CHAPTER XXXIX.. Leges and Epinomis.

LEGES AND EPINOMIS.

The Dialogue, entitled Leges--De Legibus--The Laws--distributed into twelve books, besides its Appendix the Epinomis, and longer than any other of the Platonic compositions--is presented to us as held in Krete during a walk from the town of Knossus to the temple of Zeus under Mount Ida--between three elderly persons: Megillus, a Spartan--Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus--and an Athenian who bears no name, but serves as the principal expositor and conductor. That this dialogue was composed by Plato after the Republic, we know from the express deposition of Aristotle: that it was the work of Plato's old age--probably the last which he ever composed, and perhaps not completely finished at his death--is what we learn from the scanty amount of external evidence accessible to us. The internal evidence, as far as it goes, tends to bear out the same conclusion, and to show that it was written during the last seven years of his life, when he was more than seventy years of age.

Plutarch (De Isid. et Osir. p. 370 E) ascribes the composition of the Laws to Plato's old age. In the [Greek: Prolego/mena ei)s tê\n Pla/tônos philosophi/an], it is said that the treatise was left unfinished at his death, and completed afterwards by his disciple the Opuntian Philippus (Hermann's Edition of Plato's Works, vol. vi. p. 218).--Diog. Laert. iii. 37.

See the learned Prolegomena of Stallbaum, who collects all the information on this subject, and who gives his own judgment (p. lxxxi.) respecting the tone of senility pervading the Leges, in terms which deserve the more attention as coming from so unqualified an admirer of Plato: "Totum Legum opus nescio quid senile refert, ut profecto etiam hanc ob caussam a sene scriptum esse longé verisimillimum videatur." The allusion in the Laws (i. p. 638 B) to the conquest of the Epizephyrian Lokrians by the Syracusans, which occurred in 356 B.C., is pointed out by Boeckh as showing that the composition was posterior to that date (Boeckh, ad Platon. Minoem, pp. 72-73).

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in canvassing the opinions delivered by the [Greek: A)thênai=os xe/nos] in the Laws, cites them as the opinions of Sokrates (Politic. ii. 1265, b. 11), who, however, does not appear at all in the dialogue. Either this is a lapse of memory on the part of Aristotle; or else (which I think very possible) the Laws were originally composed with Sokrates as the expositor introduced, the change of name being subsequently made from a feeling of impropriety in transporting Sokrates to Krete, and from the dogmatising anti-dialectic tone which pervades the lectures ascribed to him. Some Platonic expositors regarded the Athenian Stranger in Leges as Plato himself (Diog. Laert. iii. 52; Schol. ad Legg. 1). Diogenes himself calls him a [Greek: pla/sma a)nô/numon].]

All critics have remarked the many and important differences between the Republic and the Laws. And it seems certain, that during the interval which separates the two, Plato's point of view must have undergone a considerable change. We know from himself that he intended the Kritias as a sequel to the Timæus and Republic: a portion of the Kritias still exists--as we have just seen--but it breaks off abruptly, and there is no ground for believing that it was ever completed. We know farther from himself that he projected an ulterior dialogue or exposition, assigned to Hermokrates, as sequel to the Kritias: both being destined to exhibit in actual working and manifestation, the political scheme, of which the Republic had described the constituent elements. While the Kritias was prematurely arrested in its progress towards maturity, the Hermokrates probably was never born. Yet we know certainly that both the one and the other were conceived by Plato, as parts of one comprehensive project, afterwards abandoned. Nay, the Kritias was so abruptly abandoned, that it terminates with an unfinished sentence: as I have stated in the last chapter.

To what extent such change of project was brought about by external circumstances in Plato's life, we cannot with certainty determine. But we know that there really occurred circumstances, well calculated to produce a material change in his intellectual character and point of view. His personal adventures and experience, after his sixty-first year, and after the death of the elder Dionysius (B.C. 367), were of an eventful and melancholy character. Among them were included his two visits to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse; together with the earnest sympathy and counsel which he bestowed on his friend Dion; whose chequered career terminated, after an interval of brilliant promise, in disappointment, disgrace, and violent death. Plato not only suffered much distress, but incurred more or less of censure, from the share which he had taken, or was at least supposed to have taken, in the tragedy. His own letters remain to attest the fact. Considering the numerous enemies which philosophy has had at all times, we may be sure that such enemies would be furnished with abundant materials for invidious remark--by the entire failure of Plato himself at Syracuse as well as by the disgraceful proceedings first of Dion, next, of his assassin Kallippus: both of them pupils, and the former a favourite pupil, of Plato in the Academy. The prospect, which accident had opened, of exalting philosophy into active influence over mankind, had been closed in a way no less mournful than dishonourable. Plato must have felt this keenly enough, even apart from the taunts of opponents. We might naturally expect that his latest written compositions would be coloured by such a temper of mind: that he would contract, if not an alienation from philosophy, at least a comparative mistrust of any practical good to come from it: and that if his senile fancy still continued to throw out any schemes of social construction, they would be made to rest upon other foundations, eliminating or reducing to a minimum that ascendancy of the philosophical mind, which he had once held to be omnipotent and indispensable.

The reader will find a full account of Plato's proceedings in Sicily, and of the adventures of Dion, in chap. 84 of my 'History of Greece'.

The passage of Plato in Legg. iv. 709-710 (alluding to the concurrence and co-operation of a youthful despot, sober-minded and moderate, but not exalted up to the level of philosophy, with a competent lawgiver for the purpose of constructing a civic community, furnished with the best laws) is supposed by K. F. Hermann (System der Platon. Philos. p. 69) and by Zeller (Phil. d. Griech. vol. ii. p. 310, ed. 2nd.) to allude to the hopes which Plato cherished when he undertook his first visit to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. See Epistol. vii. pp. 327 C, 330 A-B, 334 C; Epistol. ii. 311 B.

Such allusion is sufficiently probable. Yet we must remember that the Magnetic community, described by Plato in the Treatise De Legibus, does not derive its origin from any established despot or prince, but from a general resolution supposed to have been taken by the Kretan cities, and from a Decemviral executive Board of Knossian citizens nominated by them. Kleinias, as a chief member of this Board, solicits the suggestion of laws from the Athenian elder (Legg. iii. p. 702 C). This is more analogous to Plato's subsequent counsel, after his attempt to guide the younger Dionysius had failed. See Epistol. vii. p. 337 C-E.]

Comparing the Laws with the earlier compositions of Plato, the difference between them will be found to correspond pretty nearly with the change thus indicated in his point of view. If we turn to the Republic, we find Plato dividing the intelligible world ([Greek: to\ noêto\n]) into two sections: the higher, that of pure and absolute Ideas, with which philosophy and dialectics deal--the lower, that of Ideas not quite pure, but implicated more or less with sensible illustration, to which the mathematician applies himself: the chief use of the lower section is said to consist in its serving as preparation for a comprehension of the higher. But in the Laws, this higher or dialectical section--the last finish or crowning result of the teaching process, is left out; while even the lower or mathematical section is wrapped up with theology. Moreover, the teaching provided in the Laws, for the ruling Elders, is presented as something new, which Plato has much difficulty both in devising and in explaining: we must therefore understand him to distinguish it pointedly from the teaching which he had before provided for the Elders in the Republic. Again, literary occupation is now kept down rather than encouraged: Plato is more afraid lest his citizens should have too much of it than too little. As for the Sokratic Elenchus, it is not merely not commended, but it is even proscribed and denounced by implication, since free speech and criticism generally is barred out by the rigorous Platonic censorship. On the other hand, the ethical sentiment in the Leges, with its terms designating the varieties of virtue, is much the same as in other Platonic compositions: the political and social doctrine also, though different in some material points, is yet very analogous on several others. But these ethical and political doctrines appear in the Laws much more merged in dogmatic theology than in other dialogues. This theology is of Pythagorean character--implicated directly and intimately with astronomy--and indirectly with arithmetic and geometry also. We have here an astronomical religion, or a religious astronomy, by whichever of the two names it may be called. Right belief on astronomy is orthodoxy and virtue: erroneous belief on astronomy is heretical and criminal.

In the Timæus, Plato recommended the study of astronomy, in order that the rotations of man's soul in his cranium, which were from the beginning disturbed and irregular, might become regularised, and assimilated by continued contemplation to the perfect uniformity of the celestial and cosmical movements. In the Leges, he recommends astronomy to be studied, because without it we fall into blasphemous errors respecting the cosmical movements, and because such cosmical errors are among the three varieties of heresy, to one or other of which the commission of all crimes against society may be traced. Hence we find Plato, in the city here described, consecrating his astronomical views as a part of the state-religion, and prohibiting dissent from them under the most stringent penalties. In the general spirit of the Treatise de Legibus, Plato approximates to Xenophon and the Spartan model. He keeps his eye fixed on the perpetual coercive discipline of the average citizen. This discipline, prescribed in all its details by the lawgiver, includes a modicum of literary teaching equal to all; small in quantity, and rigorously sifted as to quality, through the censorial sieve. The intellectual and speculative genius of the community, which other Platonic dialogues bring into the foreground, has disappeared from the Treatise de Legibus. We find here no youths pregnant with undisclosed original thought, which Sokrates assists them in bringing forth: such as Theætêtus, Charmidês, Kleinias, and others--pictures among the most interesting which the ancient world presents, and lending peculiar charm to the earlier dialogues. Not only no provision is made for them, but severe precautions are taken against them. Even in the Republic, Plato had banished poets, or had at least forbidden them to follow the free inspirations of the Muse, and had subjected them to censorial controul. But such controul was presumed to be exercised by highly trained speculative and philosophical minds, for the perpetual succession of whom express provision was made. In the Treatise De Legibus, such speculative minds are no longer admitted. Philosophy is interdicted or put in chains as well as poetry. An orthodox religious creed is exalted into exclusive ascendancy. All crime or immorality is ascribed to a departure from this creed. The early communities (Plato tells us), who were simple and ignorant, destitute of arts and letters, but who at the same time believed implicitly all that they heard from their seniors respecting Gods and men, and adopted the dicta of their seniors respecting good and evil, without enquiry or suspicion--were decidedly superior to his contemporaries in all the departments of virtue--justice, temperance, and courage. This antithesis, between virtue and religious faith on the one side, and arts and letters with an inquisitive spirit on the other, presenting the latter as a depraving influence, antagonistic to the former--is analogous to the Bacchæ of Euripides--the work of that poet's old age--and analogous also to the Nubes of Aristophanes, wherein the literary and philosophical teaching of Sokrates is represented as withdrawing youth from the received religious creed, and as leading them by consequence to the commission of fraud and crime.

Compare vv. 200-203 of the same drama.]

The submergence and discredit of letters and philosophy, which pervades the Dialogue De Legibus, is farther indicated by the personages introduced as conversing. In all the other Platonic dialogues, the scene is laid at Athens, and the speakers are educated citizens of Athens; sometimes visitors, equally or better educated, from other Grecian cities. Generally, they are either adults who have already acquired some intellectual eminence, or youths anxious to acquire it. Nikias and Laches, Melesias and Lysimachus (in the Lachês), are among the leaders (past or present) of the Athenian public assembly. Anytus (in the Menon) is a man not so much ignorant of letters as despising letters. Moreover Sokrates himself formally disclaims positive knowledge, professing to be only a searcher for truth along with the rest. But the scene of the Laws is laid in Krete, not at Athens: the three speakers are not merely all old men, but frequently allude to their old age. One of them only is an Athenian, to whom the positive and expository duty is assigned: the other two are Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus. Now both Sparta, and the communities of Krete, were among the most unlettered portions of the Hellenic name. They were not only strangers to that impulse of rhetoric, dialectic, and philosophical speculation which, having its chief domicile at Athens, had become diffused more or less over a large portion of Greece since the Persian war--but they were sparingly conversant even with that old poetical culture, epic and lyric, which belonged to the age of Solon and the Seven Wise Men. The public training of youth at Sparta, equal for all the citizens, included nothing of letters and music, which in other cities were considered to be the characteristics of an educated Greek: though probably individual Spartans, more or fewer, acquired these accomplishments for themselves. Gymnastics, with a slight admixture of simple chronic music and a still slighter admixture of poetry and letters, formed the characteristic culture of Sparta and Krete. In the Leges, Plato not only notes the fact, but treats it as indicating a better social condition, compared with Athens and other Greeks--that both Spartans and Kretans were alike unacquainted with the old epic or theological poems (Hesiod, Orpheus, &c.), and with the modern philosophical speculations.

Nikias is said to have made his son Nikêratus learn by heart the entire Iliad and Odyssey of Homer; at least this is the statement of Nikêratus himself in the Symposion of Xenophon (iii. 5).]

Compare the description given by Xenophon in the Cyropædia (i. 2, 6), of the public training of Persian youth, which passage bears striking analogy to his description of the Spartan training. The public [Greek: dida/skaloi] are not mentioned as teaching [Greek: gra/mmata], which belong to Athens and other cities, but as teaching justice, temperance, self-command, obedience, bodily endurance, the use of the bow and the javelin, &c.]

Not simply on this negative ground, but on another positive ground also, Sparta and Krête were well suited to furnish listeners for the Laws. Their gymnastic discipline and military drill, especially the Spartan, were stricter and more continuous than anywhere else in Greece: including toilsome fatigue, endurance of pain, heat, and cold, and frequent conflicts with and without arms between different factions of citizens. The individual and the family were more thoroughly merged in the community: the citizens were trained for war, interdicted from industry, and forbidden to go abroad without permission: attendance on the public mess-table was compulsory on all citizens: the training of youth was uniform, under official authority: the two systems were instituted, both of them, by divine authority--the Spartan by Apollo, the Kretan by Zeus--Lykurgus and Minos, semi-divine persons, being the respective instruments and mediators. In neither of them was any public criticism tolerated upon the laws and institutions (this is a point capital in Plato's view). No voice was allowed among the young men except that of constant eulogy, extolling the system as not merely excellent but of divine origin, and resenting all contradiction: none but an old man was permitted to suggest doubts, and he only in private whisper to the Archon, when no young man was near. Both in Sparta and Krete the public authorities stood forward as the conspicuous, positive, constant, agents; enforcing upon each individual a known type of character and habits. There was thus an intelligible purpose, political and social, as contrasted with other neighbouring societies, in which no special purpose revealed itself. Both Sparta and Krete, moreover, had continued in the main unchanged from a time immemorial. In this, as in numerous other points, the two systems were cognate and similar.

Compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. p. 489, where a similar affirmation is made respecting Sparta.]

K. F. Hermann (in his instructive Dissertation, De Vestigiis Institutorum veterum imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis) represents Sparta and Krete as types of customs and institutions which had once been general in Greece, but had been discontinued in the other Grecian cities. "Hoc imprimis in Lacedæmoniorum et Cretensium res publicas cadit, quæ quum et antiquissimam Græciæ indolem fidelissimé servasse viderentur, et moribus ac disciplinâ publicâ optimé fundatæ essent, non mirum est eas Græco philosopho adeò placuisse ut earum formam et libris de Civitate et Legibus quasi pro fundamento subjiceret" (p. 19, compare pp. 13-15-23) . . . "unde (sc. a legitimis Græcarum civitatum principiis) licet plurimi temporum decursu descivissent atque in aliâ omnia abiissent, nihil tamen Plato proposuit, nisi quod optimus quisque in Græciâ semper expetierat ac persecutus erat" (p. 15). I think this view is not correct, though it is adopted more or less by various critics. Sparta and Krete are not specimens (in my judgment) of what all or most Grecian cities once had been--nor of pure Dorism, as K. O. Müller affirms. On the contrary I believe them to have been very peculiar, Sparta especially. So far they resembled all early Greeks, that neither literature nor luxury had grown up among them. But neither the Syssitia nor the disciplina publica had ever subsisted among other Greeks: and these were the two characteristic features of Krete and Sparta, more especially of the latter. They were the two features which arrested Plato's attention, and upon which he brought his constructive imagination to bear; constructing upon one principle in his Republic, and upon a different principle in his Dialogue de Legibus. While he copies these two main features from Sparta, he borrows many or most of his special laws from Athens; but the ends, with reference to which he puts these elements together, are his own. K. F. Hermann, in his anxiety to rescue Plato from the charge of rashness ("temerario ingenii lusu," p. 18), understates Plato's originality.]

Comparing the Platonic Leges with the Platonic Republic the difference between them will be illustrated by the theory laid down in the Politikus. We read therein, that the process of governing mankind well is an art, depending upon scientific principles; like the art of the physician, the general, the steersman: that it aims at the attainment of a given End, the well-being of the governed--and that none except the scientific or artistic Ruler know either the end or the means of attaining it: that such rulers are the rarest of all artists, never more than one or a very few, combining philosophical aptitude with philosophical training: but that when they are found, society ought to trust and obey their directions without any fixed law: that no peremptory law can be made to fit all contingencies, and that their art is the only law which they ought to follow in each particular conjuncture. If no such persons can be found, good government is an impossibility: but the next best thing to be done is, to establish fixed laws, as good as you can, and to ensure that they shall be obeyed by every one. Now the Platonic Republic aims at realising the first of these two ideal projects: everything in it turns upon the discretionary orders of the philosophical King or Oligarchy, and even the elaborate training of the Guardians serves only to make them perfect instruments for the execution of those orders. But the Platonic Leges or Treatise on Laws corresponds only to the second or less ambitious project--a tolerable imitation of the first and best. Instead of philosophical rulers, one or a few invested with discretionary power, we have a scheme of political constitution--an alternation of powers temporary and responsible, an apportionment of functions and duties--a variety of laws enacted, with magistrates and dikasteries provided to apply them. Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, appears as adviser and as persuader; but the laws must be such as the body of citizens can be persuaded to adopt. There is moreover a scheme of education embodied in the laws: the individual citizen is placed under dominion at once spiritual and temporal: but the infallibility resides in the laws, and authority is exercised over him only by periodical magistrates who enforce them and determine in their name. It is the Laws which govern--not philosophical Artists of King-Craft.

The three first books of the Leges are occupied with general preliminary discussions on the ends at which laws and political institutions ought to aim--on the means which they ought to employ--and on the ethical effects of various institutions in moulding the character of the citizens. "For private citizens" (the Athenian says), "it is enough to say, in reply to the criticism of strangers, This is the law or custom with us. But what I propose to examine is, the wisdom of the lawgiver from whom the law proceeds." At the end of book three, Kleinias announces that the Kretans are about to found a new colony on a deserted site at one end of the island, and that they have confided to a committee of ten Knossians (himself among the number), the task of establishing a constitution and laws for the colony. He invites the Athenian to advise and co-operate with this committee. In the fourth book, we enter upon the special conditions of this colonial project, to which the constitution and laws must conform. It is not until the fifth book that the Athenian speaker begins to declare what constitutional provisions, and what legal enactments, he recommends. His recommendations are continued throughout all the remaining Treatise--from the fifth book, to the twelfth or last. They are however largely interspersed with persuasive addresses, expositions, homilies, and comminations, sometimes of extreme prolixity and vehemence, on various topics of ethics and religion: which indeed occupy a much larger space than the laws themselves.

The Athenian speaker avails himself of the privilege of old age to criticise the Spartan and Kretan institutions more freely than is approved by his two companions; who feel bound to uphold against all dissentients the divine origin of their respective polities. On enquiring from them what is the purpose of their peculiar institutions--the Syssitia or public mess-table--the gymnastic discipline--the military drill--he is informed by both, that the purpose is to ensure habits of courage, strength, and skill, with a view to superiority in war over foreign enemies: war being, in their judgment, the usual and natural condition of the different communities into which mankind are distributed. Such is the test according to which they determine the good constitution of a city. But the Athenian--proclaiming as the scope of his enquiry, What is it which is right or wrong by nature, in laws?--will not admit the test as thus laid down. War against foreign enemies (i.e. enemies foreign to the city-community) is only one among many varieties of war. There exist other varieties besides:--war among the citizens of the same town--among the constituent villages of the same city-community--among the brethren of the same family--among the constituent elements of the same individual man. Though these varieties of war or discord are of frequent occurrence, they are not the less evils, inconsistent with that idéal of the Best which a wise lawgiver will seek to approach. Whenever any of them occur, he ought to ensure to the good and wise elements victory over the evil and stupid. But his idéal should be, to obviate the occurrence of war altogether--to adjust harmoniously the relation between the better and worse elements, disposing the latter towards a willing subordination and co-operation with the former. Though courage in war is one indispensable virtue, it stands only fourth on the list--wisdom, justice, and temperance, being before it. Your aim is to inculcate not virtue, but only one part of virtue. Many mercenary soldiers, possessing courage in perfection, are unjust, foolish, and worthless in all other respects.

Compare the inquiry in the Kratylus respecting naming, wherein consists the [Greek: o)rtho/tês phu/sei tô=n o)noma/tôn]. See above, vol. iii. ch. xxxi. p. 285, seq.]

The idéal which Plato here sets forth coincides mainly with that which Xenophon adopts as his theme both in the Cyropædia and in the Oeconomicus (see the beginning of the former and the close of the latter) [Greek: to\ e)thelo/ntôn a)/rchein].]

If you wish (says the Athenian to Kleinias) to make out a plenary defence and advocacy of the Kretan system, you ought to do it in the following way:

Our laws deserve the celebrity which they have acquired in Greece, because they make us happy, and provide us with all kinds of good things: both with such as are divine and with such as are human. The divine are, Wisdom or Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Courage: the human are, Health, Beauty, Strength, Activity, Wealth. The human depend upon the divine, are certain to follow them, and are not to be obtained without them. All the regulations and precepts of the lawgiver are directed to the attainment and protection of these ends--to establish among the citizens a moral tone of praise and blame favourable to that purpose. He seeks to inculcate on the citizens a body of sentiment, as to what is honourable and not honourable--such as may guide their pleasures and pains, their desires and aversions--and such as may keep their minds right amidst all the disaster (disease, war, poverty, &c.) as well as the prosperity of life. He next regulates the properties, the acquisitions, and the expenditure of the citizens, together with their relations to each other on these heads, upon principles of justice enforced by suitable penalties. Lastly, he appoints magistrates of approved wisdom and right judgment to enforce the regulations. The cementing authority is thus wisdom, following out purposes of temperance and justice, not of ambition or love of money.

Such is the course of exposition (says the Athenian) which ought to be adopted. Now tell me--In what manner are the objects here defined ensured by the institutions of Apollo and Zeus at Sparta and Krete? You two ought to show me: for I myself cannot discern it.

This passage is of some value, because it gives us, thus early in the Treatise, a brief summary of that which Plato desiderates in the two systems here noted--and of that which he intends to supply in his own. We see that he looks upon a political constitution and laws as merely secondary and instrumental: that he postulates as the primary and fundamental fabric, a given religious and ethical character implanted in the citizens: that the lawgiver, in his view, combines the spiritual and temporal authority, making the latter subordinate to the former, and determining not merely what laws the citizens shall obey, but how they shall distribute their approval and aversion--religious, ethical, and æsthetical. It is the lawgiver alone who is responsible and who is open to praise or censure: for to the people, of each different community and different system, established custom is always a valid authority.

We Spartans (says Megillus) implant courage in our citizens not merely by our public mess-table and gymnastic, but also by inuring them to support pain and hardship. We cause them to suffer severe pain in the gymnopædia, in pugilistic contests, and other ways: we put them to hardships and privations in the Kryptia and in hunting. We thus accustom them to endurance. Moreover, we strictly forbid all indulgences such as drunkenness. Nothing of the kind is seen at Sparta, not even at the festival of Dionysus; nothing like the drinking which I have seen at Athens, and still more at Tarentum.

Plato puts into the mouth of the Athenian a remark that in some other cities (not Sparta or Kretan) these [Greek: sussi/tia] or public mess-tables had been found to lead to intestine sedition and disturbance (p. 636 B). He instances the cases of the Boeotians, the Milesians, and the Thurians. It is much to be lamented that we cannot assign the particular events and conjunctures here adverted to. The Spartan and Kretan Syssitia were daily, compulsory, and universal among the citizens, besides the strictness of the regulations: under such conditions they were peculiar to these two places, as far as our knowledge goes: the Syssitia in Southern Italy (noticed by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 10, p. 1329 b.) are not known and seemingly unimportant. The Syssitia in Boeotia, &c., may probably have been occasional or periodical banquets among members of the same tribe, deme, club, or [Greek: thi/asos]--and voluntary besides, neither prescribed nor regulated by law. Such meetings might very probably give occasion to disturbances under particular circumstances.]

How is it (says the Athenian) that you deal so differently with pains and pleasures? To make your citizens firm against pain, you expose them designedly to severe pains: if they were kept free from pains, you would have no confidence in their firmness against painful actualities, when any such shall occur. But in regard to pleasures, you are content with simple prohibition. You provide no means for strengthening your citizens against the temptations of pleasure. Are you satisfied that their courage (or self-command) shall be lame or one-sided--good against pains, but not good against pleasures? In determining about laws, the whole enquiry turns upon pleasures and pains, both in the city and in individual dispositions. These are the two natural fountains, from which he who draws such draughts as is proper, obtains happiness: while every one who draws unwisely and out of season, will fail of obtaining happiness.

Besides, as to drunkenness, we must not be too hasty in condemnation of it. We must not pronounce generally respecting any institution without examining the circumstances, persons, regulations, &c., attending it. Such hasty praise and censure is very misleading. Many other nations act upon the opposite practice. But I (says Plato) shall not pretend to decide the point by witnesses and authority. I shall adopt another course of investigation, and shall show you, in this particular case, a specimen of the way in which all such institutions ought to be criticised and appreciated.

Here Plato (as in the Sophistês, Politikus, and elsewhere) announces that the special inquiry is intended to illustrate a general method.]

Plato here digresses from his main purpose to examine the question of drunkenness. He will not allow it to be set aside absolutely and offhand, by a self-justifying ethical sentiment, without reason assigned, defence tendered, accompanying precautions discussed. Upon this, as upon the social functions proper for the female sex, he is a dissenter from the common view. He selects the subject as a case for exhibiting the proper method of criticism respecting social institutions; not without some consciousness that the discussion, if looked at in itself (like the examples of scientific classification or diæresis in the Sophistês and Politikus), would appear unduly prolonged.

To illustrate his peculiar views on the subject of drunkenness, we may refer to the picture of Sokrates which he presents in the Symposion, more especially in the latter half of that dialogue, after the appearance of Alkibiades. In this dialogue the occasion is supposed to be festive and joyous. Eros is in the ascendant, and is made the subject of a panegyric by each of the guests in succession. Sokrates partakes in the temper of the society, proclaiming himself to be ignorant of all other matters except those relating to Love. In all the Platonic writings there is hardly anything more striking than the panegyric upon Eros there pronounced by Sokrates, blending the idea of love with that of philosophical dialectics, and refining the erotic impulse into an enthusiastic aspiration for that generation of new contemplative power, by the colloquial intercourse of two minds reciprocally stimulating each other, which brings them at last into a clear view of the objects of the ideal or intelligible world. Until the appearance of Alkibiades, little wine is swallowed, and the guests are perfectly sober. But Alkibiades, being intoxicated when he first comes in, becomes at once the prominent character of the piece. He is represented as directing the large wine-cooler to be filled with wine (about four pints), first swallowing the whole himself then ordering it to be filled again for Sokrates, who does the like: Alkibiades observing, "Whatever quantity of wine you prescribe to Sokrates, he will drink it without becoming drunk". Alkibiades then, instead of panegyrising Eros, undertakes to pronounce a panegyric on Sokrates: proclaiming that nothing shall be said but what is true, and being relieved from all reserve by his drunken condition. In this panegyric he describes emphatically the playful irony of Sokrates, and the magical influence exercised by his conversation over young men. But though Sokrates thus acquired irresistible ascendancy over others, himself (Alkibiades) included, no one else acquired the least hold over Sokrates. His will and character, under a playful exterior, were self-sufficing and self-determining; independent of influences from without, to such a degree as was almost insulting to any one who sought either to captivate or oblige him. The self-command of Sokrates was unshaken either by seduction on one side, or by pain and hardship on the other. He faced danger with a courage never surpassed; he endured hunger, fatigue, the extremities of heat and cold, in a manner such as none of his comrades in the army could parallel. He was indifferent to the gratifications of love, even when they were presented to him in a manner the most irresistible to Grecian imagination; while at festive banquets, though he did not drink of his own accord, yet if the society imposed obligation to do so, he outdid all in respect to quantity of wine. No one ever saw Sokrates intoxicated. Such is the tenor of the panegyric pronounced by Alkibiades upon Sokrates. A general drinking-bout closes the Symposion, in which Sokrates swallows large draughts of wine along with the rest, but persists all the while in his dialectic cross-examination, with unabated clearness of head. One by one the guests drop asleep, and at daybreak Sokrates alone is left awake. He rises and departs, goes forthwith to the Lykeum, and there passes the whole day in his usual colloquial occupation, without being at all affected by the potations of the preceding night.

What has been here briefly recapitulated will be found in my twenty-sixth chapter, vol. iii. pp. 20-21, seq.]

I have thus cited the Symposion to illustrate Plato's view of the ideal of character. The self-command of Sokrates is tested both by pain and by pleasure. He resists both of them alike and equally: under the one as well as under the other, his reason works with unimpaired efficacy, and his deliberate purposes are pursued with unclouded serenity. This is not because he keeps out of the way of temptation and seduction: on the contrary, he is frequently exposed to situations of a tempting character, and is always found superior to them.

Now Plato's purpose is, to impart to his citizens the character which he here ascribes to Sokrates, and to make them capable of maintaining unimpaired the controul of reason against the disturbances both of pain and pleasure. He remarks that the Spartan training kept in check the first of these two enemies, but not the second. He thinks that the citizen ought to be put through a regulated system of trials for measuring and testing his competence to contend with pleasure, as the Spartans provided in regard to pain. The Dionysiac festivals afforded occasions of applying these trials of pleasure, just as the Gymnopædia at Sparta were made to furnish deliberate inflictions of pain. But the Dionysiac banquets ought to be conducted under the superintendence of a discreet president, himself perfectly sober throughout the whole ceremony. All the guests would drink largely of wine, and each would show how far and how long he could resist its disturbing tendencies. As there was competition among the youths at the Gymnopædia, to show how much pain each could endure without flinching--honour being shown to those who endured most, and most successfully--so there would be competition at the Dionysia to prove how much wine each could bear without having his reason and modesty overset. The sober president would decide as judge. Each man's self-command, as against seductive influences, would be strengthened by a repetition of such trials, while proof would be afforded how far each man could be counted on.

Compare the Republic, iii. pp. 412-413, where the same general doctrine is enforced.]

This is one mode in which the unmeasured potations (common throughout the Grecian cities, with the exception of Sparta and Krete) might under proper regulation be rendered useful for civic training. But there is another mode also, connected with the general musical and gymnastical training of the city. Plato will not allow Dionysus--and wine, the special gift of that God to mankind--to be censured as absolutely mischievous.

In developing this second topic, he is led into a general theory of ethical and æsthetical education for his city. This happens frequently enough in the desultory manner of the Platonic dialogues. We are sometimes conducted from an incidental and outlying corollary, without warning and through a side door, into the central theory from which it ramifies. The practice is noway favourable to facility of comprehension, but it flows naturally from the unsystematic and spontaneous sequence of the dialogue.

Education of youth consists mainly in giving proper direction to their pleasures and pains--their love and their hatred. Young persons are capable only of emotions, well or ill directed: in this consists their virtue or vice. At that age they cannot bear serious teaching: they are incapable of acquiring reason, or true, firm opinions, which constitute the perfection of the mature man; indeed, if a man acquires these even when old, he may be looked on as fortunate. The young can only have their emotions cultivated so as to conform to reason: they may thus be made to love what reason, personified in and enforced by the lawgiver, enjoins--and to hate what reason forbids--but without knowing wherefore. Unfortunately the hard realities of life are perpetually giving a wrong turn to the emotions. To counteract and correct this, the influence of the Muses, of Apollo, and of Dionysus, are indispensable: together with the periodical festivals of which these Deities are respectively presidents and auxiliaries. Their influence is exercised through the choric ceremony--music, singing, dancing, blended together. Every young man is spontaneously disposed to constant indeterminate movement and exercise of various kinds--running, jumping, speaking, &c. This belongs to man in common with the young of other animals: but what is peculiar to man exclusively is, the sense of rhythm and harmony, as well as of the contrary, in these movements and sounds. Such rhythm and harmony, in song and dance united, is expressed by the chorus at the festivals, in which the Muses and Apollo take part along with the assembled youth. Here we find the only way of properly schooling the emotions. The unschooled man is he who has not gone through a good choric practice; which will require that the matter which he sings shall be good and honourable, while the movements of his frame and the tones of his voice must be rhythmical and graceful. Such choric practice must be universal among the citizens, distributed into three classes: youths, mature men, elders.

But what is the good and honourable--or the bad and dishonourable? We must be able to settle this point:--otherwise we cannot know how far the chorus complies with the conditions above-named. Suppose a brave man and a coward in the face of danger: the gestures and speech of the former will be strikingly different from those of the latter. So with other virtues and vices. Now the manifestations, bodily and mental, of the virtuous man, are beautiful and honourable: those of the vicious man, are ugly and base. These are the really beautiful,--the same universally, or what ought to be beautiful to all: this is the standard of rectitude in music. But they do not always appear beautiful to all. There is great diversity in the tastes and sentiments of different persons: what appears to one man agreeable and pleasurable, appears to another disgusting or indifferent. Such diversity is either in the natural disposition, or in the habits acquired. A man's pleasure depends upon the former, his judgment of approbation on the latter. If both his nature and his acquired habits coincide with the standard of rectitude, he will both delight in what is really beautiful, and will approve it as beautiful. But if his nature be in discordance with the standard, while his habits coincide with that standard he will approve of what is honourable, but he will take no delight in it: he will delight in what is base, but will at the same time disapprove it as base. He will however be ashamed to proclaim his delight before persons whom he respects, and will never indulge himself in the delightful music except when he is alone.

To take delight in gestures or songs which are manifestations of bad qualities, produces the same kind of mischievous effect upon the spectator as association with bad men in real life. His character becomes assimilated to the qualities in the manifestations of which he delights, although he may be ashamed to commend them. This is a grievous corruption, arising from bad musical and choric exhibitions, which the lawgiver must take care to prevent. He must not allow poets to exhibit what they may prefer or may think to be beautiful. He must follow the practice of Egypt, where both the music and the pictorial type has been determined by the Gods or by divine lawgivers from immemorial antiquity, according to the standard of natural rectitude and where the government allows neither poet nor painter to innovate or depart from this consecrated type. Accordingly, Egyptian compositions of the present day are exactly like what they were ten thousand years ago: neither more nor less beautiful. The lawgiver must follow this example, and fix the type of his musical and choric exhibitions; forbidding all innovation introduced on the plea of greater satisfaction either to the poet or to the audience. In the festivals where there is competition among poets, the prize must not be awarded by the pleasure of the auditors, whose acclamations tend only to corrupt and pervert the poets. The auditors ought to hear nothing but what is better than their own characters, in order that their tastes may thus be exalted. The prize must be awarded according to the preference of a few elders--or better still, of one single elder--eminent for excellent training and virtue. This judge ought not to follow the taste of the auditors, but to consider himself as their teacher and improver.

Such is the exposition given by the Athenian speaker, respecting the characteristic function, and proper regulating principles, of choric training (poems learnt, music and dancing) for the youth. The Spartan and Kretan cordially concur with him: especially with that provision which fixes and consecrates the old established type, forbidding all novelties and spontaneous inspiration of the poets. They claim this compulsory orthodoxy, tolerating no dissent from the ancient and consecrated canon of music and orchestic, as the special feature of their two states; as distinguishing Sparta and Krete from other Hellenic cities, which were invaded with impunity by novel compositions of every variety.

The Athenian is thus in full agreement with his two companions, on the general principle of subjecting the poets to an inflexible censorship. But the agreement disappears, when he comes to specify the dogmas which the poets are required to inculcate in their hymns. While complimenting his two friends upon their enforcement of an exclusive canon, he proceeds to assume that of course there can be but ONE canon;--that there is no doubt what the dogmas contained in it are to be. He then unfolds briefly the Platonic ethical creed. "You Spartans and Kretans (he says) of course constrain your poets to proclaim that the just and temperate man is happy, whether he be tall, strong, and rich--or short, feeble, and poor: and that the bad man is wretched and lives in suffering, though he be richer than Midas, and possessor besides of every other advantage in life. Most men appreciate falsely good and evil things. They esteem as good things, health, beauty, strength, perfect sight and hearing, power, long life, immortality: they account the contrary to be bad things. But you and I take a different view. We agree in proclaiming, that all these so-called good things are good only to the just man. To the unjust man, we affirm that health, strength, perfection of senses, power, long life, &c., are not good, but exceedingly bad. This, I presume, is the doctrine which you compel your poets to proclaim, and no other--in suitable rhythm and harmony. You agree with me in this, do you not?"

"We agree with you (replies Kleinias) on some of your affirmations, but we disagree with you wholly on others."

"What? (says the Athenian.) Do you disagree with me when I affirm, that a man healthy, rich, strong, powerful, fearless, long-lived, exempt from all the things commonly reputed to be evils, but at the same time unjust and exorbitant--when I say that such a man is not happy, but miserable?"

"We do disagree with you when you affirm this," answers the Kretan.

"But will you not admit that such a man lives basely or dishonourably?"

"Basely or dishonourably.--Yes, we grant it."

"What then--do you not grant farther, that he lives badly, disagreeably, disadvantageously, to himself?"

"No. We cannot possibly grant you that,"--replies Kleinias.

"Then (says the Athenian) you and I are in marked opposition. For to me what I have affirmed appears as necessary as the existence of Krete is indisputable. If I were lawgiver, I should force the poets and all the citizens to proclaim it with one voice: and I should punish most severely every one who affirmed that there could be any wicked men who lived agreeably--or that there could be any course advantageous or profitable, which was not at the same time the most just. These and other matters equally at variance with the opinions received among Kretans, Spartans, and mankind generally--should persuade my citizens to declare unanimously.--For let us assume for a moment your opinion, and let us ask any lawgiver or any father advising his son.--You say that the just course of life is one thing, and that the agreeable course is another: I ask you which of the two is the happiest? If you say that the agreeable course is the happiest, what do you mean by always exhorting me to be just? Do you wish me not to be happy? If on the contrary you tell me that the just course of life is happier than the agreeable, I put another question--What is this Good and Beautiful which the lawgiver extols as superior to pleasure, and in which the just man's happiness consists? What good can he possess, apart from pleasure? He obtains praise and honour:--Is that good, but disagreeable--and would the contrary, infamy, be agreeable? A life in which a man neither does wrong to others nor receives wrong from others,--is that disagreeable, though good and honourable--and would the contrary life be agreeable, but dishonourable? You will not affirm that it is.

"Surely then, my doctrine--which regards the pleasurable, the just, the good, and the honourable, as indissolubly connected,--has at least a certain force of persuasion, if it has nothing more, towards inducing men to live a just and holy life: so that the lawgiver would be both base and wanting to his own purposes, if he did not proclaim it as a truth. For no one will be willingly persuaded to do anything which does not carry with it in its consequences more pleasure than pain. There is indeed confusion in every man's vision, when he looks at these consequences in distant outline: but it is the duty of the lawgiver to clear up such confusion, and to teach his citizens in the best way he can, by habits, encouraging praises, discourses, &c., how they ought to judge amidst these deceptive outlines. Injustice, when looked at thus in prospect, seems to the unjust man pleasurable, while justice seems to him thoroughly disagreeable. On the contrary, to the just man, the appearance is exactly contrary: to him justice seems pleasurable, injustice repulsive. Now which of these two judgments shall we pronounce to be the truth? That of the just man. The verdict of the better soul is unquestionably more trustworthy than that of the worse. We must therefore admit it to be a truth, that the unjust life is not merely viler and more dishonourable, but also in truth more disagreeable, than the just life."

Such is the course of proof which Plato's Athenian speaker considers sufficient to establish this ethical doctrine. But he proceeds to carry the reasoning a step farther, as follows:--

"Nay, even if this were not a true position--as I have just shown it to be--any lawgiver even of moderate worth, if ever he ventured to tell a falsehood to youth for useful purposes, could proclaim no falsehood more useful than this, nor more efficacious towards making them disposed to practise justice willingly, without compulsory force."

"Truth is honourable (observes the Kretan) and durable. You will not find it easy to make them believe what you propose."

"Why, it was found easy (replies the Athenian) to make men believe the mythe respecting Kadmus and the armed men who sprang out of the earth after the sowing of the dragon's teeth--and many other mythes equally incredible. Such examples show conclusively that the lawgiver can implant in youthful minds any beliefs which he tries to implant. He need therefore look to nothing, except to determine what are those beliefs which, if implanted, would be most beneficial to the city. Having determined this, he will employ all his machinery to make all his citizens proclaim these beliefs constantly, with one voice, and without contradiction, in all hymns, stories, and discourses."

"This brings me to my own proposition. My three Choruses (youthful, mature, elderly) will be required to sing perpetually to the tender minds of children all the honourable and good doctrines which I shall prescribe in detail. But the sum and substance of them will be--The best life has been declared by the Gods to be also the most pleasurable, and it is the most pleasurable. The whole city--man, boy, freeman, slave, male, female--will be always singing this doctrine to itself in choric songs, diversified by the poets in such manner as to keep up the interest and satisfaction of the singers."

It will be understood that here, as elsewhere, I give the substance of Plato's reasoning without binding myself to the translation of the particular words.]

Here, then, we have the general doctrine, ethical and social, which is to be maintained in exclusive possession of the voice, ear, and mind, of the Platonic citizens. The imitative movements of the tripartite Chorus must be kept in perfect accordance with it: for all music is imitative, and care must be taken to imitate the right things in a right manner. To ensure such accordance, magistrates must be specially chosen as censors over both poets and singers. But this, in Plato's view, is not enough. He requires, besides, that the choristers should themselves understand both what they ought to imitate, and how it should be imitated. Such understanding cannot be expected from the Chorus of youths nor even from that of mature men. But it may be expected, and it must be required, in the chorus of Elders: which will thus set an example to the other two, of strict adherence to the rectitude of the musical standard. The purity of the Platonic musical training depends mainly upon the constant and efficacious choric activity of the old citizens.

Aristotle directs that the elders shall be relieved from active participation in choric duties, and confined to the function of judging or criticising (Politic. viii. 6, 1340, b. 38).]

But how is such activity to be obtained? Old men will not only find it repugnant to their natural dispositions, but will even be ashamed to exhibit themselves in choric music and dance before the younger citizens.

It is here that Plato invokes the aid of wine-drinking and intoxication. The stimulus of wine, drunk by the old men at the Dionysiac banquets, will revive in them a temporary fit of something like juvenile activity, and will supply an antidote to inconvenient diffidence. Under such partial excitement, they will stand forward freely to discharge their parts in the choric exhibitions; which, as performed by them, will be always in full conformity with the canon of musical rectitude, and will prevent it from becoming corrupted or relaxed by the younger choristers. To ensure however that the excitement shall not overpass due limits, Plato prescribes that the president of the banquet shall be a grave person drinking no wine at all. The commendation or reproof of such a president will sustain the reason and self-command of the guests, at the pitch compatible with full execution of their choric duty. Plato interdicts wine altogether to youths, until 18 years of age--allows it only in small quantities until the age of 40--but permits and even encourages elders above 40 to partake of the full inspiration of the Dionysiac banquets.

This manner of regarding intoxication must probably have occurred to Plato at a time later than the composition of the Republic, wherein we find it differently handled. It deserves attention as an illustration, both of his boldness in following out his own ethical views, in spite of the consciousness that they would appear strange to others--and of the prominent function which he assigns to old men in this dialogue De Legibus. He condemns intoxication decidedly, when considered simply as a mode of enjoyment, and left to the taste of the company without any president or regulation. But with most moralists such condemnation is an unreflecting and undistinguishing sentiment. Against this Plato enters his protest. He considers that intoxication, if properly regulated, may be made conducive to valuable ends, ethical and social. Without it the old men cannot be wound up to the pitch of choric activity; without such activity, constant and unfaltering, the rectitude of the choric system has no adequate security against corruption: without such security, the emotional training of the citizens generally will degenerate. Farthermore, Plato takes occasion from drunkenness to lay down a general doctrine respecting pleasures. Men must be trained to self-command against pleasures, as they are against pains, not by keeping out of the way of temptation, but by regulated exposure to temptations, with motives at hand to help them in the task of resistance. Both these views are original and suggestive, like so many others in the Platonic writings: tending to rescue Ethics from that tissue of rhetorical and emotional commonplace in which it so frequently appears;--and to keep present before those who handle it, those ideas of an end to be attained, and of discrimination as to means--which are essential to its pretensions as a science.

But the general ethical discussion--which Plato tells us that he introduces to establish premisses for his enactment respecting drunkenness--is of greater importance than the enactment itself. He prescribes imperatively the doctrine and matter which alone is to be tolerated in his choric hymns or heard in his city. I have given an abstract (p. 292-297) of the doctrine here laid down and the reasonings connected therewith, because they admit of being placed in instructive comparison with his manner of treating the same subject in other dialogues.

What is the relation between Pleasure, Good, and Happiness? Pain, Evil, Unhappiness? Do the names in the first triplet mean substantially the same thing, only looked at in different aspects and under different conditions? Or do they mean three distinct things, separable and occurring the one without the other? This important question was much debated, and answered in many different ways, by Grecian philosophers from the time of Sokrates downward--and by Roman philosophers after them. Plato handles it not merely in the dialogue now before us, but in several others--differently too in each: in Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Philêbus, &c.

