he assimilates himself, he should use both himself and his subjects in the best manner. And to other men, indeed, if they are delinquents, the most holy purification is for them to be assimilated to their rulers, whether law or a king administers their affairs. But kings who cannot find any thing on the earth to imitate more excellent than their own nature, ought not to wander any farther in search of a paradigm, but should immediately become benefited by imitating God. For neither should any one search for the world, since he exists in, and is a part of it; nor should he who governs others be ignorant of him by whom he is governed. This, however, is a most abundant ornament, that nothing [in the universe] can be found without a ruler.

The manners of a king also ought to be the preceptors of his government. For thus the beauty of it will immediately shine forth, since he who imitates God through virtue will be dear to him whom he imitates; and much more will he be dear to his subjects. For no one who is beloved by divinity will be hated by men; since neither do the stars, nor the whole world hate God. For if they hated their ruler and leader, they would never be obedient to him. But because he governs properly, mundane affairs are well governed. I therefore, indeed, apprehend that the terrene king ought not to be deficient in any one of the virtues which pertain to the celestial king. But as the former is a certain foreign and external thing, in consequence of proceeding to men from the heavens; so, likewise, his virtues may be conceived to be the works of God, and to accede to him through divinity. And if you consider the thing from the beginning, you will find what I say to be true. For the terrestrial king obtains possession of the race of men by a communion, which is the first and the most necessary of all things. And this race is also the possession of him who governs every thing in the universe. For it is impossible that any thing can subsist without friendship and communion; the truth of which may be easily seen, if the accustomed communion which exists among citizens is supposed to be destroyed; since this is much inferior to a divine and royal nature. For natures of this kind are not oppressed by any such indigence; but, conformably to intellect, they supply the wants of others, and afford them assistance in common. For they are perfect in virtue. But the friendship which is in a city, and which possesses a certain common end, imitates the concord of the universe. But without the arrangement of magistrates no city can be inhabited. In order, however, to effect this arrangement, and to preserve the city, laws are necessary, and a certain political domination, and also a governor and the governed. But, the consequence of these things is, the general good, a certain concinnity, and the consent of the multitude in conjunction with concordant persuasion. He, likewise, who governs according to virtue, is called a king, and is so [in reality]; since he possesses the same friendship and communion with his subjects as divinity possesses with the world, and the natures which it contains. All benevolence, however, ought to be exerted; in the first place, indeed, by the king towards his subjects; but in the second place, by the subjects towards the king: and this benevolence should be such as that of a parent towards his child, of a shepherd towards his flock, and of law towards him who uses it.

For there is one virtue pertaining to the government, and to the life of men. But no one should through indigence solicit the assistance of others, when he is able to supply himself with what nature requires. For though there is a general communion [in the city], yet every one should so live as to be sufficient to himself; since he who is sufficient to himself does not appear to require the aid of any other person in his passage through life. If, therefore, it is necessary to lead an active life, it is evident that a king, though he should also assume other things, will, nevertheless, be sufficient to himself. For he will have friends through his own virtue; and in using these, he will not use them by any other virtue than that by which he regulates his own life. For it is necessary that he should follow a virtue of this kind, since he cannot procure any thing which is more excellent. And God, indeed, not having either ministers or servants, nor employing any mandate, and neither crowning nor proclaiming those that are obedient to him, or disgracing those that are disobedient, thus administers so great an empire. But as it appears to me exhibiting himself to be most worthy of imitation, he inserts in all things a vehement desire of participating his nature. He is, however, good; and the communication of goodness, and this, with the greatest facility, is his only work. But those who imitate him, accomplish every thing in a better manner through this imitation. And the imitation of him is to every thing the source of sufficiency. For there is not one virtue which makes things to be acceptable to God, and another which imitates him; [but both these are effected by one and the same virtue]. And is not our terrestrial king in a similar manner sufficient to himself? For assimilating himself to one, and that the most excellent nature, he will beneficently endeavour to render all whom he governs similar to himself. But such as offer violence to, and compel their subjects, entirely destroy in every individual of the community a promptitude to imitate [that which is most excellent]. For without benevolence, it is impossible there can be assimilation; since benevolence especially destroys every thing of a terrific nature. It is much to be wished, indeed, that human nature was not in want of persuasion: for persuasion is the relic of human depravity, of which this temporary animal is not destitute. Persuasion, indeed, is a thing proximate to necessity; since this first of itself performs those things which fly from necessity. Such beings, however, as spontaneously use what is beautiful and good, are not influenced by the reverence of persuasion; for neither are they influenced by the fear of necessity.