Here, in the Dialogue De Legibus (by incidental allusion, too, in some of the Epistles), we have the latest form in which these doctrines about Pleasure, Happiness, Good--and their respective contraries--found expression in Plato's compositions. Much of the doctrines is the same--yet with some material variation. It is here reasserted, by the Athenian, that the just and temperate man is happy, and that the unjust man is miserable, whatever may befall him: moreover that good things (such as health, strength, sight, hearing, &c.) are good only to the just man, evil to the unjust--while the contrary (such as sickness, weakness, blindness) are good things to the unjust, evil only to the just. To this position both the Spartan and the Kretan distinctly refuse their assent: and Plato himself admits that mankind in general would agree with them in such refusal. He vindicates his own opinion by a new argument which had not before appeared. "The just man himself" (he urges), "one who has been fully trained in just dispositions, will feel it to be as I say: the unjust man will feel the contrary. But the just man is much more trustworthy than the unjust: therefore we must believe what he says to be the truth." Appeal is here made, not to the Wise Man or Artist, but to the just man: whose sentence is invested with a self-justifying authority, wherein Plato looks for his aliquid inconcussum. Now it is for philosophy, or for the true Artist, that this pre-eminence is claimed in the Republic, where Sokrates declares, that each of the three souls combined in the individual man (the rational or philosophical, in the head--the passionate or ambitious, between the neck and the diaphragm--and the appetitive, below the diaphragm) has its special pleasures; that each prefers its own; but that the judgment of the philosophical man must be regarded as paramount over the other two. Comparing this demonstration in the Republic with the unsupported inference here noted in the Leges--we perceive the contrast of the oracular and ethical character of the latter, with the intellectual and dialectic character of the former.

Again, here in the Leges, the Athenian puts it to his two companions, Whether the unjust man, assuming him to possess every imaginable endowment and advantage in life, will not live, nevertheless, both dishonourably and miserably? They admit that he will live dishonourably: they deny that he will live miserably. The Athenian replies by reasserting emphatically his own opinion, without any attempt to prove it. Now in the Gorgias, the same issue is raised between Sokrates and Polus: Sokrates refutes his opponent by a dialectic argument, showing that if the first of the two doctrines (the living dishonourably--[Greek: ai)schrô=s]) be granted, the second (the living miserably--[Greek: kakô=s]) cannot be consistently denied. The dialectic of Sokrates is indeed more ingenious than conclusive: but still it is dialectic--and thus stands contrasted with the oracular emphasis which is substituted for it in Leges.

Farthermore, the distinction between Pleasure and Good, in the language of the Athenian speaker in the Leges, approximates more nearly to the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, than to his doctrine in the Gorgias, Philêbus, and Republic. The Athenian proclaims that he is dealing with men, and not with Gods, and that he must therefore recognise the nature of man, with its fundamental characteristics: that no man will willingly do anything from which he does not anticipate more pleasure than pain: that every man desires the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, and desires nothing else: that there neither is nor can be any Good, apart from Pleasure or superior to Pleasure: that to insist upon a man being just, if you believe that he will obtain more pleasure or less pain from an unjust mode of life, is absurd and inconsistent: that the doctrine which declares the life of pleasure and the life of justice to lead in two distinct paths, is a heresy deserving not only censure but punishment. Plato here enunciates, as distinctly as Epikurus did after him, that Pleasures and Pains must be regulated (here regulated by the lawgiver), so that each man may attain the maximum of the former with the minimum of the latter: and that Good, apart from maximum of pleasure or minimum of pain accruing to the agent himself, cannot be made consistent with the nature or aspirations of man.

In v. pp. 732 E to 734, the Athenian speaker delivers [Greek: ta\ a)nthrô/pina] of the general preface or proëm to his Laws, after having previously delivered [Greek: ta\ thei=a] (v. pp. 727-732).

There is another point too in which the Athenian speaker here recedes from the lofty pretensions of Sokrates in the Republic and the Gorgias. In the second Book of the Republic, we saw Glaukon and Adeimantus challenge Sokrates to prove that justice, apart from all its natural consequences, will suffice per se to make the just man happy; per se, that is, even though all the society misconceive his character, and render no justice to him, but heap upon him nothing except obloquy and persecution. If (Glaukon urges) you can only recommend justice when taken in conjunction with the requiting esteem and reciprocating justice from others towards the just agent, this is no recommendation of justice at all. Your argument implies a tacit admission, that it will be better still if he can pass himself off as just in the opinion of others, without really being just himself: and you must be understood as recommending to him this latter course--if he can do it successfully. Sokrates accepts the challenge, and professes to demonstrate the thesis tendered to him: which is in substance the cardinal dogma afterwards espoused by the Stoics. I have endeavoured to show (in a former chapter), that his demonstration is altogether unsuccessful: and when we turn to the Treatise De Legibus, we shall see that the Athenian speaker recedes from the doctrine altogether: confining himself to the defence of justice with its requiting and reciprocating consequences, not without them. The just man, as the Athenian speaker conceives him, is one who performs his obligations towards others, and towards whom others perform their obligations also: he is one who obtains from others that just dealing and that esteem which is his due: and when so conceived, his existence is one of pleasure and happiness. This is, in substance, the Epikurean doctrine substituted for the Stoic. It is that which Glaukon and Adeimantus in the Republic deprecate as unworthy disparagement of justice; and which they adjure Sokrates, by his attachment to justice, to stand up and repel. Now even this, the Epikurean doctrine, is true only with certain qualifications: since there are various other conditions essential to happiness, over and above the ethical conditions. Still it is not so utterly at variance with the truth as the doctrine which Sokrates undertakes to prove, but never does prove, in the Republic.

The last point which I shall here remark in this portion of the Treatise De Legibus is, the sort of mistrust manifested by Plato of the completeness of his own proof. Notwithstanding the vehement phrases in which the Athenian speaker proclaims his internal persuasion of the truth of his doctrine,** while acknowledging at the same time that not only his two companions, but most other persons also, took the opposite view--he finds it convenient to reinforce the demonstration of the expositor by the omnipotent infallibility of the lawgiver. He descends from the region of established truth to that of useful fiction. "Even if the doctrine (that the pleasurable, the just, the good, and the honourable, are indissoluble) were not true, the lawgiver ought to adopt it as an useful fiction for youth, effective towards inducing them to behave justly without compulsion. The law giver can obtain belief for any fiction which he pleases to circulate, as may be seen by the implicit belief obtained for the Theban mythe about the dragon's teeth, and a thousand other mythes equally difficult of credence. He must proclaim the doctrine as an imperative article of faith; carefully providing that it shall be perpetually recited, by one and all his citizens, in the public hymns, narratives, and discourses, without any voice being heard to call it in question."

Here is a second attempt on the part of Plato, in addition to that which we have seen in the Republic, to employ deliberate ethical fiction as a means of governing his citizens: first to implant and accredit it--next to prescribe its incessant iteration by all the citizens in the choric ceremonies--lastly to consecrate it, and to forbid all questioners or opponents: all application of the Sokratic Elenchus to test it. In this treatise he speaks of the task as easier to the lawgiver than he had described it to be in his Republic: in which latter we found him regarding a new article of faith as difficult to implant, but as easy to uphold if once it be implanted; while in the Treatise De Legibus both processes are treated as alike achievable and certain. The conception of dogmatic omnipotence had become stronger in Plato's mind during the interval between the two treatises. Intending to postulate for himself the complete regulation not merely of the actions, but also of the thoughts and feelings of his citizens--intending moreover to exclude free or insubordinate intellects--he naturally looks upon all as docile recipients of any faith which he thinks it right to preach. When he appeals, however, as proofs of the facility of his plan, to the analogy of the numerous mythes received with implicit faith throughout the world around him--we see how low an estimate he formed of the process whereby beliefs are generated in the human mind, and of their evidentiary value as certifying the truth of what is believed. People believed what was told them at first by some imposing authority, and transmitted the belief to their successors, even without the extraneous support of inquisitorial restrictions such as the Platonic lawgiver throws round the Magnêtic community in the Leges. It is in reference to such self-supporting beliefs that Sokrates stands forth, in the earlier Platonic compositions, as an enquirer into the reasons on which they rested--a task useful as well as unpleasant to those whom he questioned--attracting unpopularity as well as reputation to himself. Plato had then keenly felt the inestimable value of this Elenchus or examining function personified in his master; but in the Treatise De Legibus the master has no place, and the function is severely proscribed. Plato has come round to the dogmatic pole, extolling the virtue of passive recipient minds who have no other sentiment than that which the lawgiver issues to them. Yet while he postulates in his own city the infallible authority of the lawgiver, and enforces it by penalties, as final and all-sufficient to determine the ethical beliefs of all the Platonic citizens--we shall find in a subsequent book of this Treatise that he denounces and punishes those who generalise this very postulate; and who declare the various ethical beliefs, actually existing in communities of men, to have been planted each by some human authority--not to have sprung from any unseen oracle called Nature.

Such is the ethical doctrine which Plato proclaims in the Leges, and which he directs to be sung by each Chorus among the three (boys, men, elders), with appropriate music and dancing. It is on the constancy, strictness, and sameness of these choric and musical influences, that he relies for the emotional training of youth. If the musical training be either intermitted or allowed to vary from the orthodox canon--if the theatrical exhibitions be regulated by the taste of the general audience, and not by the judgment of a few discerning censors--the worst consequences will arise: the character of the citizens will degenerate, and the institutions of his city will have no foundation to rest upon. The important effects of music, as an instrument in the hands of the lawgiver for regulating the emotions of the citizens, and especially for inspiring a given emotional character to youth--are among the characteristic features of Plato's point of view, common to both the Republic and the Laws. There is little trace of this point of view either in Xenophon or in Isokrates; but Aristotle embraces it to a considerable extent. It grew out of the practice and tradition of the Grecian cities, in most of which the literary teaching of youth was imparted by making them read, learn, recite, or chaunt the works of various poets; while the use of the lyre was also taught, together with regulated movements in the dance. The powerful ethical effect of musical teaching (even when confined to the simplest choric psalmody and dance), enforced by perpetual drill both of boys and men, upon the unlettered Arcadians--may be seen recognised even by a practical politician like Polybius, who considers it indispensable for the softening of violent and sanguinary tempers: the diversity of the effect, according to the different modes of music employed, is noted by Aristotle, and was indeed matter of common repute. Plato, as lawgiver, postulates poetry and music of his own dictation. He relies upon constant supplies of this wholesome nutriment, for generating in the youth such emotional dispositions and habits as will be in harmony, both with the doctrines which he preaches, and with the laws which he intends to impose upon them as adults. Here (as in Republic and Timæus) he proclaims that the perfection of character consists in willing obedience or harmonious adjustment of the pleasures and pains, the desires and aversions, to the paramount authority of reason or wisdom--or to the rational conviction of each individual as to what is good and honourable. If, instead of obedience and harmony, there be discord--if the individual, though rationally convinced that a proceeding is just and honourable, nevertheless hates it--or if, while convinced that a proceeding is unjust and dishonourable, he nevertheless loves it--such discord is the worst state of stupidity or mental incompetence. We must recollect that (according to the postulate of Treatise De Legibus) the rational convictions of each individual, respecting what is just and honourable, are assumed to be accepted implicitly from the lawgiver, and never called in question by any one. There exists therefore only one individual reason in the community--that of the lawgiver, or Plato himself.

Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.

See the remarkable contention between Æschylus and Euripides in Aristophan. Ran. 876 seq., about the function and comparative excellence of poets (also Nubes, 955). Aristophanes, comparing Æschylus with Euripides, denounces music as having degenerated, and poetry as having been corrupted, at Athens. So far he agrees with Plato; but he ascribes this corruption in a great degree to the conversation of Euripides with Sokrates (Ranæ, 1487); and here Plato would not have gone along with him--at least not when Plato composed his earlier dialogues--though the [Greek: ê)=thos] of the Treatise De Legibus is in harmony with this sentiment. Polybius cites, with some displeasure, the remark of the historian Ephorus, who asserted that musical teaching was introduced among men for purposes of cheating and mystification--[Greek: e)p' a)pa/tê| kai\ goêtei/a| pareiskê=chthai toi=s a)nthrô/pois, ou)damô=s a(rmo/zonta lo/gon au)tô=| r(i/psas] (iv. 20). Polybius considers this an unbecoming criticism.]

The ethical and emotional effects conveyed by the sense of hearing, and distinguishing it from the other senses, are noticed in the Problemata of Aristotle, xix. 27-29, pp. 919-920.]

Besides all the ethical prefatory matter, above noticed, Plato gives us also some historical and social prefatory matter, not essential to his constructive scheme (which after all takes its start partly from theoretical principles laid down by himself, partly from a supposed opportunity of applying those principles in the foundation of a new colony), but tending to illustrate the growth of political society, and the abuses into which it naturally tends to lapse. There existed in his time a great variety of distinct communities: some in the simplest, most patriarchal, Cyclopian condition, nothing more than families--some highly advanced in civilization, with its accompanying good and evil--some in each intermediate stage between these two extremes.--The human race (Plato supposes) has perhaps had no beginning, and will have no end. At any rate it has existed from an indefinite antiquity, subject to periodical crises, destructive kosmical outbursts, deluges, epidemic distempers, &c. A deluge, when it occurs, sweeps away all the existing communities with their property, arts, instruments, &c., leaving only a small remnant, who, finding shelter on the top of some high mountain not covered with water, preserve only their lives. Society, he thinks, has gone through a countless number of these cycles. At the end of each, when the deluge recedes, each associated remnant has to begin its development anew, from the rudest and poorest condition. Each little family or sept exists at first separately, with a patriarch whom all implicitly obey, and peculiar customs of its own. Several of these septs gradually coalesce together into one community, choosing one or a few lawgivers to adjust and modify their respective customs into harmonious order, and submitting implicitly to the authority of such chosen few. By successive coalitions of this kind, operated in a vast length of time, large cities are gradually formed on the plain and on the seaboard. Property and public force is again accumulated; together with letters, arts, and all the muniments of life.

Such is the idea which Plato here puts forth of the natural genesis and development of human society. Having thus arrived at the formation of considerable cities with powerful military armaments, he carries us into the midst of Hellenic legend--the Trojan War, the hostile reception which the victorious heroes found on their return to Greece after the siege, the Return of the Herakleids to Peloponnesus, and the establishment of the three Herakleid brethren, Têmenus, Kresphontês, Aristodêmus, as kings of Argos, Messênê, and Sparta. The triple Herakleid kingdom was originally founded (he affirms) as a mode of uniting and consolidating the force of Hellas against the Asiatics, who were eager to avenge the capture of Troy. It received strong promises of permanence, both from prophets and from the Delphian oracle. But these hopes were frustrated by misconduct on the part of the kings of Argos and Messênê: who, being youths destitute of presiding reason, and without external checks, obeyed the impulse of unmeasured ambition, oppressed their subjects, and broke down their own power.

To conduct a political community well is difficult; for there are inherent causes of discord and sedition which can only be neutralised in their effects, but can never be eradicated. Among the foremost of these inherent causes, Plato numbers the many distinct and conflicting titles to obedience which are found among mankind, all co-existent and co-ordinate. There are seven such titles, all founded in the nature of man and the essential conditions of society:--1. Parents over children. 2. Men of high birth and breed (such as the Herakleids at Sparta) over men of low birth. 3. Old over young. 4. Masters over slaves. 5. The stronger man over the weaker. 6. The wiser man over the man destitute of wisdom. 7. The fortunate man, who enjoys the favour of the Gods (one case of this is indicated by drawing of the best lot), over the less fortunate man (who draws an inferior lot).

Of these seven titles to command, coexisting, distinct, and conflicting with each other, Plato pronounces the sixth--that of superior reason and wisdom--to be the greatest, preferable to all the rest, in his judgment: though he admits the fifth--that of superior force to be the most extensively prevalent in the actual world.

This enumeration by Plato of seven distinct and conflicting [Greek: a)xiô/mata tou= a)/rchein kai\ a)/rchesthai], deserves notice in many ways. All the seven are natural: nature is considered as including multifarious and conflicting titles (compare Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 6, 21), and therefore as not furnishing in itself any justification or ground of preference for one above the rest. The [Greek: a)xi/ôma] of superior force is just as natural as the [Greek: a)xi/ôma] of superior wisdom, though Plato himself pronounces the latter to be the greatest; that is--greatest, not [Greek: phu/sei] but [Greek: no/mô|] or [Greek: te/chnê|], according to his own rational and deliberate estimation. Plato is not uniform in this view, for he uses elsewhere the phrases [Greek: phu/sei] and [Greek: kata\ phu/sin] as if they specially and exclusively belonged to that which he approves, and furnished a justification for it (see Legg. x. pp. 889-890, besides the Republic and the Gorgias). Again the lot, or the process of sortition, is here described as carrying with it both the preference of the Gods and the principles of justice ([Greek: to\ dikaio/taton ei)=nai/ phamen]). The Gods determine upon whom the lot should fall--compare Homer, Iliad, vii. 179. This is a remarkable view of the lot, and represents a feeling much diffused among the ancient democracies.

The relation of master and slave counts, in Plato's view, among the natural relations, with its consequent rights and obligations.

The force of [Greek: eu)tuchi/a], as a title to command, is illustrated in the speech addressed by Alkibiades to the Athenian assembly. Thucyd. vi. 16-17: he allows it even in his competitor Nikias--[Greek: a)ll' e(/ôs te e)/ti a)kma/zô met' au)tê=s kai\ o( Niki/as eu)tuchê\s dokei= ei)=nai, a)pochrê/sasthe tê=| e(kate/rou ê(mô=n ô)pheli/a.] Compare also the language of Nikias himself in his own last speech under the extreme distress of the Athenian army in Sicily, Thucyd. vii. 77.

In the Politikus (p. 293 and elsewhere) Plato admits no [Greek: a)xi/ôma tou= a)/rchein] as genuine or justifiable, except Science, Art, superior wisdom, in one or a few Artists of governing; the same in Republic, v. p. 474 C, respecting what he there calls [Greek: philosophi/a].]

Plato thinks it imprudent to found the government of society upon any one of these seven titles singly and separately. He requires that each one of them shall be checked and modified by the conjoint operation of others. Messênê and Argos were depraved and ruined by the single principle: while Sparta was preserved and exalted by a mixture of different elements. The kings of Argos and Messênê, irrational youths with nothing to restrain them (except oaths, which they despised), employed their power to abuse and mischief. Such was the consequence of trusting to the exclusive title of high breed, embodied in one individual person. But Apollo and Lykurgus provided better for Sparta. They softened regal insolence by establishing the double line of co-ordinate kings: they introduced the title of old age, along with that of high breed, by founding the Senate of twenty-eight elders: they farther introduced the title of sortition, or something near it, by nominating the annual Ephors. The mixed government of Sparta was thus made to work for good, while the unmixed systems of Argos and Messênê both went wrong. Both the two latter states were in perpetual war with Sparta, so as to frustrate that purpose--union against Asiatics--with a view to which the triple Herakleid kingdom was originally erected in Peloponnesus. Had each of these three kingdoms been temperately and moderately governed, like Sparta, so as to maintain unimpaired the projected triple union--the Persian invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes would never have taken place.

Such is the way in which Plato casts the legendary event, called the Return of the Herakleids, into accordance with a political theory of his own. That event, in his view, afforded the means of uniting Hellas internally, and of presenting such a defensive combination as would have deterred all invasions from Asia, if only the proper principles of legislation and government had been understood and applied. The lesson to be derived from this failure is, that we ought not to concentrate great authority in one hand; and that we ought to blend together several principles of authority, instead of resorting to the exclusive action of one alone. This lesson deserves attention, as a portion of political theory; but I feel convinced that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides would have concurred in Plato's historical views. Neither of them would have admitted the disunion between Sparta, Argos, and Messênê as a main cause of the Persian invasion of Greece.

Plato here affirms not only that Messênê and Argos were and had been constantly at war with Sparta, but that they were so at the time of the Persian invasion of Greece--and that Messênê thus hindered the Spartans from assisting the Athenians at Marathon, pp. 692 E, 698 E. His statement that Argos was at least neutral, if not treacherous and philo-Persian, during the invasion of Xerxes, is coincident with Herodotus; but not so his statement that the Lacedæmonians were kept back by the war against Messênê. Indeed at that time the Messenians had no separate domicile or independent station in Peloponnesus. They had been conquered by Sparta long before, and their descendants in the same territory were Helots (Thucyd. i. 101). It is true that there always existed struggling remnants of expatriated Messenians, who maintained the name, and whom Athens protected and favoured during the Peloponnesian war; but there was no independent Messenian government in Peloponnesus until the foundation of the city of Messênê by Epaminondas in 369 B.C., two years after the battle of Leuktra: there had never been any city of that name in the Peloponnesus before.

Now Plato wrote his Treatise De Legibus after the foundation of this city of Messênê and the re-establishment of an independent Messenian community in Peloponnesus. The new city was peopled partly by returning Messenian exiles, partly by enfranchised Helots. It is probable enough that both these classes might be disposed to disguise (as far as they could) the past period of servitude--and to represent the Messenian name and community as never having been wholly effaced in the neighbourhood of Ithômê, though always struggling against an oppressive neighbour. Traditions of this tenor would become current, and Plato has adopted one of them in his historical sketch.

If we look back to what Plato says about the Kretan prophet Epimenides, we shall see that here too he must have followed erroneous traditions. He makes Epimenides contemporary with the invasion of Greece by Darius, instead of contemporary with the Kylonian sacrilege (B.C. 612). When a prophet had got reputation, a great many new prophecies were fathered upon him (as upon Bakis and Musæus) with very little care about chronological consistency. Plato may well have been misled by one of these fictions (Legg. i. p. 642, iii. p. 677).]

A lesson--analogous, though not exactly the same--is derived by Plato from the comparison of the Persian with the Athenian government. Persia presents an excess of despotism: Athens an excess of liberty. There are two distinct primordial forms of government--mother-polities, Plato calls them--out of which all existing governments may be said to have been generated or diversified. One of these is monarchy, of which the Persians manifest the extreme: the other is democracy, of which Athens manifests the extreme. Both extremes are mischievous. The wise law-giver must blend and combine the two together in proper proportion. Without such combination, he cannot attain good government, with its three indispensable constituents--freedom, intelligence or temperance, and mutual attachment among the citizens.

The Persians, according to Plato, at the time when they made their conquests under Cyrus, were not despotically governed, but enjoyed a fair measure of freedom under a brave and patriotic military chief, who kept the people together in mutual attachment. But Cyrus, though a great military chief, had neither received a good training himself, nor knew how to secure it for his own sons. He left them to be educated by the women in the harem, where they were brought up with unmeasured indulgence, acquiring nothing but habits of insolence and caprice. Kambyses became a despot; and after committing great enormities, was ultimately deprived of empire by Smerdis and the Medians. Darius, not a born prince, but an usurper, renovated the Persian empire, and ruled it with as much ability and moderation as Cyrus. But he made the same mistake as Cyrus, in educating his sons in the harem. His son Xerxes became thoroughly corrupted, and ruled despotically. The same has been the case with all the successive kings, all brought up as destined for the sceptre, and morally ruined by a wretched education. The Persian government has been nothing but a despotism ever since Darius. All freedom of action or speech has been extinguished, and the mutual attachment among the subjects exists no more.

I think it very probable that these words are intended to record Plato's dissent from the [Greek: Ku/rou Paidei/a] of Xenophon. Aulus Gellius (xiv. 3) had read that Xenophon composed the Cyropædia in opposition to the two first books of the Platonic Republic, and that between Xenophon and Plato there existed a grudge (simultas) or rivalry; so also Athenæus, xi. p. 504. It is possible that this may have been the case but no evidence is produced to prove it. Both of them selected Sokrates as the subject of their descriptions; in so far there may have been a literary competition between them: and various critics seem to have presumed that there could not be æmulatio without simultas. Each of them composed a Symposion for the purpose of exhibiting Sokrates in his joyous moments. The differences between the two handlings are interesting to notice; but the evidences which some authors produce, to show that Xenophon in his Symposion alluded to the Symposion of Plato, are altogether uncertain. See the Preface of Schneider to his edition of the Xenophontic Symposion, and his extract from Cornarius.]

While the Persian government thus exhibits despotism in excess, that of Athens exhibits the contrary mischief--liberty in excess. This has been the growth of the time subsequent to the Persian invasion. At the time when that invasion occurred, the government of Athens was an ancient constitution with a quadruple scale of property, according to which scale political privilege and title to office were graduated: while the citizens generally were then far more reverential to authority, and obedient to the laws, than they are now. Moreover, the invasion itself, being dangerous and terrific in the extreme, was enough to make them obedient and united among themselves, for their own personal safety. But after the invasion had been repelled, the government became altered. The people acquired a great increase of political power, assumed habits of independence and self-judgment, and became less reverential both to the magistrates and to the laws.

The first department in which this change was wrought at Athens was the department of music: from whence it gradually extended itself to the general habits of the people. Before the invasion, Music had been distributed, according to ancient practice and under the sanction of ancient authority, under four fixed categories--Hymns, Dirges, Pæans, Dithyrambs. The ancient canons in regard to each were strictly enforced: the musical exhibitions were superintended, and the prizes adjudged by a few highly-trained elders: while the general body of citizens listened in respectful silence, without uttering a word of acclamation, or even conceiving themselves competent to judge what they heard. Any manifestations on their part were punished by blows from the sticks of the attendants. But this docile submission of the Athenians to authority became gradually overthrown, after the repulse of the Persians, first in the theatre, next throughout all social and political life. The originators of this corruption were the poets: men indeed of poetical genius, but ignorant of the ethical purpose which their compositions ought to aim at, as well as of the rightful canons by which they ought to be guided and limited. These poets, looking to the pleasure of the audience as their true and only standard, exhibited pieces in which all the old musical distinctions were confounded together--hymns with dirges, the pæan with the dithyramb, and the flute with the harp. To such irregular rhythm and melody, words equally irregular were adapted. The poet submitted his compositions to the assembled audience, appealing to them as competent judges, and practically declaring them to be such. The audience responded to the appeal. Acclamation in the theatre was substituted for silence; and the judgment of the people became paramount instead of that pronounced by the enlightened few according to antecedent custom. Hence the people--having once shaken off the reverence for authority, and learnt to exercise their own judgment, in the theatre--began speedily to do the same on other matters also. They fancied themselves wise enough to decide everything for themselves, and contracted a shameless disregard for the opinion of better and wiser men. An excessive measure of freedom was established, tending in its ultimate consequences to an anarchical or Titanic nature: indifferent to magistrates, laws, parents, elders, covenants, oaths, and the Gods themselves.

The testimony here given by Plato respecting the practice of his own time is curious and deserves notice: respecting the practice of the times anterior to the Persian invasion he could have had no means of accurate knowledge.]

The phrase here employed by Plato affirms inferential tendencies--not facts realised. How much of the tendencies had passed into reality at Athens, he leaves to the imagination of his readers to supply. It is curious to contrast the faithless and lawless character of Athens, here insinuated by Plato--with the oration of Demosthenes adv. Leptinem (delivered B.C. 355, near upon the time when the Platonic Leges were composed), where the main argument which the orator brings to bear upon the Dikasts, emphatically and repeatedly, to induce them to reject the proposition of Leptines, is--[Greek: to\ tê=s po/leôs ê)=thos a)pseude\s kai\ chrêsto/n, ou) to\ lusitele/staton pro\s a)rgu/rion skopou=n, a)lla/ ti kai\ kalo\n pra=xai] (p. 461) . . . [Greek: ou)d' o( plei=stos lo/gos e)/moige peri\ tê=s a)telei/as e)/stin, a)ll' u(pe\r tou= ponêro\n e)/thos ei)sa/gein to\n no/mon, kai\ toiou=ton di' ou)= pant' a)/pist' o(/sa o( dê=mos di/dôsin e)/stai], also pp. 500-507, and indeed throughout nearly the whole oration. So also in the other discourses, not only of Demosthenes but of the other orators also--good faith, public and private, and respectful obedience to the laws, are constantly invoked as primary and imperative necessities.

Indeed, in order to find a contradiction to the picture here presented by Plato, of Athenian tendencies since the Persian war, we need not go farther than Plato himself. We have only to read the Menexenus, wherein he professes to describe and panegyrise the achievements of Athens during that very period which he paints in such gloomy colours in the Leges--the period succeeding the Persian invasion. Who is to believe that the people, upon whose virtue he pronounces these encomiums, had thrown off all reverence for good faith, obligation, and social authority? As for the [Greek: Titanikê\ phu/sis], to which Plato represents the Athenians as approximating, the analogy is principally to be found in the person of the Titan Promêtheus, with his philanthropic disposition (see Plato, Menexenus, pp. 243 E, 244 E), and the beneficent suggestions which he imparted to mankind in the way of science and art (Æschyl. Prom. 440-507--[Greek: Pa=sai te/chnai brotoi=sin e)k Promêthe/ôs]).]

The opinion here expressed by Plato--that the political constitution of Athens was too democratical, and that the changes (effected by Perikles and others during the half century succeeding the Persian invasion) whereby it had been rendered more democratical, were mischievous--was held by him in common with a respectable and intelligent minority at Athens. That minority had full opportunity of expressing their disapprobation--as we may see by the language of Plato himself; though he commends the Spartans for not allowing any such opportunity to dissenters at Sparta, and expressly prohibits any open expression of dissent in his own community. But his assertion, that the deterioration at Athens was introduced and originated by an innovation in the established canon of music and poetry--is more peculiarly his own. The general doctrine of the powerful revolutionising effect wrought by changes in the national music, towards subverting the political constitution, was adopted by him from the distinguished musical teacher Damon, the contemporary and companion of Perikles. The fear of such danger to the national institutions is said to have operated on the authorities at Sparta, when they forbade the musical innovations of the poet Timotheus, and destroyed the four new strings which he had just added to the established seven strings of his lyre.

Cicero agrees with Plato as to the mischievous tendency of changes in the national music.]

Of this general doctrine, however, Plato makes a particular application in the passage now before us, which he would have found few Athenians, either oligarchical or democratical, to ratify. What he really condemns is, the tragic and comic poetical representations at Athens, which began to acquire importance only after the Persian war, and continued to increase in importance for the next half century. The greatest revolution which Grecian music and poetry ever underwent was that whereby Attic tragedy and comedy were first constituted:--built up by distinguished poets from combination and enlargement of the simpler pre-existent forms--out of the dithyrambic and phallic choruses. The first who imparted to tragedy its grand development and its special novelty of character was Æschylus--a combatant at Marathon as well as one of the greatest among ancient poets: after him, Sophokles carried improvement still further. It is them that Plato probably means, when he speaks of the authors of this revolution as men of true poetical genius, but ignorant of the lawful purpose of the Muse--as authors who did not recognise any rightful canon of music, nor any end to be aimed at beyond the emotional satisfaction of a miscellaneous audience. The abundance of dramatic poetry existing in Plato's time must have been prodigious (a few choice specimens only have descended to us):--while its variety of ingredients and its popularity outshone those four ancient and simple manifestations, which alone he will tolerate as legitimate. He censures the innovations of Æschylus and Sophokles as a deplorable triumph of popular preference over rectitude of standard and purpose. He tacitly assumes--what Aristotle certainly does not believe, and what, so far as I can see, there is no ground for believing--that the earlier audience were passive, showing no marks of favour or disfavour: and that the earlier poets had higher aims, adapting their compositions to the judgment of a wise few, and careless about giving satisfaction to the general audience. This would be the practice in the Platonic city, but it never was the practice at Athens. We may surely presume that Æschylus stood distinguished from his predecessors not by desiring popularity more, but by greater success in attaining it: and that he attained it partly from his superior genius, partly from increasing splendour in the means of exhibition at Athens. The simpler early compositions had been adapted to the taste of the audience who heard them, and gave satisfaction for the time; until the loftier genius of Æschylus and the other great constructive dramatists was manifested.

The ethical repugnance expressed by Plato against the many-sided and deceptive spirit of tragic and comic compositions, is also expressed in the censure said to have been pronounced by Solon against Thespis, when the latter first produced his dramas (Plutarch, Solon, 29; Diog. Laert. i. 59).]

However Plato--while he tolerates no poetry except in so far as it produces ethical correction or regulation of the emotions, and blames as hurtful the poet who simply touches or kindles emotion--is in a peculiar manner averse to dramatic poetry, with its diversity of assumed characters and its obligation of giving speech to different points of view. His aversion had been exhibited before, both in the Republic and in the Gorgias: but it reappears here in the Treatise De Legibus, with this aggravating feature--that the revolution in music and poetry is represented as generating cause of a deteriorated character and an ultra-democratical polity of Athens. This (as I have before remarked) is a sentiment peculiar to Plato. For undoubtedly, oligarchical politicians (such as Thucydides, Nikias, Kritias), who agreed with him in disliking the democracy, would never have thought of ascribing what they disliked to such a cause as alteration in the Athenian music and poetry. They would much more have agreed with Aristotle, when he attributes the important change both in the character and polity of the Athenian people after the Persian invasion, to the events of that invasion itself--to the heroic and universal efforts made by the citizens, on shipboard as well as on land, against the invading host--and to the necessity for continuing those efforts by organising the confederacy of Delos. Hence arose a new spirit of self-reliance and enterprise--or rather an intensification of what had already begun after the expulsion of Hippias and the reform by Kleisthenes--which rendered the previous constitutional forms too narrow to give satisfaction. The creation of new and grander forms of poetry may fairly be looked upon as one symptom of this energetic general outburst: but it is in no way a primary or causal fact, as Plato wishes us to believe. Nor can Plato himself have supposed it to be so, at the time when he composed his Menexenus: wherein the events of the post-Xerxeian period are presented in a light very different from that in which he viewed them when he wrote his Leges--presented with glowing commendations on his countrymen.

Aristotle takes a view of tragedy quite opposed to that of Plato: he considers it as calculated to purge or purify the emotions of fear, compassion, &c. (Aristot. Poet. c. 13. Compare Politic. viii. 7, 9). Unfortunately the Poetica exist only as a fragment, so that his doctrine about [Greek: ka/tharsis] is only declared and not fully developed.

Rousseau (in his Lettre à d'Alembert Sur les Spectacles, p. 33 seq.) impugns this doctrine of Aristotle, and condemns theatrical representations, partly with arguments similar to those of Plato, partly with others of his own.]

The long ethical prefatory matter which we have gone through, includes these among other doctrines--1. That the life of justice, and the life of pleasure, are essentially coincident. 2. That Reason, as declared by the lawgiver, ought to controul all our passions and emotions. 3. That intoxication, under certain conditions, is an useful stimulus to elderly men. 4. That the political constitution of society ought not to be founded upon one single principle of authority, but upon a combination of several. 5. That the extreme of liberty, and the extreme of despotism, are both bad.

Of these five positions, the two first are coincident with the doctrines of the Republic: the third is not coincident compared with them, but indirectly in opposition to them: the fourth and fifth put Plato on a standing point quite different from that of the Republic, and different also from that of the Xenophontic Cyropædia. In the Cyropædia, all government is strictly personal: the subjects both obey willingly, and are rendered comfortable because of the supreme and manifold excellence of one person--their chief, Cyrus--in every department of practical administration, civil as well as military. In the Platonic Republic, the government is also personal: to this extent--that Plato provides neither political checks, nor magistrates, nor laws, nor judicature: but aims only at the perfect training of the Guardians, and the still more elaborate and philosophical training of those few chief or elder Guardians, who are to direct the rest. He demands only a succession of these philosophers, corresponding to the regal Artist sketched in the Politikus: and he leaves all ulterior directions to them. Upon their perfect dispositions and competence, all the weal or woe of the community depends. All is personal government; but it is lodged in the hands of a few philosophers, assumed to be super-excellent, like the one chief in the Xenophontic Cyropædia. When however we come to the Leges, we find that Plato ceases to presume upon such supreme personal excellence. He drops it as something beyond the limit of human attainment, and as fit only for the golden or Saturnian age. He declares that power, without adequate restraints, is a privilege with which no man can be trusted. Nevertheless the magistrates must be vested with sufficient power: since excess of liberty is equally dangerous. To steer between these two rocks, you want not only a good despot but a sagacious lawgiver. It is he who must construct a constitutional system, having regard to the various natural foundations of authority in the minds of the citizens. He must provide fixed laws, magistrates, and a competent judicature: moreover, both the magistrates and the judicature must be servants of the law, and nothing beyond. The lawgiver must frame his laws with single-minded view, not to the happiness of any separate section of the city, but to that of the whole. He must look to the virtue of the whole, in its most comprehensive sense, and to all good things, ranked in their triple subordination and their comparative value--that is, First, the good things belonging to the mind--Secondly, Those belonging to the body--Thirdly, Wealth and External acquisitions.

We now enter upon this constructive effort of Plato's old age. That a political constitution with fixed laws (he makes the Athenian say) and with magistrates acting merely as servants of the laws, is the only salvation for a city and its people--this is a truth which every man sees most distinctly in his old age, though when younger he was very dull in discerning it. Probably enough what we here read represents the change in Plato's own mind: the acquisition of a new point of view, which was not present to him when he composed his Republic and his Politikus.

Compare vii. pp. 819 D-821 D, for marks of Plato's old age and newly acquired opinions.]

Here the exposition assumes a definite shape. The Kretan Kleinias apprises his Athenian companion, that the Knossians with other Kretans are about to establish a new colony on an unsettled point in Krete; and that himself with nine others are named commissioners for framing and applying the necessary regulations. He invites the co-operation of the Athenian: who accordingly sets himself to the task of suggesting such laws and measures as are best calculated to secure the march of the new Magnetic settlement towards the great objects defined in the preceding programme.

The new city is to be about nine English miles from the sea. The land round it is rough, poor, and without any timber for shipbuilding; but it is capable of producing all supplies absolutely indispensable, so that little need will be felt of importation from abroad. The Athenian wishes that the site were farther from the sea. Yet he considers the general conditions to be tolerably good; inasmuch as the city need not become commercial and maritime, and cannot have the means of acquiring much gold and silver--which is among the greatest evils that can befall a city, since it corrupts justice and goodness in the citizens. The settlers are all Greeks, from various towns of Krete and Peloponnesus. This (remarks the Athenian) is on the whole better than if they came from one single city. Though it may introduce some additional chance of discord, it will nevertheless render them more open-minded and persuadable for the reception of new institutions.

The colonists being supposed to be assembled in their new domicile and ready for settlement, Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, addresses to them a solemn exhortation, inculcating piety towards the Gods, celestial and subterranean, as well as to the Dæmons and Heroes--and also reverence to parents. He then intimates that, though he does not intend to consult the settlers on the acceptance or rejection of laws, but assumes to himself the power of prescribing such laws as he thinks best for them--he nevertheless will not content himself with promulgating his mandates in a naked and peremptory way. He will preface each law with a proëm or prologue (i.e. a string of preliminary recommendations): in order to predispose their minds favourably, and to obtain from them a willing obedience. He will employ not command only, but persuasion along with or antecedent to command: as the physician treats his patients when they are freemen, not as he sends his slaves to treat slave-patients, with a simple compulsory order. To begin with an introductory proëm or prelude, prior to the announcement of the positive law, is (he says) the natural course of proceeding. It is essential to all artistic vocal performances: it is carefully studied and practised both by the rhetor and the musician. Yet in spite of this analogy, no lawgiver has ever yet been found to prefix proëms to his laws: every one has contented himself with issuing peremptory commands. Here then Plato undertakes to set the example of prefixing such prefatory introductions. The nature of the case would prescribe that every law, every speech, every song, should have its suitable proëm: but such prolixity would be impolitic. A discretion must be entrusted to the lawgiver, as it is to the orator and the musician. Proëms or prologues must be confined to the great and important laws.

The [Greek: prooi/mia dêmêgorika/] of Demosthenes are well known.]

Accordingly, from hence to the end of the Treatise De Legg., Plato proceeds upon the principle here laid down. He either prefixes a prologue to each of his laws--or blends the law with its proëm--or gives what may be called a proëm without a law, that is a string of hortatory or comminatory precepts. There are various points (he says) on which the lawgiver cannot propose any distinct and peremptory enactment, but must confine himself to emphatic censure and declaration of opinion, with threats of displeasure on the part of the Gods: the rather as he cannot hope to accomplish his public objects, without the largest interference with private habits--nor without bringing his regulations to bear upon individual life, where positive law can hardly reach. The Platonic prologues are sometimes expositions of the reasons of the law--i. e. of the dangers which it is intended to ward off, or the advantages to be secured by it. But far more frequently, they are morsels of rhetoric--lectures, discourses, or homilies--addressed to the emotions and not to the reason, insisting on the ethical and religious point of view, and destined to operate with persuasive or intimidating effect upon an uninstructed multitude.

It seems that Plato took credit to himself for what he thought a beneficial innovation, in thus blending persuasive exhortation with compulsory command. His assurance, that no Grecian lawgiver had ever done so before, is doubtless trustworthy: though we may remark that the confusion of the two has been the general rule with Oriental lawgivers--the Hindoos, the Jews, the Mahommedan Arabs, &c. But with him the innovation serves a farther purpose. He makes it the means of turning rhetoric to account; and of enlisting in his service, as lawgiver, not only all the rhetoric but all the poetry, in his community. His Athenian speaker is so well satisfied with these prologues, that he considers them to possess the charm of a poetical work, and suspects them to have been dictated by inspiration from the Gods. He pronounces them the best and most suitable compositions for the teaching of youth, and therefore prescribes that teachers shall cause the youth to recite and learn them, instead of the poetical and rhetorical works usually employed. He farther enjoins that his prologues shall serve as type and canon whereby all other poetical and rhetorical compositions shall be tried. If there be any compositions in full harmony and analogy with this type, the teachers shall be compelled to learn them by heart, and teach them to pupils. Any teacher refusing to do so shall be dismissed. Nor shall any poet be allowed to compose and publish works containing sentiments contradictory to the declaration of the lawgiver.

Cicero read the proëms ascribed to Zaleukus and Charondas as genuine (Legg. ii. 6); so did Diodôrus, xii. 17-20; Stobæus, Serm. xlii.]

As a contrast to this view of Plato in his later years, it is interesting to turn to that which he entertained in an earlier part of his life, in the Gorgias and the Phædrus, respecting rhetoric. In the former dialogue, Gorgias is recognised as a master of the art of persuasion, especially as addressed to a numerous audience, and respecting ethical questions, What is just, and what is unjust? Sokrates, on the contrary, pointedly distinguishes persuasion from teaching--discredits simple persuasion, without teaching, as merely deceptive--and contends that rhetorical discourse addressed to a multitude, upon such topics, can never convey any teaching. But in the Leges we find that the art of persuasion has risen greatly in Plato's estimation. Whether it be a true art, or a mere unartistic knack, he now recognises its efficacy in modifying the dispositions of the uninstructed multitude, and announces himself to be the first lawgiver who will employ it systematically for that purpose. He combines the seductions of the rhetor with the unpalatable severities of the lawgiver: the two distinct functions of Gorgias and his brother the physician Herodikus, when Gorgias accompanied his brother to visit suffering patients, and succeeded by force of rhetoric in overcoming their repugnance to the cutting and burning indispensable for cure. Again, in the Phædrus, Plato treats the art of persuasion, when applied at once to a mixed assemblage of persons, either by writing or discourse, as worthless and unavailing. He affirms that it makes no durable impression on the internal mind of the individuals: the same discourse will never suit all. Individuals differ materially in their cast of mind; moreover, they differ in opinion upon ethical topics (just and unjust) more than upon any other. Some men are open to persuasion by topics which will have no effect on others. Accordingly, you must go through a laborious discrimination: first, you must discriminate generally the various classes of minds and the various classes of discourse--next, you must know to which classes of minds the individuals of the multitude before you belong. You must then address to each mind the mode of persuasion specially adapted to it. The dialectic philosopher is the only one who possesses the true art of persuasion. Such was Plato's point of view in the Phædrus. I need hardly point out how completely it is dropped in his Leges: wherein he pours persuasion into the ears of an indiscriminate multitude, through the common channel of a rhetorical lecture, considering it of such impressive efficacy as to justify the supposition of inspiration from the Gods.

How poor an opinion had Plato of the efficacy of the [Greek: nouthetêtiko\n ei)=dos lo/gôn] at the time when he composed the Sophistês (p. 230 A)! What a superabundance of such discourse does he deliver in the Treatise De Legibus, taking especial pride in the peculiarity!]

After this unusual length of preliminaries, Plato enters on the positive regulation of his colony. As to the worship of the Gods, he directs little or nothing of his own authority. The colony must follow the advice of the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon--together with any consecrated traditions, epiphanies, or inspirations from the Gods belonging to the spot--as to the Gods who shall be publicly worshipped, and the suitable temples and rites. Only he directs that to each portion of the territory set apart for civil purposes, some God, Dæmon, or Hero, shall be specially assigned as Patron, with a chapel and precinct wherein all meetings of the citizens of the district shall be held, whether for religious ceremonies, or for recreation, or for political duties.

That such "ordained seasons" for meetings and sacrifices should be punctually attended to--was a matter of great moment, on religious no less than on civil grounds. It was with a view to that object principally that each Grecian city arranged its calendar and its system of intercalation. Plato himself states this (vii. p. 809 D).

Sir George Lewis, in his Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, adverts to the passage of Plato here cited, and gives a very instructive picture of the state of the Hellenic world as to Calendar and computation of time (see p. 19; also the greater part of chapter i. of his valuable work). The object of all the cities was to adjust lunar time with solar time by convenient intercalations, but hardly any two cities agreed in the method of doing so. Different schemes of intercalation and periods (trietêric, octaetêric, enneadekaetêric) were either adopted by civic authority or suggested by private astronomers, such as Kleostratus and Meton. The practical dissonance and confusion was great, and the theoretical dissatisfaction also.

Now in this dialogue De Legibus, Plato recognises both the importance of the object and the problem to be solved, yet he suggests no means of his own for solving it. He makes no arrangement for the calendar of his new Magnêtic city. I confess that this is to me a matter of some surprise. To combine an exertion of authority with an effort of arithmetical calculation, is in his vein; and the exactness of observances as respects the Gods, in harmony with the religious tone of the treatise, depended on some tolerable solution of the problem.

We may perhaps presume that Plato refused to deal with the problem because he considered it as mathematically insoluble. Days, months, and years are not exactly commensurable with each other. In the Timæus (p. 36 C) Plato declares that the rotation of the Circle of the Same, or the outermost sidereal sphere, upon which the succession of day and night depends, is according to the side of a parallelogram ([Greek: kata\ pleura/n])--while the rotations of the Moon and Sun (two of the seven branches composing the Circle of the Different) are according to the diagonal thereof ([Greek: kata\ dia/metron]): now the side and the diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitudes among the ancient reasoners. It would appear also that he considers the rotations of the Moon and Sun to be incommensurable with each other, both of them being members included in the Circle of the Different.