Again, a king alone is capable of effecting this good in human nature, that through the imitation of what is more excellent, man may pursue what is fit and decorous; and that those who are corrupted as if by intoxication, and through a bad education have fallen into an oblivion of that which is more excellent, may through his eloquence be corroborated, may have their diseased minds healed, and the oblivion which dwells in them through depravity being expelled, may have memory for an intimate associate, from which persuasion is produced. For this, though it originates from depraved seeds, yet is the source of a certain good to the inhabitants of the terrestrial region, in which language supplies what is deficient (through the imbecility of our nature), in our converse with each other.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

He who has a sacred and divine conception of things, will be in reality a king. For being persuaded by this, he will be the cause of all good but of no evil. And, moreover, that he will be just, being fitted for society, is evident to every one. For communion or association consists in equality, and in the distribution of it. And justice indeed precedes, but communion participates. For it is impossible for a man to be unjust, and yet distribute equality; or that he should distribute equality, and yet not be adapted to association. But how is it possible that he who is sufficient to himself should not be continent? For sumptuousness is the mother of incontinence, and incontinence of wanton insolence, from which so many human evils are derived. But self-sufficiency is not vanquished by sumptuousness, nor by any thing which proceeds from it; but being itself a certain principle, it leads all things, but is not led by any thing. And to govern, indeed, is the province of God, and also of a king (on which account, likewise, he is denominated sufficient to himself); but it pertains to both, not to be governed by any one. It is, however, evident, that these things cannot be effected without prudence. And it is manifest that God is the intellectual prudence of the world. For the world is connectedly contained by gracefulness, and a fit order of things, which cannot take place without intellect. Nor is it possible for a king without prudence to possess these virtues; I mean justice, continence, communion, and such other virtues as are the sisters of these.

FROM ARCHYTAS.

The unwritten laws of the gods were promulgated against depraved manners, inflicting a severe destiny and penalty on the disobedient; and these unwritten laws are the fathers and leaders of those that are written, and of the dogmas established by men.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

It is proper to invoke God in the beginning both of supper and dinner, not because he is in want of any thing of this kind, but in order that the soul may be adorned by the recollection of Divinity. For since we proceed from him, and participate of a divine nature, it is requisite that we should honour him. And since God also is just, it is fit that we should act justly in all things. In the next place, there are four causes which terminate all things, and bring them to an end, viz. nature, law, art, and fortune. And nature, indeed, is universally the principle of all things. But of those things which from manners lead to political concord, law is the inspective guardian and fabricator. Of things which obtain their consummation through human prudence, art is justly said to be the mother and leader. And of those things which, casually and accidentally, similarly befall the worthy and the depraved, we assert fortune to be the cause. For fortune does not produce any thing in measure and bound, in an orderly and prudent manner.

THE PREFACE OF CHARONDAS, THE CATANEAN, TO HIS TREATISE OF LAWS.

It is requisite that those who deliberate about, and perform any thing, should begin from the Gods: for it is best, as the proverb says, for God to be the cause of all our deliberations and works. And, farther still, it is requisite to abstain from base actions, and especially on account of consulting with God. For there is no communication between God and him who is unjust. Every one, also, should give assistance to himself, and should incite himself to the undertaking and performance of such things as are conformable to his desert; since for a man to extend himself similarly to small and great undertakings appears to be too sordid and illiberal. Hence, you should be very careful to avoid falling vehemently into things of an extended nature, and of great consequence. But, in every undertaking, you should measure your own desert and power, in order that you may obtain honour and veneration.