Since an exact mathematical solution was thus unattainable, Plato may probably have despised a merely approximative solution, sufficient for practical convenience--to which last object he generally pays little attention. He might also fancy that even the attempt to meddle with the problem betokened that confusion of the incommensurable with the commensurable, which he denounces in this very treatise (vii. pp. 819-820).]

Plato requires for his community a fixed and peremptory total of 5040 citizens, never to be increased, and never to be diminished: a total sufficient, in his judgment, to defend the territory against invaders, and to lend aid on occasion to an oppressed neighbour. He distributes the whole territory into 5040 lots of land, each of equal value, assigning one lot to each citizen. Each lot is assumed to be sufficient for the maintenance of a family of sober habits, and no more. The total number (5040) is selected because of the great variety of divisors by which it may be divided without remainder.

Aristotle declares this total of 5040 to be extravagantly great, inasmuch as it would require an amount of territory beyond the scale which can be reckoned upon for a Grecian city, to maintain so many unproductive persons, including not merely the 5040 adult citizens, but also their wives, children, and personal attendants, none of whom would take part in any productive industry (Politic. ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 16).

The remark here cited indicates the small numerical scale upon which the calculations of a Greek politician were framed. But we can hardly be surprised at it, seeing that the new city is intended for the Island of Krete, where none even of the existing cities were considerable. Moreover Aristotle had probably present to his mind the analogy of Sparta. The Spartan citizens were in a situation more analogous to the 5040 than any other Grecian residents. But the Spartan citizens could not have been near so numerous as 5040 at that time; not even one-fifth of it--Aristotle tells us, Politic. ii. 9, 1270, a. 31. Aristotle goes on to remark on the definition given by Plato of the size and value of each lot of land sufficient for the citizen and his family to live [Greek: sôphro/nôs]: it ought to be (says Aristotle) [Greek: sôphro/nôs kai\ e)leutheri/ôs]. These are the two modes of excellence, and the only two, which a man can display in the use of his property (1265, a. 35). But this change would only aggravate the difficulty as to the total area of land required for the 5040. Compare the remark of Aristotle on the scheme of Hippodamus, Politic. ii. 8, 1268, a. 42.]

We thus see that Plato, in laying down his fundamental principle ([Greek: u(po/thesin]), recognises separate individual property and separate family among his citizens: both of which had been strenuously condemned and strictly excluded, in respect to the Guardians of his Republic. But he admits the principle only with the proviso that there shall be a peremptory limit to number of citizens, to individual wealth, and to individual poverty: moreover, even with this proviso, he admits it only as a second-best, because mankind will not accept, and are not sufficiently exalted to work out, what is in itself the best. He reasserts the principle of the Republic, that separate property and separate family are both essentially mischievous: that all individuality, either of interest or sympathy or sentiment, ought to be extinguished as far as possible. Though constrained against his will to renounce this object, he will still approximate to it as near as he can in his second-best. Moreover, he may possibly, at some future time (D.V.), propose a third-best. When once departure from the genuine standard is allowed, the departure may be made in many different ways.

This declaration deserves notice as attesting the undiminished adhesion of Plato to the main doctrines of his Republic. The point here noted is one main difference of principle between the Treatise De Legibus and the Republic: the enactment of written fundamental laws with prologues serving as homilies to be preached to the citizens, is another. Both of them are differences of principle: each gives rise to many subordinate differences or corollaries.

That Plato did intend to compose a third work upon an analogous subject appears to me clear from the words,--but it does not at all follow that he thought that three varieties would exhaust all possibility. Upon this point I dissent from Hermann, and also upon his interpretation of Aristotle's phrase [Greek: ê( e)x u(pothe/seôs politei/a]. Aristotle distinguishes three distinct varieties of end which the political constructor may propose to himself:--1. [Greek: tê\n politei/an tê\n a(plô=s a)ri/stên, tê\n ma/lista kat' eu)chê/n]. 2. [Greek: Tê\n e)k tô=n u(pokeime/nôn a)ri/stên]. 3. [Greek: Tê\n e)x u(pothe/seôs a)ri/stên]. Now K. F. Hermann here maintains, and Boeckh had already maintained before him (ad Platonis Minoem et de Legibus, pp. 66-67), that the city sketched in Plato's treatise De Legibus coincides with No. 2 in Aristotle's enumeration, and that the projected [Greek: tri/tê] in Plato coincides with No. 3--[Greek: tê\n e)x u(pothe/seôs]. I differ from them here. There is no ground for presuming that what Plato puts third must also be put by Aristotle third. I think that the Platonic city De Legibus corresponds to No. 3 in Aristotle and not to No. 2. It is a city [Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs], not [Greek: e)k tô=n u(pokeime/nôn a)ri/stên]. Plato borrows little or nothing from [Greek: ta\ u(pokei/mena], and almost everything from his own [Greek: u(po/thesis] or assumed principle, which in this case is the fixed number of the citizens as well as of the lots of land, the imposition of a limit on each man's proprietary acquisitions, and the recognition of separate family establishments subject to these limits. This is the [Greek: u(po/thesis] of Plato's second city, to which all his regulations of detail are accommodated: it is substituted by him (unwillingly, because of the repugnance of others) in place of the [Greek: u(po/thesis] of his first city or the Republic, which [Greek: u(po/thesis] is perfect communism among the [Greek: phu/lakes], without either separate property or separate family. This last is Plato's [Greek: a(plôs a)ri/stê].]

Each citizen proprietor shall hold his lot of land, not as his own, but as part and parcel of the entire territory, which, taken as a whole, is Goddess and Mistress--conjointly with all the local Gods and Heroes--of the body of citizens generally. No citizen shall either sell or otherwise alienate his lot, nor divide it, nor trench upon its integrity. The total number of lots, the integrity of each lot, and the total number of citizens, shall all remain consecrated in perpetuity, without increase or diminution. Each citizen in dying shall leave one son as successor to his lot: if he has more than one, he may choose which of them he will prefer. The successor so chosen shall maintain the perpetuity of worship of the Gods, reverential rites to the family and deceased ancestors, and obligations towards the city. If the citizen has other sons, they will be adopted into the families of other citizens who happen to be childless: if he has daughters, he will give them out in marriage, but without any dowry. Such family relations will be watched over by a special board of magistrates: with this peremptory condition, that they shall on no account permit either the number of citizen proprietors, or the number of separate lots, to depart from the consecrated 5040. Each citizen's name, and each lot of land, will be registered on tablets of cypress wood. These registers will be preserved in the temples, in order that the magistrates may be able to prevent fraud.

Plato concurs in this opinion, though he trusts to prudence and the admonition of elders for bringing about this indispensable limitation of births in a family, without legal prohibition. I have already touched upon this matter in my review of Plato's Republic. See above--chap. xxxvii. p. 198 seq.

The [Greek: no/moi thetikoi\] of Philolaus at Thebes, regulating [Greek: tê\n paidopoii+/an] with a view to keep the lots of land unchanged, are only known by the brief allusion of Aristotle, Polit. ii. 12, 1274, b. 4.]

The city, with its appropriate accessories, shall be placed as nearly as possible in the middle of the territory. The akropolis, sacred to Hestia and Athênê, will be taken as a centre from whence twelve radiating lines will be drawn to the extremity of the territory, so as to distribute the whole area into twelve sections, not all equal in magnitude, but equalised in value by diminishing the area in proportion to superior goodness of land. The total number of citizens will be distributed also in twelve sections, of 420 each (5040/12), among whom the lots of land contained in each twelfth will be apportioned. This duodecimal division, the fundamental canon of Plato's municipal arrangements, is a sanctified present from the Gods, in harmony with the months and with the kosmical revolutions. Each twelfth, land and citizens together, will be constituted a Tribe, and will be consecrated to some God (determined by lot) whose name it will bear, and at whose altar two monthly festivals will be celebrated: one for the tribe, the other for the entire city. The tribes are peremptorily equal in respect to number of citizens; but care shall also be taken to make them as nearly equal as possible in respect to registered property: that is, in respect to property other than land, which each citizen brings with him to the settlement, and which will all be recorded (as well as the land) in the public registers. The lot of land assigned to each citizen will include a portion near the centre, and a portion near the circumference: the most central portion being coupled with the most outlying, and so on in order. Each citizen will thus have two separate residences: one nearer to the city, the other more distant from it.

Plato would be glad if he were able to establish among all the citizens, equality not merely of landed property, but property of all other property besides. This, however, he recognises his inability to exact. The colonists will bring with them movable property--some more, some less: and inequality must be tolerated up to a certain limit. Each citizen is allowed to possess movable property as far as four times the value of his lot of land, but no more. The maximum of wealth possessed by any citizen will thus be equal to five times the value of his lot of land: the minimum of the poorest citizen will be the lot of land itself, which cannot, under the worst circumstances, be alienated or diminished. If any citizen shall in any way acquire property above the maximum here named, he is directed to make it over to the city and to the Gods. In case of disobedience, he may be indicted before the Nomophylakes; and if found guilty, shall be disgraced, excluded from his share of public distributions, and condemned to pay twice as much--half being assigned as recompense to the prosecutor. The public register kept by the magistrates, in which is enrolled all the property of every kind belonging to each citizen, will enable them to enforce this regulation, and will be farther useful in all individual suits respecting money.

In the public census of the city, the citizens will be distributed into four classes, according to their different scales of property. The richest will be four minæ: the other three minæ, two, and one mina, respectively. Direct taxation will be assessed upon them according to the difference of wealth: to which also a certain reference will be had in the apportionment of magistracies, and in the regulation of the voting privilege.

By this determination of a maximum and minimum, coupled with a certain admitted preference to wealth in the assignment of political power, Plato considers that he has guarded against the intestine dissensions and other evils likely to arise from inequality of property. He accounts great poverty to be a serious cause of evil; yet he is very far from looking upon wealth as a cause of good. On the contrary, he proclaims that great wealth is absolutely incompatible either with great virtue or great happiness. Accordingly, while he aims at preserving every individual citizen from poverty, he at the same time disclaims all purpose of making his community either richer or more powerful. He forbids every private citizen to possess gold and silver. The magistrates must hold a certain stock of it in reserve, in case of public dealing with foreign cities: but they will provide for the daily wants of the community by a special cheap currency, having no value beyond the limits of the territory. Moreover, Plato prohibits all loans on interest. He refuses to enforce by law the restoration even of a deposit. He interdicts all dowry or marriage portion with daughters.

How is the Platonic colony to be first set on its march, and by whom are its first magistrates to be named? By the inhabitants of Knôssus, its mother city--replies Plato. The Knossians will appoint a provisional Board of two hundred: half from their own citizens, half from the elders and most respected men among the colonists themselves. This Board will choose the first Nomophylakes, consisting of thirty-seven persons, half Knossians, half colonists. These Nomophylakes are intended as a Council of State, and will be elected by the citizens in the following way, when the colony is once in full march:--All the citizens who perform or have performed military service, either as hoplites or cavalry, will be electors. They will vote by tablets laid upon the altar, and inscribed with the name both of the voter himself and of the person whom he prefers. First, three hundred persons will be chosen by the majority of votes according to this process. Next, out of these three hundred, one hundred will be chosen by a second process of the same kind. Lastly, out of these one hundred, thirty-seven will be chosen by a third similar process, but with increased solemnity: these thirty-seven will constitute the Board of Nomophylakes, or Guardians of the Laws. No person shall be eligible for Guardian until he has attained the age of fifty. When elected, he shall continue to serve until he is seventy, and no longer: so that if elected at sixty, he will have ten years of service. The duties of this Board will be to see that all the laws are faithfully executed: in which function they will have superintendence over all special magistrates and officers.

For the office of General and Minister of War, three persons shall be chosen by show of hands of the military citizens. It shall be the duty of the Nomophylakes to propose three names for this office: but other citizens may also propose different names, and the show of hands will decide. The three Generals, when chosen, shall propose twelve names as Taxiarchs, one for each tribe: other names may also be proposed, and the show of hands of each tribe will determine.

A Council shall be annually chosen, consisting of 360 members, ninety from each of the four proprietary scales in the Census. The mode of electing this Council is highly complicated. First, Plato provides that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the first (or richest) class, and as many out of the second class, by universal suffrage, every citizen being compelled to give his vote: then that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the third class, by universal suffrage, but under this condition, that the three richest classes are compelled to vote, while the fourth class may abstain from voting, if they please: next, that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the fourth class, still by universal suffrage, but with liberty to the third and fourth classes to abstain from voting, while the first and second classes are compelled to vote. Out of the four batches, of 360 names from each class, 180 names from each class are to be chosen by universal suffrage compulsory on all. This last list of 180 names is to be reduced, by drawing lots, to 90 from each class, or 360 in all: who constitute the Council for the year.

The passage of Plato is not perspicuous. It appears to me to have been misunderstood by some commentators, who suppose that only 90 [Greek: bouleutai\] are to be chosen out of each census in the original voting (see Schneider's Comment. on the passage of Aristotle above alluded to, p. 99). The number originally chosen from each class must be 360, because it is directed, in the final process, to be reduced first (by election) to 180 from each class, and next (by sortition) to 90 from each class.]

Here the evident purpose of Plato is to obtain in the last result a greater number of votes from the rich than from the poor, without absolutely disfranchising the poor. Where the persons to be voted for are all of the richer classes, there the poor are compelled to come and vote as well as the rich: where the persons to be voted for are all of the poorer class, there the rich are compelled to vote, while the poor are allowed to stay away. He seems to look on the vote, not as a privilege which citizens will wish to exercise, but as a duty which they must be compelled by fine to discharge. This is (as Aristotle calls it) an oligarchical provision. It exhibits Plato's mode of attaining the end stated by Livy as proposed in the Servian constitution at Rome, and the end contemplated (without being announced) by the framers of most other political constitutions recorded in history--"Gradus facti, ut neque exclusus quisquam suffragio videretur, et vis omnis penes primores civitatis esset". Plato defends it by distinguishing two sorts of equality: one complete and undistinguishing, in which all the citizens are put upon a level: the other in which the good and able citizen is distinguished from the bad and incapable citizen, so that he acquires power and honour in proportion to his superior merit. This second sort of equality Plato approves, pronouncing it to be political justice. But such defence tacitly assumes that superiority in wealth, as between the four classes of his census, is to count as evidence of, or as an equivalent for, superior merit: an assumption doubtless received by many Grecian politicians, and admitted in the general opinion of Greece--but altogether at variance with the declared judgment of Plato himself as to the effect of wealth upon the character of the wealthy man. The poorest citizen in the Platonic community must have his lot of land, which Plato considers sufficient for a sober-minded family: the richest citizen can possess** only five times as much: and all receive the same public instruction. Here, therefore, there can be no presumption of superior merit in the richer citizen as compared with the poorer, whatever might be said about the case as it stood in actual Grecian communities. We see that Plato in this case forgets his own peculiar mode of thought, and accommodates himself to received distinctions, without reflecting that the principles of his own political system rendered such distinctions inapplicable. He bows to the oligarchical sentiment of his contemporaries, by his preferential encouragement to the votes of the rich: he bows to the democratical sentiment, when he consents to employ to a small extent the principle of the lot.

Aristotle characterises these regulations of the Platonic community as oligarchical, and remarks that this is in contradiction to the principle with which Plato set out--that it ought to be a compound of monarchy and democracy. Aristotle understands this last principle somewhat differently from what Plato seems to have intended (Politic. ii. 6, 1266, a. 10).]

Compare a like distinction drawn between two sorts of [Greek: i)so/tês] in Isokrates, Areiopagitic. Orat. vii. s. 23-24; also Aristotel. Politic.]

Of the annually-chosen Council, one twelfth part only (or thirty Councillors) will be in constant session in the city: each of their sessions lasting for one month, and the total thus covering the year. The remaining eleven twelfths will be attending to their private affairs, except when special necessities arise. The Council will have the general superintendence of the city, and controul over all meetings of the citizens. Provision is made for three magistrates called Astynomi, to regulate the streets, roads, public buildings, water-courses, &c.: and for five Agoranomi, to watch over the public market with its appertaining temples and fountains, and to take cognisance of disputes or offences occurring therein. None but citizens of the two richest classes of the census are eligible as Astynomi or Agoranomi: first, twice the number required are chosen by public show of hands--next, half of the number so chosen are drawn off by lot. In regard to the show of hands, Plato again decrees, that all citizens of the two richer classes shall be compelled to take part in it, under fine: all citizens of the two poorer classes may take part if they choose, but are not compelled. By this provision, as before, Plato baits for the oligarchical sentiment: by the partial use of the lot, for the democratical.

The defence of the territory is entrusted to the Agronomi, five persons selected from each of the twelve tribes, making sixty in all; and assisted by sixty other junior subordinates, selected by the five Agronomi (those of each tribe choosing twelve) from their respective tribes. Each of these companies of seventeen will be charged with the care of one of the twelve territorial districts, as may be determined by lot. Each will then pass by monthly change from one district to another, so as to make the entire circuit of the twelve districts in one year, going round in an easterly direction or to the right: each will then make the same circuit backward, during a second year, in a westerly direction or to the left. Their term of service will be two years in all, during which all of them will have become familiarly acquainted with every portion of the territory. A public mess will be provided for these companies, and each man among them will be held to strict continuity of service. Their duties will be, not merely to keep each district in a condition of defence against a foreign enemy, but also to improve its internal condition: to facilitate the outflow of water where there is too much, and to retard it where there is too little: to maintain, in the precincts sacred to the Gods, reservoirs of spring-water, partly as ornament, partly also as warm baths (for the heating of which large stocks of dry wood must be collected)--to benefit the old, the sick, and the overworked husbandman. Farthermore, these Agronomi will adjudicate upon disputes and offences among the rural population, both slave and free. If they abuse their trust, they will be accountable, first to the assembled citizens of the district, next to the public tribunals in the city.

In reference to omens and auguries the Greek spectator looked towards the north, so that he had the east on his right hand.]

Agreeable and refreshing combinations of springs with shady trees near the precincts of the Gods were frequent. See Xenophon, Hellen. v. 3, 19.

The thermal waters were also generally connected with some precinct of Hêraklês or Asklêpius.

In some temples it was forbidden to use this adjoining water except for sacred rites, Thucyd. iv. 97.]

Plato considers that these Agronomi will go through hard work during their two years of service, inasmuch as they will have no slaves, and will have to do everything for themselves: though in the performance of any public work they are empowered to put in requisition both men and cattle from the neighbourhood. He pronounces it to be a salutary discipline for the young men, whom he admonishes that an apprenticeship in obedience is indispensable to qualify them for command, and that exact obedience to the laws and magistrates will be their best title to posts of authority when older. Moreover, he insists on the necessity that all citizens should become minutely acquainted with the whole territory: towards which purpose he encourages young men in the exercise of hunting. He compares (indirectly) his movable guard of Agronomi to the Lacedæmonian Krypti, who maintained the police of Laconia, and kept watch over the Helots: though they are also the parallel of the youthful Peripoli at Athens, who were employed as Guards for two years round various parts of Attica.

The phrase seems however to indicate that Plato did not much like to call his Agronomi by the name of [Greek: Kruptoi/]. The duties performed by the Lacedæmonian [Greek: Kruptoi\] against the Helots were of the harshest character. See chap. vi. p. 509 of my 'History of Greece'. Schömann, Antiq. Juris Publ. Græc. iv. 1-4, p. 111, v. 1, 21, p. 199.]

Besides Astynomi and Agoranomi, Plato provides priests for the care of the sacred buildings in the city, and for the service of the Gods. In choosing these priests, as in choosing the other magistrates, election and sortition are to be combined: to satisfy at once the oligarchical and the democratical sentiment. The lot will be peculiarly suitable in a case where priests are to be chosen--because the God may be expected to guide it in a manner agreeable to himself. Plato himself however is not confident on this point, for he enjoins additional precautions: the person chosen must be sixty years old at least, free from all bodily defect, of legitimate birth, and of a family untainted by previous crime. Plato prescribes farther, that laws or canons respecting matters of divine concern shall be obtained from the Delphian oracle: and that certain Exêgêtæ shall be named as authorised interpreters of these canons, as long as they live. Treasurers or stewards shall also be chosen, out of the two richer classes of the census, to administer the landed property and produce belonging to the various temples.

In the execution of the duties imposed upon them, the Agoranomi and Astynomi are empowered to fine an offender to the extent of one mina (one hundred drachmæ), each of them separately--and when both sit together, to the extent of two minæ.

Here, as in other provisions, Plato copies the practice at Athens, where each individual magistrate was empowered to impose a fine of definite amount ([Greek: e)pibolê\n e)piba/llein]), though we do not know what that amount was. The Proedri could impose a fine as high as one mina, the Senate as high as five minæ (Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 34).]

Music and Gymnastic.--For each of these, two magisterial functions must be constituted: one to superintend the teaching and training--the other, to preside over the matches and distribution of prizes. In regard to the musical matches, one President must be appointed for the monôdic single-headed exhibitions, another for the choric exhibitions. The President of the former must be not less than thirty years of age. The President of the latter must be not less than forty years of age. In order to appoint a fit person, the Nomophylakes shall constrain all the citizens whom they believe to be conversant with monôdic or choric matters, to assemble and agree on a preliminary list of ten candidates, who shall undergo a Dokimasy or examination, upon the single point of skill and competency, and no other. If they all pass, recourse shall be had to lot, and the one who draws the first lot shall be President for the year. In regard to the gymnastic matches, of men as well as of horses, the citizens of the three richest classes shall be constrained to come together (those of the fourth class may come, or stay away, as they please), and to fix upon twenty suitable persons; who shall undergo the Dokimasy, and out of whom three shall be selected by lot as Presidents of gymnastic contests for the year.

We observe that in the nomination of Presidents for the musical and gymnastic contests, Plato adopts the same double-faced machinery as before--To please the oligarchical sentiment by treating the votes of the rich as indispensable, the votes of the poor as indifferent--To please the democratical sentiment by a partial application of the lot. But in regard to the President of musical and gymnastic education or training, he prescribes a very different manner of choice. He declares this to be the most important function in the city. Upon the way in which the Minister of Education discharges his functions, the ultimate character of the citizens will mainly turn. Accordingly, this magistrate must be a man of fifty years of age, father of legitimate children--and, if possible, of daughters as well as sons. He must also be one of the thirty-seven Nomophylakes. He will be selected, not by the votes of the citizens generally, but by the votes of all the magistrates (except the annual Councillors and the Prytanes): such votes being deposited secretly in the temple of Apollo. The person who obtains the most of these secret votes will be submitted to a farther Dokimasy by all the voting magistrates (except the Nomophylakes themselves), and will, if approved, be constituted President of musical and gymnastic education for five years.

From the magisterial authority in his city, Plato now passes to the judicial or dikastic. He remarks that no peremptory line of separation can be drawn between the two. Every magistrate exercises judicial functions on some matters: every dikast, on the days when he sits, decides magisterially. He then proceeds to distinguish (as the Attic forum did) between two sorts of causes:--Private, disputes between man and man, where the persons complaining of being wronged are one or a few individuals--Public, where the party wronged or alleged to be wronged is the state.

This was the main distinction adopted in the Attic law. 1. Complaint, founded upon injury alleged to be done to the interest of some individual--[Greek: a)gô\n i)/dios, di/kê i)di/a, di/kê] in the narrow sense. 2. Complaint, founded upon injury alleged to be done towards some interest not strictly individual--[Greek: a)gô\n dêmo/sios, di/kê dêmosi/a, graphê/] (Meier und Schömann, der Attische Prozess, p. 162).]

In regard to the private causes, he institutes Tribe-Dikasteries, taken by lot out of the citizens of each tribe, and applied without notice to each particular cause as it comes on, so that no one can know beforehand in what cause he is to adjudicate, nor can any one be solicited or bribed. He institutes farthermore a superior court of appeal, formed every year by the various Boards of Magistrates, each choosing out of its own body the most esteemed member, subject to approval by an ensuing Dokimasy. When one citizen believes himself to be wronged by another, he must first submit the complaint to arbitration by neighbours and common friends. If this arbitration fails to prove satisfactory, he must next bring the complaint before the Tribe-Dikastery. Should their decision prove unsatisfactory, the case may be brought (seemingly by either of the parties) before the superior court of appeal, whose decision will be final. Plato directs that this superior Court shall hold its sittings publicly, in presence of all the Magistrates and all the Councillors, as well as of any other citizen who may choose to attend. The members of the Court are to give their votes openly. Should they be suspected of injustice or corruption, they may be impeached before the Nomophylakes; who, if convinced of their guilt, shall compel them to make good the wrong done, and shall impose penalties besides, if the case requires.

In regard to Public Causes, Plato makes unusual concession to a feeling much prevalent in Greece, and especially potent at Athens. Where the wrong done is to the public, he recognises that the citizens generally will not submit to be excluded from the personal cognizance of it: the citizen excluded from that privilege feels as if he had no share in the city. If one citizen accuses another of treason, or peculation, or other wrong towards the public, the accusation shall be originated at first, and decided at last, before the general body of citizens. But after having been originated before this general assembly, the charge must be submitted to an intermediate stage of examination, before three of the principal Boards of Magistrates; who shall sift the allegations of the accuser, as well as the defence of the accused. These commissioners (we must presume) will make a report on the case, which report will be brought before the general assembly; who will then adjudicate upon it finally, and condemn or acquit as they think right.

Here the word [Greek: ba/sanos] is used in a much more extended sense than usual, so as to include the whole process of judicial enquiry.]

This proposition deserves notice. Plato proclaims his disapprobation of the numerous Dikasteries in Athens, wherein the Dikasts sat, heard, and voted--perhaps with applause or murmurs, but with no searching questions of their own--leaving the whole speech to the parties and their witnesses. To decide justly (he says), the judicial authority must not remain silent, but must speak more than the parties, and must undertake the substantial conduct of the inquiry. No numerous assembly--nor even any few, unless they be intelligent--are competent to such a duty: nor even an intelligent few, without much time and patience. To secure such an inquiry on these public causes--as far as is possible consistent with the necessity of leaving the final decision to the general assembly--is the object of Plato's last-mentioned proposition. It is one of the most judicious propositions in his whole scheme.

* * * * *

Plato has now constituted the magistrates and the judicial machinery. It is time to specify the laws which they are to obey and to enforce.

Plato considers the Nomophylakes (together with another board called the Nocturnal Council, to be hereafter described) as the permanent representatives of himself: destined to ensure that the grand ethical purpose of the lawgiver shall be constantly kept in view, and to supply what may have been left wanting in the original programme. Especially at the first beginning, provision will be found wanting in many details, which the Nomophylakes will take care to supply. In respect to the choric festivals, which are of so much importance for the training and intercourse of young men and maidens, the lawgiver must trust to the Choric Superintendents and the Nomophylakes for regulating, by their experience, much which he cannot foresee. But an experience of ten years will enable them to make all the modifications and additions required; and after that period they shall fix and consecrate in perpetuity the ceremonies as they then stand, forbidding all farther change. Neither in that nor in any other arrangement shall any subsequent change be allowed, except on the unanimous requisition of all the magistrates, all the people, and all the oracles of the Gods.

The choric festivals, in which the youths and maidens will take part, both of them naked as far as a sober modesty will allow, present occasions for mutual acquaintance between them, which serves as foundation for marriage. At the age of twenty-five a young man is permitted to marry; and before the age of thirty-five he is required to marry, under penalty of fine and disgrace, if he does not. Plato introduces here a discourse, in the form of a prologue to his marriage law, wherein he impresses on young men the general principles according to which they ought to choose their wives. The received sentiment, which disposes a rich youth to choose his wife from a rich family, is (in Plato's view) altogether wrong. Rich husbands ought to assort themselves with poor wives; and in general the characters of husband and wife ought to be opposite rather than similar, in order that the offspring may not inherit the defects of either. The religious ceremonies antecedent to marriage are to be regulated by the Exêgêtæ. A costly marriage feast--and, above all, drunkenness at that feast--are emphatically forbidden. Any offspring begotten when the parent is in this disorderly and insane condition, will probably be vitiated from the beginning. Out of the two residences which every citizen's lot will comprise, one must be allotted to the son when the son marries.

Compare the Politikus, pp. 310-311, where the necessity is insisted on of coupling in marriage two persons of opposite dispositions--[Greek: to\ a)ndrei=on ê)=thos] with [Greek: to\ ko/smion ê)=thos]. There is a natural inclination (Plato says) for the [Greek: a)ndrei=oi] to intermarry with each other, and for the [Greek: ko/smioi] to do the like: but the lawgiver must contend against this. If this be permitted, each of the breeds will degenerate through excess of its own peculiarity.]

Plato now enters upon his laws respecting property; and first of all upon the most critical variety of property; that in human beings, or slavery. This he declares to be a subject full of difficulty. There is much difference of opinion on the subject. Some speak of slaves as deserving trust and good treatment, in proof of which various anecdotes of exemplary fidelity on their part are cited: others again regard them as incorrigibly debased, fit for nothing better than the whip and spur, like cattle. Then moreover the modified form of slavery, such as that of the Helots in Laconia, and the Penestæ in Thessaly, has been found full of danger and embarrassment, though the Spartans themselves are well satisfied with it. (It will be recollected that the Helots and Penestæ were not slaves bought and imported from abroad, as the slaves in Attica were, but conquered Hellenic communities who had been degraded from freedom into slavery, and from the condition of independent proprietorship into that of tributary tenants or serfs; but with the right to remain permanently on their lands, without ever being sold for exportation.) This form of slavery (where the slaves are of the same race and language, with reciprocal bonds of sympathy towards each other) Plato denounces as especially dangerous. Care must be taken that there shall be among the slaves as little fellowship of language and feelings as possible; but they must be well fed: moreover everything like cruelty and insolence in dealing with them must be avoided, even more carefully than in dealing with freemen. This he prescribes partly for the protection of the slave himself, but still more for the interest of the master: whose intrinsic virtue, or want of virtue, will be best tested by his behaviour as a master. The slaves must be punished judicially, when they deserve it. But the master must never exhort or admonish them, as he would address himself to a freeman: he must never say a word to them, except to give an order: above all, he must abstain from all banter and joking, either with male or female slaves. Many foolish masters indulge in such behaviour, which emboldens the slaves to give themselves airs, and renders the task of governing them almost impracticable.

What Aristotle says about slaves in the fifth chapter of the first book of his Oeconomica, is superior to what he says in the Politica, and superior to anything which we read in the Platonic Treatise De Legibus.]

As to the construction of the city, Plato prescribes that its external contour shall be of circular form, encircling the summit of an eminence, with the agora near the centre. The temples of the Gods shall be planted around the agora, and the buildings for gymnasia and schooling, for theatrical representation, for magistrative, administrative, and judicial business, near at hand. Plato follows the example of Sparta in prohibiting any special outer wall for the fortification of the city, which he treats as an indication of weakness and timidity: nevertheless he suggests that the houses constituting the city may be erected on such a plan, and in such connection, as to be equivalent to a fortification. When once the city is erected, the Astynomi or Ædiles are to be charged with the duty of maintaining its integrity and cleanliness.

Plato next proceeds to regulate the mode of life proper for all his new-married couples. He proclaims broadly that large interference with private and individual life is unavoidable; and that no great public reform can be accomplished without it. He points out that this principle was nowhere sufficiently admitted: not even at Sparta, where it was carried farther than anywhere else. Even the Spartans and Kretans adopted the public mess-table only for males, and not for females. In Plato's view, it is essential for both. He would greatly prefer (as announced already in his Republic) that it should be one and the same for both--males and females taking their meals together.

The newly-married couples are enjoined to bestow their best attention upon the production of handsome and well-constituted children: this being their primary duty to the city for ten years after their marriage. Their conduct will be watched by a Board of Matrons, chosen for the purpose by the Nomophylakes, and assembling every day in the temple of Eileithuia. In case of any dispute, or unfaithful or unseemly conduct, these Matrons will visit them to admonish or threaten, if they see reason. Should such interference fail of effect, the Matrons will apprise the Nomophylakes, who will on their parts admonish and censure, and will at last denounce the delinquents, if still refractory, to the public authority. The delinquents will then be disgraced, and debarred from the public ceremonies, unless they can clear themselves by indicting and convicting their accusers before the public tribunal.

The age of marriage is fixed at from thirty to thirty-five for males, from sixteen to twenty for females. The first ten years after marriage are considered as appropriated to the production of children for the city, and are subject to the strict supervision above mentioned. If any couple have no offspring for ten years, the marriage shall be dissolved by authority. After ten years the supervision is suspended, and the couple are left to themselves. If either of them shall commit an infidelity with another person still under the decennial restriction, the party so offending is liable to the same penalty as if he were still himself also under it. But if the person with whom infidelity is committed be not under that restriction, no penalty will be incurred beyond a certain general discredit, as compared with others whose conduct is blameless, and who will receive greater honour. However, Plato advises that nothing shall be said in the law respecting the conduct of married couples after the period of decennial restriction has elapsed, unless there be some grave scandal to call attention to the subject.

Plato now proceeds to treat about the children just born. The principle of separate family being admitted in the Treatise De Legibus, he refrains from promulgating any peremptory laws on this subject, because it is impossible for the lawgiver or the magistrate to enter into each private house, and to enforce obedience on such minute and numerous details: while it would be discreditable for him to command what he could not enforce, and it would moreover accustom citizens to disobey the law with impunity. Still, however, Plato thinks it useful to deliver some general advice, which he hopes that fathers and mothers will spontaneously follow. He begins with the infant as soon as born, and even before birth. The mother during pregnancy is admonished to take regular exercise; the infant when born must be carried about constantly in the nurse's arms. The invigorating effects of such gestation are illustrated by the practice of Athenian cock-fighters, who cause the cocks while under training to be carried about under the arms of attendants in long walks. Besides that the nurses (slaves) must be strong women, there must also be more than one to each infant, in order that he may be sufficiently carried about. He must be kept in swaddling-clothes for the first two years, and must not be allowed to walk until he is three years of age. The perpetual movement and dandling, in the arms of the nurse, produces a good effect not only on the health and bodily force of the infant, but also upon his emotions. The infant ought to be kept (if it were possible) in movement as constant and unceasing as if he were on shipboard. Nurses know this by experience, when they lull to sleep an insomnious child, not by holding him still, but by swinging him about in their arms, and by singing a ditty. So likewise the insane and furious emotions inspired by Dionysus (also by Zeus, by the mother of the Gods, &c.) are appeased by the regulated movement, dance and music, solemnly performed at the ceremonial worship of the God who excited the emotions. These are different varieties of fear and perturbation: they are morbid internal movements, which we overpower and heal by muscular and rhythmical movements impressed from without, with appropriate music and religious solemnities.

About the effect of the movement, bustle, noise, and solemn exhibitions, &c., of a Grecian festival, in appeasing the over-wrought internal excitement of those who took part in it, see Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 689.

Compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 141, where the Chorus addresses the love-sick Phædra:--

Also Eurip. Medea, 1172 about [Greek: Pano\s o)rga/s].]

To guard the child, during the first three years of his life, against disturbing fears, or at least to teach him to conquer them when they may spring up, is to lay the best foundation of a fearless character for the future. By extreme indulgence he would be rendered wayward: by extreme harshness his spirit would be broken. A middle course ought to be pursued, guarding him against pains as far as may be, yet at the same time keeping pleasures out of his reach, especially the stronger pleasures: thus shall we form in him a gentle and propitious disposition, such as that which we ascribe to the Gods.

The comparison made here by Plato between the effect produced by these various religious ceremonies upon the mind of the votary, and that produced by the dandling of the nurse upon the perturbed child in her arms, is remarkable. In both, the evil is the same--unfounded and irrational fear--an emotional disturbance within: in both, the remedy is the same--regulated muscular movement and excitement from without: more gentle in the case of the infant, more violent in the case of the adult. Emotion is a complex fact, physical as well as mental; and the physical aspect and basis of it (known to Aristotle as well as to Plato) is here brought to view. To speak the language of modern science (with which their views here harmonise, in spite of their imperfect acquaintance with human anatomy), if the energies of the nervous system are overwrought within, they may be diverted into a new channel by bodily movements at once strenuous and measured, and may thus be discharged in a way tranquillising to the emotions. This is Plato's theory about the healing effects of the choric and orchestic religious ceremonies of his day. The God was believed first to produce the distressing excitement within--then to suggest and enjoin (even to share in) the ceremonial movements for the purpose of relieving it. The votary is brought back from the condition of comparative madness to that of sober reason. Strong emotion of any kind is, in Plato's view, a state of distemper. The observances here prescribed respecting wise regulation of the emotions, especially in young children, are considered by Plato as not being laws in the proper and positive sense, but as the unwritten customs, habits, rules, discipline, &c., upon which all positive laws repose and depend. Though they appear to go into excessive and petty details, yet unless they be well understood and efficaciously realised, the laws enacted will fail to attain their purpose.

Servius observes (Not. ad Virgil. Bucol. v. 73):--"Sane, ut in religionibus saltaretur, hæc ratio est, quod nullam majores nostri partem corporis esse voluerunt, quæ non sentiret religionem. Nam cantus ad animam, saltatio ad mobilitatem pertinet corporis."]

Pursuant to this view of the essential dependence of leges upon mores, Plato continues his directions about the training of children. From the age of three to six, the child must be supplied with amusements, under a gentle but sufficient controul. The children of both sexes will meet daily at the various temples near at hand, with discreet matrons to preside over them, and will find amusement for each other. At six years of age the boys and girls will be separated, and will be consigned to different male and female tutors. The boys shall learn riding, military exercise, and the use of the various weapons of war. The girls shall learn these very same things also, if it be possible. Plato is most anxious that they should learn, but he fears that the feelings of the community will not tolerate the practice. All the teaching will be conducted under the superintendence of teachers, female as well as male: competent individuals, of both sexes, being appointed to the functions of command without distinction. The children will be taught to use their left hands as effectively as their right. Wrestling shall be taught up to a certain point, to improve the strength and flexibility of the limbs; but elaborate wrestling and pugilism is disapproved. Imitative dancing, choric movements, and procession, shall also be taught, but always in arms, to familiarise the youth with military details.

Plato now enters upon the musical and literary teaching proper for the youthful portion of his community. Poetry, music, and dancing, as connected with the service and propitiation of the Gods, are in the first instance recreative and amusing; but they also involve serious consequences. It is most important to the community that these exercises should not only be well arranged, but that when arranged they should be fixed by authority, so as to prevent all innovations or deviations by individual taste. Plato here repeats, with emphasis, his commendation of the Egyptian practice to consecrate all the songs, dances, and festive ceremonies, and to tolerate no others whatever. Change is in itself a most serious evil, and change in one department provokes an appetite for change in all. Plato forbids all innovation, even in matters of detail, such as the shape of vessels or articles of furniture. He allows no poet to circulate any ode except such as is in full harmony with the declaration of the lawgiver respecting good and evil. All the old poems must be sifted and weeded. All new hymns and prayers to the Gods, even before they are shown to a single individual, must be examined by Censors above fifty years of age, in order that it may be seen whether the poet knows what he ought to praise or blame, and what he ought to pray for. In general, the poets do not know what is good and what is evil. By mistaken prayers--especially for wealth, which the lawgiver discountenances as prejudicial--they may bring down great mischief upon the city. Different songs must be composed for the two sexes: songs of a bold and martial character for males--of a sober and quiet character for females. But the poet must on no account cultivate "the sweet Muse," or make it his direct aim to produce emotions delightful to the audience. The sound and useful music will always in the end become agreeable, provided the pupils hear it from their earliest childhood, and hear nothing else. Plato censures the tragic representations exhibited in the Grecian cities (at Athens, more than anywhere else) as being unseemly, and even impious, because, close to the altar where sacrifice was offered to the Gods, choric and dramatic performances of the most touching and pathetic character were exhibited. The poet who gained the prize was he who touched most deeply the tender emotions of the audience, and caused the greatest flow of tears among them. Now, in the opinion of Plato, the exhibition of so much human misery, and the communication of so much sorrowful sympathy, was most unsuitable to the festival day, and offensive to the Gods. It was tolerable only on the inauspicious days of the year, and when exhibited by hired Karian mourners, such as those who wailed loudly at funerals. The music at the festivals ought to have no emotional character, except that of gentle, kindly, auspicious cheerfulness.

This is a remarkable declaration of Plato, condemning the tragic representations at Athens. Compare Gorgias, p. 501; Republic, x. p. 605; also about the effect on the spectators, Ion, p. 535 E.

The idea of [Greek: eu)phêmi/a] is more negative than positive; it is often shown by silence. The [Greek: dusphê/miai] (Soph. Phil. 10), or [Greek: blasphêmi/a], as Plato calls it, are the positive act or ill-omened manifestation. Plato, Phædon, p. 117: [Greek: e)n eu)phêmi/a| chrê\ teleuta=|n.]]

At ten years old, the boys and girls (who have hitherto been exercised in recitation, singing, dancing, &c.) are to learn their letters, or reading and writing. They will continue this process until thirteen years old. They will learn the use of the lyre, for three years. The same period and duration is fixed for all of them, not depending at all upon the judgment or preference of the parents. It is sufficient if they learn to read and and write tolerably, without aiming to do it either quickly or very well. The boys will be marched to school at daybreak every morning, under the care of a tutor, who is chosen by the magistrate for the purpose of keeping them under constant supervision and discipline. The masters for teaching will be special persons paid for the duty, usually foreigners. They will be allowed to teach nothing except the laws and homilies of the lawgiver, together with any selections from existing poets which may be in full harmony with these. Plato here proclaims how highly he is himself delighted with his own string of homilies: which are not merely exhortations useful to be heard, but also have the charm of poetry, and have been aided by inspirations from the Gods. As for the poets themselves, whether serious or comic, whose works were commonly employed in teaching, being committed wholly or partially to memory--Plato repudiates them as embodying a large proportion of mischievous doctrine which his pupils ought never to hear. Much reading, or much learning, he discountenances as dangerous to youths.

The teaching of the harp and of music (occupying the three years from thirteen to sixteen, after the three preceding years of teaching letters) will not be suffered to extend to any elaborate or complicated combinations. The melody will be simple: the measure grave and dignified. The imitative movement or dancing will exhibit only the gestures and demeanour suitable to the virtuous man in the various situations of life, whether warlike or pacific: the subject-matter of the songs or hymns will be regulated (as above described) by censorial authority. The practice will be consecrated and unchangeable, under the supervision of a magistrate for education.

All this teaching is imparted to the youth of both sexes: to boys, by male teachers--to girls, by female teachers, both of them paid. The training in gymnastic and military exercises and in arms, is also common to girls and boys. Plato deems it disgraceful that the females shall be brought up timorous and helpless--unable to aid in defending the city when it is menaced, and even unmanning the male citizens by demonstrations of terror.

We next come to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Plato directs that all his citizens shall learn the rudiments of these sciences--not for the reason urged by most persons, because of the necessities of practical life (which reason he discards as extravagantly silly, though his master Sokrates was among those who urged it)--but because these are endowments belonging to the divine nature, and because without them no man can become a God, Dæmon, or Hero, capable of watching over mankind. In Egypt elementary arithmetic and geometry were extensively taught to boys--but very little in Greece: though he intimates that both in Egypt, and in the Phenician towns, they were turned only to purposes of traffic, and were joined with sordid dispositions which a good lawgiver ought to correct by other provisions. In the Platonic city, both arithmetic and geometry will be taught, so far as to guard the youth against absurd blunders about measurement, and against confusion of incommensurable lines and spaces with commensurable. Such blunders are now often made by Greeks. By a good method, the teaching of these sciences may be made attractive and interesting; so that no force will be required to compel youth to learn.

Respecting the distinction between [Greek: theoi/, dai/mones, ê(/rôes], see Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 104-115.]

I transcribe here the curious passage which we read a little before.

Plat. Legg. vii. p. 819 A-C. [Greek: Tosa/de toi/nun e(/kasta chrê\ pha/nai mantha/nein dei=n tou\s e)leuthe/rous, o(/sa kai\ pa/mpolus e)n Ai)gu/ptô| pai/dôn o)/chlos a(/ma gra/mmasi mantha/nei. Prô=ton me\n ga\r peri\ logismou\s a)technô=s paisi\n e)xeurême/na mathê/mata, meta\ paidia=s te kai\ ê(donê=s mantha/nein; mê/lôn te/ tinô=n dianomai\ kai\ stepha/nôn plei/osin a(/ma kai\ e)la/ttosin, a(rmotto/ntôn a)rithmô=n tô=n au)tô=n . . . kai\ dê\ kai\ pai/zontes, phia/las a(/ma chrusou= kai\ chalkou= kai\ a)rgu/rou kai\ toiou/tôn tinô=n a)/llôn kerannu/ntes, oi( de\ kai\ o(/las pôs diadido/ntes, o(/per ei)=pon, ei)s paidia\n e)narmo/ttontes ta\s tô=n a)nagkai/ôn a)rithmô=n chrê/seis, ô)phelou=si tou\s mantha/nontas ei)s te ta\s tô=n stratope/dôn ta/xeis kai\ a)gôga\s kai\ stratei/as kai\ ei)s oi)konomi/as au)=; kai\ pa/ntôs chrêsimôte/rous au)tou\s au)toi=s kai\ e)grêgoro/tas ma=llon tou\s a)nthrô/pous a)perga/zontai.]

The information here given is valuable respecting the extensive teaching of elementary arithmetic as well as of letters among Egyptian boys, far more extensive than among Hellenic boys. The priests especially, in Egypt a numerous order, taught these matters to their own sons (Diodor. i. 81), probably to other boys also. The information is valuable too in another point of view, as respects the method of teaching arithmetic to boys; not by abstract numbers, nor by simple effort of memory in the repetition of a multiplication-table, but by concrete examples and illustrations exhibited to sense in familiar objects. The importance of this concrete method, both in facilitating comprehension and in interesting the youthful learner, are strongly insisted on by Plato, as they have been also by some of the ablest modern teachers of elementary arithmetic: see Professor Leslie's Philosophy of Arithmetic, and Mr. Horace Grant's Arithmetic for Young Children and Second Stage of Arithmetic. The following passage from a work of Sir John Herschel (Review of Whewell's History of Inductive Sciences, in the Quarterly Review, June, 1841) bears a striking and curious analogy to the sentences above transcribed from Plato:--"Number we cannot help regarding as an abstraction, and consequently its general properties or its axioms to be of necessity inductively concluded from the consideration of particular cases. And surely this is the way in which children do acquire their knowledge of number, and in which they learn its axioms. The apples and the marbles are put in requisition ([Greek: mê/lôn dianomai\ kai\ stepha/nôn], Plato), and through the multitude of gingerbread nuts their ideas acquire clearness, precision, and generality."

I borrow the above references from Mr. John Stuart Mill, System of Logic, Book ii. ch. vi. p. 335, ed. 1. They are annexed as a note to the valuable chapters of his work on Demonstration and Necessary Truths, in which he shows that the truth so-called, both in Geometry and Arithmetic, rest upon inductive evidence.

"The fundamental truths of the Science of Number all rest upon the evidence of sense: they are proved by showing to our eyes and to our fingers that any given number of objects, ten balls for example, may by separation and re-arrangement exhibit to our senses all the different sets of numbers, the sum of which is equal to ten. All the improved methods of teaching arithmetic to children proceed upon a knowledge of this fact. All who wish to carry the child's mind along with them in learning arithmetic--all who (as Dr. Biber in his remarkable Letters on Education expresses it) wish to teach numbers and not mere ciphers--now teach it through the evidence of the senses, in the manner we have described" (p. 335).]

Astronomy must also be taught up to a certain point, in order that the youth may imbibe correct belief respecting those great Divinities--Hêlios, Selênê, and the Planets--or may at any rate be protected from the danger of unconsciously advancing false affirmations about them, discreditable to their dignity. The general public consider it impious to study the Kosmos and the celestial bodies, with a view to detect the causes of what occurs: while at the same time they assert that the movements of Hêlios and Selênê are irregular, and they call the planets Wanderers. Regular action is (in Plato's view) the characteristic mark of what is good and perfect: irregularity is the foremost of all defects, and cannot without blasphemy be imputed to any of the celestial bodies. Moreover, many persons also assert untruly, that among the celestial bodies the one which is really the slowest mover, moves the fastest--and that the one which is really the fastest mover, moves the slowest. How foolish would it appear (continues Plato) if they made the like mistake about the Olympic runners, and if they selected the defeated competitor, instead of the victor, to be crowned and celebrated in panegyrical odes! How offensive is such falsehood, when applied to the great Gods in the heavens! Each of them has in reality one uniform circular movement, though they appear to have many and variable movements. Our youth must be taught enough of astronomy to guard against such heresies. The study of astronomy up to this point, far from being impious, is indispensable as a safeguard against impiety. Plato intimates that these astronomical truths were of recent acquisition, even to himself.

This portion of the Leges is obscure, and would be hardly intelligible if it were not illustrated by a passage in the Timæus (p. 38). Even with such help it is difficult, and has been understood differently by different interpreters. Proklus (in Timæum, pp. 262-263) and Martin (Études sur le Timée, ii. note 36, p. 84) interpret it as alluding to the spiral line ([Greek: e(/lika]) described by each planet (Sun and Moon are each counted as planets) round the Earth, arising from the combination of the force of the revolving sidereal sphere or Aplanês, carrying all the planets round along with it from East to West, with the counter-movement (contrary, but obliquely contrary) inherent in each planet. The spiral movement of each planet, resulting from combination of these two distinct forces, is a regular movement governed by law; though to an observer who does not understand the law, the movements appear irregular. Compare Derkyllides ap. Theon Smyrn. c. 41, f. 27, p. 330, ed. Martin.

The point here discussed forms one of the items of controversy between Gruppe and Boeckh, in the recent discussion about Plato's astronomical views. Gruppe, Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, pp. 157-168: Boeckh, Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, pp. 45-57.

Gruppe has an ingenious argument to show that the novelty ([Greek: para/doxon]) which Plato had in his mind, but was afraid to declare openly because of existing prejudices, was the heliocentric or Copernican system, which he believes to have been Plato's discovery. Boeckh refutes Gruppe's reasoning; and refutes it, in my judgment, completely. He sustains the interpretation given by Proklus and Martin.

Boeckh also illustrates (pp. 35-38-49-54), in a manner more satisfactory than Gruppe, the dicta of Plato about the comparative velocity of the Planets (Sun and Moon counted among them).

Plato declares the Moon to be the quickest mover among the planets, and Saturn to be the slowest. On the contrary Demokritus pronounced the Moon to be the slowest mover of all; slower than the Sun, because the Sun was farther from the Earth and nearer to the outermost or sidereal sphere. It was the rotation of this last-mentioned sphere (according to Demokritus) which carried round along with it the Sun, the Moon, and all the planets: the bodies near to it were more forcibly acted upon by its rotation, and carried round more rapidly, than the bodies distant from it--hence the Moon was the least rapid mover of all (Lucretius, v. 615-635. See Sir George Lewis's Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, ch. ii. pp. 139-140).

It appears to me probable that Plato, in the severe remarks which he makes on persons who falsely affirmed the quickest mover in the heavens to be the slowest, had in view these doctrines of Demokritus. Plato never once mentions Demokritus by name (see Mullach, Fragment. Demokrit. p. 25); but he is very sparing in mentioning by name any contemporaries. It illustrates the difference between the manner of Aristotle and Plato, that Aristotle frequently names Demokritus--seventy-eight times according to Mullach (p. 107)--even in the works which we possess.]

In regard to hunting, Plato thinks that it is a subject on which positive laws are unsuitable or insufficient, and he therefore gives certain general directions which partake of the nature both of advice and of law. The good citizen (he says) is one who not only obeys the positive laws prescribed by the lawgiver, but who also conforms his conduct to the general cast of the lawgiver's opinions: practising what is commended therein, abstaining from what is blamed. Plato commends one mode of hunting--the chase after quadrupeds: yet only with horses, dogs, javelins, &c., wherein both courage and bodily strength are improved--but not with nets or snares, where no such result is produced. He blames other modes--such as fishing and bird-snaring (especially by night). He blames still more emphatically theft and piracy, which he regards also as various modes of hunting.

What principally deserves notice here is, the large general idea which Plato conceives to himself under the term Hunting, and the number of diverse particulars comprehended therein. 1. Hunting of quadrupeds; either with dogs and javelins openly, or with snares, by stratagem. 2. Hunting of birds, in the air. 3. Hunting of fishes, in the water. 4. Hunting after the property of other men, in the city or country. 5. Hunting after men as slaves, or after other valuables, by means of piratical vessels. 6. Hunting of public enemies, by one army against an opposite one. 7. Hunting of men to conciliate their friendship or affection, sometimes by fair means, sometimes by foul.

So also in the Sophistês (pp. 221-222) Plato analyses and distributes the general idea of [Greek: thêreutikê/]: including under it, as one variety, the hunting after men by violent means ([Greek: tê\n bi/aion thê/ran, tê\n lê|stikê/n, a)ndrapodistikê\n, turannikê/n, kai\ xu/mpasan tê\n polemikê/n])--and as another variety, the hunting after men by persuasive or seductive means ([Greek: tê\n pithanourgikê/n, e)rôtikê/n, kolakikê/n]). In the Memorabilia of Xenophon also (ii. 6, 29-33), Sokrates expands this same idea--[Greek: tê\n thê/ran a)nthrô/pôn--ta\ tô=n phi/lôn thêratika/], &c. Compare also the conversation between Sokrates and Theodotê (iii. 11, 8-15)--[Greek: thêrô/menos], ib. i. 2, 24--and Plato Protag. init.]

That all these processes--which Plato here includes as so many varieties of hunting--present to the mind, when they are compared, a common point of analogy, is not to be denied. The number of different comparisons which the mind can make between phenomena, is almost unlimited. Analogies may be followed from one to another, until at last, after successive steps, the analogy between the first and the last becomes faint or imperceptible. Yet the same word, transferred successively from the first to the last, conceals this faintness of analogy and keeps them all before the mind as one. To us, this extension of the word hunting to particular cases dissimilar in so many respects, appears more as poetical metaphor: to intelligent Greeks of the Sokratic school, it seemed a serious comparison: and to Plato, with his theory of Ideas, it ought to have presented a Real Idea or permanent One, which alone remained constant amidst an indefinite multitude of fugitive, shadowy, and deceptive, particulars. But though this is the consistent corollary, from Plato's theory of Ideas, he does not so state it in the Treatise De Legibus, and probably he did not so conceive it. Critics have already observed that in this Treatise scarce any mention is made of the theory of Ideas. Plato had passed into other points of view: yet he neither formally renounces the points of view which we find in anterior dialogues, nor takes the trouble of reconciling them with the thoughts of the later dialogues. Whether there exists any Real, Abstract, Idea of Hunting, apart from the particular acts and varieties of hunting--is a question which he does not touch upon. Yet this is the main feature of the Platonic philosophy, and the main doctrine most frequently impugned by Aristotle as Platonic.

Although, in regard to the religious worship of his community, the oracle of Delphi is asked to prescribe what sacrifices are to be offered, and to what Gods--yet the religious lawgiver will determine the number of such sacrifices and festivals, as well as the times and seasons. Each day in the year, sacrifice will be offered by one of the magistrates to some God or Dæmon. Once in every month, there will be a solemn sacrifice and festival, with matches of music and gymnastics, offered by each tribe to its eponymous God. The offerings to the celestial Gods will be kept distinct from the offerings to the subterranean Gods. Among these last, Pluto will be especially worshipped during the twelfth month of the year. The festivals will be adjusted to the seasons, and there will on proper occasions be festivals for women separately and exclusively.

Once a month certainly--and more than once, if the magistrates command--on occasion of one of these festivals, all the citizen population are ordered to attend in military muster--men, women and children. They will be brought together in such divisions and detachments as the magistrate shall direct. They will here go through gymnastic and military exercises. They will also have fights, with warlike weapons not likely to inflict mortal wounds, yet involving sufficient danger to test their bravery and endurance: one against one, two against two, ten against ten. The victors will receive honorary wreaths, and public encomium in appropriate songs. Both men and women will take part alike in these exercises and contests, and in the composition of the odes to celebrate the victors.

Such monthly musters, over and above the constant daily gymnastics of the youthful population, are indispensable as preliminary training; without which the citizens cannot fight with efficiency and success, in the event of a real foreign enemy invading the territory. No athlete ever feels himself qualified to contend at the public games without the most laborious special training beforehand. Yet Plato expresses apprehension that his proposal of regular musters for warlike exercises with sham-battles, will appear ridiculous. He states that nothing of the kind existed in any Grecian city, by reason of two great corruptions:--First, the general love of riches and money-getting: Secondly, the bad governments everywhere existing, whether democracy, oligarchy, or despotism--each of which was in reality a faction or party-government, i.e., government by one part over another unwilling part.

I read with surprise the declaration of Plato, that no such military training exercises existed anywhere in Greece. How is this to be reconciled with the statements of Xenophon in his Treatise on the Republic of the Lacedæmonians, wherein he expressly calls the Spartans [Greek: techni/tas tô=n polemikô=n]--or even with statement of Plato himself about Sparta in the first book of this Treatise De Legibus? Compare Thucyd. v. 69.]

Plato prescribes that the gymnastic training in his community shall be such as to have a constant reference to war; and that elaborate bodily excellence, for the purpose simply of obtaining prizes at the public games, shall be discouraged. There will be foot-races, for men, for boys, and for young women up to twenty years of age--the men always running in full panoply. Horse-racing is permitted, but chariot-racing is discountenanced. There will also be practice with the bow and with other weapons of light warfare, in which the young women are encouraged to take part--yet not constrained, in deference to prevalent sentiment.

In regard to sexual intercourse, Plato recognises that the difficulty of regulating it according to the wisdom of the lawgiver is greater in his city than** in any actual city, because of the more free and public life of the women. Neither Krete nor Sparta furnish a good example to follow on this point. He thinks however that by causing one doctrine on the subject to be continually preached, and by preventing any other from being even mentioned, the lawgiver may be able so to consecrate this doctrine as to procure for it pretty universal obedience. The lawgiver may thus be able to suppress pæderasty altogether, and to restrict generally the sexual intercourse to that of persons legally married--or to enforce at least the restriction, that the exceptional cases of sexual intercourse departing from these conditions shall be covered with the veil of secrecy. The constant bodily exercises prescribed in the Platonic community will tend to diminish the influence of such appetites in the citizens: while the example of the distinguished prize combatants at the Olympic games, in whose long-continued training strict continence was practised, shows that even more than what Plato anticipates can be obtained, under the stimulus of sufficient motive.

Compare the remarks which I have made above in this volume (p. 197) respecting the small probable influence of Aphroditê in the Platonic Republic. A like remark may be made, though not so emphatically, respecting the Platonic community in the Leges.]

What is here proposed respecting the sexual appetite finds no approbation from Kleinias, since the customs in Krete were altogether different. But the Syssitia, or public mess-table for the citizens, are welcomed readily both by the Kretan and the Spartan. The Syssitia existed both in Krete and at Sparta; but were regulated on very different principles in one and in the other. Plato declines to discuss this difference, pronouncing it to be unimportant. But Aristotle informs us what it was; and shows that material consequences turned upon it, in reference to the citizenship at Sparta.

Plato enters now upon the economical and proprietary rules proper for his community. As there will be neither gold and silver nor foreign commerce, he is dispensed from the necessity of making laws about shipments, retailing, interest, mine-digging, collectors of taxes, &c. The persons under his charge will be husbandmen, shepherds, bee-keepers, &c., with those who work under them, and with the artisans who supply implements to them. The first and most important of all regulations is, the law of Zeus Horius or Terminalis--Not to disturb or transgress the boundary marks between different properties. Upon this depends the maintenance of those unalterable fundi or lots, which is the cardinal principle of the Platonic community. Severe penalties, religious as well as civil, are prescribed for offenders against this rule. Each proprietor is directed to have proper regard to the convenience of neighbours, and above all to abstain from annoying or damaging them, especially in regard to the transit, or retention, or distribution, of water. To intercept the supply, or corrupt the quality of water, is a high crime. Regulations are made about the carrying of the harvest, both of grain and fruit. Disputes arising upon these points are to be decided by the magistrates, up to the sum of three minæ: above that sum, by the public Dikasteries. Many rules of detail will require to be made by the magistrates themselves with a view to fulfil the purposes of the lawgiver. So soon as the magistrates think that enough of these regulations have been introduced, they will consecrate the system as it stands, rendering it perpetual and unalterable.

Next, Plato passes to the Demiurgi or Artisans. These are all non-citizens or metics: for it is a peremptory law, that no citizen shall be an artisan in any branch. Nor is any artisan permitted to carry on two crafts trades at once. If any article be imperatively required from abroad, either for implements of war or for religious purposes, the magistrates shall cause it to be imported. But there shall be no retailing, nor reselling with profit, of any article.

The distribution of the produce of land shall be made on a principle approaching to that which prevails in Krete. The total produce raised will be distributed into twelve portions, each equivalent to one month's consumption. Each twelfth portion will then be divided into equal thirds. Two of these thirds will be consumed by the citizens, their families, their slaves, and their agricultural animals: the other third will be sold in the market for the consumption of artisans and strangers, who alone are permitted to buy it, all citizens being forbidden to do so. Each citizen will make the apportionment of his own two-thirds among freemen and slaves: a measured quantity shall then be given to each of the working animals. On the first of each month, the sale of barley and wheat will be made in the market-place, and every artisan or stranger will then purchase enough for his monthly consumption: the like on the twelfth of each month, for wine and other liquids--and on the twentieth of each month, for animals and animal products, such as wool and hides. Firewood may be purchased daily by any stranger or artisan, from the proprietors on whose lands the trees grow, and may be resold by him to other artisans: other articles can only be sold at the monthly market-days. The Agoranomi, or regulators of the market, will preside on those days, and will fix the spots on which the different goods shall be exposed for sale. They will also take account of the quantity which each man has for sale, fixing a certain price for each article. They will then adjust the entries of each man's property in the public registers according to these new transactions. But if the actual purchases and sales be made at any rate different from what is thus fixed, the Agoranomi will modify their entries in the register according to the actual rate, either in plus or in minus. These entries of individual property in the public register will be made both for citizens and resident strangers alike.

These regulations are given both briefly and obscurely.]

It shall be open to any one who chooses, to come and reside in the city as a stranger or artisan to exercise his craft, without payment of any fee, simply on condition of good conduct; and of being enrolled with his property in the register. But he shall not acquire any fixed settlement. After twenty years, he must depart and take away his property. When he departs, the entries belonging to his name, in the proprietary register, shall be cancelled. If he has a son, the son may also exercise the same art and reside as a metic in the city for twenty years, but no longer; beginning from the age of fifteen. Any metic who may render special service to the city, may have his term prolonged, the magistrates and the citizens consenting.

Plato now passes to the criminal code of his community: the determination of offences, penalties, and penal judicature. Serious and capital offences will be judged by the thirty-seven Nomophylakes, in conjunction with a Board of Select Dikasts, composed of the best among the magistrates of the preceding year. They will hear first the pleading of the accuser, next that of the accused: they will then proceed, in the order of seniority, to put questions to both these persons, sifting the matter of charge. Plato requires them to be active in this examination, and to get at the facts by mental effort of their own. They will take notes of the examination, then seal up the tablet, and deposit it upon the altar of Hestia. On the morrow they will reassemble and repeat their examination, hearing witnesses and calling for information respecting the affair. On the third day, again the like: after which they will deliver their verdict on the altar of Hestia. Upon this altar two urns will be placed, for condemnation and acquittal: each Dikast will deposit his pebble in one or other of these, openly before the accuser and accused, and before the assembled citizens.

Conformably to the general sentiment announced still more distinctly in the Republic, Plato speaks here also of penal legislation as if it were hardly required. He regards it as almost an insult to assume that any of his citizens can grow up capable of committing grave crimes, when they have been subjected to such a training, discipline, and government as he institutes. Still human nature is perverse: we must provide for the occurrence of some exceptional criminals among our citizens, even after all our precautionary supervision: besides, over and above the citizens, we have metics and slaves to watch over.

The first and gravest of all crimes is Sacrilege: pillage or destruction of places or objects consecrated to the Gods. Next comes high treason: either betrayal of the city to foreign enemies, or overthrow of the established laws and government. Persons charged with these crimes shall be tried before the Select Dikasts, or High Court above constituted. If found guilty, they shall be punished either capitally or by such other sentence as the court may award. But no sentence either of complete disfranchisement or of perpetual banishment can be passed against any citizen, because every one of the 5040 lots of land must always remain occupied. Nor can any citizen be fined to any greater extent than what he possesses over and above his lot of land. He may be imprisoned, or flogged, or exposed in the pillory, or put to do penance in some sacred precinct. But his punishment shall noway extend to his children, unless persons of the same family shall be condemned to death for three successive generations. Should this occur, the family shall be held as tainted. Their lot of land shall be considered vacant, and assigned to some deserving young man of another citizen family.

Compare the penalties inflicted by Plato with those which were inflicted in Attic procedure. Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, pp. 739-740 seq. There is considerable difference between the two, arising to a great degree out of Plato's peculiar institution about the unalterable number of lots of land (5040) and of citizen families--as well as out of his fixation of maximum and minimum of property. Flogging or beating is prescribed by Plato, but had no place at Athens: [Greek: a)timi/a] was a frequent punishment at Athens: Plato's substitute for it seems to be the pillory--[Greek: tina\s a)mo/rphous e(/dras]. Fine was frequent at Athens as a punishment: Plato is obliged to employ it sparingly.]

Theft.--Plato next adverts to theft, and prescribes that the punishment for a convicted thief shall be one and the same in all cases--to compensate the party robbed to the extent of double the value of the property, or to be imprisoned until he does so. But upon a question upon this being raised, how far one and the same poena dupli, neither more nor less, can be properly applied to all cases of theft, we are carried (according to the usual unsystematic manner of the Platonic dialogue) into a general discussion on the principles of penal legislation. We are reminded that the Platonic lawgiver looks beyond the narrow and defective objects to which all other lawgivers have hitherto unwisely confined themselves. He is under no pressing necessity to legislate at once: he can afford time for preliminary discussion and exposition: he desires to instruct his citizens respecting right and wrong, as well as to constrain their acts by penalty. As he is better qualified than the poets to enlighten them about the just and honourable, so the principles which he lays down ought to have more weight than the verses of Homer or Tyrtæus. In regard to Justice and Injustice generally, there are points on which Plato differs from the public, and also points on which the public are at variance with themselves. For example, every one is unanimous in affirming that whatever is just is also beautiful or honourable. But if this be true, then not only what is justly done, but also what is justly suffered, is beautiful or honourable. Now the penalty of death, inflicted on the sacrilegious person, is justly inflicted. It must therefore be beautiful or honourable: yet every one agrees in declaring it to be shocking and infamous. Here there is an inconsistency or contradiction in the opinions of the public themselves.

The same argument is employed by Sokrates in the Gorgias, p. 476 E.]

But Plato differs from the public on another point also. He affirms all wicked or unjust men to be unwillingly wicked or unjust: he affirms that no man does injustice willingly. How is he to carry out this maxim in his laws? He cannot make any distinction (as all existing cities make it) in the penalties prescribed for voluntary injustice, and for involuntary injustice; for he does not recognise the former as real. He must explain upon what foundation his dissent from the public rests. He discriminates between Damnum and Injuria--between Damage or Hurt, and Injustice. When damage is done, it is sometimes done voluntarily--sometimes, and quite as often, involuntarily. The public call this latter by the name of involuntary injustice; but in Plato's view it is no injustice at all. Injustice is essentially distinct from damage: it depends on the temper, purpose, or disposition of the agent, not on the result as affecting the patient. A man may be unjust when he is conferring benefit upon another, as well as when he is doing hurt to another. Whether the result be beneficial or hurtful, the action will be right or wrong, and the agent just or unjust, according to the condition of his own mind in doing it.

The eighth chapter, fifth Book, of Aristotle's Nikomachean Ethics, discusses this question more instructively than Plato.]

The real distinction therefore (according to Plato) is not between voluntary and involuntary injustice, but between voluntary and involuntary damage. Voluntary damage is injustice, but it is not voluntary injustice. The unjust agent, so far forth as unjust, acts involuntarily: he is under the perverting influence of mental distemper. He must be compelled to make good the damage which he has done, or to offer such requital as may satisfy the feelings of the person damaged: and he must besides be subjected to such treatment as will heal the distemper of his mind, so that he will not be disposed to do farther voluntary damage in future. And he ought to be subjected to this treatment equally, whether his mental distemper (injustice) has shown itself in doing wilful damage to another, or in conferring corrupt profit on another--in taking away another man's property, or in giving away his own property wrongfully. The healing treatment may be different in different cases: discourses addressed, or works imposed--pleasures or pains, honour or disgrace, fine or otherwise. But in all cases the purpose is one and the same--to heal the distemper of his mind, and to make him hate injustice. If he be found incurable, he must be put to death. It is a gain for himself to die, and a still greater gain for society that he should die, since his execution will serve as a warning to others.

Of misguided or erroneous proceeding there are in the human mind three producing causes, acting separately or conjointly:--1. The painful stimulus--Anger, Envy, Hatred, or Fear. 2. The seductive stimulus, of Pleasure or Desire. 3. Ignorance. Ignorance is twofold:--1. Ignorance pure and simple. 2. Ignorance combined with the false persuasion of knowledge. This last again is exhibited under two distinguishable cases:--1. When combined with power; and in this case it produces grave and enormous crimes. 2. When found in weak persons, children or old men, in which case it produces, nothing worse than slight and venial offences, giving little trouble to the lawgiver.

Now the unjust man (Plato tells us) is he in whose mind either one or other of the two first causes are paramount, and not controuled by Reason: either Hatred, Anger, Fear--or else Appetite and the Desire of Pleasure. What he does under either of these two stimuli is unjust, whether he damages any one else or not. But if neither of these two stimuli be prevalent in his mind--if, on the contrary, both of them are subordinated to the opinion which he entertains about what is good and right--then everything which he does is just, even though he falls into error. If in this state of mind he hurts any one else, it will be simply hurt, not injustice. Those persons are incorrect who speak of it as injustice, but as involuntary injustice. The proceedings of such a man may be misguided or erroneous, but they will never be unjust.

All these three causes may realise themselves in act under three varieties of circumstances: 1. By open and violent deeds. 2. By secret, deceitful, premeditated contrivance. 3. By a combination of both the two. Our laws must make provision for all the three.

Such is the theory here advanced by Plato to reconcile his views and recommendations in the Leges with a doctrine which he had propounded and insisted upon elsewhere:--That no man commits injustice voluntarily--That all injustice is involuntary, arising from ignorance--That every one would be just, if he only knew wherein justice consists--That knowledge, when it exists in the mind, will exercise controul and preponderance over the passions and appetites.

The distinction whereby Plato here proposes to save all inconsistency, is a distinction between misconduct or misguided actions ([Greek: a(martê/mata], or [Greek: a(martano/mena]), and unjust actions ([Greek: a)dikê/mata]). The last of these categories is comprised by him in the first, as one species or variety thereof. That is, all [Greek: a)dikê/mata] are [Greek: a(martê/mata]: but all [Greek: a(martê/mata] are not [Greek: a)dikê/mata]. He reckons three distinct causes of [Greek: a(martê/mata]: two belonging to the emotional department of mind; one to the intellectual. Those [Greek: a(martê/mata] which arise from either of the two first causes are also [Greek: a)dikê/mata]: those which arise from the third are not [Greek: a)dikê/mata].

This is the distinction which Plato here draws, with a view to save consistency in his own doctrine--at least as far as I can understand it, for the reasoning is not clear. It proceeds upon a restricted definition, peculiar to himself, of the word injustice--a restriction, however, which coincides in part with that which he gives of Justice in the Republic, where he treats Justice as consisting in the controul exercised over Passion and Appetite (the emotional department) by Reason (the intellectual): each of the three departments of the soul or each of the three separate souls, keeping in its own place, and discharging its own appropriate functions. Every act which a man does under the influence of persuasion or opinion of the best, is held by Plato to be just--whatever his persuasion may be--whether it be true or false If he be sincerely persuaded that he is acting for the best, he cannot commit injustice.

Injustice being thus restricted to mean the separate and unregulated action of emotional impulse--and such unregulated action being, as a general fact, a cause of misery to the agent--Plato's view is, that no man is voluntarily unjust: for no man wishes to be miserable. Every man wishes to be happy: therefore every man wishes to be just: because some controul of impulse by reason is absolutely essential to happiness. When once such controul is established, a man becomes just: he no longer commits injustice. But he may still commit misconduct, and very gross misconduct: moreover, this misconduct will be, or may be, voluntary. For though the rational soul be now preponderant and controuling over the emotional (which controul constitutes justice), yet the rational soul itself may be imperfectly informed (ignorance simple); or may not only be ignorant, but preoccupied besides with false persuasions and prejudices. Under such circumstances the just man may commit misconduct, and do serious hurt to others. What he does may be done voluntarily, in full coincidence with his own will: for the will postulates only the controul of reason over emotion, and here that condition is fulfilled, the fault lying with the controuling reason itself.

Plato's reasoning here (obscure and difficult to follow) is intended to show that there can be no voluntary injustice, but that there is much both of voluntary misconduct, and voluntary mischief. His purpose as lawgiver is to prevent or remedy not only (what he calls) injustice, but also misconduct and mischief. As a remedy for mischief done, he prescribes that the agent thereof shall make full compensation to the sufferer. As an antidote to injustice, he applies his educational discipline as well as his penal and remuneratory treatment, to the emotions, with a view to subdue some and develop others. As a corrective to misconduct in all its branches, he assumes to himself as lawgiver a spiritual power, applied to the improvement of the rational or intellectual man: prescribing what doctrines and beliefs shall be accredited in his city, tolerating no others, and forbidding all contradiction, or dissentient individuality of judgment. He thus ensures that every man s individual reason shall be in harmony with the infallible reason.

I do not conceive Plato's reasoning exactly in the same way as Hermann. Plato denies only the reality of [Greek: e(kou/sia a)dikê/mata]: he considers all [Greek: a)dikê/mata] as essentially [Greek: a)kou/sia]. But he does not deny [Greek: e(kou/sia a)dikê/mata] (which is the large genus comprehending [Greek: a)dikê/mata] as one species): he recognises both [Greek: a(martê/mata e(kou/sia] and [Greek: a(martê/mata a)kou/sia]. And he considers the [Greek: a(martê/mata] arising from [Greek: thumo\s] to be midway between the two. But he also recognises [Greek: a(martê/mata] as springing from the three different sources in the human mind. The two positions are not incompatible; though the whole discussion is obscured by the perplexing distinction between [Greek: a(martê/mata] and [Greek: a)dikê/mata].]

The peculiar sense in which Plato uses the words justice and injustice is perplexing throughout this discussion. The words, as he uses them, coincide only in part with the ordinary meaning. They comprehend more in one direction, and less in another.

Plato now proceeds to promulgate laws in respect to homicide, wounds, beating, &c.

Homicide, however involuntary and unintentional, taints the person by whose hands it is committed. He must undergo purification, partly by such expiatory ceremonies as the Exêgêtæ may appoint, partly by a temporary exile from the places habitually frequented by the person slain: who even after death (according to the doctrine of an ancient fable, which Plato here ratifies), if he saw the homicidal agent among his prior haunts, while the occurrence was yet recent, would be himself disturbed, and would communicate tormenting disturbance to the agent. This latter accordingly is commanded to leave the territory for a year, and to refrain from visiting any of the sacred precincts until he has been purified. If he obeys, the relatives of the person slain shall forgive him; and he shall, after his year's exile, return to his ordinary abode and citizenship. But if he evades obedience, these relatives shall indict him for the act, and he shall incur double penalties. Should the nearest relative, under these circumstances, neglect to indict, he may himself be indicted by any one who chooses, and shall be condemned to an exile of five years.

Compare Antiphon. Accus. Cæd. p. 116, and Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 301. The old law of Drako is given in substance in Demosthen. adv. Leptin. p. 505. [Greek: A)peniautismo/s], compulsory year of exile. K. F. Hermann, Griechische Privat-Alterthümer, s. 61, not. 23.]

Plato provides distinct modes of proceeding for this same act of involuntary homicide, under varieties of persons and circumstances--citizens, metics, strangers, slaves, &c. He especially lays it down that physicians, if a patient dies under their hands, they being unwilling--shall be held innocent, and shall not need purification.

After involuntary homicide, Plato passes to the case of homicide committed under violent passion or provocation; which he ranks as intermediate between the involuntary and the voluntary--approaching the one or the other, according to circumstances: according as it is done instantaneously, or with more or less of interval and premeditation. If the act be committed instantaneously, the homicide shall undergo two years' exile: if after time for deliberation, the time of exile must be extended to three years. But if the slain person before his death shall have expressed forgiveness, the case shall be dealt with as one of involuntary homicide. Special enactments are made for the case of a slave killed by a citizen, a citizen killed by a slave, a son killed by his father, a wife by her husband, &c., under the influence of passion or strong provocation. Homicide in self-defence against a previous aggressor is allowed universally.

Thirdly, Plato passes to the case of homicide voluntary, the extreme of injustice, committed under the influence of pleasure, appetite, envy, jealousy, ambition, fear of voluntary divulgation of dangerous secrets, &c.--homicide premeditated and unjust. Among all these causes, the chief and most frequent is love of wealth; which gets possession of most men, in consequence of the untrue and preposterous admiration of wealth** imbibed in their youth from the current talk and literature. The next in frequency is the competition of ambitious men for power or rank. Whoever has committed homicide upon a fellow-citizen, under these circumstances, shall be interdicted from all the temples and other public places, and shall be indicted by the nearest relatives of the deceased. If found guilty, he shall be put to death: if he leave the country to evade trial, he must be banished in perpetuity. The nearest relative is bound to indict, otherwise he draws down upon himself the taint, and may himself be indicted. Certain sacrifices and religious ceremonies will be required in such cases, to accompany the legal procedure. These, together with the names of the Gods proper to invoke, will be prescribed by the Nomophylakes, in conjunction with the prophets and the Exêgêtæ, or religious interpreters. The Dikasts before whom such trials will take place are the Nomophylakes, together with some select persons from the magistrates of the past year: the same as in the case of sacrilege and treason. The like procedure and penalty will be employed against any one who has contrived the death of another, not with his own hands, but by suborning some third person: except that this contriver may be buried within the limits of the territory, while the man whose hands are stained with blood cannot be buried therein.

For the cases of homicide between kinsmen or relatives, Plato provides a form of procedure still more solemn, and a still graver measure of punishment. He also declares suicide to leave a taint upon the country, which requires to be purified as the Exêgêtæ may prescribe: unless the act has been committed under extreme pain or extreme disgrace. The person who has killed himself must be buried apart without honour, not in the regular family burying places. The most cruel mode of death is directed to be inflicted upon a slave who has voluntarily slain, or procured to be slain, a freeman. If a slave be put to death without any fault of his own, but only from apprehension of secrets which he may divulge, the person who kills him shall be subjected to the same trial and sentence as if he had killed a citizen. If any animal, or even any lifeless object, has caused the death of a man, the surviving relatives must prosecute, and the animal or the object must be taken away from the country.

Justifiable Homicide.--Some special cases are named in which he who voluntarily kills another, is nevertheless perfectly untainted. A housebreaker caught in act may thus be rightfully slain: so also a clothes-stealer, a ravisher, a person who attacks the life of any man's father, mother, or children.

Wounds.--Next to homicide, Plato deals with wounds inflicted: introducing his enactments by a preface on the general necessity of obedience to law. Whosoever, having intended to kill another (except in the special cases wherein homicide is justifiable), inflicts a wound which proves not mortal, is as criminal as if he had killed him. Nevertheless he is not required to suffer so severe a punishment, inasmuch as an auspicious Dæmon and Fortune have interposed to ward off the worst results of his criminal purpose. He must make full compensation to the sufferer, and then be exiled in perpetuity. The Dikastery will decide how much compensation he shall furnish. In general, Plato trusts much to the discretion of the Dikastery, under the great diversity of the cases of wounds inflicted. He would not have allowed so much discretion to the numerous and turbulent Dikasteries of Athens: but he regards his select Dikastery as perfectly trustworthy. Peculiar provision is made for cases in which the person inflicting the wound is kinsman or relative of the sufferer--also for homicide under the same circumstances. Plato also directs how to supply the vacancy which perpetual banishment will occasion in the occupation of one among the 5040 citizen-lots. If one man wounds another in a fit of passion, he must pay simple, double, or triple, compensation according as the Dikasts may award: he must farther do all the military duty which would have been incumbent on the wounded man, should the latter be disabled. But if the person inflicting the wound be a slave and the wounded man a freeman, the slave shall be handed over to the wounded freeman to deal with as he pleases. If the master of the slave will not give him up, he must himself make compensation for the wound, unless he can prove before the Dikastery that the case is one of collusion between the wounded freeman and the slave; in which case the wounded freeman will become liable to the charge of unlawfully suborning away the slave from his master.

Beating.--The laws of Plato on the subject of beating are more peculiar. They are mainly founded in reverence for age. One who strikes a person twenty years older than himself, is severely punished: but if he strikes a person of the same age with himself, that person must defend himself as he can with his own hands--no punishment being provided. For him who strikes his father or mother, the heaviest penalty, excommunication and perpetual banishment, is provided. If a slave strike a freeman, he shall be punished with as many blows as the person stricken directs, nevertheless in such manner as not to diminish his value to his master.

The person who struck first blow was guilty of [Greek: ai)ki/a], Demosth. adv. Euerg. and Mnesibul. pp. 1141-1151.]

Throughout all this Treatise De Legibus, in regard both to civil and criminal enactments, Plato has borrowed largely from Attic laws and procedure. But in regard to homicide and wounds, he has borrowed more largely than in any other department. Both the general character, and the particular details, of his provisions respecting homicide, are in close harmony with ancient Athenian sentiment, and with the embodiments of that sentiment by the lawgivers Drako and Solon. At Athens, though the judicial procedure generally, as well as the political constitution, underwent great modification between the time of Solon and that of Demosthenes, yet the procedure in the case of homicide remained without any material change. It was of a sanctified character, depending mainly upon ancient religious tradition. The person charged with homicide was not tried before the general body of Dikasts, drawn by lot, but before special ancient tribunals and in certain consecrated places, according to the circumstances under which the act of homicide was charged. The principal object contemplated, was to protect the city and its public buildings against the injurious consequences arising from the presence of a tainted man--and to mollify the posthumous wrath of the person slain. This view of the Attic procedure against homicide is copied by the Platonic. Plato keeps prominently in view the religious bearing and consequences of such an act; he touches comparatively little upon its consequences in causing distress and diminishing the security of life. He copies the Attic law both in the justifications which he admits for homicide, and in the sentence of banishment which he passes against both animals and inanimate objects to whom any man owes his death. He goes beyond the Attic law in the solemnity and emphasis of his details about homicide among members of the same family and relatives: as well as in the severe punishment which he imposes upon the surviving relatives of the person slain, if they should neglect their obligation of indicting. Throughout all this chapter, Plato not only follows the Attic law, but overpasses it, in dealing with homicide as a portion of the Jus Sacrum rather than of the Jus Civile.

The first of Matthiæ's Dissertations, De Judiciis Atheniensium (Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i. pp. 145-176), collects the information on these matters: and K. F. Hermann (De Vestigiis Institutorum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis De Legibus Libros indagandis, Marburg, 1836) gives a detailed comparison of Plato's directions with what we know about the Attic Law:--"Ipsas homicidiorum religiones (Plato) ex antiquissimo jure patrio in suum ita transtulit, ut nihil opportunius ad illustranda illius vestigia inveniri posse videatur" (p. 49). . . . "quæ omnia Solonis Draconisve in legibus ferè ad verbum eadem inveniuntur" (p. 50). The same about [Greek: trau/mata e)k pronoi/as], pp. 58-59.]

In respect to the offence of beating, he does not follow the Attic law, when he permits it between citizens of the same age, and throws the beaten person upon his powers of self-defence. This is Spartan, not Athenian. It is also Spartan when he makes the criminality, in giving blows, to turn upon the want of reverence for age: upon the circumstance, that the person beaten is twenty years older than the beater.

Compare, about Sparta, Xenophon, Rep. Laced. iv. 5; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 27; Pausanias, iii. 14: Dionys. Halikarnass. Arch. Rom. xx. 2. [Greek: Lakedaimo/nioi o(/ti toi=s presbute/rois e)pe/trepon tou\s a)kosmou=ntas tô=n politô=n e)n o(/tô| dê/ tini tô=n dêmosi/ôn to/pôn tai=s baktêri/ais pai/ein.]]

From these various crimes--sacrilege or plunder of holy places, theft, homicide, wounding, beating--Plato passes in the tenth book to insult or outrage ([Greek: u(/bris]). These outrages (he considers) are essentially the acts of wild young men. Outrage may be offered towards five different subjects. 1. Public temples. 2. Private chapels and sepulchres. 3. Parents. 4. The magistrates, in their dignity or their possessions. 5. Private citizens, in respect of their civic rights and dignity. The tenth book is devoted entirely to the two first-mentioned heads, or to impiety and its alleged sources: the others come elsewhere, not in any definite order.

Plato declares that all impiety, either in word or deed, springs from one of three heretical doctrines. 1. The heretic does not believe in the Gods at all. 2. He believes the Gods to exist, but believes also that they do not interest themselves about human affairs; or at least that they interfere only to a small extent. 3. He believes that they exist, and that they direct every thing; but that it is perfectly practicable to appease their displeasure, and to conciliate their favour, by means of prayer and sacrifice.

If a person displays impiety, either by word or deed, in either of these three ways, he shall be denounced to the archons by any citizen who becomes acquainted with the fact. The archons, on pain of taking the impiety on themselves, shall assemble the dikastery, and put the person accused on trial. If found guilty, he shall be put in chains and confined in one or other of the public prisons. These public prisons are three in number: one in the market-place, for ordinary offenders: a second, called the House of Correction ([Greek: sôphronistê/rion]), attached to the building in which the Supreme Board of Magistrates hold their nocturnal sittings: a third, known by some designation of solemn penalty, in the centre of the territory, but in some savage and desolate spot.

Imprisonment included chains round the prisoner's legs. Sokrates was put in chains during his thirty days' confinement, arising from the voyage of the Theôric ship to Delos (Plat. Phædon, p. 60 B).]

Suppose the heretic, under either one of the three heads, to be found guilty of heresy pure and simple--but that his conduct has been just, temperate, unexceptionable, and his social dispositions steadily manifested, esteeming the society of just men, and shunning that of the unjust. There is still danger that by open speech or scoffing he should shake the orthodox belief of others: he must therefore be chained in the house of Correction for a term not less than five years. During this term no citizen whatever shall be admitted to see him, except the members of the Nocturnal Council of Magistrates. These men will constantly commune with him, administering exhortations for the safety of his soul and for his improvement. If at the expiration of the five years, he appears to be cured of his heresy and restored to a proper state of mind, he shall be set at liberty, and allowed to live with other proper-minded persons. But if no such cure be operated, and if he shall be found guilty a second time of the same offence, he shall suffer the penalty of death.

Again--the heretic may be found guilty, not of heresy pure and simple in one of its three varieties, but of heresy manifesting itself in bad conduct and with aggravating circumstances. He may conceal his real opinion, and acquire the reputation of the best dispositions, employing that reputation to overreach others, and combining dissolute purposes with superior acuteness and intelligence: he may practise stratagems to succeed as a despot, a public orator, a general, or a sophist: he may take up, and will more frequently take up, the profession of a prophet or religious ritualist or sorcerer, professing to invoke the dead or to command the aid of the Gods by prayer and sacrifice. He may thus try to bring ruin upon citizens, families, and cities. A heretic of this description (says Plato) deserves death not once or twice only, but several times over, if it were possible. If found guilty he must be kept in chains for life in the central penal prison--not allowed to see any freemen--not visited by any one, except the slave who brings to him his daily rations. When he dies, his body must be cast out of the territory without burial: and any freeman who may assist in burying it, shall himself incur the penalty of impiety. From the day that the heretic is imprisoned, he shall be considered as civilly dead; his children being placed under wardship as orphans.

As a still farther assurance for reaching and punishing these dangerous heretics, Plato enacts--No one shall erect any temple or altar, no one shall establish any separate worship or sacrifice, in his own private precincts. No one shall propitiate the Gods by secret prayer and sacrifice of his own. When a man thinks fit to offer prayer and sacrifice, he must do it at the public temples, through and along with recognised priests and priestesses. If a man keep in his house any sacred object to which he offers sacrifice, the archons shall require him to bring it into the public temples, and shall punish him until he does so. But if he be found guilty of sacrificing either at home or in the public temples, after the commission of any act which the Dikastery may consider grave impiety--he shall be condemned to death.

In justifying this stringent enactment, Plato not only proclaims that the proper establishment of temples and worship can only be dictated by a man of the highest intelligence, but he also complains of the violent and irregular working of the religious feeling in the minds of individuals. Many men (he says) when sick, or in danger and troubles of what kind soever, or when alarmed by dreams or by spectres seen in their waking hours, or when calling to mind and recounting similar narratives respecting the past, or when again experiencing unexpected good fortune--many men under such circumstances, and all women, are accustomed to give a religious colour to the situation, and to seek relief by vows, sacrifices, and altars to the Gods. Hence the private houses and villages become full of such foundations and proceedings. Such religious sentiments and fears, springing up spontaneously in the minds of individuals, are considered by Plato to require strict repression. He will allow no religious worship or manifestation, except that which is public and officially authorised.

If, however, we turn back to v. p.738 C, we shall see that Plato ratifies these [Greek: kathierô/seis], when they have once got footing, and rejects only the new ones. The rites, worship, and sacrifices, in his city, are assumed to have been determined by local or oracular inspiration (v. p. 738 B): the orthodox creed is set out by himself.]

Such is the Act of Uniformity promulgated by Plato for his new community of the Magnêtes, and such the terrible sanctions by which it is enforced. The lawgiver is the supreme and exclusive authority, spiritual as well as temporal, on matters religious as well as on matters secular. No dissenters from the orthodoxy prescribed by him are admitted. Those who believe more than he does, and those who believe less, however blameless their conduct, are condemned alike to pass through a long solitary imprisonment to execution. Not only the speculations of enquiring individual reason, but also the spontaneous inspirations of religious disquietude or terror, are suppressed and punished.

See K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, sect. 10: Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 201-204.

Cicero also enacts, in his Treatise De Legibus (ii. 8-10):--"Separatim nemo habessit Deos: neve novos, sed ne advenas, nisi publicé adscitos, privatim colunto." Compare Livy, xxxix. 16, about the Roman prohibitions of sacra externa. But Cicero does not propose to inflict such severe penalties as Plato.]

We seem to be under a legislation imbued with the persecuting spirit and self-satisfied infallibility of mediaeval Catholicism and the Inquisition. The dissenter is a criminal, and among the worst of criminals, even if he do nothing more than proclaim his opinions. How striking is the contradiction between this spirit and that in which Plato depicts the Sokrates of the Phædon, the Apology, and the Gorgias! How fully does Sokrates in the Phædon recognise and respect the individual reason of his two friends, though dissenting from his own! How emphatically does he proclaim, in the Apology and Gorgias, not merely his own individual dissent from his fellow-citizens, but also his resolution to avow and maintain it against one and all, until he should hear such reasons as convinced him that it was untrue! How earnestly does he declare (in the Apology) that he has received from the Delphian God a mission to cross-examine the people of Athens, and that he will obey the God in preference to them: thus claiming to himself that special religious privilege which his accuser Melêtus imputes to him as a crime, and which Plato, in his Magnêtic colony, also treats as a crime, interdicting it under the severest penalties! During the interval of forty-five years (probably) between the trial of Sokrates and the composition of the Leges, Plato had passed from sympathy with the free-spoken dissenter to an opposite feeling--hatred of all dissent, and an unsparing employment of penalties for upholding orthodoxy. I have already remarked on the Republic, and I here remark it again--if Melêtus lived long enough to read the Leges, he would have found his own accusation of Sokrates amply warranted by the enactments and doctrines of the most distinguished Sokratic Companion.