Let no assistance be afforded to a man or woman who has been condemned by the city, nor let any one associate with such a person, or if he does, let him be disgraced, as being similar to him or her with whom he associates. But it is proper to love men who, from the previous decision of the city, are good, and to associate with them; and by imitating and acquiring in reality their virtue and probity, to be thus initiated in the greatest and most perfect of the mysteries. For no man is perfect without virtue. And assistance should be given to an injured citizen, whether he is in his own, or in a foreign country. But let every stranger who was venerated in his own country, and conformably to the proper laws of that country, be received and dismissed auspiciously and familiarly, calling to mind hospitable Jupiter, as a God who is established by all nations in common, and who is the inspective guardian of hospitality and inhospitality.

Let more elderly men also preside over such as are younger, so that the latter may be ashamed of and deterred from vice, through reverence and fear of the former. For in cities in which more elderly men are shameless, the children and grandchildren of these are also destitute of shame. But wanton insolence and injustice are the attendants of shamelessness and impudence. And destruction follows these. Let, however, no one be impudent, but let every one be modest and temperate; because he will thus have the Gods propitious to him, and will procure for himself salvation. For no vicious man is dear to divinity. Let every one likewise honour probity and truth, and hate what is base and false. For these are the indications of virtue and vice. Hence it is requisite to accustom children from their youth [to worthy manners], by punishing those that are lovers of falsehood, but being delighted with those that are lovers of truth, in order that in each that which is most beautiful, and most prolific of virtue, may be implanted. Each of the citizens, likewise, should be more anxious to pretend to be temperate than to pretend to be wise: for the pretence of wisdom is a great indication of an ignorance of probity, and is also a sign of pusillanimity. But let the pretence of temperance be considered as a true claim to it. For no one should feign with his tongue, that he performs beautiful deeds, when at the same time he is both destitute of worthy conduct and good intentions.

It is likewise requisite to preserve benevolence towards rulers, being obedient to and venerating them as if they were parents. For he who does not conceive that this is proper will suffer the punishment of bad counsel from the dæmons who are the inspective guardians of the seat of empire. For the rulers are the guardians of the city, and of the safety of the citizens.

But it is also necessary that governors should preside justly over those that are governed, in the same manner as over their own children, in passing sentence on others, laying asleep hatred, friendship, and anger.

Let those likewise be praised and celebrated who, being themselves in affluence, have assisted the indigent, and let them be considered as the saviours of the children and defenders of their country. And let the wants of those be relieved who are poor through fortune, and not through an indolent and intemperate life. For fortune is common to all men, but an indolent and intemperate life is peculiar to bad men.

Let it also be considered as a worthy deed, to point out any one who has acted unjustly, in order that the polity may be saved, which has many guardians of its decorous arrangement. But let the indicator of the unjust action be considered as a pious man, though his information should be respecting his most familiar acquaintance. For nothing is more familiar and allied to a man than his country. Let, however, the indication be made, not of things done through involuntary ignorance, but of such crimes as have been committed from a previous knowledge [of their enormity.] And if he who is detected should be hostile to him by whom he is detected, let him be hated by all men, in order that he may suffer the punishment of ingratitude, through which he deprives himself of being cured of the greatest of diseases injustice.

Farther still, let a contempt of the Gods be considered as the greatest of iniquities, and also injuring parents voluntarily, the neglecting rulers and laws, and voluntarily dishonouring justice. But let him be considered as a most just and holy citizen who honours these things, and indicates to the citizens and rulers those that despise them.

Let it be esteemed to be more venerable for a man to die for his country than, through a desire of life, to desert it, together with probity. For it is better to die well than to live basely and disgracefully.

It is likewise requisite to honour each of the dead, not with tears nor with lamentations, but with good remembrance, and with an oblation of annual fruits. For when we grieve immoderately for those that are dead, we are ungrateful to the terrestrial dæmons.