I transcribe the above passage from an interesting article upon Book-Censors, in Beckmann's History of Inventions (Ed. 1817, vol. iii. p. 93 seq.), where numerous examples are cited of the prohibition, combustion, or licensing of books by authority, from the burning of the work of Protagoras by decree of the Athenian assembly, down to modern times; illustrating the tendency of different sects and creeds, in proportion as they acquired power, to silence all open contradiction. The Christian Arnobius, at a time when his creed was under disfavour by the Emperors, protests against this practice, in a liberal and comprehensive phrase which would have much offended Plato (at the time when he wrote the Leges) and Hermolaus:--"Alios audio mussitare indignanter et dicere:--Oportere statui per Senatum, aboleantur ut hæc scripta quibus Christiana religio comprobetur et vetustatis opprimatur auctoritas. . . . Nam intercipere scripta, et publicatam velle submergere lectionem, non est Deos defendere, sed veritatis testificationem timere" (Arnob. adv. Gentes, iii. p. 104. Also iv. p. 152).

"We are told by Eusebius (Beckmann, ed. 1817, vol. iii. p. 96; Bohn's ed., vol. ii. p. 514) that Diocletian caused the sacred Scriptures to be burnt. After the spreading of the Christian religion, the clergy exercised against books that were either unfavourable or disagreeable to them, the same severity which they had censured in the heathens as foolish and prejudicial to their own cause. Thus were the writings of Arius condemned to the flames at the Council of Nice; and Constantine threatened with the punishment of death those who should conceal them. The clergy assembled at the Council of Ephesus requested the Emperor Theodosius II. to cause the works of Nestorius to be burnt; and this desire was complied with. The writings of Eutyches shared the like fate at the Council of Chalcedon: and it would not be difficult to collect examples of the same kind from each of the following centuries."

Dr. Vaughan observes, in criticising the virtuous character and sincere persecuting spirit of Sir Thomas More:--"If there be any opinion which it would be just to punish as a crime, it is the opinion which makes it to be a virtue not to tolerate opinion." (Revolutions in English History, vol. ii. p. 178.)

I find the following striking anecdote in the transactions of the Académie Royale de Belgique, 1862; Bulletins, 2me Sér., tom. xiii. p. 567 seq.; Vie et Travaux de Nicolas Cleynaerts par M. Thonissen. Cleynaerts (or Clenardus) was a learned Belgian (born 1495--died 1543), professor both at Louvain and at Salamanca, and author of Grammaticæ Institutiones, both of the Greek and the Hebrew languages. He acquired, under prodigious difficulties and disadvantages, a knowledge of the Arabic language; and he employed great efforts to organise a course of regular instruction in that language at Louvain, with a view to the formation of missionaries who would combat the doctrines of Islam.

At Grenada, in Spain (1538), "Clenardus ne réussit pas mieux à arracher aux bûchers de l'inquisition les manuscrits et les livres" (Moorish and Arabic books which had been seized after the conquest of Grenada by the Spaniards) "qu'elle avait entassés dans sa succursale de Grenade. Ce fut en vain que Cleynaerts, faisant valoir le but éminemment chrétien qu'il voulait atteindre, prodigua les démarches et les prières, pour se faire remettre 'ces papiers plus nécessaires à lui qu'à Vulcain'. . . . L'inexorable inquisition refusa de lâcher sa proie. Un savant théologien, Jean-Martin Silicæus, précepteur de Philippe II., fit cependant entendre à notre compatriote, que ses voeux pourraient être exaucés, s'il consentait à fonder son école, non à Louvain, mais à Grenade, où une multitude de néophytes faisaient semblant de professer le Christianisme, tout en conservant les préceptes de Mahomet au fond du coeur. Mais le linguiste Belge lui fit cette réponse, doublement remarquable à cause du pays et de l'époque où elle fut émise: 'C'est en Brabant, et nullement en Espagne, que je poserai les fondements de mon oeuvre. Je cherche des compagnons d'armes pour lutter là où la lutte peut être loyale et franche. Les habitants du royaume de Grenade n'oseraient pas me répondre, puisque la terreur de l'inquisition les force à se dire chrétiens. Le combat est impossible, là où personne n'ose assumer le rôle de l'ennemi'--." Galen calls for a strict censorship, even over medical books--ad Julianum--Vol. xviii. p. 247 Kühn.]

Compare also p. 482 B of the same dialogue, where Sokrates declares his anxiety to maintain consistency with himself, and his indifference to other authority.]

Compare my 'History of Greece,' ch. xxviii.

I have in one passage greatly understated the amount of severity which Plato employs against heretics. I there affirm that he banishes them: whereas the truth is, that he imprisons them, and ultimately, unless they recant, puts them to death.]

It is true that the orthodoxy which Plato promulgates, and forbids to be impugned, in the Magnêtic community, is an orthodoxy of his own, different from that which was recognised at Athens; but this only makes the case more remarkable, and shows the deep root of intolerance in the human bosom--esteemed as it frequently is, by a sincere man, among the foremost of his own virtues. Plato marks out three varieties of heresy, punishable by long imprisonment, and subsequent death in case of obstinate persistence. Now under one or other of the three varieties, a large majority of actual Greeks would have been included. The first variety--those who did not believe the Gods to exist--was doubtless confined to a small minority of reflecting men; though this minority (according to Plato), not contemptible even in number, was distinguished in respect to intellectual accomplishments. The second variety--that of those who believed the Gods to exist, but believed them to produce some results only, not all--was more numerous. And the third variety--that of those who believed them to be capable of being appeased or won over by prayer and sacrifice--was the most numerous of all. Plato himself informs us that this last doctrine was proclaimed by the most eminent poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests, as well as by thousands and tens of thousands besides. That prayer and sacrifice were means of appeasing the displeasure or unfavourable dispositions of the Gods--was the general belief of the Grecian world, from the Homeric times downwards. The oracles or individual prophets were constantly entreated to inform petitioners, what was the nature or amount of expiatory ceremony which would prove sufficient for any specific case; but that there was some sort of expiatory ceremony which would avail, was questioned by few sincere believers. All these would have been ranked as heretics by Plato. If the Magnêtic community had become a reality, the solitary cells of the Platonic Inquisition might have been found to include Anaxagoras, and most of the Ionic philosophers, under the first head of heresy; Aristotle and Epikurus under the second; Herodotus and Nikias under the third. Indeed most of the 5040 Magnêtic colonists must have adjusted anew their canon of orthodoxy in order to satisfy the exigence of the Platonic Censors.

Fabricius tells us that Plato himself has been considered and designated as an atheist, by various critics:--"Alii Platonem atheis, alii Spinozæ præcursoribus, adnumerarunt. Utriusque criminis reum eum fecit Nic. Henr. Gundling. . . At alii bené defenderunt philosophum ab illo crimine." (Bibliothec. Græc. tom. iii. pp. 69, not. hh, ed. Harles.)

This illustrates the loose manner in which the epithet [Greek: a)/theos] has been applied in philosophical and theological controversies: a practice forcibly exposed in the following acute note of Wyttenbach.

Wyttenbach, Præf. ad Plutarch. De Superstit. vol. vi. pars ii. p. 995. "Nam quæ est superstitio? quæ [Greek: a)theo/tês]? quæ harum species? qui gradus? His demum explicitis et inter se comparatis intelligi poterit, quæ [Greek: a)theo/têtos] species cui superstitionis speciei, qui gradus hujus cui gradui illius, anteferri aut postponi debeat. Ac primum in ipsis illis de quibus agitur rebus definiendis magna est difficultas. Quamquam atheum quidem definire non difficile videtur; quippe quo ipso nomine significetur is qui nullum esse deum putet. Atqui hæc etiam definitio non intelligatur, nisi antea declaretur quid sit id quod Dei vocabulo significemus--omnino quæ sit definitio Dei. Jam nemo ignorat quantopere in notione ac definitione Dei dissentiant non modo universi populi, sed et singuli homines: nec solum vulgus, sed et sapientes: ita quidem, ut quo plures partes sint, ex quibus hæc notio constituatur, eo minus in ea consentiant. Sed fac esse qui eam paucissimis complectatur proprietatibus, ut dicat Deum esse mentem æternam, omnium rerum creatricem et gubernatricem. Erunt qui eum parum, erunt qui nimium, dixisse putent: neutri se atheos volent, utrique et hunc et se invicem atheos dicent. . . Ita se res habet. Quotidié jactatur tralatitium illud, verus Deus: quo suam quisque de Deo notionem significat, sæpe illam ineptam et summi numinis majestate indignam. Et bene nobiscum ageretur, si non nisi ab indocto vulgo jactaretur. Nunc philosophi, certe qui se philosophos haberi volunt, item crepant. Disputant de vero Deo, nec ab ejus definitione proficiscuntur, quasi vero hæc nemini ignota sit. . . . Pervulgata illa veri Dei appellatio nobis venit a consuetudine Ecclesiæ, cujus diversæ quondam sectæ notionem Dei diverso modo informantes, ejus ignorationem et [Greek: a)theo/têta] non modo profanis, sed invicem aliæ aliis sectis exprobrare solebant. Hæc de notione athei: quæ profecto, nisi constitutâ notione Dei, constitui ipsa nequit."]

To these severe laws and penalties against heretics, Plato prefixes a Proëm or Prologue of considerable length, commenting upon and refuting their doctrines. In the earlier part of this dialogue he had taken credit to himself for having been the first to introduce his legal mandates by a prefatory harangue, intended to persuade and conciliate the persons upon whom the mandate was imposed, and to procure cheerful obedience. For such a purpose the Proëm in the tenth Book would be badly calculated. But Plato here introduces it with a different view: partly to demonstrate a kosmical and theological theory, partly to excite alarm and repugnance in the heretics whom he marks out and condemns. How many among them might be convinced by Plato's reasonings, I do not know; but the large majority of them could not fail to be offended and exasperated by the tone of his Proëm or prefatory discourse. Confessing his inability to maintain completely the calmness and dignity of philosophical discussion, he addresses them partly with passionate asperity, partly with the arrogant condescension of a schoolmaster lecturing indocile pupils. He describes them now as hateful and unprincipled men--now as presumptuous youths daring to form opinions before they are competent, and labouring under a distemper of reason; and this too, although he intimates that the first-named variety of heresy was adopted by most of the physical philosophers; and the third variety by many of the best poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests. Such unusual vehemence is justified by Plato on the ground of a virtuous indignation against the impugners of orthodox belief. We learn from the Platonic and Xenophontic Apologies, that Melêtus and Anytus, when they accused Sokrates of impiety before the Dikastery, indulged in the same invective, announced the same justification, and felt the same confidence that they were righteous champions of the national faith, against an impious and guilty assailant.

Among the three varieties of heresy, Plato considers the third to be the worst. He accounts it a greater crime to believe in indulgent and persuadeable Gods, than not to believe in any Gods at all. Respecting the entire unbelievers, he acknowledges that a certain proportion are so from intellectual, not from moral, default: and that there are, among them, persons of blameless life and disposition. It must be remembered that the foremost of these unbelievers, and the most obnoxious to Plato, were the physical astronomers: those who did not agree with him in recognising the Sun, Moon, and Stars as animated and divine Beings--those who studied their movements as if they were mechanical agents. Plato gives a brief summary of various cosmogonic doctrines professed by these heretics, who did not recognise (he says) either God, or reason, or art, in the cosmogonic process; but ascribed to nature, chance, and necessity, the genesis of celestial and terrestrial substances, which were afterwards modified by human art and reason. Among these matters regulated by human art and reason, were included (these men said) the beliefs of each society respecting the Gods and religion, respecting political and social arrangements, respecting the just and the beautiful: though there were (they admitted) certain things beautiful by nature, yet not those which the lawgiver declared to be such. Lastly, these persons affirmed (Plato tells us) that the course of life naturally right was, for each man to seize all the wealth, and all the power over others, which his strength enabled him to secure, without any regard to the requirements of the law. And by such teaching they corrupted the minds of youth.

Who these teachers were, whom Plato groups together as if they taught the same doctrine, we do not know. Having no memorials from themselves, we cannot fully trust the description of their teaching given by an opponent: especially when we reflect, that it coincides substantially with the accusation which Melêtus and Anytus urged against Sokrates before the Athenian Dikastery--viz.: that he was irreligious, and that he corrupted youth by teaching them to despise both the laws and their senior relatives--of which corruption Kritias and Alkibiades were cited as examples. Such allegations, when advanced against Sokrates, are noted both by Plato and Xenophon as the stock-topics, always ready at hand for those who wished to depreciate philosophers.

In so far as these heretics affirmed that right as opposed to wrong, just as opposed to unjust, true belief as opposed to false respecting the Gods, were determined by the lawgiver and not by any other authority--Plato has little pretence for blaming them: because he himself claims such authority explicitly in his Magnêtic community, and punishes severely not merely those who disobey his laws in act, but those who contradict his dogmas in speech or argument. Before he proclaims his intended punishments in a penal law, he addresses the heretics in a proëm or prefatory discourse intended to persuade or win them over: a discourse which was the more indispensable, since their doctrines (he tells us) were disseminated everywhere. If he seriously intended to persuade real dissentients, his attempt is certainly a failure: for the premisses on which he reasons are such as would not have been granted by them--nor indeed by many who agreed in the conclusion which he was himself trying to prove.

The theory here given by Plato, represents the state of his own convictions at the time when the Leges were composed. It is a theory of kosmology of universal genesis: different in many respects from what he propounds in the Timæus, since it comprises no mention of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus--nor of the eternal Ideas--nor of the primordial chaotic movements called Necessity--while it contains (what we do not find in the Timæus) the allegation of a twofold or multiple soul pervading the universe--the good soul (one or more), being co-existent and co-eternal with others (one or more), that are bad.

The fundamental principle which he lays down (in this tenth Book De Legibus) is--That soul or mind is older, prior, and more powerful, than body. Soul is the principle of self-movement, activity, spontaneous change. Body cannot originate any movement or change by itself. It is simply passive, receiving movement from soul, and transmitting movement onward. The movement or change which we witness in the universe could never have begun at first, except through the originating spontaneity of soul. None of the four elements--earth, water, air, or fire--is endowed with any self-moving power. As soul is older and more powerful than body, so the attributes of soul are older and more powerful than those of body: that is, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, love, hatred, volition, deliberation, reason, reflection, judgment true or false--are older and more powerful than heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hardness, softness, whiteness, sweetness, &c. The attributes and changes of body are all secondary effects, brought about, determined, modified, or suspended, by the prior and primitive attributes and changes of soul. In all things that are moved there dwells a determining soul: which is thus the cause of all effects however contrary--good and bad, just and unjust, honourable and base. But it is one variety of soul which works to good, another variety which works to evil. The good variety of soul works under the guidance of [Greek: Nou=s] or Reason--the bad variety works irrationally. Now which of the two (asks Plato) directs the movements of the celestial sphere, the Sun, Moon, and Stars? Certainly, the good soul, and not the bad. This is proved by the nature and character of their movements: which movements are rotatory in a circle, and exactly uniform and equable. Now among all the ten different sorts of motion or change, rotatory motion in a circle is the one which is most akin or congenial to Reason. The motion of Reason, and the motion of the stars, is alike rotatory, and the same, and unchangeable--in the same place, round the same centre, and returning into itself. The bad soul, acting without reason, produces only irregular movements, intermittent, and accompanied by constant change of place. Though it is the good variety of soul which produces the celestial rotation, yet there are many distinct and separate souls, all of this same variety, which concur to the production of the result. The Sun, the Moon, and each of the Stars, has a distinct soul inherent in itself or peculiar to its own body. Each of these souls, invested in the celestial substance and in each of the visible celestial bodies, is a God: and thus all things are full of Gods.

As an illustration or comment on this portion of Plato De Legibus, Lord Monboddo's Ancient Metaphysics are instructive. See vol. i. pp. 2-7-9-25. He adopts the distinction between Mind and Body made both in the tenth Book De Legg., and in the Epinomis. He considers that Body and Mind are mixed together in each part of nature; and in the material world never separated: that motion is perpetual; and "Where there is motion, there must be there something that moves. What is moved, I call body; what moves, I call mind.

"Under mind, in this definition, I include:--1. The rational and intellectual; 2. The animal life; 3. That principle in the vegetable, by which it is nourished, grows, and produces its like, and which therefore is commonly called the vegetable life; and 4. That motive principle which I understand to be in all bodies, even such as are thought to be inanimate. This is the distinction between body and mind made by Plato in his tenth Book of Laws" (pp. 8-9).

"The Greek word [Greek: psuchê/] denotes the three first kinds I have mentioned, which are not expressed by any one word that I know in English; for the word mind, that I have used to express them, denotes in common use only the rational mind or soul, as it is otherwise called. The fourth kind that I have mentioned, viz., the motive principle in all bodies, is not commonly in Greek called [Greek: psuchê/]. But Aristotle, in a passage which I shall afterwards quote, says that it is [Greek: ô(/sper psuchê/] (p. 8, note).

"As to the principle of motion or moving principle, which Aristotle supposes to be in all bodies, it is what he calls nature (p. 9). . . . He makes Nature also to be the principle of rest in bodies; by which I suppose he means, that those bodies which he calls heavy, that is, which move towards the centre of the earth, would rest if they were there" (p. 9, note).

"From the account here given of motion, it is evident that by it the whole business of nature, above, below, and round about us, is carried on. . . . To those who hold that mind is the first of things, and principal in the universe, it will not appear surprising that I have made moving, or producing motion, an essential attribute of mind" (p. 25).

In the same Treatise--which exhibits very careful study both of Plato and of Aristotle--Lord Monboddo analyses the ten varieties of motion here recognised by Plato, and shows that Plato's account is confused and unsatisfactory. Ancient Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 23-230-252.]

In this argument--which Plato tells us that no man will be insane enough to dispute, and which he proclaims to be a triumphant refutation of the unbelievers--we find, instead of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus and pre-kosmical Chaos or necessity (the doctrine of the Platonic Timæus), two opposing primordial forces both intra-kosmical: the good soul and the bad soul, there being a multiplicity of each. Though Plato here proclaims his conclusion with an unqualified confidence which contrasts greatly with the modest reserve often expressed in his Timæus--yet the conclusion is rather disproved than proved by his own premisses. It cannot be true that all things are full of Gods, since there are two varieties of soul existing and acting, the bad as well as the good: and Plato calls the celestial bodies Gods, as endowed with and moved by good and rational souls. Aristotle in his theory draws a marked distinction between the regularity and perfection of the celestial region, and the irregularity and imperfection of the terrestrial and sublunary: Plato's premisses as here laid out would have called upon him to do the same, and to designate the Kosmos as the theatre of counteracting agencies, partly divine, partly not divine. So he terms it indeed in the Timæus.

The remarks of Zeller, in the second edition of his work, Die Philosophie der Griechen (vol. ii. p. 634 seq.), upon this portion of the Treatise De Legibus, are very acute and instructive. He exposes the fallacy of the attempt made by various critics to explain away the Manichæan doctrine declared in this treatise, and to reconcile the Leges with the Timæus. The subject is handled in a manner superior to the Platonische Studien of the same author (wherein the Leges are pronounced to be spurious, while in the History of Philosophy Zeller retracts this opinion), though in that work also there is much instruction.--Stallbaum's copious notes on these passages (pp. 188-189-195-207-213 of his edition of Leges), while admitting the discrepancy between Leges and Timæus, furnish what he thinks a satisfactory explanation. One portion of his explanation is, that Plato here accommodates himself "ad captum hominum vulgarem (p. 189) . . . ad captum civium communem accommodaté et populari ratione explicari" (p. 207). I dissent from this as a matter of fact. I think that the heretics of the second and third class coincide rather with the "captus vulgaris". So Plato himself intimates.]

There is another feature, common both to the Timæus and the Leges, which deserves attention as illustrating Plato's point of view. It is the reverential sentiment with which he regards uniform rotatory movement in the same place. This he pronounces to be the perfect, regular, movement appertaining and congenial to Reason and the good variety of soul. Because the celestial bodies move thus and only thus, he declares them to be Gods. It is this circular rotation which continues with perfect and unchangeable regularity in the celestial sphere of the Kosmos, and also, though imperfect and perturbed, in the spherical cranium of man. Aristotle in his theory maintains unabated the reverence for this mode of motion, as the perfection of reason and regularity. The feeling here noted exercised a powerful and long-continued influence over the course of astronomical speculations.

Having demonstrated to his own full satisfaction, from the regularity of the celestial rotations, that the heavenly bodies are wise and good Gods, and that all things are full of Gods--Plato applies this conclusion to refute the second class of heretics--those who did not believe that the Gods directed all human affairs, the small things as well as the great; that is, the lot of each individual person as well as that of the species or of its component aggregates. He himself affirms that they direct all things. It is inconsistent with their attributes of perfect intelligence, power, and goodness (he maintains) that they should leave anything, either small or great, without regulation. All good human administrators, generals, physicians, pilots, &c., regulate all things, small and great, in their respective provinces: the Gods cannot be inferior to them, and must be held to do the same. They regulate every thing with a view to the happiness of the whole, in which each man has his share and interest; and each man has his special controuling Deity watching over his minutest proceedings, whether the individual sees it or not. Soul, both in its good variety and its bad variety, is essentially in change from one state to another, and passes from time to time out of one body into another. In the perpetual conflict between the good and the bad variety of soul, according as each man's soul inclines to the better or to the worse, the Gods or Fate exalt it to a higher region or degrade it to a lower. By this means the Gods do the best they can to ensure triumph to virtue, and defeat to vice, in the entire Kosmos. This reference to the entire Kosmos is overlooked by the heretics who deny the all-pervading management of the Gods.

Plato gives here an outburst of religious eloquence which might prove impressive when addressed to fellow-believers--but which, if employed for the avowed purpose of convincing dissentients, would fail of its purpose, as involving assumptions to which they would not subscribe. As to the actual realities of human life, past as well as present, Plato himself always gives a very melancholy picture of them. "The heaven is full of good things, and also full of things opposite to good: but mostly of things not good." Moreover, when we turn back to the Republic, we find Plato therein expressly blaming a doctrine very similar to what he declares true here in the Leges--as a dangerous heresy, although extensively believed, from the time of Homer downward. "Since God is good" (Plato had there affirmed) "he cannot be the cause of all things, as most men pronounce him to be. He is the cause of a few things, but of most things he is not the cause: for the good things in our lot are much fewer than the evil. We must ascribe all the good things to him, but for the evil things we must seek some other cause, and not God." The confessed imperfection of the actual result was one of the main circumstances urged by those heretics, who denied that all-pervading administration of the Gods which Plato in the Leges affirms. If he undertook to convince them at all, he would have done well to state and answer more fully their arguments, and to clear up the apparent inconsistencies in his own creed.

Compare iii. pp. 676-677, where Plato states that in the earlier history of the human race, a countless number of different societies ([Greek: muri/ai e)pi\ muri/ais]) have all successively grown up and successively perished, with extinction of all their comforts and civilization.]

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam Naturam mundi: tantâ stat prædita culpâ.]

A similar criticism may be made still more forcibly, upon the demonstration whereby he professes to refute the third and most culpable class of heretics--"Those who believe that the Gods exercise an universal agency, but that they can be persuaded by prayer and conciliated by sacrifice". Here he was treading on dangerous ground: for he was himself a heretic, by his own confession, if compared with Grecian belief generally. Not merely the ordinary public, but the most esteemed and religious persons among the public--poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests--believed the doctrine which he here so vehemently condemns. Moreover it was the received doctrine of the city--that is, it was assumed as the basis of the official and authorised religious manifestations: and the law of the city was recognised by the Delphian oracle as the proper standard of reference for individual enquirers who came there to ask for information on matters of doubtful religious propriety. In the received Grecian conception of religious worship, prayer and sacrifice were correlative and inseparable: sacrifice was the gift of man to the Gods, accompanying the prayer for gifts from the Gods to man, and accounted necessary to render the prayer efficacious. The priest was the professional person competent and necessary to give advice as to the details: but as a general principle, it was considered disrespectful to ask favours from the Gods without tendering to them some present, suitable to the means of the petitioner.

In approaching a king a satrap or any other person of exalted position above the level of ordinary men, it was the custom to come with a present. Thucyd. ii. 97; Xenoph. Anab. vii. 3, 26; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 10-12.

The great person, to whom the presents were made, usually requited them magnificently.]

Plato himself states this view explicitly in his Politikus. Moreover, when a man desired information from the Gods on any contemplated project or on any grave matter of doubt, he sought it by means of sacrifice. Such sacrifice was a debt to the God: and if it remained unpaid, his displeasure was incurred. The motive for sacrificing to the Gods was thus, not simply to ensure the granting of prayers, but to pay a debt: and thus either to prevent or to appease the wrath of the Gods. The religious practice of Greece rested upon the received belief that the Gods were not merely pleased with presents, but exacted them as a mark of respect, and were angry if they were not offered: yet that being angry, their wrath might be appeased by acceptable presents and supplications. To learn what proceedings of this kind were suitable, a man went to consult the oracle, the priests, or the Exêgêtæ: in cases wherein he believed that he had incurred the displeasure of the Gods by any wrong or omission.

Now it is against this latter sentiment--that which recognised the Gods as placable or forgiving--that Plato declares war as the worst of all heresies. He admits indeed, implicitly, that the Gods are influenced by prayer and sacrifice; since he directs both the one and the other to be constantly offered up, by the citizens of his Magnêtic city, in this very Treatise. He even implies that the Gods are too facile and compliant: for in his second Alkibiadês, Sokrates is made to remark that it was dangerous for an ignorant man to pray for specific advantages, because he might very probably bring ruin upon himself by having his prayers granted--

"Evertêre domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles."

Farthermore Plato does not scruple to notice it as a real proceeding of the Gods, that they executed the prayer or curse of Theseus, by bringing a cruel death upon the blameless youth Hippolytus; which Theseus himself is the first to deplore when he becomes acquainted with the true facts. That the Gods should inflict punishment on a person who did not deserve it, Plato accounts not unworthy of their dignity: but that they should remit punishment in any case where he conceives it to have been deserved, he repudiates with indignation. Though accessible and easily influenced by prayer and sacrifice from other persons, they are deaf and inexorable to those who have incurred their displeasure by wrong-doing. The prayer so offered is called by Plato a treacherous cajolery, the sacrifice a guilty bribe, to purchase their indulgence. Since, in human affairs, no good magistrate, general, physician, pilot, &c., will allow himself to be persuaded by prayers or presents to betray his trust: much less can we suppose (he argues) the Gods to be capable of such betrayal.

The general doctrine, upon which Plato here lays so much stress, and the dissent from which he pronounces to be a capital offence--that the Gods, though persuadeable by every one else, were thoroughly unforgiving, deaf to any prayer or sacrifice from one who had done wrong--is a doctrine from which Sokrates himself dissented; and to which few of Plato's contemporaries, perhaps hardly even himself, consistently adhered. The argument, upon which Plato rests for convincing all these numerous dissentients, is derived from his conception of the character and functions of the Gods. But this, though satisfactory to himself, would not have been granted by his opponents. The Gods were conceived by Herodotus as jealous, meddlesome, intolerant of human happiness beyond a narrow limit, and keeping all human calculations in a state of uncertainty: in this latter attribute Sokrates also agreed. He affirmed that the Gods kept all the important results essentially unpredictable by human study, reserving them for special revelations by way of prophecy to those whom they preferred. These were privileged and exclusive communications to favoured individuals, among whom Sokrates was one: and Plato, though not made a recipient of the same favour as Sokrates, declares his own full belief in the reality of such special revelations from the Gods, to particular persons and at particular places. Aristotle, on the other hand, pronounces action and construction, especially action in details, to be petty and unworthy of the Gods; whom he regards as employed in perpetual contemplation and theorising, as the only occupation worthy to characterise their blessed immortality. Epikurus and his numerous followers, though not agreeing with Aristotle in regarding the Gods as occupied in intellectual contemplation, agreed with him fully in considering the existence of the Gods as too dignified and enviable to be disturbed by the vexation of meddling with human affairs, or to take on the anxieties of regard for one man, displeasure towards another.

At the same time, Sokrates maintains that the Gods accepted sacrifices from good men with greater favour than sacrifices from bad men. Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 3.]

Solon. Frag. v. 53, ed. Gaisf.:--

See the curious narrative in Herodotus ix. 94 seq. about the prophetic gifts bestowed on Euenius. The same narrative attests the full belief prevalent respecting both the displeasure of the Gods and their placability on the proper expiation being made. It conflicts signally in every respect with the canon of orthodoxy set up by Plato.]

The orthodox religious belief, which Plato imposes upon his 5040 Magnêtic citizens under the severest penalties, would thus be found inconsistent with the general belief, not merely of ordinary Greeks, but also of the various lettered and philosophical individuals who thought for themselves. Most of these latter would have passed, under one of the three heads of Platonic heresy, into the Platonic prison for five years, and from thence either to recantation or death. The arguments which Plato considered so irresistible, that none but silly youths could be deaf to them--did not appear conclusive to Aristotle and other intelligent contemporaries. Plato makes up his own mind, what proceedings he thinks worthy and unworthy of the Gods, and then proclaims with confidence as a matter of indisputable fact, that they act conformably. But neither Herodotus, nor Aristotle, would have granted his premisses: they conceived the attributes and character of the Gods differently from him, and differently from each other. And if we turn to the Kratylus of Plato, we find Sokrates there declaring, that men knew nothing about the Gods: that speculations about the Gods were in reality speculations about the opinions of men respecting the Gods.

Such opinions were local, traditional, and dissentient, among the numerous distinct cities and tribes which divided the inhabited earth between them in Plato's time. Each of these claimed a local infallibility, principally as to religious rites and customs, indirectly also as to dogmas and creed: and Plato's Magnêtic community, if it had come into existence, would have added one to the number of distinct varieties. To this general sentiment, deeply rooted in the emotions and unused to the scrutiny of reason, the philosophers were always more or less odious, as dissenters, enquirers, and critics, each on his own ground. At Athens the sentiment manifested itself occasionally in severe decrees and judicial sentences against obnoxious freethinkers, especially in the case of Sokrates. If the Athenians had carried out consistently and systematically the principle involved in their sentence against Sokrates, philosophy must have been banished from Athens. The school of Plato could never have been maintained. But the principle of intolerance was usually left dormant at Athens: philosophical debate continued active and unshackled, so that the school of Plato subsisted in the city without interruption for nearly forty years until his death. We might have expected that the philosophers, to whose security toleration of free dissent and debate was essential, would have upheld it as a general principle against the public. But here we find the most eminent among them, at the close of a long life, not only disallowing all liberty of philosophising to others, and assuming to himself the exclusive right of dictating the belief, as well as the conduct, of his imaginary citizens--but also enforcing this exclusive principle with an amount of systematic rigour, which I do not believe to have been equalled in any actual Grecian city. This is a memorable fact in the history of Grecian philosophy. The Stoic Kleanthes, in the century after Plato's death, declared that the Samian astronomer Aristarchus ought to be indicted for impiety, because he had publicly advocated the doctrine of the Earth's rotation round the Sun. Kleanthês and Plato thus stand out as known examples, among Grecian philosophers before the Christian era, of that intolerance which would apply legal penalties against individual dissenters and competitors.

The eleventh Book of the Treatise De Legibus, and the larger portion of the twelfth, are devoted to a string of civil and political regulations for the Magnêtic community. Each regulation is ushered in with an expository prologue, often with severe reproof towards persons committing the various forbidden acts. There is little of systematic order in the enumeration of subjects. In general we may remark that neither here nor elsewhere in the Treatise is there any proof, that Plato--though doubtless he had visited Italy, Sicily, and Egypt, perhaps other countries--had taken much pains to acquaint himself with the practice of human life, or that he had studied and compared the working of different institutions in different communities. His experience seems all derived from Athenian law and practice: the criticisms and modifications which he applies to it flow from his own sentiment and theory: from his religious or ethical likings or dislikings. He sets up a type of character which he desires to enforce among his citizens, and which he guards against adulteration by very stringent interference. The displeasure of the Gods is constantly appealed to, as a justification for the penalties which he proposed: sometimes even the current mythes are invoked as authority, though in other places Plato so greatly disparages them.

Various modes of acquiring property are first forbidden as illegitimate. The maxim--"That which you have not put down, do not take up"--is rigorously enforced: any man who finds a buried treasure is prohibited from touching it, though he find it by accident and though the person who buried it be unknown. If a man violates this law, every one, freeman or slave, is invited and commanded to inform against him. Should he be found guilty, a special message must be sent to the Delphian oracle, to ask what is to be done both with the treasure and with the offender. So again, an article of property left on the highway is declared to be under protection of the Goddess or Dæmon of the Highway: whoever finds and takes it, if he be a slave, shall be severely flogged by any freeman above thirty years of age who meets him: if he be a freeman, he shall be disgraced and shall pay, besides, ten times its value to the person who left it. These are average specimens of Plato's point of view and manner of handling offences respecting property.

The general constitution of Plato's community restricts within comparatively narrow limits the occasions of proprietary dispute. His 5040 lots of land are all marked out, unchangeable, and indivisible, each possessed by one citizen. No man is allowed to acquire or possess movable property to a greater value than four times the lot of land: every article of property possessed by every man is registered by the magistrates. Disputes as to ownership, if they arise, are settled by reference to this register. If the disputed article be not registered, the possessor is bound to produce the seller or donor from whom he received it. All purchases and sales are required to take place in the public market before the Agoranomi: and all for ready-money, or by immediate interchange and delivery. If a man chooses to deliver his property, without receiving the consideration, or in any private place, he does so at his own risk: he has no legal claim against the receiver. So likewise respecting the Eranoi or Associations for mutual Succour and Benefit. Plato gives no legal remedy to a contributor or complainant respecting any matter arising out of these associations. He requires that every man shall contribute at his own risk: and trust for requital to the honesty or equity of his fellow-contributors.

A remark must here be made upon Plato's refusal to allow any legal redress in such matters as sale on credit, or payments for the purpose of mutual succour and relief. Such refusal appears to contradict his general manner of proceeding: for his usual practice is, to estimate offences not according to the mischief which they inflict, but according to the degree of wickedness or impiety which he supposes them to imply in the doer. Now the contributor to an association for mutual succour, who, after paying his contributions for the aid of his associates, finds that they refuse to contribute to his aid when the hour of his necessity arrives--suffers not only heavy calamity but grievous disappointment: which implies very bad dispositions on the part of those who, not being themselves distressed, nevertheless refuse. Of such dispositions Plato takes no notice in the present case. He does not expatiate (as he does in many other cases far more trifling and disputable) upon the displeasure of the Gods when they see a man who has been benefited in distress by his neighbour's contributions, refusing all requital at the time of that neighbour's need. Plato indeed treats it as a private affair between friends. You do a service to your friend, and you must take your chance whether he will do you a service in return: you must not ask for legal redress, if he refuses: what you have contributed was a present voluntarily given, not a loan lent to be repaid. This is an intelligible point of view, but it excludes those ethical and sentimental considerations which Plato usually delights in enforcing. His ethics here show themselves by leading him to turn aside from that which takes the form of a pecuniary contract. It was in this form that the Eranoi or Mutual Assurance Associations were regarded by Attic judicature: that is, they seem to have been considered as a sort of imperfect obligation, which the Dikastery would enforce against any citizen whose circumstances were tolerably prosperous, but not against one in bad circumstances. Such Eranic actions before the Attic Dikastery were among those that enjoyed the privilege of speedy adjudication ([Greek: e)/mmênoi di/kai]).

The word [Greek: e)/ranos] meant very different things--a pic-nic banquet, a club for festive meetings kept up by subscription with a common purse, a contribution made to relieve a friend in distress, carrying obligation on the receiver to requite it if the donor fell into equal distress. This last sense is the prevalent one in the Attic orators, and is brought out well in the passage of Theophrastus--[Greek: Peri\ Mempsimoiri/as]. Probably the Attic [Greek: e)ranikai\ di/kai] took cognizance of complaints arising out of [Greek: e)/ranos] in all its senses.]

As to property in slaves, Plato allows any owner to lay hold of a fugitive slave belonging either to himself or to any friend. If a third party reclaims the slave as being not rightfully in servitude, he must provide three competent sureties, and the slave will then be set free until legal trial can be had. Moreover, Plato enacts, respecting one who has been a slave, but has been manumitted, that such freedman ([Greek: a)peleu/thros]), if he omits to pay "proper attention" to his manumitter, may be laid hold of by the latter and re-enslaved. Proper attention consists in: 1. Going three times per month to the house of his former master, to tender service in all lawful ways. 2. Not contracting marriage without consulting his former master. 3. Not acquiring so much wealth as to become richer than his former master: if he should do so the latter may appropriate all that is above the limit. The freed man, when liberated, does not become a citizen, but is only a non-citizen or metic. He is therefore subject to the same necessity as all other metics--of departing from the territory after a residence of twenty years, and of never acquiring more wealth than is possessed by the second class of citizens enrolled in the Schedule.

The duties imposed by Plato on the freedman towards his former master--involving a formal recognition at least of the prior dependence, and some positive duties besides--are deserving of remark, as we know so little of the condition or treatment of this class of persons in antiquity.

Regulations are made to provide for the case where a slave, sold by his master, is found to be distempered or mad, or to have committed a murder. If the sale has been made to a physician or a gymnast, Plato holds that these persons ought to judge for themselves about the bodily condition of the slave bought: he therefore grants them no redress. But if the buyer be a non-professional man, he may within one month restore the distempered slave (or within one year, if the distemper be the Morbus Sacer), and may cause a jury of physicians to examine the case. Should they decide the distemper of the slave to be undoubted, the seller must take him back: repaying the full price, if he be a private man--double the price, if he be a professional man, who ought to have known, and perhaps did know, the real condition of the slave sold.

In regard to Retail Selling, and to frauds committed either in sale or in barter, Plato provides or enjoins strict regulations. The profession of the retailer, and the function of money as auxiliary to it, he pronounces to be useful and almost indispensable to society, for the purpose of rendering different articles of value commensurable with each other, and of ensuring a distribution suitable to the requirements of individuals. This could not be done without retailers, merchants, hired agents, &c. But though retailing is thus useful, if properly conducted, it slides easily and almost naturally into cheating, lying, extortion, &c., from the love of money inherent in most men. Such abuses must be restrained: at any rate they must not be allowed to corrupt the best part of the community. Accordingly, none of the 5040 citizens will be allowed either to practise retailing, or to exercise any hired function, except under his own senior relatives, and of a dignified character. The discrimination of what is dignified and not dignified must be made according to the liking or antipathy of a court of honour, composed of such citizens as have obtained prizes for virtue. None must be permitted to sell by retail except metics or non-citizens: and these must be kept under strict watch by the Nomophylakes, who, after enquiring into the details of each article, will fix its price at such sum as will afford to the dealer a moderate profit.

If there be any fraud committed by the seller (which is nearly akin to retailing), Plato prescribes severe penalty. The seller must never name two prices for his article during the same day. He must declare his price: and if no one will give it, he must withdraw the article for the day. He is not allowed to praise his own articles, or to take any oath respecting them. If he shall take any oath, any citizen above thirty years of age shall be held bound to thrash him, and may do so with impunity: such citizen, if he neglect to thrash the swearer, will himself be amenable to censure for betraying the laws. If the seller shall sell a spurious or fraudulent article, the magistrates must be informed of it by any one cognizant. The informer, if a slave or a metic, shall be rewarded by having the article made over to him. If he be a citizen, he will receive the article, but is bound to consecrate it to the Gods who preside over the market: if being cognizant he omits to inform, he shall be proclaimed a wicked man, for defrauding the Gods of that to which they are entitled. The magistrates, on receiving information, will not only deprive the seller of the spurious article, but will cause him to be flogged by the herald in the market-place--one stripe for every drachma contained in the price demanded. The herald will publicly proclaim the reason why the flogging is given. Besides this, the magistrates will collect and write up in the market-place both regulations of detail for the sellers, and information to put buyers on their guard.

Plato is more rigorous on these matters than the Attic law. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Privat-Alterthümer, s. 62.]

Compare this enactment in Plato with the manner in which the Attic law would have dealt with the like offence. The defrauded buyer would have brought his action before the Dikastery against the fraudulent seller, who, if found guilty, would have been condemned in damages to make good the wrong: perhaps fined besides. The penalties inflicted by the usual course of law at Athens were fine, disfranchisement, civil disability of one kind or other, banishment, confiscation of property: occasionally imprisonment--sometimes, though rarely, death by the cup of hemlock in prison. Except in very rare cases, an accused person might retire into banishment if he chose, and might thus escape any penalty worse than banishment and confiscation of property. But corporal punishment was never inflicted by the law at Athens. The people, especially the poorer citizens, were very sensitive on this point, regarding it as one great line of distinction between the freeman and the slave. At Sparta, on the contrary, corporal chastisement was largely employed as a penalty: moreover the use of the fist in private contentions, by the younger citizens, was encouraged rather than forbidden.

Plato follows the analogy of Sparta in preference to that of Athens. Here, as elsewhere, he employs corporal punishment abundantly as a penalty. Here, as elsewhere, he not only prescribes that it shall be inflicted by a public agent under the supervision of magistrates, but also directs it to be administered, against certain offenders, by private unofficial citizens. I believe that this feature of his system would have been more repugnant than any other, to the feelings of all classes of Athenian citizens--to all the different types of character represented by Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Isokrates, Demosthenes, and Sokrates. Abstinence from manual violence was characteristic of Athenian manners. Whatever licence might be allowed to the tongue, it was at least a substitute for the aggressive employment of the arm and hand. Athens exhibited marked respect for the sanctity of the person against blows--much equality of dealing between man and man--much tolerance, public as well as private, of individual diversity in taste and character--much keenness of intellectual and oral competition, liable to degenerate into unfair stratagem in political, forensic, professional, and commercial life, as well as in rhetorical, dialectical, and philosophical exercises. All these elements, not excepting even the first, were distasteful to Plato. But those who copy the disparaging judgment which he pronounces against Athenian manners, ought in fairness to take account of the point of view from which that judgment is delivered. To a philosopher whose ideal is depicted in the two treatises De Republicâ and De Legibus, Athenian society would appear repulsive enough. We learn from these two treatises what it was that a great speculative politician of the day desired to establish as a substitute.

Plato next goes on to make regulations about orphans and guardians, and in general for cases arising out of the death of a citizen. The first question presenting itself naturally is, How far is the citizen to be allowed to direct by testament the disposition of his family and property? What restriction is to be placed upon his power of making a valid will? Many persons (Plato says) affirmed that it was unjust to impose any restriction: that the dying man had a right to make such dispositions as he chose, for his property and family after his death. Against this view Plato enters his decided protest. Each man--and still more each man's property--belongs not to himself, but to his family and to the city: besides which, an old man's judgment is constantly liable to be perverted by decline of faculties, disease, or the cajoleries of those around him. Accordingly Plato grants only a limited liberty of testation. Here, as elsewhere, he adopts the main provisions of the Attic law, with such modifications as were required by the fundamental principles of his Magnêtic city: especially by the fixed total of 5040 lots or fundi, each untransferable and indivisible. The lot, together with the plant or stock for cultivating it, must descend entire to one son: but the father, if he has more than one son, may determine by will to which of them it shall descend. If there be any one among the sons whom another citizen (being childless) is disposed to adopt, such adoption can only take place with the father's consent. But if the father gives his consent, he cannot bequeath his own lot to the son so adopted, because two lots cannot be united in the same possessor. Whatever property the father possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances, he may distribute by will among his other sons, in any proportion he pleases. If he dies, leaving no sons, but only daughters, he may select which of them he pleases; and may appoint by will some suitable husband, of a citizen family, to marry her and inherit his lot. If a citizen (being childless) has adopted a son out of any other family, he must bequeath to that son the whole of his property, except one-tenth part of what he possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances: this tenth he may bequeath to any one whom he chooses.

It is to be observed that Plato does not make any allusion to these misguiding influences operating upon an aged man, when he talks about the curse of a father against his son being constantly executed by the Gods: xi. p. 931 B.]

If the father dies intestate, leaving only daughters, the nearest relative who has no lot of his own shall marry one of the daughters, and succeed to the lot. The nearest is the brother of the deceased; next, the brother of the deceased's wife (paternal and maternal uncles of the maiden); next, their sons; next, the parental and maternal uncle of the deceased father, and their sons. If all these relatives be wanting, the magistrates will provide a suitable husband, in order that the lot of land may not remain unoccupied. If a citizen die both intestate and childless, two of his nearest unmarried relatives, male and female, shall intermarry and succeed to his property: reckoning in the order of kinship above mentioned. In thus imposing marriage as a legal obligation upon persons in a certain degree of kinship, Plato is aware that there will be individual cases of great hardship and of repugnance almost insurmountable. He treats this as unavoidable: providing however that there shall be a select judicial Board of Appeal, before which persons who feel aggrieved by the law may bring their complaints, and submit their grounds for dispensation.

These provisions deserve notice as showing how largely Plato coincides with the prevalent Attic sentiment respecting family and relationship. He does not award the slightest preference to primogeniture, among brothers: he grants to agnates a preference over cognates: he regards it as a public misfortune that any house shall be left empty, so as to cause interruption of the sacred rites of the family: lastly, he ensures that the family, in default of lineal male heirs, shall be continued by inter-marriage with the nearest relatives--and he especially approves the marriage of an heiress with her paternal or maternal uncle. On these points Plato is in full harmony with his countrymen, though he dissents widely from modern sentiment.

Respecting tutelage of orphans, he makes careful provision against abuse, as the Attic law also did: he tries also to meet the cases of family discord, where father and son are in bitter wrath against each other. A father may formally renounce his son, but not without previously obtaining the concurrence of a conseil de famille: if the father has become imbecile with age, and wastes his substance, the son may institute a suit as for lunacy, but not without the permission of the Nomophylakes. Respecting disagreement between married couples, ten of the Nomophylakes, together with ten women chosen as supervisors of marriages, are constituted a Board of reference, to obtain a reconciliation, if it be possible: but if this be impossible, then to divorce the couple, and unite each with some more suitable partner. The lawgiver must keep in view, as far as he can, to obtain from each married couple a sufficiency of children--that is, one male and one female child from each, whereby the total of 5040 lots may be kept up. If a husband loses his wife before he has these two children, the law requires him to marry another wife: but if he becomes a widower, having already the sufficiency of children, he is advised not to marry a second wife (who will become stepmother), though not prohibited from doing so, if he chooses. So also, if a woman becomes a widow, not having the sufficient number of children, she must be compelled to marry again: if she already has the sufficient number, she is directed to remain in the house, and to bring them up. In case she is still young, and her health requires a husband, her relatives will apply to the Female Supervisors of Marriage, and will make such arrangements as may seem advisable.

Against neglect of aged parents by their children, Plato both denounces the most stringent legal penalties, and delivers the most emphatic reproofs: commending with full faith the ancient traditional narratives, that the curse of an offended parent against his sons was always executed by the Gods, as in the cases of Oedipus, Theseus, Amyntor, &c. In the event of lunacy, he directs that the lunatic shall be kept in private custody by his relatives, who will be fined if they neglect the duty.

Hurt or damage, not deadly, done by one man to another.--Plato enumerates two different modes of inflicting damage:--1. By drugs (applied externally or internally), magic, or sorcery. 2. By theft or force.

As to the first mode, if the drug be administered by a physician, he must be put to death: if by one not a physician, the Dikasts will determine the nature of his punishment. And in the case of magical arts, or incantations, if the person who resorts to them be a prophet, or an inspector of prodigies, he must be put to death: another person doing the same will be punished at the discretion of the Dikasts. Here we see that the prophet is ranked as a professional person (the like appears in Homer) along with the physician,--who must know what he is about, while another person perhaps may not know. But Plato's own opinion respecting magical incantations is delivered with singular reserve. He will neither avouch them nor reject them. He intimates that a man can hardly find out what is true on the subject; and even if he could, it would be harder still to convince others. Most men are in serious alarm when they see waxen statuettes hung at their doors or at their family tombs; and it is useless to attempt to tranquillise them by reminding them that they have no certain evidence on the subject. Here we see how Plato discourages the received legends and the current faith, when he believes them to be hurtful--as contrasted with his vehemence in upholding them when he thinks them useful: as in the case of the paternal curse, and the judgments of the Gods. The question of their truth is made to depend on their usefulness. The Gods are made to act exactly as he thinks they ought to act. They are not merely invoked, but positively counted on, as executioners of Plato's ethical sentences.

Homer, Odys. Xvii. 383:--

. . . [Greek: tô=n oi(\ dêmioergoi\ e)/asi, ma/ntin, ê)\ i)ê/têra kakô=n, ê)\ te/ktona dou/rôn, ê)\ kai\ the/spin a)oido/n], &c.]

See the remarkable narrative of the death of Germanicus in Syria, supposed to have been brought about by the magical artifices wrought under the auspices of Piso (Tacitus, Ann. ii. 69).]

Respecting the second mode of damage--by theft or violence--Plato's law forms a striking contrast to that which has been just set forth. The person who inflicts damage must repay it, or make full compensation for it, to the sufferer: small, if the damage be small--great, if it be great. Besides this, the guilty person must undergo some farther punishment with a view to correction or reformation. This will be smaller, if he be young and seduced by the persuasion of others; but it must be graver, if he be self-impelled by his own desires, fears, wrath, jealousy, &c. Understand, however (adds Plato), that such ulterior punishment is not imposed on account of the past misdeed--for the past cannot be recalled or undone--but on account of the future: to ensure that he shall afterwards hate wrong-doing, and that those who see him punished shall hate it also. The Dikasts must follow out in detail the general principle here laid down.

This passage proclaims distinctly an important principle in regard to the infliction of legal penalties: which principle, if kept in mind, might have lead Plato to alter or omit a large portion of the Leges.

Respecting words of abuse, or revilement, or insulting derision.--These are altogether forbidden. If used in any temple, market, or public and frequented place, the magistrate presiding must punish the offender forthwith, as he thinks fit: if elsewhere, any citizen by-stander, being older than the offender, is authorised thrash him. No writer of comedy is allowed to ridicule or libel any citizen.

Mendicity is strictly prohibited. Every mendicant must be sent away at once, in order that the territory may be rid of such a creature. Every man, who has passed an honest life, will be sure to have made friends who will protect him against the extremity of want.

The rules provided by Plato about witnesses in judicial trials and indictments for perjury, are pretty much the same as those prevalent at Athens: with some peculiarities. Thus he permits a free woman to bear witness, and to address the court in support of a party interested, provided she be above forty years of age. Moreover, she may institute a suit, if she have no husband: but not if she be married. A slave or a child may bear witness at a trial for murder; provided security be given that they will remain in the city to await an indictment for perjury, if presented against them.

It appears that women were not admitted as witnesses before the Athenian Dikasteries. Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, pp. 667-668. The testimony of slaves was received after they had been tortured; which was considered as a guarantee for truth, required in regard to them, but not required in regard to a free-man. The torture is not mentioned in this Platonic treatise. Plato treats a male as young up to the age of thirty (compare Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 35), a female as young up to the age of forty (pp. 932 B-C, 961 B).]

Among Plato's prohibitions, we are not surprised to find one directed emphatically against forensic eloquence, and against those who professed to teach it. Every thing beneficial to man (says he) has its accompanying poison and corruption. Justice is a noble thing, the great civilising agent in human affairs: to aid any one in obtaining justice, is of course a noble thing also. But these benefits are grossly abused by men, who pretend to possess an art, whereby every one may be sure of judicial victory, either as principal or as auxiliary, whether his cause be just or unjust:--and who offer to teach this art to all who pay a stipulated price. Whether this be (as they pretend) a real art, or a mere inartificial knack--it would be a disgrace to our city, and must be severely punished. Whoever gives show of trying to pervert the force of justice in the minds of the Dikasts, or indulges in unseasonable and frequent litigation, or even lends his aid to other litigants--may be indicted by any citizen as guilty of abuse of justice, either as principal or auxiliary. He shall be tried before the Court of Select Judges: who, if they find him guilty, will decide whether he has committed the offence from love of money, or from love of contention and ambitious objects. If from love of contention, he shall be interdicted, for such time as the Court may determine, from instituting any suit at law on his own account as well as from aiding in any suit instituted by others. If from love of money, the citizen found guilty shall be capitally punished, the non-citizen shall be banished in perpetuity. Moreover the citizen convicted of committing this offence even from love of contention, if it be a second conviction for the offence, shall be put to death also.

The vague and undefined character of this offence, for which Plato denounces capital punishment, shows how much his penal laws are discharges of ethical antipathy and hostility against types of character conceived by himself--rather than measures intended for application, in which he had weighed beforehand the practical difficulties of singling out and striking the right individual. On this matter the Athenian public had the same ethical antipathy as himself; and Melêtus took full advantage of it, when he brought his accusation against Sokrates. We know both from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, and from the Nubes of Aristophanes--that Sokrates was rendered odious to the Athenian people and Dikasts, partly as heterodox and irreligious, but partly also as one who taught the art of using speech so as to make the worse appear the better reason. Both Aristophanes and Melêtus would have sympathised warmly with the Platonic law. If there had been any Solonian law to the same effect, which Melêtus could have quoted in his accusatory speech, his case against Sokrates would have been materially strengthened. Especially, he would have had the express sanction of law for his proposition of death as the penalty: a proposition to which the Athenian Dikasts would not have consented, had they not been affronted and driven to it by the singular demeanour of Sokrates himself when before them. It would be irrelevant here to say that Sokrates was not guilty of what was imputed to him: that he never came before the Dikastery until the time of his trial--and that he did not teach "the art of words". If he did not teach it, he was at least believed to teach it, not merely by Aristophanes and by the Athenian Dikasts, but also by intelligent men like Kritias and Charikles, who knew him perfectly well: while the example of Antiphon shows that a man might be most acute and efficacious as a forensic adviser, without coming in person before the Dikastery. What the defence really makes us feel is, the indefinite nature of the charge: which is neither provable nor disprovable, and which is characterised, both by Xenophon and in the Platonic Apology, as one of the standing calumnies against all philosophising men. Here, in the Platonic Leges, this same unprovable offence is adopted and made capital: the Select Platonic Dikasts being directed to ascertain, not only whether a man has really committed it, but whether he has been impelled to commit it by love of money, or by love of victory and personal consequence.

Such was the colloquial power of Sokrates, in the portrait drawn by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 14), "that he handled all who conversed with him just as he pleased--[Greek: toi=s de\ dialegome/nois au)tô=| pa=si chrô/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pôs bou/loito.] Kritias and Alkibiades (Xenophon tells us) sought his society for the purpose of strengthening their own oratorical powers as political men, and of becoming [Greek: krei/ttone tô=n suggignome/nôn] (i. 2, 16). Looked at from the point of view of opponents, this would be described as the proceeding of one who himself both could pervert justice--and who taught others to pervert it also. This was the picture of Sokrates which the accusers presented to the Athenian Dikastery: as we may see by the language of Sokrates himself at the beginning of the Platonic Apology.]

The twelfth and last Book of the Treatise De Legibus deals with various cases of obligation, not towards individuals, but towards the public or the city. Abuse of trust in the character of a public envoy is declared punishable. This offence (familiar to us at Athens through the two harangues of Demosthenes and Æschines) is invested by Plato with a religious colouring, as desecrating the missions and commands of Hermês and Zeus. Wrongful appropriation of the public money by a citizen is also made capital. The penalty is to be inflicted equally whether the sum appropriated be large or small: in either case the guilt is equal, and the evidence of wicked disposition the same, for one who has gone through the public education and training. This is quite different from Plato's principle of dealing with theft or wrongful abstraction of property from private persons: in which case, the sentence of Plato was, that the amount of damage done, small or great, should be made good by the offender, and that a certain ulterior penalty should be inflicted sufficient to deter him as well as others from a repetition.

Provision is farther made for punishing any omission of military service either by males or females, or any discreditable abandonment of arms. The orders of the military commander must be implicitly and exactly obeyed. The actions of all must be orderly, uniform, and simultaneous. Nothing can be more mischievous than that each should act for himself, separately and apart from others. This is confessedly true as to war; but it is no less essential as to the proceedings in peace. Suppression of individuality, and conversion of life into a perpetual, all-pervading, drill and discipline--is a favourite aspiration always present to Plato.

A Board of Elders is constituted by Plato, as auditors of the proceedings of all Magistrates after their term of office. The mode of choosing these Elders, as well as their duties, liabilities, privileges, and honours, both during life and after death, are prescribed with the utmost solemnity.

Plato forbids the parties in any judicial suit from swearing: they will present their case to the court, but not upon oath. No judicial oath is allowed to be taken by any one who has a pecuniary interest in the matter on hand. The Dikasts--the judges in all public competitions--the Electors before they elect to a public trust--are all to be sworn: but neither the parties to any cause, nor (seemingly) the witnesses. If oaths were taken on both sides, one or other of the parties must be perjured: and Plato considers it dreadful, that they should go on living with each other afterwards in the same city. In aforetime Rhadamanthus (he tells us) used to settle all disputes simply, by administering an oath to the parties: for in his time no one would take a false oath: men were then not only pious, but even sons or descendants of the Gods. But now (in the Platonic days) impiety has gained ground, and men's oaths are no longer to be trusted, where anything is to be gained by perjury.

Strict regulations are provided, as to exit from the Platonic city, and ingress into it. Plato fears contamination to his citizens from converse with the outer world. He would introduce the peremptory Spartan Xenelasy, if he were not afraid of the obloquy attending it. He strictly defines the conditions on which the foreigner will be allowed to come in, or the citizen to go out. No citizen is allowed to go out before he is forty years of age. Envoys must be sent on public missions; and sacred legations (theôries) must be despatched to the four great Hellenic festivals--Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian. But private citizens are not permitted to visit even these great festivals at their own pleasure. The envoys sent must be chosen and trustworthy men: moreover, on returning, they will assure their youthful fellow-citizens, that the home institutions are better than anything that can be seen abroad.

Special travellers, between the ages of fifty and sixty, will also be permitted to go abroad, and will bring back reports to the Magistrates of what they have observed. Strangers are admitted into the city or its neighbourhood, under strict supervision; partly as observers, partly as traders, for the limited amount of traffic which the lawgiver tolerates. Thus scanty is the worship which Plato will allow his Magnêtes to pay to Zeus Xenius. He seems however to take credit for it as liberal dealing.

Plato proceeds with various enactments respecting suretyship--time of prescription for ownership--keeping men away by force either from giving testimony in court or from contending at the public matches--receiving of stolen goods--private war or alliance on the part of any individual citizen, without the consent of the city--receipt of bribes by functionaries--return and registration of each citizen's property--dedications and offerings to the Gods. No systematic order or classification can be traced in the successive subjects.

In respect to judiciary matters, he repeats (what had before been directed) his constitution of three stages of tribunals. First, Arbitrators, chosen by both parties in the dispute. From their decision, either party may appeal to the Tribe-Dikasteries, composed of all the citizens of the Tribe or Dême: or at least, composed of a jury taken from these. After this, there is a final appeal to the Select Dikastery, chosen among all the Magistrates for the time being. Plato leaves to his successors the regulations of details, respecting the mode of impannelling and the procedure of these Juries.

Lastly come the regulations respecting funerals--the cost, ceremonies, religious proceedings, mode of showing sorrow and reverence, &c. These are given in considerable detail, and with much solemnity of religious exhortation.

We have now reached the close. The city has received its full political and civil outfit: as much legal regulation as it is competent for the lawgiver to provide at the beginning. One guarantee alone is wanting. Some security must be provided for the continuance and durability of the enactments. We must have a special conservative organ, watching over and keeping up the scheme of the original lawgiver. For this function, Plato constitutes a Board, which, from its rule of always beginning its sittings before daybreak, he calls the Nocturnal council. It will comprise ten of the oldest Nomophylakes: all those who have obtained prizes for good conduct or orderly discipline: all those who have been authorised to go abroad, and have been approved on their return. Each of these members will introduce into the Synod one young man of thirty years of age, chosen by himself, but approved by the others. The members will thus be partly old, partly young.

This Nocturnal council is intended as the conservative organ of the Platonic city. It is, in the city, what the soul and head are in an animal. The soul includes Reason: the head includes the two most perfect senses--Sight and Hearing. The fusion, in one, of Reason with these two senses ensures the preservation of the animal. In the Nocturnal council, the old members represent Reason, the young members represent the two superior senses, serving as instruments and means of communication between Reason and the outer world. The Nocturnal council, embracing the agency of both, maintains thereby the life and continuity of the city.

It is the special duty of this council, to serve as a perpetual embodiment of the original lawgiver, and to comprehend as well as to realise the main purpose for which the city was put together. The councillors must keep constantly in view this grand political end, as the pilot keeps in view safe termination of the voyage--as the military commander keeps in view victory, and the physician, recovery of health. Should the physician or the pilot either not know his end, or not know the conditions under which it may be attained--his labour will be in vain. So, if there does not exist in the city an authority understanding the great political end and the means (either by laws or human agents) of accomplishing it, the city will be a failure. Hence the indispensable necessity of the Nocturnal council, with members properly taught and organised.

The great political end must be one, and not many. All the arrows aimed by the central Conservative organ must be aimed at one and the same point. This is the chief excellence of a well-constituted conservative authority. Existing cities err all of them in one of two ways. Either they aim at one single End, but that End bad or wrong: or they aim at a variety of Ends without giving exclusive attention to any one. Survey existing cities: you will find that in one, the great purpose, and the main feature of what passes for justice, is, that some party or faction shall obtain or keep political power, whether its members be better or worse than their fellow-citizens: in a second city, it is wealth--in a third freedom of individuals--in a fourth, freedom combined with power over foreigners. Some cities, again, considering themselves wiser than the rest, strive for all these objects at once or for a variety of others, without exclusive attention to any one. Amidst such divergence and error in regard to the main end, we cannot wonder that all cities fail in attaining it.

The One End proposed by our city is, the virtue of its citizens. But virtue is fourfold, or includes four varieties--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice. Our End is and must be One. The medical Reason has its One End, Good Health: the stratêgic Reason has its One End--Victory: What is that One End (analogous to these) which the political Reason aims at? It must be that in which the four cardinal virtues--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice--are One, or coincide: that common property, possessed by all and by each, which makes them to be virtue, and constitutes the essential meaning of the name, Virtue. We must know the four as four, that is, the points of difference between them: but it is yet more important to know them as One--to discern the point of essential coincidence and union between them.

To understand thoroughly this unity of virtue, so as to act upon it themselves, to explain it to others and to embody it in all their orders--is the grand requisite for the supreme Guardians of our city--the Nocturnal council. We cannot trust such a function in the hands of poets, or of visiting discoursers who announce themselves as competent to instruct youth. It cannot be confided to any less authority than the chosen men--the head and senses--of our city, properly and specially trained to exercise it. Upon this depends the entire success or failure of our results. Our guardians must be taught to see that one Idea which pervades the Multiple and the Diverse: to keep it steadily before their own eyes, and to explain and illustrate it in discourse to others. They must contemplate the point of coincidence and unity between Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice: as well as between the many different things called Beautiful, and the many different things called Good. They must declare whether the name Virtue, common to all the four, means something One--or a Whole or Aggregate--or both together. If they cannot explain to us whether Virtue is Manifold or Fourfold, or in what manner it is One--they are unfit for their task, and our city will prove a failure. To know the truth about these important matters--to be competent to explain and defend it to others--to follow it out in practice, and to apply it in discriminating what is well done and what is ill done--these are the imperative and indispensable duties of our Guardians.

Farthermore it is also essential that they should adopt an orthodox religious creed, and should be competent to explain and defend it. The citizens generally must believe without scrutiny such dogmas as the lawgiver enjoins; but the Guardians must master the proofs of them. The proofs upon which, in Plato's view, all true piety rests, are two (he here repeats them):--1. Mind or soul is older than Body--anterior to Body as a moving power--and invested with power to impel, direct, and controul Body. 2. When we contemplate the celestial rotation, we perceive such extreme exactness and regularity in the movement of the stars (each one of the vast multitude maintaining its relative position in the midst of prodigious velocity of movement) that we cannot explain it except by supposing a Reason or Intelligence pervading and guiding them all. Many astronomers have ascribed this regular movement to an inherent Necessity, and have hereby drawn upon science reproaches from poets and others, as if it were irreligious. But these astronomers (Plato affirms) were quite mistaken in excluding Mind and Reason from the celestial bodies, and in pronouncing the stars to be bodies without mind, like earth or stones. Necessity cannot account for their exact and regular movements: no other supposition is admissible except the constant volition of mind in-dwelling in each, impelling and guiding them towards exact goodness of result. Astronomy well understood is, in Plato's view, the foundation of true piety. It is only the erroneous astronomical doctrines which are open to the current imputations of irreligion.

These are the capital religious or kosmical dogmas which the members of the Nocturnal Council must embrace and expound to others, together with the mathematical and musical teaching suitable to illustrate them. Application must be made of these dogmas to improve the laws and customs of the city, and the dispositions of the citizens.

When this Nocturnal Council, with its members properly trained and qualified, shall be established in the akropolis--symbolising the conjunction of Reason with the head or with the two knowledge-giving senses--the Magnêtic City may securely be entrusted to it, with certainty of an admirable result.

* * * * *

EPINOMIS.

Here closes the dialogue called Leges: somewhat prematurely, since the peculiar training indispensable for these Nocturnal Counsellors has not yet been declared. The short dialogue called Epinomis supplies this defect. It purports to be a second day's conversation between the same trio.

The Athenian--adverting to the circumstances of human life generally, as full of toil and suffering, with few and transient moments of happiness--remarks that none except the wise have any chance of happiness; and that few can understand what real wisdom is, though every one presumes that there must be something of the kind discoverable. He first enumerates what it is not. It is not any of the useful arts--husbandry, house-building, metallurgy, weaving, pottery, hunting, &c.: nor is it prophecy, or the understanding of omens: nor any of the elegant arts--music, poetry, painting: nor the art of war, or navigation, or medicine, or forensic eloquence: nor does it consist in the natural endowments of quick wit and good memory. True wisdom is something different from all these. It consists in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, leading to a full comprehension of the regular movements of the Kosmos--combined with a correct religious creed as to the divine attributes of the Kosmos and its planetary bodies which are all pervaded and kept in harmonious rotation by divine, in-dwelling, soul or mind. It is the God Uranus (or Olympus, or Kosmos), with the visible Gods included therein, who furnishes to us not only the gifts of the seasons and the growth of food, but also varied intelligence, especially the knowledge of number, without which no other knowledge would be attainable. Number and proportion are essential conditions of every variety of art. The regular succession of night and day, and the regularly changing phases of the moon--the comparison of months with the year--first taught us to count, and to observe the proportions of numbers to each other.

The Athenian now enters upon the directly theological point of view, and re-asserts the three articles of orthodoxy which he had laid down in the tenth book of Leges: together with the other point of faith also--That Soul or Mind is older than body: soul is active and ruling--body, passive and subject. An animal is a compound of both. There are five elementary bodies--fire, air, æther, water, earth--which the kosmical soul moulded, in varying proportions, so as to form different animals and plants. Man, animals, and plants were moulded chiefly of earth, yet with some intermixture of the other elements: the stars were moulded chiefly from fire, having the most beautiful bodies, endowed with divine and happy souls, and immortal, or very long-lived. Next to the stars were moulded the Dæmons, out of æther, and inhabitants of that element: after them, the animals inhabiting air, and Nymphs inhabiting water. These three occupy intermediate place between the stars above and man below. They serve as media of communication between man and the Gods: and also for the diffusion of thought and intelligence among all parts of the Kosmos. The Gods of the ordinary faith--Zeus, Hêrê, and others--must be left to each person's disposition, if he be inclined to worship them: but the great visible Kosmos, and the sidereal Gods, must be solemnly exalted and sanctified, with prayer and the holiest rites. Those astronomers who ignore this divine nature, and profess to explain their movements by physical or mechanical forces, are guilty of grave impiety. The regularity of their movements is a proof of their divine nature, not a proof of the contrary, as some misguided persons affirm.

Next, the Athenian intimates that the Greeks have obtained their astronomical knowledge, in the first instance, from Egypt and Assyria, but have much improved upon what they learnt (p. 987): that the Greeks at first were acquainted only with the three [Greek: phorai\]--the outer or sidereal sphere ([Greek: A)planê\s]), the Sun, and the Moon--but unacquainted with the other five or planetary [Greek: phorai\], which they first learned from these foreigners, though not the names of the planets (p. 986): that all these eight were alike divine, fraternal agents, partakers in the same rational nature, and making up altogether the divine [Greek: Ko/smos]: that those who did not recognise all the eight as divine, consummately rational, and revolving with perfectly uniform movement, were guilty of impiety (p. 985 E): that these kosmical, divine, rational agents taught to mankind arithmetic and the art of numeration (p. 988 B): that soul, or plastic, demiurgic, cognitive force (p. 981 C), was an older and more powerful agent in the universe than body--but that there were two varieties of soul, a good and bad, of which the good variety was the stronger: the good variety of soul produced all the good movements, the bad variety produced all the bad movements (p. 988 D, E): that in studying astronomy, a man submitted himself to the teaching of this good soul and these divine agents, from whom alone he could learn true wisdom and piety (pp. 989 B-990 A): that this study, however, must be conducted not with a view to know the times of rising and setting of different stars (like Hesiod) but to be able to understand and follow the eight [Greek: periphora/s] (p. 990 B).

To understand these--especially the five planetary and difficult [Greek: periphora\s]--arithmetic must also be taught, not in the concrete, but in the abstract (p. 990 C, D), to understand how much the real nature of things is determined by the generative powers and combination of Odd and Even Number. Next, geometry also must be studied, so as to compare numbers with plane and solid figures, and thus to determine proportions between two numbers which are not directly commensurable. The varieties of proportion, which are marvellously combined, must be understood--first arithmetical and geometrical proportions, the arithmetical proportion increasing by equal addition (1 + 1 = 2), or the point into a line--then the geometrical proportion by way of multiplication (2 × 2 = 4; 4 × 2 = 8), or the line raised into a surface, and the surface raised into a cube. Moreover there are two other varieties of proportion ([Greek: to\ ê(mio/lion] or sesquialterum, and [Greek: to\ e)pi/triton] or sesquitertium) both of which occur in the numbers between the ratio of 6 to 12 (i.e. 9 is [Greek: to\ ê(mio/lion] of 6, or 9 = 6 + 6/2; again 8 is, [Greek: to\ e)pi/triton] of 6, or 8 = 6 + 6/3). This last is harmonic proportion, when there are three terms, of which the third is as much greater than the middle, as the middle is greater than the first (3 : 4 : 6)--six is greater than four by one-third of six, while four is greater than three by one-third of three (p. 991 A).

Lastly, having thus come to comprehend the general forms of things, we must bring under them properly the visible individuals in nature; and in this process interrogation and cross-examination must be applied (p. 991 C). We must learn to note the accurate regularity with which time brings all things to maturity, and we shall find reason to believe that all things are full of Gods (p. 991 D). We shall come to perceive that there is one law of proportion pervading every geometrical figure, every numerical series, every harmonic combination, and all the celestial rotations: one and the same bond of union among all (p. 991 E). These sciences, whether difficult or easy, must be learnt: for without them no happy nature will be ever planted in our cities (p. 992 A). The man who learns all this will be the truly wise and happy man, both in this life and after it; only a few men can possibly arrive at such happiness (p. 992 C). But it is these chosen few who, when they become Elders, will compose our Nocturnal Council, and maintain unimpaired the perpetual purity of the Platonic City.

Such then is the answer given by the Epinomis, to the question left unanswered in the Leges. However unsatisfactory it may appear, to those who look for nothing but what is admirable in Plato--I believe it to represent the latest views of his old age, when dialectic had given place in his mind to the joint ascendancy of theological sentiment and Pythagorean arithmetic.

Now it is upon this very point that Plato's opinions are said to have changed towards the close of his life. He came to repent that he had assigned to the Earth the central place in the system; and to conceive that place as belonging properly to something else, some other better (or more powerful) body. This is a curious statement, made in two separate passages by Plutarch, and in one of the two passages with reference to Theophrastus as his witness (Plutarch, Vit. Numæ, c. 11; Platonic. Quæst. 8, p. 1006 C).

Boeckh (Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, pp. 144-149) and Martin (Études sur le Timée, ii. 91) discredit the statement ascribed by Plutarch to Theophrastus. But I see no sufficient ground for such discredit. Sir George Lewis remarks very truly (Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, p. 143):--"The testimony of Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, and nearly his contemporary, has great weight on this point. The ground of the opinion alludes to the Pythagorean doctrine mentioned by Aristotle, that the centre is the most dignified place, and that the earth is not the first in dignity among the heavenly bodies. It has no reference to observed phenomena, and is not founded on inductive scientific arguments. . . . The doctrine as to the superior dignity of the central place, and of the impropriety of assigning the most dignified station to the earth, was of Pythagorean origin and was probably combined with the Philolaic cosmology."

This remark of Sir George Lewis deserves attention, not merely from the proper value which he assigns to the testimony of Theophrastus, but because he confines himself to the exact matter which Theophrastus affirmed; viz., that Plato in his old age came to repent of his own cosmical views on one particular point and on one special ground. Theophrastus does not tell us what it was that Plato supposed to be in the centre, after he had become convinced that it was too dignified a place for the earth. Plato may have come to adopt the positive opinion of Philolaus (that of a central fire) as well as the negative opinion (that the Earth was not the central body). But we cannot affirm that he did adopt either this positive opinion or any other positive opinion upon that point. I take Theophrastus to have affirmed exactly what Plutarch makes him affirm, and no more: that Plato came to repent of having assigned to the earth the central place which did not befit it, and to account the centre the fit place "for some other body better than the Earth," yet without defining what that other body was. If Theophrastus had named what the other body was, surely Plutarch would never have suppressed the specific designation to make room for the vague [Greek: e(te/rô| tini\ krei/ttoni].

There is thus, in my judgment, ground for believing that Plato in his old age (after the publication of the Treatise De Legibus) came to distrust the geocentric dogma which he had previously supported; but we do not know whether he adopted any other dogma in place of it. The geocentric doctrine passed to the Epinomis as a continuation of the Treatise De Legibus. The phrase which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus deserves notice--[Greek: Theo/phrastos de\ kai\ prosistorei= tô=| Pla/tôni presbute/rô| genome/nô| metamelei=n, ô(s ou) prosê/kousan a)podo/nti tê=| gê=| tê\n me/sên chô/ran tou= panto/s.] Plato repented. Whoever reads the Treatise De Legibus (especially Books vii. and x.) will see that Plato at that period of his life considered astronomical errors as not merely errors, but heresies offensive to the Gods; and that he denounced those who supported such errors as impious. If Plato came afterwards to alter his astronomical views, he would repent of his own previous views as of a heresy. He came to believe that he had rated the dignity of the Earth too high; and we can see how this change of view may have been occasioned. Earth was looked upon by him, as well as by many others, in two distinct points of view. 1. As a cosmical body, divine, and including [Greek: tou\s chthoni/ous theou/s]. 2. As one of the four elements, along with water, air, and fire; in which sense it was strung together with [Greek: li/thoi], and had degrading ideas associated with it (Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 26 D). These two meanings, not merely distinct but even opposed to each other, occur in the very same sentence of De Legibus, x. p. 886 D. The elemental sense of Earth was brought prominently forward by those reasoners whom Plato refutes in Book x.: and the effect of such reasonings upon him was, that though he still regarded Earth as a Deity, he no longer continued to regard Earth as worthy of the cosmical post of honour. At that age, however, he might well consider himself excused from broaching any new positive theory.]

Assuming that the magistrates of the Nocturnal Council have gone through the course of education prescribed in the Epinomis, and have proved themselves unimpeachable on the score of orthodoxy--will they be able to solve the main problem which he has imposed upon them at the close of the Leges? There, as elsewhere, he proclaims a problem as indispensable to be solved, but does not himself furnish any solution. What is the common property, or point of similarity between Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice--by reason of which each is termed Virtue? What are the characteristic points of difference, by reason of which Virtue sometimes receives one of these names, sometimes another?

The proper way of answering this question has been much debated, from Plato's day down to the present. It is one of the fundamental problems of Ethical Philosophy.

The subjective matter of fact, implied by every one who designates an act or a person as virtuous, is an approving or admiring sentiment which each man knows in his own bosom. But Plato assumes that there is, besides this, an objective connotation: a common object or property to which such sentiment refers. What is that common object? I see no other except that which is indicated by the principle of Utility: I mean that principle which points out Happiness and Unhappiness, not merely of the agent himself, but also of others affected or liable to be affected by his behaviour, as the standard to which these denominations refer. Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, all tend to prevention and mitigation of unhappiness, and to increase of happiness, as well for the agent himself as for the society surrounding him. The opposite qualities--Timidity, Imprudence, Intemperance, Injustice--tend with equal certainty either to increase positively the unhappiness of the agent and of society, or to remove the means for warding it off or abating it. Indeed there is a certain minimum of all the four--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice--without which or below which neither society could hold together, nor the life of the individual agent himself could be continued.

Here then is one answer at least to the question of Plato. Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice--all of them mental attributes of rational voluntary agents--have also the common property of being, in a certain minimum degree, absolutely essential to the life of the agent and the maintenance of society--and of being, above that degree, tutelary against the suffering, and beneficial to the happiness, of both. This tutelary or beneficent tendency is the common objective property signified by the general term Virtue; and is implicated with the subjective property before mentioned--the sentiment of approbation. The four opposite qualities are designated by the general term Vice or Defect, connoting both maleficent tendency and the sentiment of disapprobation.

This proposition will be farther confirmed, if we look at all the four qualities--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice--in another point of view. Taking them in their reference to Virtue, each of them belongs to Virtue as a part to the whole, not as one species contradistinguished from and excluding other species. The same person may have, and ought to have, a certain measure of all: he will not be called virtuous unless he has a measure of all. Excellence in any one will not compensate for the entire absence of the others.

See also iii. pp. 688 B, 696 C-D, iv. p. 705 D.]

A just and temperate man will not be accounted virtuous, if (to use an Aristotelian simile) he be so extravagantly timid as to fear every insect that flits by, or the noise of a mouse. All probability of beneficent results from his agency is effaced by this capital defect: and it is the probability of such results which constitute his title to be called virtuous.

When we speak of the four as qualities or attributes of men (as Plato does in this treatise, while considering the proper type of character which the lawgiver should aim at forming) we speak of them in the abstract--that is, making abstraction of particular circumstances, and regarding only what is common to most men in most situations. But in the realities of life these particulars are always present: there is a series of individual agents and patients, acts and sufferings, each surrounded by its own distinct circumstances and situation. Now in each of these situations an agent is held responsible for the consequences of his acts, when they are such as he knows and foresees, or might by reasonable care know and foresee. An officer who (like Charles XII. at Bender) marches up without necessity at the head of a corporal's guard to attack a powerful hostile army of good soldiers, exhibits the maximum of courage: but his act, far from being commended as virtue, must be blamed as rashness, or pitied as folly. If a friend has deposited in my care a sword or other deadly weapon (to repeat the very case put by Sokrates), justice requires me to give it back to him when he asks for it. Yet if, at the time when he asks, he be insane, and exhibits plain indications of being about to employ it for murderous purposes, my just restoration of it will not be commended as an act of virtue. When we look at these four qualities--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice--not in the abstract, but in reference to particular acts, agents, and situations--we find that before a just or courageous act can be considered to deserve the name of Virtue, there is always a tacit supposition, that no considerable hurt to innocent persons is likely or predictable from it in the particular case. The sentiment of approbation, implied in the name Virtue, will not go along with the act, if in the particular case it produce a certain amount of predictable mischief. This is another property common to all the four attributes of mind--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice:--and forming one of the conditions under which they become entitled to the denomination of Virtue.

In the first books of the Leges, Plato puts forward Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, as the parts or sorts of Virtue: telling us that the natural rectitude of laws consists in promoting, not any one of the four separately, but all the four together in their due subordination. He classifies good things (Bona or Expetenda) in a triple scale of value. First, and best of all, come the mental attributes--which he calls divine--Prudence or Intelligence, Temperance, Justice, and Courage: Second, or second best, come the attributes of body--health, strength, beauty, activity, manual dexterity: Third, or last, come the extraneous advantages, Wealth, Power, Family-Position, &c. It is the duty of the lawgiver to employ his utmost care to ensure to his citizens the first description of Bona (the mental attributes)--upon which (Plato says) the second and third description depend, so that if the first are ensured, the second and third will be certain to follow: while if the lawgiver, neglecting the first, aims at the second and third exclusively or principally, he will miss all three. Here we see, that while Plato assigns the highest scale of value to the mental attributes, he justifies such preference by assuring us that they are the essential producing causes of the other sorts of Bona. His assurance is even given in terms more unqualified than the realities of life will bear out.

The same doctrine is declared by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, pp. 29-30. [Greek: le/gôn, o(/ti ou)k e)k chrêma/tôn a)retê\ gi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)retê=s chrê/mata kai\ ta)/lla a)gatha\ toi=s a)nthrô/pois a(/panta kai\ i)di/a| kai\ dêmosi/a|] (30 B).]

When Plato therefore proclaims it as the great desideratum for his Supreme Council, that they shall understand the common relation of the four great mental attributes (Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice) to each other as well as to the comprehensive whole, Virtue--he fastens their attention on the only common property which the four can be found to possess: i.e. that they are mental attributes required in every one for the security and comfort of himself and of society. To ward off or mitigate the suffering, and to improve the comfort of society, is thus inculcated as the main and constant end for them to keep in view. It is their prescribed task, to preserve and carry forward that which he as lawgiver had announced as his purpose in the beginning of the Leges.

In thus taking leave of Plato, at the close of his longest, latest, and most affirmative composition, it is satisfactory to be able to express unqualified sympathy with this main purpose which, as departing lawgiver, he directs his successors to promote. But to these salutary directions, unfortunately, he has attached others noway connected with them except by common feelings of reverence in his own mind and far less deserving of sympathy. He requires that his own religious belief shall be erected into a peremptory orthodoxy, and that heretics shall be put down by the severest penalties. Now a citizen might be perfectly just, temperate, brave, and prudent--and yet dissent altogether from the Platonic creed. For such a citizen--the counterpart of Sokrates at Athens--no existence would be possible in the Platonic community.

We must farther remark that, even when Plato's ends are unexceptionable, the amount of interference which he employs to accomplish them is often extravagant. As a Constructor, he carries the sentiment of his own infallibility--which in a certain measure every lawgiver must assume--to an extreme worthy only of the kings of the Saturnian age: manifesting the very minimum of tolerance for that enquiring individual reason of which his own negative dialogues remain as immortal masterpieces. We trace this intolerance through all the dialogue Leges. Even when he condescends to advise and persuade, he speaks rather in the tone of an encyclical censor, than of one who has before him a reasonable opponent to be convinced. The separate laws proposed by Plato are interesting to read, as illustrating antiquity: but most of them are founded on existing Athenian law. Where they depart from it, they depart as often for the worse as for the better--so far as I can pretend to judge. And in spite of all the indisputable defects, political and judicial, of that glorious city, where Plato was born and passed most of his days--it was, in my judgment, preferable to his Magnêtic city, as to all the great objects of security, comfort, recreation, and enjoyment. Athens was preferable, even for the ordinary citizen: but for the men of free, inquisitive, self-thinking, minds--the dissentient minority, who lived upon that open speech of which Athenian orators and poets boasted--it was a condition of existence: since the Platonic censorship would have tolerated neither their doctrines nor their persons.

APPENDIX.

Since the commencement of the present century, with its increased critical study of Plato, different and opposite opinions have been maintained by various authors respecting the genuineness or spuriousness of the Treatise De Legibus. Schleiermacher (Platons Werke, I. i. p. 51) admitted it as a genuine work of Plato, but ranked it among the Nebenwerke, or outlying dialogues: i.e., as a work that did not form an item or stepping-stone in the main Platonic philosophical series (which Schleiermacher attempts to lay out according to a system of internal sequence and gradual development), but was composed separately, in general analogy with the later or more constructive portion of that series. On the other hand, Ast (Platons Leben und Schriften, pp. 376-392) distinctly maintains that the Treatise De Legibus is not the composition of Plato, but of one of his scholars and contemporaries, perhaps Xenokrates or the Opuntian Philippus. Ast supports this opinion by many internal grounds, derived from a comparison of the treatise with other Platonic dialogues.

Zeller (in his Platonische Studien, Tübingen, 1839, pp. 1-144) discussed the same question in a more copious and elaborate manner, and declared himself decidedly in favour of Ast's opinion--that the Treatise De Legibus was not the work of Plato, but of one among his immediate scholars. But in his History of Grecian Philosophy (vol. ii. pp. 348-615-641, second edition), Zeller departs from this judgment, and pronounces the Treatise to be a genuine work of Plato--the last form of his philosophy, modified in various ways.

Again Suckow (in his work, Die wissenschaftliche und künstlerische Form der Platonischen Schriften, Berlin, 1855, I. pp. 111-118 seq.) advocates Zeller's first opinion--that the Treatise De Legibus is not the work of Plato.

Lastly Stallbaum, in the Prolegomena prefixed to his edition of the Treatise, strenuously vindicates its Platonic authorship. This is also the opinion of Boeckh and K. F. Hermann; and was, moreover, the opinion of all critics (I believe) anterior to Ast.

To me, I confess, it appears that the Treatise De Legibus is among the best authenticated works of the Platonic collection. I do not know what better positive proof can be tendered than the affirmation of Aristotle in his Politics--distinct and unqualified, mentioning both the name of the author and the title of the work, noting also the relation in which it stood to the Republic, both as a later composition of the same author, and as discrepant on some points of doctrine, analogous on others. This in itself is the strongest primâ facie evidence, not to be rebutted, except by some counter-testimony, or by some internal mark of chronological impossibility: moreover, it coincides with the consentient belief of all the known ancient authors later than Aristotle--such as Zeno the Stoic, who composed a treatise in seven books--[Greek: Pro\s tou\s Pla/tônos No/mous] (Diog. Laert. vii. 36), Persæus, the Alexandrine critics, Cicero, Plutarch, &c. (Stallbaum, Prolegg. p. xliv.) Aristophanes Grammaticus classified both Leges and Epinomis as Plato's works. The arguments produced in Zeller's Platonische Studien, to show that Aristotle may have been mistaken in his assertion, are of little or no force. Nor will it be material to the present question, even if we concede to Zeller and Suckow another point which they contend for--that the remarks of Aristotle upon Plato's opinions are often inaccurate at least, if not unfair. For here Aristotle is produced in court only as a witness to authenticity.

Among the points raised by Suckow, there is indeed one, which if it were made out, would greatly invalidate, if not counterbalance, the testimony of Aristotle. Suckow construes the passage in the Oration of Isokrates ad Philippum (p. 84, § 14)--[Greek: o(moi/ôs oi( toiou=toi tô=n lo/gôn a)/kuroi tugcha/nousin o)/ntes toi=s no/mois kai\ tai=s politei/ais tai=s u(po\ tô=n sophistô=n gegramme/nais]--as if it alluded to the Platonic Republic, and to the Treatise De Legibus; but as if it implied, at the same time, that the two treatises were not composed by the same author, but by different authors, indicated by the plural [Greek: sophistô=n]. If this were the true meaning of Isokrates, we should then have Aristotle distinctly contradicted by another respectable contemporary witness, which would of course much impair the value of his testimony.

But Stallbaum (p. lii.) disputes altogether the meaning ascribed by Suckow to the words of Isokrates, and contends that the plural [Greek: sophistô=n] noway justifies the hypothesis of a double authorship. So far, I think, he is decidedly right: and this clears away the only one item of counter-testimony which has yet been alleged against Aristotle as a witness. Stallbaum, indeed, goes a step farther. He contends that the passage above cited from Isokrates is an evidence on his side, and against Suckow: that Isokrates alludes to Plato as author of both Republic and Leges, and thus becomes available as a second contemporary witness, confirming the testimony of Aristotle. This is less certain; yet perhaps supposable. We may imagine that Isokrates, when he composed the passage, had in his mind Plato pre-eminently--then recently dead at a great age, and the most illustrious of all the Sophists who had written upon political theory. The vague and undefined language in which Isokrates speaks, however, sets forth, by contrast, the great evidentiary value of Aristotle's affirmation, which is distinct and specific in the highest degree, declaring Plato to be the author of Leges.

To contradict this affirmation--an external guarantee of unusual force--Zeller produces a case of internal incredibility. The Legg. cannot be the work of Plato (he argues) because of the numerous disparities and marked inferiority of style, handling, and doctrine, which are very frequently un-Platonic, and not seldom anti-Platonic. Whoever will read the Platonische Studien, will see that Zeller has made out a strong case of this sort, set forth with remarkable ability and ingenuity. Indeed, the strength of the case, as to internal discrepancy, is fully admitted by his opponent Stallbaum, who says in general terms (Prolegg. vol. ii. p. v.)--"Argumentatio quidem ac disserendi ratio, quæ in Legibus regnat, ubi considerata fuerit paullo accuratius, dubitare nemo sanè poterit, quin multa propria ac peculiaria habere judicanda sit, quæ ab aliorum librorum Platonicorum usu et consuetudine longissimé recedant". He then proceeds to enumerate in detail many serious points of discrepancy. See the second part (ch. xv.) of his Prolegomena, prefixed to Book v. Legg., and in Prolegg. to his edition of 1859, pp. lv.-lix. But in spite of such undeniable force of internal improbability, Stallbaum still maintains that the Treatise is really the work of Plato. Of course, he does not admit that the whole of the internal evidence is nothing but discrepancy. He points out also much that is homogeneous and Platonic.

I agree with his conclusion (which is also the subsequent conclusion of Zeller) respecting the authorship of Legg. To me the testimony of Aristotle appears conclusive. But when I perceive how strong are the grounds for doubt, so long as we discuss the question on grounds of internal evidence simply (that is, by comparison with other Platonic dialogues) while yet such doubts are over-ruled, by our fortunately possessing incontestable authenticating evidence ab extra--an inference suggests itself to me, of which Platonic critics seem for the most part unconscious. I mean the great fallibility of reasonings founded simply on internal evidence, for the purpose of disproving authenticity, where we have no external evidence, contemporary or nearly contemporary, to controul them. In this condition are the large majority of the dialogues. I do not affirm that such reasonings are never to be trusted; but I consider them eminently fallible. To compare together the various dialogues, indeed, and to number as well as to weigh the various instances of analogy and discrepancy between them, is a process always instructive. It is among the direct tasks and obligations of the critic. But when, after detecting discrepancies, more or less grave and numerous, he proceeds to conclude, that the dialogue in which they occur cannot have been composed by Plato, he steps upon ground full of hypothesis and uncertainty. Who is to fix the limit of admissible divergence between the various compositions of a man like Plato? Who can determine what changes may have taken place in Plato's opinions, or point of view, or intellectual powers--during a long literary life of more than fifty years, which we know only in mere outline? Considering that Plato systematically lays aside his own personal identity, and speaks only under the assumed names of different expositors, opponents, and respondents--which of us can claim to possess a full and exhaustive catalogue of all the diverse phases of Platonism, so as to make sure that some unexpected variety has no legitimate title to be ranked among them?

For my part, I confess that these questions appear to me full of doubt and difficulty. I am often surprised at the confidence with which critics, upon the faith of internal evidence purely and simply, pronounce various dialogues of the Platonic collection to be spurious. A lesson of diffidence may be learnt from the Leges: which, if internal evidence alone were accessible, would stand among the questionable items of the Platonic catalogue--while it now takes rank among the most unquestionable, from the complete external certificate which has been fortunately preserved to us.

Stallbaum, who maintains the authenticity of the Platonic Leges, disallows altogether that of the Epinomis. In his long and learned Prolegg. (vol. iii. p. 441-470), he has gone over the whole case, and stated at length his reasons for this opinion. I confess that his reasons do not satisfy me. If, on the faith of those reasons, I rejected the Epinomis, I should also on the grounds stated by Ast and Zeller reject the Leges. The reasons against the Leges are of the same character and tenor as those against the Epinomis, and scarce at all less weighty. Respecting both of them, it may be shown that they are greatly inferior in excellence to the Republic and the other masterpieces of the Platonic genius, and that they contain points of doctrine and reasoning different from what we read in other Platonic works. But when, from these premisses, I am called upon to admit that they are not the works of Plato, I cannot assent either about the one or the other. I have already observed that I expect to find among his genuine compositions, some inferior in merit, others dissentient in doctrine--especially in compositions admitted to belong to his oldest age. All critics from Aristophanes down to Tennemann, have admitted the Epinomis as genuine: and when Stallbaum contends that Diogenes mentions doubts on the point entertained even in antiquity--I think he is not warranted by the words of that author, iii. 37: [Greek: e)/nioi/ te phasi\n o(/ti Phi/lippos o( O)pou/ntios tou\s No/mous au)tou= (Pla/tônos) mete/grapsen o)/ntas e)n kêrô=|; tou/tou de\ kai\ tê\n E)pinomi/da phasi\n ei)=nai.] I do not think we can infer from these words anything more than this--that "Philippus transcribed the Epinomis also out of the waxen tablet as he had transcribed the Leges". The persons (whosoever they were--[Greek: e)/nioi]) to whom Diogenes refers, considered Philippus as in part the author of the [Greek: No/moi]; because he had first transcribed them in a legible form from the rough original, and might possibly have introduced changes of his own in the transcription. If they had meant to distinguish what he did in respect to the Leges, from what he did in respect to the Epinomis: if they had meant to assert that he transcribed the Leges, but that he composed the Epinomis as an original addition of his own; I think they would have employed, not the conjunction [Greek: kai\], but some word indicating contrast and antithesis.

But even if we concede that the persons here alluded to by Diogenes did really believe, that the Epinomis was the original composition of Philippus and not of Plato--we must remember that all the critics of antiquity known to us believed the contrary--that it was the genuine work of Plato. In particular, Aristophanes Grammaticus acknowledges it as such; enrolling it in one trilogy with the Minos and the Leges. The testimony of Aristophanes, and the records of the Alexandrine Library in his time, greatly outweigh the suspicions of the unknown critics alluded to by Diogenes; even if we admit that those critics did really conceive the Epinomis as an actual composition of Philippus.

THE END.

GENERAL INDEX.

Absolute and relative, radically distinct points of view, i. 23 n.; of Xenophanes, 18; of Parmenides, 20-24, 66; agrees with Kant's, 21; of Herakleitus, 29; and Parmenides opposed, 37; of Anaxagoras, homoeomeries, 59 n.; of Demokritus, 71, 80; of Zeno, 93, 101; Gorgias the Leontine reasoned against, as ens or entia, 103; and relative, antithetised by Plato in regard to the beautiful, ii. 54; Plato's argument against, iii. 204, 227; to Plato the only real, 385; an objective, impossible, 294 n., 298 n.; see Relative.

Abstract, dialectic deals with, rhetoric with concrete, ii. 52, 53; and concrete aggregates, ib.; terms, debates about meaning, iii. 76-78; different views of Aristotle and Plato, 76; and concrete, difference not conspicuous in Plato's time, 229.

Academy, the, i. 254; decorations, 269 n.; Platonic school removed, 87 B.C., 265 n.; library founded for use of inmates and special visitors, 278 n.; Cicero on negative vein of, 131 n.

Achilleus, and the tortoise, i. 97; preferred by Hippias to Odysseus, ii. 56.

Acoustics, to be studied by applying arithmetical relations and theories, iv. 74.

Actual and potential, Aristotle's distinction, iii. 135 n., i.** 139.

Ælian, ii. 85 n.

Æschines, Sokraticus, dialogues of, i. 112, 114 n., 115, 211 n.; Lysias' oration against, 112.

Æsculapius, belief in, ii. 418 n.

Æthiops, i. 195.

Affirmative, see Negative.

Aggregate, see Whole.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, on Chance, i. 143 n.

Alexandrian Museum founded as a copy of the Platonic and Aristotelic [Greek: mousei=a] at Athens, i. 277; date of foundation, 280; Demetrius Phalereus chief agent in its establishment, ib.; its contents, 275; rapid accumulation of books, ib.; under charge of Aristophanes, 273; contained Plato's works before time of Aristophanes, 274; editions of Plato issued, 295; its authority followed by ancient critics, 297, 299.

Alexis, iii. 387 n.

Alkibiadês, when young, frequented Sokrates' society, ii. 21; attachment of Sokrates to, iii. 8; fitness as ideal in Alkibiadês I. and II., ii. 22; see Alkibiadês I. and II. and Symposion.

Alkibiadês I. and II., different critical opinions, ii. 17; date, i. 306, 308-11, ii. 22; authenticity, i. 306-7, 309-10, ii. 2 n., 17; prolixity, 26; circumstances and interlocutors, 1; fitness of historical Alkibiadês for ideal, 22; no bearing on the historical Alkibiadês, 20 n.; the Platonic picture an ideal, 22; illustrates Sokratico-Platonic method in negative and positive aspect, 7; actual and anticipated effects of dialectic, 11; analogy with Xenophontic dialogues, 21, 29; Alkibiadês as Athenian adviser, 2; advises on war and peace, his standard the just and unjust, 3; whence knowledge of it, 4; from the multitude, their judgment worthless, 5; the expedient and inexpedient substituted, 6; the just identified with the good, honourable, expedient, 7; ignorance of Athenian statesmen, eulogy of Spartan and Persian kings, 8; Alkibiadês must become good--for what end and how, 8-10; confesses his ignorance, 10; will never leave Sokrates, 12; Delphian maxim--the mind the self, 11; self-knowledge, from looking into other minds is temperance, 11; situation in Second, 12; danger of prayer for mischievous gifts--most men unwise, ib.; instances of injurious gifts--mischiefs of ignorance, 14; depend on the subject-matter, ib.; few wise public counsellors, why called wise, 15; special accomplishments often hurtful, if no knowledge of the good, 16; Sokrates on prayer and sacrifice, ib.; Sokrates' purpose, to humble presumptuous youths, 21; his mission against false persuasion of knowledge, 24; his positive solutions illusory, 26-7; opinion embraces all varieties of knowledge save of the good, 30; the good, how known--unsolved, 31.

Allegorical interpretation of poets, ii. 285; see Mythe.

Amabile primum, ii. 181, 191; approximates to Idea of Good, 192; the Good, 194; compared with Aristotle's prima amicitia, ib.

Amazons, iv. 196.

Ana of philosophers, i. 153 n.

Analogical and generic wholes, ii. 47, 193 n., iii. 365.

Analogy, Aristotle first distinguished [Greek: o(mô/numa], [Greek: sunô/numa], and [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an]**, iii. 94 n.; see Metaphor.

Anaxagoras, chiefly physical, i. 48; physics, 49; homoeomeries, 48, 52 n., 53, 55-6, 58 n.; essential intermixture of Demokritean atoms analogous, 79 n.; denied generation and destruction, 48; and simple bodies, 52 n.; chaos, 50, 50 n., 54; Nous, relation to the homoeomeries, 54-57; originates rotatory movement in chaotic mass, 50; exercised only a catalytic agency, 55; alone pure and unmixed, 50; immaterial and impersonal, 56 n.; its two attributes, to move and to know, ib.; compared with Herakleitus' [Greek: perie/chon], ib.; Plato's Idea of Good, ii. 412; represented later as a god, i. 54; his own view of it. ib.; theory as understood by Sokrates, ii. 393, 400, 402 n.; Hegel on, 403 n.; erroneously charged with inconsistency, i. 56, ii. 394, 407; animal bodies purer than air or earth, i. 51; suggested partly by the phenomenon of animal nutrition, 53; air and fire, 52, 56 n.; astronomy, 57; his geology, meteorology, and physiology, 58; his heresy, Sokrates on, 413; threatened prosecution for impiety, 59; accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii. 401; opposed Empedokles' theory of sensation, i. 58; theory of vision, iv. 237 n.; illusions of sense, i. 59 n.; compared with Empedokles, 52; relation to Anaximander, 54; agreement with Diogenes of Apollonia, 64; influence on Aristotle, 89.

Anaximander, philosophy, i. 5; Infinite reproduced in chaos of Anaxagoras, 54; relation to Empedokles, ib.

Anaximenes, i. 7.

Angler, definition of, iii. 189.

Animal bodies purer than air or earth, i. 51; generation, Empedokles on, 42; Demokritus' researches in, 75; kosmos the copy of the [Greek: Au)to/zôon]**, iv. 223, 235 n., 263; genesis of inferior from degenerate man, 252; genesis of, 421.

Annikeris, i. 202.

Antalkidas, peace of, iii. 404.

Anterastæ, see Erastæ.

Antipater, i. 195.

Antisthenes, works, i. 111, 115, 163 n.; constant friend of Sokrates, 152; copied manner of Sokrates in plainness and rigour, 150, 158 n.; ethical, not transcendental, 122, 149; and ascetic, 151, 160; did not borrow from the Veda, 159 n.; only identical predication possible, iii. 221, 223, 232 n., 252, i. 165; coincidence with Plato, ii. 47 n.; refutation of, in Sophistês, iii. 223, 390 n., i. 163, 165; misconceived the function of the copula, iii. 221; errors due to the then imperfect logic, 241; fallacies of, ii. 215; not caricatured in Kratylus, iii. 304 n., 322 n.; on pleasure, 389 n.; compared with Aristippus, i. 190; antipathy to Plato, 151, 152 n., 165; opposed Platonic ideas, 164; the first protest of Nominalism against Realism, ib.; qualities non-existent without the mind, iii. 74 n.; distinction of simple and complex objects, i. 171; simple undefinable, ib.; Aristotle on, 172; Plato, ib.; Mill, ib. n.; Aristotle on school of, 115; doctrines developed by Stoics, 198.

Antoninus, Marcus, view of death, i. 422 n.; etymologies, iii. 308 n.; Pius, compared to Sokrates, ii. 382 n., iii. 21 n.

Anytus, hostility to Sophists, ii. 240; and philosophy generally, 255.

Aphorisms of Herakleitus and the Pythagoreans, i. 106.

Aphroditê, influence very small in Platonic state, iv. 197, 359 n.

Apollo, to be consulted for religious legislation, iv. 34, 137 n., 325, 337; Xenophon on, i. 237; consulted by Xenophon under Sokrates' advice, 208.

Apology, naturally the first dialogue for review, i. 411; authenticity, 304, 306, 410, 422 n., ii. 421 n.; date, i. 306-8, 311, 313, 330; Zeno, the Stoic, attracted to Athens by perusal of, 418; its general character, 412; is Sokrates' real defence not intentionally altered 410; testimony to truth of general features of Sokrates' character in, 419 n.; differently set forth in Kriton, 428; Sokrates' mission, to combat false persuasion of knowledge, 374, ii. 24; influence of public beliefs, generated without any ostensible author, i. 424; Sokrates' judgment on poets, expanded, ii. 129; compared with Gorgias, 362 n., 368; Phædon, 419; Kleitophon, iii. 421; Antigone of Sophokles, i. 429, n.

Appetite subordinated by Plato and Aristotle to reason and duty, iv. 204; soul, 245; analogous to craftsmen in state, 39.

À priori, Plato's dogmas are, i. 399; reasonings, Plato differs from moderns, ii. 251; element of cognition, iii. 118.

Archelaus of Macedonia, ii. 325, 333 n., 334, 336.

Archilochus, censured by Herakleitus, i. 26.

Arêtê, i. 195.

Argos, bad basis of government, iv. 310.

Argumenta ad Hominem, i. 98.

Aristeides, pupil of Sokrates, ii. 102; reply to Gorgias, 371 n., i. 243 n.; belief in dreams, iii. 146 n.

Aristippus, works, i. 111, 116; ethical, not transcendental, 122; discourse of Sokrates with, 175; the choice of Herakles, 177; Sokrates on the Good and Beautiful, 184; good is relative to human beings and wants, 185; relativity of knowledge, iii. 126 n., i. 198, 204; the just and honourable, by law, not nature, 197; prudence, a good from its consequent pleasures, ib.; acted on Sokrates' advice, 187, 199, 201; aspiration for self-mastery, 188; ethical theory, 195, 200 n.; compared with Diogenes and Antisthenes, 190; developed by Epikurus, 198; scheme of life, 181, 188; Horace's analogous, 192 n.; pleasure a generation, iii. 378 n.; communism of wives, i. 189 n.; contempt for geometry and physics, 186, 192; taught as a Sophist, 193; intercourse with Dionysius, ib.; antipathy to Xenophon, 182 n.

Aristogeiton, iii. 4 n.

Aristophanes, the Euthyphron a retort against, i. 442; connects idea of immorality with free thought, iv. 166; Sokrates in the Nubes, 230 n.; function of poet, 306 n.; Nubes analogous to Plato's Leges, 277; Vespæ, 298 n.; Aves, 329 n.

Aristophanes [Greek: grammatiko/s], librarian at Alexandria, i. 273; labours, ib. n.; first to arrange Platonic canon, 286; catalogue of Plato trustworthy, 285; division of Plato into trilogies, 273; principle followed by Thrasyllus, 295, 299.

Aristotle and Plato represent pure Hellenic philosophy, i. xiv; St. Jerome on, xv; MSS., 270, 283; Arabic translation, iv. 213 n.; zoological works, iii. 62 n.; lost Dialogues, i. 262 n.; different in form from Plato's, 356 n.; style, 405; no uniform consistency, 340 n.; relation to predecessors, 85, 91; importance of his information about early Greek philosophy, 85; as historian, misled by his own conceptions, 24 n.; contrasts "human wisdom" with primitive theology, 3 n.; treatment of his predecessors compared by Bacon to conduct of a Sultan, 85 n.; blames Ionic philosophy for attending to material cause alone, 87; abstractions of, compared with Ionians, ib.; erroneously identified heat with Parmenides' ens, 24 n.; on Zeno's arguments, 93; on Anaxagorean homoeomeries, 52 n.; charges Anaxagoras with inconsistency, 56; relation to Empedokles and Anaxagoras, 89; approves of fundamental tenet of Diogenes of Apollonia, 61 n.; Demokritus often mentioned in, iv. 355 n.; blames Demokritus for omitting final causes, i. 73 n.; on flux of Herakleitus, iii. 154 n.; accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii. 401 n.; cause, difference from Plato, 407; controversy with Megarics about Power, i. 135; depends on question of universal regularity of sequence, 141; Megarics defended by Hobbes, 143; Aristotle's arguments not valid, 136-9; himself concedes the doctrine, 139 n.; distinction of actual and potential, iii. 135 n., i. 139; graduation of causes, 142; motion, coincides nearly with Diodôrus Kronus, 146; and Hobbes, ib.; chance, 142; physics retrograded with, 89 n.; sphericity of kosmos, 25 n., iv. 225 n.; Demiurgus little noticed in, 255; Plato's geometrical theory of the elements, 241 n.; espoused and enlarged astronomical theory of Eudoxus, i. 257 n.; reason of the kosmos, different from Sokrates' conception, ii. 402 n.; on Eudoxus, iii. 375 n., 379 n.; time, 103; friend of Ptolemy Soter, i. 279; pupil of Plato, 260; opposition during Plato's lifetime, 360 n.; mode of alluding to Plato, iii. 186 n.; on Plato's lectures, i. 347; on poetical vein in Plato, 343, iv. 255 n.; Plato's tendency to found arguments on metaphor, ii. 337 n.; ontology substratum for phenomenology, i. 24 n.; philosophia prima, 358 n., iii. 230 n., 382; materia prima, i. 72; view of logic of a science, different from Plato's, 358 n.; on Plato's ideas, 348, 360 n., ii. 192, 194 n., 410 n., iii. 64 n., 65 n., 66 n., 67 n., 77 n., 78, 245, 367 n., iv. 214 n., i. 120 n.; generic and analogical aggregates, ii. 193, iii. 365 n.; Sophistês an approximation to Aristotle's view, 247; definition of ens, 230 n., 242 n.; on the different, 238 n.; partly successful in fitting on the ideas to facts of sense, 78; percept prior to the percipient, 76 n.; conception of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis], 165 n.; Plato's theory of vision, iv. 237 n.; Plato's doctrine of naming, iii. 286 n., 294 n., 325 n.; etymologies, 301 n., 307 n., 308 n.; no analysis or classification of propositions before, 222; propositions, some true, others false, assumed, 249; definition of simple objects, i. 172; on only identical predication possible, 166, 171; more careful than Plato in distinguishing equivoques, ii. 170, 279 n.; equivocal meaning of know, 213 n.; indeterminate predicates Ens, Unum, Idem, &c., iii. 94; first to attempt classification of fallacies, ii. 212; De Sophisticis Elenchis, 222; first distinguished [Greek: o(mô/numa], [Greek: sunô/numa], and [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], iii. 94 n.; two methods, coincide with Thrasyllus' classification, i. 303; basis of dialectic, 133 n.; negative method, its necessity as a condition of reasoned truth, 372 n.; distinct aptitudes required for dialectic, ii. 54; on dissecting function of dialectic, 70 n.; distinction of dialectic and eristic, 221 n.; precepts for debate, iii. 91 n.; Rhetoric, 43; on Menexenus, 409 n., 412 n.; distinction of ends, 374 n.; good the object of universal desire, 372 n.; threefold division of good, iv. 428 n.; no common end among established [Greek: no/mima], iii. 282 n.; combats Sokrates' thesis in Memorabilia and Hippias Minor, ii. 67; lying not justifiable, iii. 386 n.; meanings of justice, iv. 102; meaning of [Greek: phu/sei], iii. 294 n.; on opposition of natural and legal justice, ii. 340 n.; nature, iv. 387 n.; on Law, ii. 92 n.; theory of politics to resist King Nomos, i. 392; on virtue is knowledge, ii. 67 n., 290 n.; divine inspiration, 131 n.; [Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: phro/nêsis], 120 n.; on [Greek: to\ a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai], 333 n.; treatment of courage and temperance, compared with Plato's, 170; derivation of [Greek: sôphrosu/nê], iii. 301 n.; on pleasure, 383 n., 386 n.; pleasure not a generation, 378 n.; painless pleasures of geometry, 357, 388 n.; on intense pleasures, 376 n.; on Antisthenes, 253 n.; school of Antisthenes, i. 115; on friendship, ii. 186; prima amicitia, compared with Sokrates' amabile primum, 194; on Plato's reminiscence, 250 n.; immortality of soul, 420 n.; relation of body to soul, iii. 389 n.; on function of lungs, iv. 245 n.; liver, 258 n.; Plato's physiology and pathology compared with, 260; definition of sophist, ii. 210; equally with Sophists, laid claim to universal knowledge, iii. 219; on Homo mensura, 120 n., 128 n., 131 n., 132 n., 149 n., 152; cites from the Protagoras, ii. 290 n.; category of relation, iii. 128 n.; the Axioms of Mathematics, i. 358 n.; ethics and politics treated apart, iv. 138; three ends of political constructor, 328 n.; education combined with polity, 142, 184; on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187, 189 n.; training of Spartan women, 188; views on teaching, iii. 53 n.; chorus of elders only criticise, iv. 297 n.; importance of music in education, 151 n., 305; ethical and emotional effects conveyed by sense of hearing, 307 n.; implication of intelligence and emotion, iii. 374 n.; view of tragic poetry, iv. 317 n.; Plato's ideal state, 139 n.; it is two states, 185; objection valid against his own ideal, 186 n.; the Demos adjuncts, not members of state, 184; Plato's state impossible, in what sense true, 189; democracy and monarchy not mother-polities, 312 n.; oligarchical character of Plato's second idéal, 334 n.; idéal of character, different from Spartan, 182; differs from Plato on slavery, 344 n.; land of citizens, 327 n.; number of citizens limited, 198-201, 326 n.; communism, 180** n.; Plato's family restrictions, 329 n.; on marriage, 189, 198-202; on infanticide, 202; recognised Malthus' law of population, ib.; allusions to Leges, 272 n., 432; prayer and sacrifice, 394.

Arithmetic, Pythagorean, i. 15; modern application of their principle, 10 n.; subject of Plato's lectures, 349 n.; twofold, iii. 359, 394; to be studied, iv. 423; awakening power of, 71, 72; value of, 329 n., 352; acoustics to be studied by relations and theories of, 74; proportionals, 224 n., 423; its axioms from induction, 353 n.; Mill on assumption in axioms of, iii. 396 n.

Art, the supreme, is philosophy, ii. 119, 120; disparaged by Plato, 355; relation to science, iii. 43 n., 45, 155, 263; relation to morality, see Education, Poets**.

Ascetic life of philosopher, ii. 386; Pythagoreans, iii. 390 n.; Orphics, ib.; Cynics, i. 151, 157; Diogenes compared with Indian Gymnosophists and Selli, 157, 159 n., 163 n.; Indian Gynmosophists, antiquity of, 159 n.; Selli, 163 n.

Aspasia, iii. 402, i. 112, 211 n.

Association of Ideas, i. 423 n.; Plato's statement of general law of, ii. 191; Aristotle, ib. n.; Straton on, iii. 166 n.

Ast, theory of Platonic canon, i. 304; admits only fourteen, 305; on Apology, 422 n.; Lachês, ii. 151; Hippias Major, 33 n.; Kratylus, iii. 310 n.; Menexenus, 412 n.; Timæus, iv. 255 n.; Leges, 431, 434.

Astronomy, ancient, i. 3; of Anaxagoras, 57; modern, doctrine of aerolithes anticipated by Diogenes of Apollonia, 64 n.; first systematic Greek hypothesis propounded by Eudoxus, 255; Planets, meaning in Plato's age, iv. 354 n., 422; Demokritus' idea of motions of, 355 n.; Plato's idea of motions of, ib.; Sokrates avoided, i. 376; Plato's relation to theory of Eudoxus, 257 n.; theological view of, iv. 421; advantages of this view, 422; object of instruction in, 354; must be studied by ideal figures, not observation, 73.

Atheist, loose use of term, iv. 382 n.

Athenians, proceedings of Sokrates repugnant to, i. 387; statesmen, ignorance of, ii. 8, 360; characteristics of, 118; customs of, iii. 24 n.; intellect predominant in, iv. 38; Plato's idéal of character, 147, 151; ancient, citizens of Plato's state identified with, 266; general coincidence of Platonic and Attic law, 364, 374 n., 403, 406, 430; taxes of, i. 242 n.

Athens, less intolerance at, than elsewhere, iii. 277, iv. 396; lauded, iii. 405, 409 n.; by Xenophon, i. 238; funeral harangues at, iii. 401-5; hatred to [Greek: ba/rbaroi], 406 n.; and Persia compared, iv. 312; excess of liberty at, ib.; change for worse at, after Persian invasion, 313; contrast in Demosthenes and Menexenus, 315 n., 318; Plato's aversion to dramatic poetry at, 316; peculiar to himself, 317; Aristotle differs, ib. n.; Plato's ideal compared with, 430; secession of philosophers from, i. 111 n.

Atlantic, unnavigable, the belief in Plato's age, iv. 270.

Atlantis, iv. 215; description of, 268; corruption and wickedness of people, 269; address of Zeus, ib.; submergence, 270.

Atoms, atomic theory, i. 65; relation to Eleatics, 66; of Demokritus, differ, only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement, 69; generate qualities by movements and combinations, ib., 70; possess inherent force, 73; not really objects of sense, 72 n.; essentially separate from each other, 71; yet analogous to the homoeomeries of Anaxagoras, 79 n.; different from Platonic Idea and Aristotle's materia prima, 72; mental, 75; thought produced by influx of, 79.

Attikus, iv. 242 n.

Augustine, St., iii. 303 n.

Austin, meaning of law, ii. 92 n.

Authority, early appearance in Greece of a few freethinkers, i. 384; multiplicity of individual authorities characteristic of Greek philosophy, 84; distinguished them from contemporary nations, 90; advantages, ib.; influence of, on most men, 378-82, 392, 424, ii. 333, iv. 351; Aristophanes connects idea of immorality with free thought, 166; freedom of thought essential to philosophy, i. 383, 394 n., ii. 368, iii. 151 n.; the basis of dialectic, 147, 297, 337 n.; all exposition an assemblage of individual judgments, 139; belief on, relation to Homo mensura, 142, 143, 293; Sokrates asserts right of satisfaction for his own individual reason, i. 386, 423, 436, ii. 233; individual reason authoritative to each, i. 432; Plato on difficulty of resisting, 392 n.; combated by Plato, 398 n.; Plato's dissent from established religious doctrine, iv. 161, 163; danger of one who dissents from the public, ii. 359, 364, 366; dignity and independence of philosophic dissenter, upheld, 375; individual reason worthless, Herakleitus, i. 34; of public judgment, nothing, of expert, everything, 426, 435; different view, 446 n.; Sokrates does not name, but himself acts as, expert, 435; appeal to, suppressed in Academic sect, 368 n.; Epiktetus on, 388 n.; Cicero, 369, 384 n.; Bishop Huet, ib.; Council of Trent, 390 n.; Dr. Vaughan, iv. 380 n.; see Orthodoxy.

Averroism, iii. 68 n.

Axiomata media, iii. 52, 369.

Axioms of Mathematics, Aristotle's view, i. 358 n.; of Arithmetic and Geometry, from induction, iii. 396 n., iv. 353 n.

Bacon, importance of negative method, i. 373 n., 386; on doubt, 394 n.; misrepresents Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors, 85 n.; contrasts Plato and Aristotle with Pre-Sokratic philosophy, 88 n.; Idola, ii. 218; anticipation of nature, 219 n.; relativity of mental and sensational processes, iii. 122 n.; axiomata media, 52, 369.

Badham, Dr., on Philêbus, iii. 365 n., 381 n., 389 n., 392 n., 396 n.

Bain, Prof., on the Beautiful, ii. 50 n.; the Tender Emotion, 188 n.; law of mental association, 192 n.; analysis of Belief, 218; reciprocity of regard indispensable to society, 312 n.; relativity of knowledge, iii. 123 n.; on pleasures, 383 n.

Batteux, iv. 229 n.

Bayle, iv. 233.

Beautiful, the, as translation of [Greek: to\ kalo/n], ii. 49 n.; Hippias' lectures at Sparta on, 39; what is, ib.; instances given, 40; gold makes all things beautiful, 41; not the becoming or the profitable, 43, 50 n.; a variety of the pleasurable, 45; inadmissible, ib.; Dugald Stewart, Mill, and Bain on, 50 n.; Plato's antithesis of relative and absolute, 54; difference of Sokrates and Plato, 55; as object of attachment, 194; aspect of physical, awakens reminiscence of Ideas, 422, iii. 4, 14; Greek sentiment towards youths, 1; stimulus to mental procreation, 4, 6, 18; different view, Phædon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Republic, ib.; exaltation of Eros in a few, love of beauty in genere, 7, 16; love of, excited by musical training, iv. 27; and the good, iii. 5 n.; Idea of, exclusively presented in Symposion, 18; discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus, i. 184.

Beckmann, book-censors, iv. 379 n.

Belief, Prof. Bain's analysis, ii. 218; causes of, variable, iii. 150; always relative to the believer's mind, 292, 297; sentiments of disbelief and, common, but grounds different with different men and ages, 296; and conjecture, two grades of opinion, iv. 67; Plato's canon of, 231.

Bentham, meaning of Law, ii. 92 n.

Berkeley, theory of, iv. 243 n.; implication of subject and object, iii. 123 n.; his use of sensation, 165 n.

Bion, on Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, ii. 249 n.

Body, animal bodies purer than air or earth, Anaxagoras doctrine, i. 51; Plato's antithesis of soul to, ii. 384; soul prior to and more powerful than, iv. 386, 419, 421; relation of mind to organs of, iii. 159; Aristotle, 389 n.; Monboddo, iv. 387 n.; discredit of, in Phædon, ii. 422; life a struggle between soul and, 386, 388, iv. 233, 235 n.; derivation of [Greek: sô=ma], iii. 301 n.; alone reflects beauty of ideal world, ii. 422, iii. 4, 14; Ideas gained through bodily senses, ii. 422; of kosmos, iv. 225; genesis of, 421; Demiurgus prepares for man's construction, places a soul in each star, 235; Demiurgus conjoins three souls and one body, 233; generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos with rational soul rotating within, 235; generated gods mount cranium on a tall body, 236; genesis of women and inferior animals from degenerate man, 252; this degeneracy originally intended, 263; organs of sense, 236; vision, sleep, dreams, ib.; sleep, doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 34; principal advantages of sight and hearing, iv. 237; each part of the soul is at once material and mental, 257; thoracic soul, function of heart and lungs, 245; Empedokles' belief as to the movement of the blood, i. 43; Empedokles illustrated respiration by klepsydra, 44 n.; abdominal soul, function of liver, iv. 245, 258; seat of prophetic agency, 246; function of spleen, ib.; object of length of intestinal canal, 247; bone, flesh, marrow, nails, mouth, teeth, ib.; general survey of diseases, 249; diseases of mind from, ib.; intense pleasures belong to distempered, iii. 355, 391; preservative and healing agencies, iv. 250; training should be simple, 28.

Boeckh, on Minos and Hipparchus, i. 337 n., ii. 93; Kleitophon, iii. 419 n.; Timæus, iv. 224 n., 226 n., 227 n., 241 n.; Leges, 273 n., 355 n.; Epinomis, 424 n.; Xenophon's financial schemes, i. 242 n.

Boethius, on Plato's reminiscence, ii. 250 n.

Böhme, lingua Adamica, iii. 322 n.

Boissier, Gaston, on Varro's etymologies, iii. 311 n.; influence of belief on practice, i. 157 n.

Bonitz, on Theætêtus, iii. 184 n.

Books, writing as an art, iii. 27; is it teachable by system? 28; worthless for teaching, ii. 136, 233 n., iii. 33-35, 49, 52, 54, 337 n.; may remind, 50, 53; censorship, iv. 379 n.; ancient bookselling, i. 278 n., 281 n.; ancient libraries, official MSS., 284 n.; making copies, ib. n.; forgeries of books, 287 n.

Brandis, on Parmenidês, iii. 88 n.

Brown, on power, i. 138 n.

Bryson, dialogues, i. 112 n.

Buddhism, i. 378 n.

Buffon, iv. 232 n.

Butler, Bp., iv. 166 n.

Cabanis, i. 168 n.

Calendar, ancients', iv. 325 n.

Campbell, Dr. George, iii. 391 n.

Campbell, Prof. Lewis, on Theætêtus, iii. 111 n., 112 n., 146 n., 158 n.; advance of modern experimental science, 155 n.

Canon of Plato, ancient discussions, i. 264; works in Alexandrine library at the time of Kallimachus, 276; probability of being in Alexandrine library at formation, 283; editions from Alexandrine library, 295; spurious works possibly in other libraries, 286; Aristophanes, the grammarian, first arranged Platonic canon, ib.; in trilogies, 273; indicated by Plato himself, 325; catalogue by Aristophanes trustworthy, 285; ten dialogues rejected by all ancient critics, following Alexandrine authorities, 297; Thrasyllus follows Aristophanes' classification, 295, 299; Tetralogies, 273 n.; not the order established by Plato, 335 n.; his classification, 289; its principle, 295 n.; division into dramatic and diegematic, 288; incongruity of divisions, 294; classification, defective but useful--dialogues of Search, of Exposition, 361; erroneously applied, 364; the scheme, when its principles correctly applied, 365; sub-classes recognised, 366; coincides with Aristotle's two methods, Dialectic, Demonstrative, 363; Thrasyllus did not doubt Hipparchus, 297 n.; authority acknowledged till 16th century, 301; more trustworthy than modern critics, 299 n., 335; Diogenes Laertius, 291 n., 294; Serranus, 302; Phædrus considered by Tennemann keynote of series, 303; Schleiermacher, ib.; proofs slender, 317, 324; includes a preconceived scheme and an order of interdependence, 318; assumptions as to Phædrus inadmissible, 319; his reasons internal, ib., 337, iv. 431; Phædon, the first dialogue disallowed upon internal grounds, i. 288; considered spurious by Panætius the Stoic, ib.; no internal theory yet established, 319; Ast, 304; admits only fourteen, 305; Socher, 306; Stallbaum, 307; K. F. Hermann, ib.; coincides with Susemihl, 310; principle reasonable, 322; more tenable than Schleiermacher's, 324; Ueberweg attempts reconcilement of Schleiermacher and Hermann, 313; Steinhart rejects several, 309; Munk, 311; next to Schleiermacher's in ambition, 320; Trendelenburg, 345 n.; other critics, 316; the problem incapable of solution, 317; few certainties or reasonable presumptions for fixing date or order of dialogues, 324; positive date of any dialogue unknown, 326; age of Sokrates in a dialogue, of no moment, 320; no sequence or interdependence of the dialogues provable, 322, 407; circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical development little known, 323 n.; Plato did not write till after death of Sokrates, 326, 334, 443 n.; proofs, 327-334; unsafe ground of modern theories, 336; shown by Schleiermacher, 337; a true theory must recognise Plato's varieties and be based on all the works in the canon, 339; dialogues may be grouped, 361; inconsistency no proof of spuriousness, xiii., 344, 375, 400 n., ii. 299, iii. 71, 85, 93, 176, 179, 182 n., 284, 332, 400, 420, iv. 138; see Dialogues, Epistles.

Category of relation, iii. 128 n.

Cause, Aristotle blames Demokritus for omitting final, i. 73 n.; only the material attended to by Ionic philosophy, 88; designing cause, 74 n.; Sokrates' intellectual development turned on different views as to a true, ii. 398; first doctrine, rejected, 391, 399; second principle, optimistic, renounced, 395, 403; efficient and co-efficient, 394, 400; third doctrine, assumption of ideas as separate entia, 396, 403; ideas the only true, 396; substitution of physical for mental, Anaxagoras, Sokrates, Aristotle, Descartes, Newton, 401; tendency to embrace logical phantoms as real, 404 n.; no common idea of, 405, 407, 410 n.; but common search for, 406; Aristotle and Plato differ, 407; Plato's formal and final, 408 n.; principal and auxiliary, iii. 266; controversy of Megarics and Aristotle, i. 135-141; depends on question of universal regularity of sequence, 141; potential as distinguished from actual, 139; meaning of, Hobbes, ib. n., 144; regular and irregular, ii. 408; no regular sequence of antecedent on consequent, doctrine of Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, i. 142; Aristotle's graduation of, ib.; Aristotle's notion of Chance, ib.; Stoics, 143 n.; Aristotle's four, in middle ages, ii. 409 n.; More's Emanative, 403 n.; modern inductive theory, 408; chief point of divergence of modern schools, 409 n.

Cave, simile of, iv. 67-70.

Cavendish, discovery of composition of water, ii. 163 n.

Chance, of Demokritus and the Epikureans, i. 73 n.; Aristotle's notion of, 142; Theophrastus, 143 n.; Stoics, ib.

Chaos, Hesiod, i. 4 n.; Empedokles, 39, 54; Anaxagoras, 50, ib. n.; postulated in Timæus, iv. 220, 240.

Charmidês, authenticity, i. 306-7, ii. 171; date, i. 308-10, 312, 315, 328, 331; excellent specimen of dialogues of search, ii. 163; scene and interlocutors, 153; temperance, a kind of sedateness, objections, 154; a variety of feeling of shame, refuted, ib.; doing one's own business, refuted, 155, iv. 136, 137; distinction of making and doing, ii. 155; self-knowledge, ib.; is impossible, 167; no object of knowledge distinct from the knowledge itself, 156; knowledge of knowledge impossible, analogies, ib.; all properties relative, 157; all knowledge relative to some object, ib.; if cognition of cognition possible, yet cognition of non-cognition impossible, 158; temperance as cognition of cognition and of non-cognition, of no avail for happiness, 159, 161; knowledge of good and evil contributes most to happiness, 160; different from other sciences, 168; temperance not the science of good and evil, 161; temperance undiscovered, but a good, 162; compared with Lachês, 168; Lysis, 172, 184 n.; Politikus, iii. 282; Republic, iv. 137, 138.

Charondas, iv. 323 n., 398 n.

Chinese compared with Pythagorean philosophers, i. 159 n.

Chrysippus, sophisms, i. 128 n., 141; communism of wives, 189 n.

Cicero, on freedom of thought, i. 384 n.; state religion alone allowed, iv. 379 n.; De Amicitia compared with Lysis, ii. 189 n.; Plato's reminiscence, 250 n.; immortality of the soul, 423 n.; pleasure, iii. 389 n.; Menexenus, 407 n.; Sokrates, concitatio, 423 n.; proëms to laws, iv. 322 n.; Stoics, i. 130 n., 157 n.; Academics, 131 n.; Megarics, 135 n.

Classes, fiction as to origin of, iv. 30; see Demos, State.

Classification, emotional and scientific contrasted, iii. 61, 195, 196 n.; conscious and unconscious, 345; the feeling of Plato's age respecting, 192 n., 344; dialogues of search a lesson in, 177, 188; novelty and value of this, 190; all particulars of equal value, 195; tendency to omit sub-classes, 255, 342; well illustrated in Philêbus, 254, 344; but feebly applied, 369; importance of founding it on sensible resemblances, 255; Plato's doctrine not necessarily connected with that of Ideas, 345; Plato enlarges Pythagorean doctrine, 368; same principle of, applied to cognitions and pleasures in Philêbus, 382, 394; its valuable principles, 395; of sciences as more or less true, dialectic the standard, 382; of Megarics, over-refined, 196 n.

Cleynaerts, iv. 380 n.

Climate, influence of, iv. 330 n.

Colenso, Bp., iii. 303 n.

Collard, Royer, iii. 165 n.

Colour, Demokritean theory, i. 77; defined, ii. 235; pleasures of, true, iii. 356.

Comedy, mixed pleasure and pain excited, iii. 355 n.; Plato's aversion to Athenian, iv. 316; peculiar to himself, 317; Aristotle differs, ib. n.

Commerce, each artisan only one trade, iv. 361; importation, by magistrates, of what is imperatively necessary only, ib.; Benefit Societies,g 399; retailers, 21, 361, 401; punishment for fraud, 492; Attic law compared, 403; Xenophon inexperienced in, i. 236; admired by Xenophon, ib.; Metics, iv. 362; Xenophon on encouragement of, i. 238.

Communism of guardians, iv. 140, 169, 198; necessary to maintenance of state, 170, 178; peculiarity of Plato's, 179; Aristotle on, 189 n.; acknowledged impracticable, 327; of wives, opinions of Aristippus, Diogenes, Zeno, and Chrysippus, i. 189, ib. n.

Comte, three stages of progress, ii. 407.

Concrete, its Greek equivalent, ii. 52 n.; see Abstract.

Condorcet, iv. 232 n., 258 n.

Connotation, or essence, to be known before accidents and antecedents, ii. 242.

Consciousness, judgment implied in every act of, iii. 165 n.; the facts of, not explicable by independent Subject and Object, 131.

Contradiction, principle of, in Plato, iii. 99 n.; logical maxim of, 239; necessity of setting forth counter-propositions, 149 n., 150; contradictory propositions not possible, i. 166 n.

Contraries, ten pairs of opposing, Pythagorean, i. 15; the Pythagorean "principia of existing things," ib. n.; Herakleitus, 29, 31; excluded in nothing save the self-existent Idea, ii. 7 n.

Copula, logical function of, i. 169; misconceived by Antisthenes, iii. 221, 232 n., 251 n., ii. 47 n.

Cornutus, i. 128, 133.

Council, Nocturnal, to conserve the original scheme of State, iv. 416, 418; to comprehend and carry out the end of the State, ib., 425, 429; training in Epinomis, 420, 424.

Courage, what is, ii. 143; not endurance, 144; is knowledge, 288; a right estimate of terrible things, 144, 296, 307, iv. 138; such intelligence not possessed by professional artists, ii. 148; the intelligence of good and evil generally, too wide, 146; relation to rest of virtue, 288, 304 n., iv. 426, 283 n.; of philosopher and ordinary citizen, different principles, ii. 308 n.; in state, iv. 34-5; imparted by gymnastic, 29; Lachês difficulties ignored in Politikus, iii. 282; Plato and Aristotle compared, ii. 170.

Cousin, the absolute, iii. 298 n.; on Sophistês, 244; Timæus, iv. 224 n.

Creation out of nothing denied by all ancient physical philosophers, i. 52; see Body, Kosmos.

Crime, distinction of damage and injury, iv. 365, 367-9; three causes of misguided proceedings, 366; purpose of punishment, to heal criminals' distemper or deter, ib., 408; sacrilege and high treason the gravest, 363; see Law-administration.

Criticism, value of, ii. 118.

Cudworth, entities, iii. 74 n.

Cynics, origin of name, i. 150 n.; a [Greek: ai(/resis], 160 n.; asceticism, 157; Sokrates' precepts fullest carried out by, 160; suicide, 161 n.; coincidence of Hegesias with, 203; an order of mendicant friars, 163; connection with Christian monks, ib. n.; the decorous and the indecorous, iii. 390 n.

Cyrus, iv. 312,** i. 223.

Dæmon, of Sokrates, i. 437, ii. 104, i. 115; his experience of, ii. 102; explains his eccentricity, 104; variously alluded to in Plato--its character and working impenetrable, 107, 108; in Theagês and Theætêtus, 107; a special revelation, 108, 131 n.; privileged communications common, 130, 131 n.; see Inspiration; belief of Empedokles, i. 47; etymology, iii. 301 n.; Eros, intermediate between gods and men, 9; subordinate to divine steersman of kosmos, 265 n.; intermediate, iv. 421.

Dähne, on Philo-Judæus, iii. 308 n., iv. 157 n.

Damon, a teacher of [Greek: mousikê/], ii. 139 n.; dangers of change in national music, iv. 315.

Dancing to be regulated by authority, iv. 292; laws, 291; three choruses, youths, mature men, elders, 296, 305; and music, effect on emotions, 347; comic, by slaves or mean persons only, 352 n.

Darius, iv. 312.

Death, doctrine of Parmenides, i. 26 n.; Herakleitus, 34; Sokrates, 422, 430 n.; emancipates soul from struggle with body, ii. 386, 388, iv. 234, 235** n.; guardians must not fear, 25; see Immortality.

Debate of secondary questions before settling fundamental notions, mischief of, ii. 242; see Dialectic.

Definition gives classes, Type, natural groups, ii. 47, 193 n.; Sokrates introduced search for, 47; frequent mistake of giving a particular example, i. 444, ii. 143; dialogues of search illustrate process of, iii. 29, 176, 188; novelty and value of this, 190; importance in Plato's time of bringing forward logical subordinations and distinctions, ii. 235; tested by clothing it in particulars, iv. 3 n.; of common and vague terms, hopelessness of, ii. 186 n.; Aristotle on, 234 n.; none of a general word, Sextus Empiricus, i. 168, n.; none of simple objects, Antisthenes, 171; Plato on, 172; Aristotle, ib.; Mill, ib. n.; and division, the two processes of dialectic, iii. 29, 39; necessity for, 29; conditions of a good, ii. 318.

Degérando, M., iii. 140 n., 152 n.

Dekad, the Pythagorean perfect number, i. 11.

Delphian oracle, reply to Sokrates, i. 413; maxim, Know thyself, ii. 11, 25; to be consulted for religious legislation, iv. 34, 137 n., 325.

Demetrius Phalereus, Alexandrine librarian, i. 274 n.; chief agent in establishment of Alexandrine library, 280; history and character, 279; Apology, 111 n.

Demiurgus, opposed to [Greek: i)diô/tês], ii. 272 n.; of kosmos, iii. 265 n.; postulated, iv. 220; is not a creator, ib.; produces kosmos, by persuading Necessity, ib., 222; on pattern of ideas, 227; evolved the four elements from primordial chaos, 240; addresses generated gods, 233; prepares for man's construction, places a soul in each star, ib.; conjoins three souls and one body, 234; how conceived by other philosophers of same century, 254; little noticed in Aristotle, 255; degeneracy of man originally intended by, 263.

Demochares, law against philosophers, i. 111 n.

Democracy, least bad of unscientific governments, iii. 270, 278; origin, iv. 80; monarchy and, the mother-polities, 312; dissent of Aristotle, ib. n.; Plato's second ideal state a compromise of oligarchy and, 333, 337.

Demokritus, life and travels, i. 65; Plato's antipathy to, 66 n., 82 n., ii. 118, iv. 355 n.; often mentioned in Aristotle, ib.; opinions of ancients on, i. 82 n.; his universality, 82; relation to Parmenidean theory, 66; plena and vacua, ens and non-ens, 67, iii. 243 n.; his absolute and relative, i. 71, 80; atoms differ only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement, 69; different from Plato's Idea, and Aristotle's materia prima, 72; not really objects of sense, ib. n.; inherent force, 73; his ultimatum, the course of nature, ib.; primary and secondary qualities, iv. 243 n.; air, i. 76, 78; theory of colour, 77; theory of vision, combated by Theophrastus, 78 n.; hearing and taste, 78; motions of planets, iv. 355 n.; blamed by Aristotle for omitting final causes, i. 73 n.; chance, ib.; [Greek: phu/sis], 70 n.; mind is heat throughout nature, 75; parts of the soul, 76; on its immortality, ii. 425 n.; truth obtainable by reason only, i. 72; thought produced by influx of atoms, 79; on Homo mensura, 82, iii. 152; knowledge is obscure, or sensation, and genuine, or thought, i. 80; the gods, 81; ethical views, 82; treatise on Pythagoras, ib. n.; researches in zoology and animal generation, 75; influence on growth of dialectic, 82; works of, 65; in Alexandrine library, 276; divided into Tetralogies by Thrasyllus, 273 n., 295 n.

Dêmos, in state, analogous to appetite in individual mind, iv. 39; Plato more anxious for good treatment of, than Xenophon and Aristotle, 183; in Aristotle adjuncts, not members, of state, 184; Plato's scheme fails from no training for, 186; see State.

Demosthenes, pupil of Plato, i. 261 n.; rhetorical powers, iii. 408 n.; teaching of Isokrates, iv. 150 n.; adv. Leptinem contrasted with Leges, 315 n.

Descartes, advantages of protracted study, i. 404 n.; accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii. 401 n.; argument for being of God, a "fallacy of confusion," iii. 297 n.; on criticism by report, i. 118 n.

Desire for what is akin to us or our own, cause of friendship, ii. 182; good, object of universal, 243, iii. 335, 371, 392 n.; largest measure and all varieties of, are good, ii. 344; belongs to the mind, presupposes a bodily want and memory of previous satisfaction, iii. 350; exception, 351 n., 387 n.

Despot, has no real power, ii. 324; worst of unscientific governments, iii. 270, 278; origin, iv. 81; excess of despotism in Persia, 312; Solon on, i. 219 n.; Xenophon on interior life of, 218, 220; Xenophon's scheme of government, a wisely arranged Oriental despotism, 234.

Determining, Pythagorean doctrine of the, i. 11; the, iii. 346; it is intelligence, 348.

Deuschle, on Kratylus, iii. 325 n.

Deycks, on Megarics, i. 127 n., 136 n.

Dialectic, little or none in earliest theorists, i. 93; Demokritus' influence on its growth, 82; of Zeno the Eleate, 93; iii. 107; its purpose and result, i. 98; compared with Parmenidês, 100; early physics discredited by growth of, 91; its introduction changes the character of philosophy, 105, 107; repugnant to Herakleiteans, 106 n.; influence of Drama and Dikastery, 385; debate common in Sokratic age, 370, ii. 284; died out in later philosophy, i. 394 n.; disputations in the Middle Ages, 397 n.; modern search for truth goes on silently, 369; process per se interesting to Plato, 403, 406; has done more than any one else to interest others in it, 405; its importance, 91, 354, 372, ii. 167, 221; debate a generating cause of friendship, 188 n.; and Eristic, 210, 221 n.; of Sokrates, x; contrasted with Sophists', 197, i. 124; Sokrates first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness, 385, 389 n.; to social, political, ethical, topics, 385; necessity of negative vein, 91, 371, 373, 386, 394 n., 421, 444, 130; a value by itself, iii. 51, 70, 85, 149-50, 176, 184 n., 284, 422; see Negative Method; procedure of Sokrates repugnant to Athenian public, i. 387, ii. 305; colloquial companion necessary to Sokrates, 287; Sokrates asserts right of satisfaction for his own individual reason, i. 386; Sokrates' reason for attachment to, iii. 258 n.; Sokrates to the last insists on freedom of, ii. 379; stimulates, i. 420, 449, iv. 52 n.; as stimulating, not noticed in Republic training, 208; its negative and positive aspect, illustrated in Alkibiadês I. and II., ii. 7; indiscriminate, not insisted on in Gorgias, 367; protest against, iii. 335; Euthydemus popular among enemies of, ii. 222; common want of scrutiny, i. 398 n.; value of formal debate, as corrective of fallacies, ii. 221; its actual and anticipated effects, 11; Sokrates' positive solutions illusory, 26; its ethical basis, iii. 113; autonomy of the individual mind, 147, 297, 298; contrast with the Leges, 148; Aristotle on, i. 133 n.; obstetric method, lead of the respondent followed, 368; the respondent makes the discoveries for himself, 367; assumptions necessary in, iii. 251; precepts for, 91 n.; long answers inadmissible, ii. 281; brought to bear on Sokrates himself, iii. 57, 89; the sovereign purifier, 197; its result, Knowledge, i. 396; contrasted with lectures, ii. 277, iii. 337 n.; alone useful for teaching, 34, 49, 53; a test of the expository process, i. 358, 396; attainment of dialectical aptitude, purpose of Sophistês and Politikus, iii. 261; antithesis of rhetoric and, i. 433, ii. 52-3, 70, 277, 278 n., 282, 303; difference of method, illustrated in Protagoras, 300; superiority over rhetoric, claimed, 282; issue unsatisfactorily put, 369; rhetoric, as a real art, is comprised in, iii. 30, 34; rhetoric superior in usefulness and celebrity, 360, 380; Plato's desire for celebrity in rhetoric and, 408; its object, definition, i. 452, ii. 318; its two processes, definition and division, iii. 29, 39; testing of definitions by clothing them in particulars, iv. 7 n.; Inductive and Syllogistic, ii. 27; and Demonstrative, Aristotle's two intellectual methods, 363; the purest of all cognitions, iii. 360; and geometry, two modes of mind's procedure applicable to ideal world, iv. 65; requires no diagrams, deals with forms only, descending from highest, 66; is the consummation of all the sciences, gives the contemplation of the ideas, 75; one of the manifestations [Greek: tou= philosophei=n], 150 n.; standard for classifying sciences, iii. 382-3, 394; valuable principle, 395; exercises in, iv. 76; Republic contradicts other dialogues, 207-212; difference of Aristotle's and Plato's view, i. 363; mixture in Plato of poetical fancy and religious mysticism with dialectic theory, iii. 16; distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for, ii. 54; Aristotle on its dissecting function, 70 n.; Stoic View, i. 371 n.; Theopompus, 450.

Dialogues, the Sokratic, i. x, xi; the lost, of Aristotle, 262 n., 356 n.; of Sokratici viri, 111, 114; of Plato, give little information about him personally, 262; different in form from Aristotle's, 356 n.; vary in value, ii. 19; variety of Plato, i. 344; dramatic pictures, not historical, 419 n., ii. 33 n., 150, 155 n., 163, 172, 195, 199, 203, 265 n., iii. 9 n., 19, 25; of common form--Plato never speaks in his own name, i. 344; reluctant to publish doctrines on his own responsibility, 350, 352, 355, 361 n.; may have published under the name of others, 360; his lectures differ from, in being given in his own name, 402; Plato assumed impossibility of teaching by written exposition, 350, 355, ii. 56 n., 64; assumption intelligible in his day, i. 357; Sokratic elenchus, a test of the expository process, 358; of Search predominate, 366; a necessary preliminary to those of Exposition, ii. 201; their basis, Sokratic doctrine that false persuasion of knowledge is universal, i. 367, 393; illustrated by Hippias and Charmidês, ii. 64, 163; appeal to authority, suppressed in Academics, i. 368; debate common in the Sokratic age, 370; process per se interesting to Plato, 403; the obstetric method--lead of the respondent followed, 368; modern search for truth goes on silently, 369; purpose to stimulate intellect, and form verifying power, iii. 177, 188, 284; novelty and value of this, 190; process of generalisation always kept in view in, i. 406; affirmative and negative veins distinct, 399, 402, 420; often no ulterior affirmative end, 375; but Plato presumes the search will be renewed, 395; value as suggestive, and reviewing under different aspects, ii. 69; untenable hypothesis that Plato communicated solutions to a few, i. xii, 360, 401; no assignable interdependence, 407; each has its end in itself, xii, 344, 375, 400 n., ii. 300 n., iii. 71, 85, 93, 176, 179, 184 n., 284, 332, 400, 420, iv. 138; of Exposition, pedagogic tone, iii. 368 n.; Plato's change in old age, iv. 273, 320, 380, 424, i. 244; Xenophon compared, ib.; order for review, i. 408; see Canon.

Dianoia, Nous and, two grades of intelligence, iv. 66.

Dikæarchus, ii. 425 n.

Dikasts, opposition of feeling between Sokrates and, i. 375; influence of dikastery on growth of Dialectic, 385.

Diodorus Kronus, doctrine of Power, i. 140; defended by Hobbes, 143; hypothetical propositions, 145; time, difficulties of Now, ib.; motion, 146; Aristotle nearly coincides with, ib.; and Hobbes, ib.; his death, 147.

Diogenes of Apollonia, life and doctrines, i. 60; air his primordial element, 61; many properties of, ib.; physiology, 60 n., 62; cosmology and meteorology, 64; often followed Herakleitus, ib. n.; anticipated modern doctrine of aerolithes, ib.; Agreement with Anaxagoras, 65; fundamental tenet, agreement with Aristotle and Demokritus, 69 n.; theory of vision, iv. 237 n.

Diogenes of Sinôpê, i. 152; works, 155; doctrines, 154; Sokrates' precepts fullest carried out by, 160; asceticism, 157; compared with Indian Gymnosophists and Selli, ib., 160 n., 163 n.; with Aristippus, 190; Communism of wives, 189 n.; opposed Platonic ideas, 163; the first protest of Nominalism against Realism, 164.

Diogenes Laertius, i. 291 n., 294.

Dion Chrysostom, i. 112 n.

Dionysius, the elder, Aristippus' intercourse with, i. 193; visited by Plato, 351; the younger, visited by Plato, 258, 355; expedition of Dion against, 259.

Dionysius Hal., on Apology, i. 411 n.; rhetorical powers of Plato and Demosthenes, iii. 407 n.; rivalry of Plato and Lysias, 411 n.; contrasts Plato's with [Greek: Sôkratikoi\ dia/logoi], i. 110 n.; Plato's jealousy and love of supremacy, 117 n.

Diotima, iii. 8 n., 9.

Disease, general survey of, iv. 249; preservative and healing agencies, 250.

Dittrich on Kratylus, iii. 303 n.

Diversum, iv. 226; form of, pervades all others, iii. 209, 232; Aristotle on, 238 n.

Division, logical, ii. 27; and definition, the two processes of dialectic, iii. 29, 39; dialogues of search illustrate process, 29, 177, 188; novelty and value of this, ii. 235, iii. 190; by dichotomy, 254; importance of founding on sensible resemblances, 255; sub-classes often overlooked, 341; well illustrated in Philêbus, 344; but feebly applied, 369; Plato enlarges Pythagorean doctrine, 368.

Divorce, iv. 406.

Dodona, oracle to be consulted, iv. 325; Xenophon, i. 237.

Doing and making, ii. 155; use of [Greek: eu)= zê=n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein] in Charmidês, 216 n.

Drama, influence on growth of Dialectic, i. 385; mixed pleasure and pain excited by, iii. 355 n.; Plato's aversion to Athenian, iv. 316, 350; peculiar to himself, 317; Aristotle differs, ib. n.; see Poetry.

Dreams, doctrine of Demokritus, caused by images from objects, i. 81; Plato's theory of, iv. 237; as affecting doctrine Homo mensura, iii. 130; belief of rhetor Aristeides in, 146 n.

Drunkenness, Sokrates proof against, iii. 21, 23, iv. 287; is test of self-control, iii. 21 n., iv. 289, 298; forbidden at Sparta, how far justifiable, 286; chorus of elders require, 297; unbecoming the guardians, 298 n.

Eberhard, ii. 300 n.

Eclipse, foretold by Thales, i. 4 n.; Anaximander's doctrine, 6 n.; Pythagoras', 14 n.; Herakleitus', 32.

Education, who is to judge what constitutes, ii. 142; combined with polity by Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, iv. 142, 185, 337; on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 186; precautions in electing Minister of, 338; of men compared by Sokrates with training of inferior animals, iii. 62 n.; bad, of kings' sons, iv. 312; training of boys and girls, 348; by music and gymnastic, 23; musical training excites love of the beautiful, 27; importance of music, 305; views of Xenophon, Polybius, Aristotle, ib.; music, Platonic sense, 149; by fictions as well as by truth, 24; actual place of poetry in Greek, compared with Plato's ideal, 149-153; type for narratives about men, 26; songs, music, and dancing to be regulated, 25, 289, 291, 349; to keep emotions in a proper state, 169; prizes at festivals, 292, 337; but object of training, war, not prizes, 358; only grave music allowed, 26, 168; music and gymnastic necessary to correct each other, 29; gymnastic imparts courage, ib.; training to ascend to the idea of good, 61; purpose, 69; studies introductory to philosophy, 70-74, 206; difference in Leges, 275 n.; arithmetic, 423; awakening power, 70; stimulus from contradiction of one and many, 72; geometry, 423; conducts mind towards universal ens, 72; value of arithmetic and geometry, 352; by concrete method, 353 n.; particulars to be brought under the general forms, 423; astronomy, 422; object of teaching, 354; by ideal figures, not observation, 72; acoustics, by applying arithmetical relations and theories, 74; of Nocturnal Counsellors, 420, 424; exercises in dialectic, 76; Plato's remarks on effect of, 207; age for studies, 76, 350; philosophy should not be taught at a very early age, 60, 76; Republic contradicts other dialogues, 207-211; same training for men and women, 77; maintained in Leges, and harmonises with ancient legends, 195; contrast with Aristotle, 194; public training at Sparta and Krete, 279; Plato's scheme fails from no training for Demos, 186; Xenophon's scheme, i. 226-31; geometry and physics, Aristippus' contempt for, 186, 192.

Egger, i. 376 n.

Ego, and Mecum or non-ego, antithesis of, iii. 132 n., 144 n.

Egyptians, iv. 330 n., 352, 353 n., 415 n.; priests, historical knowledge of, 266, 268; causes, 271; Plato's reverence for regulations of, 267 n.

Eleatic philosophy, i. 16-26, 93-103; Leukippus, 65; relation to atomic theory, ib.; theory of vision, iv. 237** n.; compared with Hindoo philosophers, i. 160 n.

Eleians, iii. 24 n.

Elements, the four, not primitive, iv. 238; varieties of each, 242; forms of the, 238; geometrical theory of, 240; Aristotle on, 241 n.; a fifth added, ib. n., 421.

Emotions, appealed to in the Kriton, i. 433; Bain on the Tender, ii. 188 n.; a degenerate appendage of human nature, 126, iii. 389; implication of intelligence and, 374; antithesis of science and, 61, 195, 196 n.; the tender and aesthetic, no place for, in tripartite division of soul, iv. 149 n.; poet's appeal to, disturbs the rational government of the mind, 92, 152, 349; restrictions on music and poetry, to keep emotions in a proper state, 169, 347; similitude of, in all, but dissimilarity of objects, i. 452 n.

Empedokles, of universal pretensions, i. 47; doctrines, 38; four principles, ib.; dissents from Ionic School and Herakleitus, ib., 48; denies [Greek: phu/sis] (in sense of [Greek: ge/nesis]), 38 n.; compared with Anaxagoras, 52; Anaximander, 54; the moving forces, Love and Enmity, 39; modern attraction and repulsion, 40 n.; physics, 38; predestined cycle, 39; Chaos, ib., 54; was aware of effect of pressure of air, 44 n.; movements of the blood, 43; illustrated respiration by Klepsydra, 44 n.; perception, 44, iv. 235 n.; contrary to Anaxagoras, i. 58; knowledge of like by like, 44; God, 40 n., 42; dæmons, 47; religious mysticism in, 47 n.; claims magical powers, 47; sacredness of life, metempsychosis, 46; friendship, ii. 179; deplores impossibility of finding out truth from shortness of life, i. 47; influence on Aristotle, 91; doctrines identified by Plato with Homo Mensura, iii. 114, 115.

Ends, science of, postulated, ii. 32, 169; dimly indicated by Plato, 148; correlation with the unknown Wise Man, 149; distinction of, iii. 374 n.; no common, among established [Greek: no/mima], 282 n.

Energy, analogous to guardians in state, iv. 39; Aristotle's [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], ii. 355.

Ens, of Xenophanes, i. 17; of Parmenides, 66, iii. 58; combines extension and duration, i. 19; and Non-Ens, an inherent contradiction in human mind, 20; alone contains truth--phenomena, probability, 24; erroneously identified by Aristotle with Heat, ib. n.; Zeno, 93; Gorgias the Leontine, 103-4; Demokritus, 67; contraries the Pythagorean principles of, 15 n.; an intermediate predicate, iii. 94; theories of philosophers about, 200, 231; materialists and idealists, 202; of Plato, comprehends objects of perception and of conception, 229, 231; is ens one or many, 201; difficulties about non-ens and ens equally great, ib., 206; is equivalent to potentiality, 204; includes both the unchangeable and the changeable, 205; a tertium quid, distinct from motion and rest, 206; philosopher lives in region of ens,--Sophist, of non-ens, 208; non-ens, 331; different views about, 243 n.; its different meanings in Plato, 181 n.; non-ens inconceivable, 200; five forms examined, 208, 231-5; a real form, not contrary to, but different from, ens, 211, 233; inter-communion of forms of non-ens and of proposition, opinion, judgment, 213, 214, 235; non-ens in Sophistês different from other dialogues, 242; Plato's view of non-ens, ib. n., 249 n.; unsatisfactory, ib. n.; alone knowable, non-ens unknowable, iv. 49; what is between ens and non-ens, the object of opinion, ib.; fundamental distinction of ens from fientia, 219; see Relativity, Ontology.

Entities, quadruple distribution of, iii. 346; Cudworth's immutable, 74 n.

Epicharmus, i. 9.

Epiktêtus, on authority, i. 388 n.; objective and subjective, 451 n.; [Greek: philo/sophos] and [Greek: i)diô/tês], iv. 104 n.; scheme conformable to nature, i. 162 n.

Epikurus, garden, i. 255 n.; school and library, 269 n.; Symposion of, iii. 22 n.; developed Aristippus' doctrines, i. 198; identity of good and pleasure, ii. 315 n., 355 n., iii. 374, 377 n., 387 n., iv. 301; scheme conformable to nature, i. 163 n.; on justice, iv. 130 n.; antithesis of speculative and political life, ii. 368 n.; immortality of the soul, 425 n.; against repulsive pictures of Hades, iv. 155 n.; prayer and sacrifice, 395; agreement with Demokritean doctrine of chance, i. 73 n.; Plato's theology compared with, iv. 161.

Epimenidês, date, iv. 311 n.

Epimêtheus, ii. 268.

Epinomis, its authorship, i. 299 n., 306, 307, 309; represents Plato's latest opinions, iv. 421 n., 424 n.; gives education of Nocturnal Counsellors, 420, 424; soul prior to and more powerful than body, 421; genesis of kosmos, ib.; five elements, 240 n., 421; wisdom, ib.; theological view of astronomy, ib.; arithmetic and geometry, proportionals, 423; particulars to be brought under the general forms, 423.

Epistles, Plato's, i. 333 n.; genuineness, 306-7, 309, 349 n.; written when old, 262; valuable illustrations of his character, 339 n.; intentional obscurity as to philosophical doctrine, 350, 353 n.

Equivoques, ii. 8 n., 214, iii. 29; Sokrates does not distinguish, ii. 279; Aristotle more careful than Plato, 170, 279 n.; fallacies of equivocation, 212, 352 n.; gain, 82; know, 213 n.; [Greek: eu)= zê=n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], 216 n., 352 n.; Nature, 341 n., iv. 194; Cause, ii. 404, 409, 410 n.; Good, 406, iii. 370; Ens, 231; Unum, Ens, Idem, Diversum, &c., 94; Pleasure, 379 n.; Justice, iv. 102, 120, 123, 125.

Eranos, meaning, iv. 400 n.; Plato inconsistent, 399.

Erasistratus, iv. 259 n.

Erastæ, authenticity, i. 306-7, 309, 315, ii. 121; subject and interlocutors, 111; vivacity, 116; philosophy the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, 112; how to fix the quantity, 113; philosophy not multiplication of learned acquirements, 114; special art for discriminating bad and good, 115, 119; supreme, 120; the philosopher its regular practitioner, 115; the philosopher, second best in several arts, 114; Aristotle's [Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: phro/nêsis], 120 n.; relation of second-best man to regular practitioner, 113, 115, 118; supposed to point at Demokritus, ib.; humiliation of literary erastes, 116.

Eretrian school, transcendental, not ethical, i. 121; qualities non-existent without the mind, iii. 74 n.; Phædon, i. 148; Menedêmus, ib., 149.

Eristic and dialectic, ii. 221 n.; Aristotle's definition, 210.

Eros, differently understood, necessity for definition, iii. 29; derivation, 308 n.; contrast of Hellenic and modern sentiment, 1; erotic dialogues, Phædrus and Symposion, ib.; as conceived by Plato, ib., 4, 11; inconsistent with expulsion of poets, 3 n.; purpose of Symposion, to contrast Plato's with other views, 8; views of interlocutors in Symposion, 9; a Dæmon intermediate between gods and men, 9; but in Phædrus a powerful god, ib. n., 11 n.; the stimulus to improving philosophical communion, 4, 6, 18; Phædon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Republic, ib.; exaltation of, in a few, love of Beauty in genere, 7, 15; analogy to philosophy, 10, 11, 14; disparaged, then panegyrised, by Sokrates in Phædrus, 11; a variety of madness, ib.; Sokrates as representative of Eros Philosophus, 15, 25; Xenophon's view, ib.

Ethics, diversity of beliefs, noticed by the ancients, i. 378, iii. 282 n.; hostility to novel attempts at analysis, i. 387 n.; Sokrates distinguished objective and subjective views, 451; subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent, ib.; Aristophanes connects idea of immorality with free thought, iv. 166; the matter of ethical sentiment variable, the form permanent, 203; Pascal on, i. 231 n.; with political and social life, topic of Sokrates, 376, ii. 362, iii. 113; self-regarding doctrine of Sokrates, ii. 349, 354 n.; order of problems as conceived by Sokrates, 299; to do, worse than to suffer, evil, 326, 332, 338, 359; no man voluntarily does, iv. 249, 365-7; [Greek: a(martê/mata] and [Greek: a)dikê/mata] distinguished, 365, 367; and politics treated together by Plato, 133; apart by Aristotle, 138; Sokrates and Plato dwell too exclusively on intellectual conditions, ii. 67, 83; rely too much on analogy of arts, and do not note what underlies epithets, 68; Plato blends ontology with, iii. 365; forced conjunction of kosmology and, 391; physiology of Timæus subordinated to ethical teleology, iv. 257; different points of view in Plato, ii. 167; modern theories, intuition, 348; moral sense, not recognised in Gorgias and Protagoras, ib.; permanent and transient elements of human agency, 353-5; [Greek: ta\ anthrô/pina],** iv. 302 n.; the permanent, and not immediate satisfaction, the end, ii. 360; [Greek: to\ e(/neka/ tou] confused with [Greek: to\ dia/ ti], 182 n.; basis in Republic imperfect, iv. 127-32; Plato more a preacher than philosopher in the Republic, 131, 132; purpose in Leges, to remedy all misconduct, 369; of Demokritus, i. 82; see Cynics, Kyrenaics, Epikurus, &c.

Etymology, see Name.

Eubulides, sophisms of, i. 128, 133.

Eudemus, iv. 255; Proklus borrowed from, i. 85 n.

Eudoxus, i. 255; identity of good and pleasure, ii. 315 n., iii. 375 n., 379 n.

Eukleides, i. 116; enlarged summum genus of Parmenides, iii. 196 n.; blended Parmenides with Sokrates, i. 118; Good, iii. 365, i. 119, 127 n.; nearly Plato's last view, 120.

Euripides, Bacchæ analogous to Leges, iv. 277, 304 n.; Hippolytus illustrates popular Greek religious belief, 163 n.

Eusebius, i. 384 n., iv. 160 n., 256 n.

Euthydêmus, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 195; date, i. 308-11, 312, 315, 320, 325 n., ii. 227 n., iii. 36 n.; scenery and personages, ii. 195; dramatic and comic exuberance, ib.; purpose, i. 309 n., ii. 198, 204 n., 211, i. 128; Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus do not represent Protagoras and Gorgias, ii. 202; ironical admiration of Sophists, 208; earliest known attempt to expose fallacies, 216; the result of habits of formal debate, 221; character drawn of Sokrates suitable to its purpose, 203; possession of good things, without intelligence, useless, 204; intelligence must include making and use, 205; fallacies of equivocation, 212, iii. 238 n.; à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, ii. 213, 214; extra dictionem, 215; involving deeper logical principles, ib.; its popularity among enemies of dialectic, 222; the epilogue to obviate this inference, 223; Euthydêmus the representative of dialectic and philosophy, 226; disparagement of half-philosophers, half-politicians, 224; Plato's view untenable, 229; is Isokrates meant? 227, iii. 38 n.; no teacher can be indicated, ii. 225; compared with Parmenidês, 200; Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras, 208, iii. 373 n.

Euthyphron, date of, i. 457 n.; its Sokratic spirit, 449; gives Platonic Sokrates' reply to Melêtus, Xenophontic compared, 441, 455; a retort against Aristophanes, 442; interlocutors, 437; Euthyphron indicts his father for homicide, 438, ii. 329 n.; as warranted by piety, i. 439; acts on Sokratic principle of making oneself like the gods, 440; Holiness, 439; answer by a particular example, 444; not what pleases the gods, 445, 448, 454; Sokrates disbelieves discord among gods, 440; why gods love the Holy, 446; not a branch of justice, 447; for gods gain nothing, 448; holiness not a right traffic between men and gods, ib.; dialogue useful as showing the subordination of logical terms, 455.

Evil, to do, worse than to suffer, ii. 326, 332, 338, 359; contrast of usual with Platonic meaning, 331; the greatest, ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, iii. 197; great preponderance of, iv. 25, 262 n., 390; gods not the cause of, 24; the good and the bad souls at work in the universe, 386; man the cause of, 234; inconsistency, ib., n.; diseases of mind arise from body, 250; no man voluntarily wicked, ii. 292, iv. 249, 365-7; done by the good man wilfully, by the bad unwillingly, ii. 61; three causes of misguided proceedings, iv. 366; see Good, Virtue, Body.

Existence, notion of, iii. 135 n., 205, 226, 229, 231.

Experience, Zeno's arguments not contradictions of data generalized from, i. 100; Plato's theory of pre-natal, ii. 252; operation of pre-natal on man's intellectual faculties, iii. 13; reminiscence of pre-natal knowledge gained by, 17; post-natal not ascertained and measured by him, ii. 252; no appeal to observation or, in studying astronomy and acoustics, iv. 73, 74; see Sense.

Expert, authority of public judgment, nothing, of Expert, everything, i. 426, 435; opposition to Homo mensura, iii. 135, 143; different view, i. 446 n.; correlation with undiscovered science of ends, ii. 149; is never seen or identified, 117, 142; how known, 141; Sokrates himself acts as, i. 436; the pentathlos of Erastæ, ii. 119 n.; finds out and certifies truth and reality, 87, 88; badness of all reality, iii. 330; required to discriminate pleasures, ii. 345; as dialectician and rhetorician, iii. 39; impracticable, 42; true government by, 268; postulated for names in Kratylus, 329.

Fabricius, iv. 382 n.

Faith and Conjecture, two grades of opinion, iv. 67.

Fallacies, Sophists abused, ii. 199; did not invent, 217, i. 133 n.; inherent liabilities to error in ordinary process of thinking, ii. 217, i. 129; corrected by formal debate, ii. 217, 220 n., 221; exposure of, by multiplication of particular examples, 211; by conclusion shown aliunde to be false, 216; Plato enumerates, Aristotle tries to classify, 212; Euthydêmus, earliest known attempt to expose, 216; Bacon's Idola, 218; Mill's complete enumeration of heads of, 218; of sufficient Reason, i. 6 n.; of equivocation, ii. 212, 352 n.; extra dictionem, 214; à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, 213, 214; Plato and Aristotle fall into, iii. 138, 158; of confusion, 297 n.; arguing in a circle, ii. 428 n.; of Ratiocination, 213, 219; of Megarics and Antisthenes, 215; see Sophisms, Equivoques.

Family, Greek views of, iii. 1 n.; restrictions at Thebes, iv. 329 n.; no separate families for guardians, 41, 174, 178; ties mischievous, but can not practically be got rid of, 327; to be watched over by magistrates, 328; treatment of infants, 346; see Education, Communism, Woman, Infanticide.

Farrar, F. W., iii. 326 n.

Fate, relation to gods, iv. 221 n., i. 142; see Chance.

Ferrier, on scope and purpose of philosophy, i. viii, n.; relativity of knowledge, iii. 123 n.; antithesis of Ego and Mecum, 132 n.; necessity of setting forth counter-propositions, 148.

Ficinus, interpretation of Plato, i. xi; followed Thrasyllean classification, 301; on Good and Beauty, iii. 5 n.; on Parmenidês, 84 n.; mystic sanctity of names, 323 n.

Figure, defined, ii. 235; pleasures of, true, iii. 356.

Finance, see Xenophon.

Finite, Zeno's reductiones ad Absurdum, i. 93; natural coalescence of infinite and, iii. 340; illustration from speech and music, 342; insufficient, 343.

Fire, doctrine of Anaximander, i. 5; Anaximenes, 7; Pythagoras, 13; Herakleitus, 27, 30 n., 32; soul compared to, 34; Empedokles, 38; Anaxagoras, 50, 52, 56 n.; identified with mind by Demokritus, 75.

Fischer, Kuno, iii. 84 n.

Foes, iv. 251 n.

Freewill, the Necessity of Plato, iv. 221.

Friendship, a moving force, in Empedokles, i. 38; problem in Lysis too general, ii. 186; causes of enmity and, exist by nature, 341 n.; colloquial debate as a generating cause, 188 n.; desire for what is akin to us or our own, 182; not likeness and unlikeness, 179, 180, 359; physical analogy 188 n.; the Indifferent friend to Good, 180, 189; illustrated by philosopher, 181; the primum amabile, ib., 192; prima amicitia of Aristotle, compared, 194; Xenophontic Sokrates and Aristotle, 186.

Gain, double meaning of, ii. 82; no tenable definition found, ib., 83; see Hipparchus.

Galen, relation to Plato, iv. 258; soul threefold, ib.; a [Greek: kra=sis] of bodily elements, ii. 391 n.; immortal, 423 n., 427; on Philêbus, iii. 365 n.; belief in legends, iv. 153 n.; Plato's theory of vision, 237 n.; structure of apes, 257 n.

Galuppi, Pascal, iii. 118.

General maxims readily laid down by pre-Sokratic philosophers, i. 69 n.; terms vaguely understood, 398 n., 452 n., ii. 49 n., 166, 242, 279 n., 279, 341 n.; Mill on, 48 n.; hopelessness of defining, 186 n.

Generals, Greek, no professional experience, ii. 134.

Generic and specific terms, distinction unfamiliar in Plato's time, ii. 13; and analogical wholes, 48, 193 n., iii. 365; unity, how distributed among species and individuals, 339, 346.

Genius, why not hereditary, ii. 271, 272, 274.

Geometry, Pythagorean, i. 12; modern application, 10 n.; subject of Plato's lectures, 349 n.; value of, iv. 352, 423; Lucian against, i. 385 n.; successive stages of its teaching illustrate Platonic doctrine, 353; twofold, iii. 359, 395; pure and applied mathematics, 396 n.; Aristotle's view of axioms of, i. 358 n.; from induction, iv. 353 n.; painless pleasures of, iii. 356, 388 n.; and dialectic, two modes of mind's procedure applicable to ideal world, iv. 65; geometry, assumes diagrams, ib.; conducts mind towards universal ens, 72; uselessness of written treatises, ii. 136; proportionals, iv. 224 n., 241 n., 423; geometrical theory of the elements, i. 349 n., iv. 240; Aristotle on, 241 n.; Kyrenaic and Cynic contempt for, i. 155, 186, 192.

Gfrörer, iv. 256 n.

Gods, derivation of [Greek: theoi/], iii. 300 n.; Xenophanes, i. 16, 119 n.; Parmenides, 19, 24; Empedokles, 40 n., 42, 47; Anaxagorean Nous represented later as a god, 54; Diogenes of Apollonia, 64 n.; Demokritus, 81; Sokrates, 414, 440, ii. 28; Plato's proofs of existence of, iv. 385, 389, 419; locality assigned to, 230 n.; fabricated men and animals, ii. 268; possess the Idea of cognition, iii. 66, 67 n.; free from pleasure and pain, 389; do not assume man's form, iv. 25, 154 n.; Lucretius on, ib.; cause good only, 24; no repulsive fictions to be tolerated about, 25, 154; Dodona and Delphi to be consulted for religious legislation, 34, 137 n., 325, 337; [Greek: ta\ thei=a], 302 n.; primary and visible gods, 229; secondary and generated gods, 230; Plato's dissent from established religious doctrine, 161, 163; Plato compared with Epikurus, 161, 395; Plato's view of popular theology, 238 n., 328, 337; popular Greek belief, well illustrated in Euripides' Hippolytus, 163 n.; God's [Greek: phtho/nos], 164 n.; Aristotle, 395; see Demiurgus, Religion, Inspiration.

Gold, makes all things beautiful, ii. 41.

Good, Demokritus' theory, i. 82; the Pythagorean [Greek: kairo/s], first cause of, iii. 397 n.; an equivoque, 370; and pleasurable, as conceived by the Athenians, ii. 371; contrast of usual with Platonic meaning, 331, 335; universal desire of, 243, 324, iii. 5, 335, 371, 392 n.; akin, evil alien, to every one, ii. 183; alone caused by gods, iv. 24; its three varieties, ii. 306 n., 350 n., iv. 12, 116, 428; Eros one, iii. 5; as object of attachment, ii. 194; the four virtues the highest, and source of all other goods, iv. 428; is the just, honourable, expedient, ii. 7; not knowledge, 29; is gain, 72-6; True and Real coalesce in Plato's mind, 88; Campbell on erroneous identification of truth and, iii. 391 n.; the primum amabile, ii. 181, 191; approximation to Idea, 192; Indifferent friend to, 180, 189; pleasure is, 289, 306 n., 347 n.; agreement with Aristippus, i. 199-202; meaning of pleasure as the summum bonum, iii. 338; the permanent, and not immediate satisfaction, the end, ii. 360; Sokrates' reasoning, 307; too narrow and exclusively prudential, 309; not Utilitarianism, 310 n.; not ironical, 314; compared with Republic, 310; Protagoras, 345; coincidence of Republic and Protagoras, 350 n.; inconsistent with Gorgias, 306, 345; argument in Gorgias untenable, 351; Platonic idéal, view of Order, undefined results, 374; Plato's view of rhetoric dependent on his idéal of, 374; is [Greek: a)lupi/a], iii. 338 n.; is maximum of pleasure and minimum of pain, iv. 293-97, 299-303; at least an useful fiction, 303; not intelligence nor pleasure, 62; and happiness, correlative terms in Philêbus, iii. 335; is it intense pleasure without any intelligence, 338; or intelligence without pleasure or pain, ib.; intelligence more cognate than pleasure to, 347, 361; pleasure a generation, therefore not an end, nor the good, 357; a tertium quid, 339, 361; intelligence the determining, pleasure the indeterminate, 348; a mixture, 361; five constituents, 362; the answer as to, does not satisfy the tests Plato lays down, 371; has not the unity of an idea, 365; Plato's in part an eclectic doctrine, 366; special accomplishments oftener hurtful, if no knowledge of the good, ii. 16; man who has knowledge of, can alone do evil wilfully, 61; knowledge of, identified with [Greek: nou=s], 30; postulated under different titles, 31; special art for discriminating, 115; how known, undetermined, 31, 206; only distinct answer in Protagoras, 208, 308, 347; the profitable, general but not constant explanation of Plato, 38; is essentially relative, iv. 213 n., i. 185; Idea of, rules the world of Ideas, as sun the visible, iv. 63, 64; Aristotle on, 214 n.; Anaxagoras' nous, ii. 412; training to ascend to Idea, iv. 62; dialectic gives the contemplation of, 75; rulers alone know, 212; Idea of, left unknown, 213; changes in Plato's views, i. 119; Eukleides, iii. 365, i. 119, 127 n.; nearly same as Plato's last doctrine, 120; discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus, 184, 185; Xenophontic Sokrates, iii. 366.

Gorgias the Leontine, reasoned against the Absolute as either Ens or Entia, i. 103; Ens incogitable and unknowable, 104; contrasted with earlier philosophers, 105; not represented by Dionysodorus in Euthydemus, ii. 202; celebrity, 317; theory of vision, iv. 237 n.

Gorgias, the date, i. 305-7, 308-10, 312, 315, ii. 228 n., 318 n., 367; its general character, discrediting the actualities of life, 355; reply to, by Aristeides, 371 n.; upholds independence and dignity of philosophic dissenter, 375; scenery and person ages, 317; rhetoric the artisan of persuasion, 319; a branch of flattery, 321, 370; citation of four statesmen, 358, 362; true and counterfeit arts, 322; multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure, 357; despots and rhetors have no real power, 324; description of rhetors, untrue, 369; rhetoric is of little use, 329, iii. 410; Sokrates' view different in Xenophon, ii. 371 n.; issue unsatisfactorily put by Plato, 369; view stands or falls with idéal of Good, 374; all men wish for Good, 324; illustration from Archelaus, 325, 333 n., 334, 336, i. 179; Plato's peculiar view of Good, ii. 331, 335; contrasted with usual meaning, 331; [Greek: kalo\n] and [Greek: ai)schro\n] defined, 327, 334; definition untenable, 334; to do, a greater evil than to suffer, wrong, 326, 359; inconsistent with description of Archelaus, 333; reciprocity of regard indispensable, ib.; opposition of Law and Nature, ib., 338; no allusion to Sophists, 339; uncertainty of referring to nature, 340; punishment a relief to the wrong-doer, 327, 328, 335; the only cure for criminals' mental distemper, 328; consequences of theory, 336; analogy of mental and bodily distemper pushed too far, 337; its incompleteness, 363; are largest measure, and all varieties, of desire, good, 344; good and pleasurable as conceived by the Athenians, 371; good and pleasurable not identical, 345, iii. 380 n.; argument untenable, ii. 351; expert required to discriminate pleasures, 345, 347; idéal of measure, view of order, undefined results, 374; permanent and transient elements of human agency 353-5; psychology defective, 354; temperance the condition of virtue and happiness, 358; Sokrates resolves on scheme of life, 360; agreement of Sokrates with Aristippus, i. 200 n.; Sokrates alone follows the true political art, ii. 361-2; condition of success in life, 359; danger of dissenter, ib.; Sokrates as a dissenter, 364; claim of locus standi for philosophy, 367; but indiscriminate cross-examination given up, 368; mythe respecting Hades, 361; compared with Protagoras, 270 n., 306 n., 345-8, 349-55, iii. 379; Philêbus, ib., 380; Apology, Kriton, Republic, ii. 362; Leges, ib., iv. 301, 302, 324; Menexenus, 409; Xenophontic Sokrates, i. 178, 221.

Government, natural rectitude of, ii. 89; Plato does not admit the received classification, iii. 267; true classification, scientific or unscientific, 268; monarchy and democracy the mother-polities, iv. 312; dissent of Aristotle, ib. n.; seven distinct natural titles to, 309; illustrated by Argos, Messênê, Sparta, 310; imprudent to found on any one title only, ib.; five types of, 78-84; three constituents of good, 312; Plato's idéal, ii. 363; unscientific, or by many, counterfeit, iii. 268; genuine, by the one scientific man, ib., 273, iv. 280; counter-theory in Protagoras, ii. 268, iii. 275; distinguished from general, &c., 271; no laws, 269; practicable only in golden age, iv. 319; by fixed laws the second best, iii. 270; excess of energetic virtues entails death or banishment, of gentle, slavery, 273; true ruler aims at forming virtuous citizens, 272; standard of ethical orthodoxy to be maintained, 273; of unscientific forms despotism worst, democracy least bad, 270, 278; a bad government no government, 281 n.; timocracy, iv. 79; oligarchy, ib.; democracy, 80; despot, 81; education combined with, by Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, 142; Sokratic ideal differently worked out by Plato and Xenophon, iii. 273; Xenophon's idéal, citizen willing to be ruled, i. 215, 218, 219; and scientific ruler, 224; Xenophon's scheme of, a wisely arranged Oriental despotism, 234; see State.

Gräfenhahn, iii. 312 n.

Grammar, no formal, existed in Plato's time, ii. 34 n., iii. 222.

Greece, political changes in, during Plato's life, i. 1; Greeks all by nature kinsmen, iv. 47.

Grimm, iii. 314 n., 329 n.

Gruppe, on Leges, iv. 355 n.

Guardians, characteristics, iv. 23, 25; drunkenness unbecoming, 298 n.; consist of men and women, 41, 46; syssitia, 359; communism of, ib., 44, 140, 169; maintenance of city dependent on their habits, character, education, 32, 34, 139, 170, 178; no family ties, 41, 174-8; temporary marriages, 44, 175; object, 198; number limited, Plato and Aristotle, 178, 198-200; age for studies, 76; studies introductory to philosophy, 70-4; courage seated in, 35; analogous to reason and energy in individuals, 39; divided into rulers and auxiliaries, 29; compared with modern soldiers, 148, 180.

Gymnastic, art reducible to rule, ii. 372 n.; measured quantity alone good, 112; education in, necessary for guardians, iv. 23; should be simple, 28; imparts courage, 29; prizes at festivals, 338; but object of training, war, not prizes, 358; music necessary to correct, 29.

Hades, no repulsive fictions tolerated of, iv. 25, 154; mythe of, in Republic, 94; in Gorgias, ii. 361.

Hamilton, Sir Wm., doctrines inconsistent, i. xiii. n.; Plato's reasonings on the soul, ii. 250 n., 428 n.; Reid and Berkeley, iii. 165 n.; Judgment implied in every act of Consciousness, 166 n.; relativity of knowledge, 133 n.; primary and secondary qualities, iv. 243 n.

Happiness, relation to knowledge, ii. 159, 160; Plato's peculiar view of, 335; contrasted with usual meaning, 331; its elements depreciated, 353; temperance the condition of, 358; all men love Good as means to, iii. 5; and good, correlative terms in Philêbus, 335; Sydenham on seat of, 372 n.; the end of the state and individual, iv. 98; flowing from justice, 20, 84, 90; see Good, Pleasure.

Harmodius, iii. 4 n.

Harris, James, on Homo Mensura, iii. 139 n.; Plato's etymologies, 302 n.; on Stoical doctrine of virtue, iv. 106 n.; on sophism [Greek: Kurieu/ôn], i. 141 n.; time, 146 n.

Harvey, Dr. Wm., iv. 259.

Hebrew studies, their effect on classical scholarship, i. xv. n.; uniformity of tradition contrasted with diversity of Greek philosophy, 384 n.; allegorical interpretation of prophets, ii. 286 n.; writers, Plato's resemblance to, iv. 160 n., 256.

Hedonists, doctrine, iii. 374; included [Greek: a)lupi/a] in end, 377; did not set aside all idea of limit, 392 n.; basis adopted in Plato's argument, 375, 387 n.; enforced same view as Plato on intense pleasures, 378; see Pleasure.

Hegel, origin of philosophy, i. 382 n.; ideal expert, ib.; Plato's view of the soul, ii. 414 n.; Anaxagoras' nous, 403 n.

Hegesias, the "death-persuader," i. 202; coincidence with Cynics, 203; doctrine of relativity, 204.

Heindorf, on Kratylus, iii. 310 n.; Charmidês, iv. 136 n.; Republic, ib.

Hekatæus, censured by Herakleitus, i. 26.

Herakleitus, works and obscure style, i. 26; dogmatism and censure of his predecessors, ib.; metaphysical, 27; physics, ib., 32; did not rest proof of a principle on induction of particulars, iii. 309 n.; Fieri his principle, i. 28; Parmenides' opposed, 37; the law of Fieri alone permanent, 29; no substratum, 30; identified with Homo Mensura, iii. 114, 115, 126, 128; rejected by Aristotle, but approved by modern science, i. 37 n., iii. 126 n., 154 n.; exposition by metaphors, i. 28, 30; fire and air, 27, 31; fire a symbol for the universal force or law, 30 n.; distinction of ideal and elementary fire, 32 n.; doctrine of contraries, 30, 31, iii. 101 n.; the soul an effluence of the Universal, i. 34; individual reason worthless, ib.; Universal Reason, the reason of most men as it ought to be, 35; [Greek: perie/chon] compared with Anaxagorean Nous, 56 n.; sleep, 34; theory of vision, iv. 237 n.; time, 228 n.; paradoxes, i. 37 n.; [Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou) dida/skei], 26; reappears in Plato, ii. 30; enigmatical doctrine of his followers, iii. 159 n.; their repugnance to dialectic, i. 106 n.; names first imposed in accordance with his theory, iii. 301 n., 314-7; names the essence of things, 324 n., 325; theory admitted, 316; some names not consistent with it, 318; the theory uncertain, 321; flux, true of particulars, not of Ideas, 320; antipathy to Pythagoras, 316 n.; influence on the development of logic, i. 37; on Diogenes of Apollonia, 64 n.; Protagoras, iii. 159 n.; Plato, i. 27; Stoics, 27, 34 n._

Herakleitus the Allegorist, iii. 3 n., iv. 157 n.

Hêraklês, the choice of, ii. 267 n., i. 177.

Heresy, see Orthodoxy.

Hermann, Godfrey, natural rectitude of names, iii. 300 n.

Hermann, K. F., theory of Platonic canon, i. 307; Susemihl coincides, 310; principle of arrangement reasonable, 322; more tenable than Schleiermacher's, 324; Ueberweg attempts to reconcile Schleiermacher with, 313; on Hippias Major, ii. 34 n.; Kratylus, iii. 309 n.; Republic, 244 n.; Leges, iv. 274 n., 328 n., 369 n., 374 n.

Hermokrates, intended as last in Republic tetralogy, i. 325, iv. 266, 273.

Herodotus, infers original aqueous state of earth from prints of shells and fishes, i. 19 n.; Psammetichus' experiment, iii. 289 n.; the gods' jealousy, iv. 164 n.; sacrifice and prayer, 394, ib. n.

Herschel, Sir John, axioms of arithmetic from induction, iv. 353 n.

Hesiod, cosmology, i. 2-3, 4 n.; censured by Xenophanes, 16; by Herakleitus, 26.

Hetæræ, iv. 359, i. 188-90.

Hindoos, Sleeman on grounds of belief among, iii. 150 n.; philosophers compared with Eleatics, i. 159 n.

Hipparchia, wife of Krates, i. 173.

Hipparchus, authenticity, i. 297 n., 307, 309, 337 n., ii. 82, 93; and Minos analogous and inferior to other works, 82; purpose, 84; subject--definition of lover of gain, 71; double meaning of gain, 82; first definition, rejected, 71; character and precept of Hipparchus the Peisistratid, eulogy of Sokrates, 73; Gain is good--apparent contradiction, ib.; gain the valuable, the profitable, and therefore the good, 75; some gain is good, some evil, 74; objections, ib.; no tenable definition of gain found, 82, 83.

Hippias Major, authenticity, i. 306, 315, ii. 33 n.; date, i. 307, 308-10, 313; situation and interlocutors, ii. 33; Hippias lectured at Sparta on the beautiful, the fine, the honourable, 35, 39; no success at Sparta--law forbids, 35; the lawful is the profitable, 36; comparison with Xenophon, 34, 37; the beautiful? 39; instances, 40; Gold makes all things beautiful, 41; complaint of vulgar analogies, 42; answer fails of universal application, ib.; the becoming, and the useful--objections, 43-4; a variety of the pleasurable, 45; inadmissible, ib.; Sokrates attempts to assign some general concept, 47, 193 n., iii. 365; analogy of Sokrates' explanations in Memorabilia, ii. 49; and Minor illustrate general theory of the dialogues of Search, 63; antithetise rhetoric and dialectic, 70.

Hippias Minor, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 55 n., 57 n.; date, i. 306, 308-10, 310, 315; and Major illustrate general theory of dialogues of Search, ii. 63; antithetise rhetoric and dialectic, 70; polemical and philosophical purpose, 63; its thesis maintained by Sokrates in Memorabilia, 66; combated by Aristotle, 67; characters and situation, 55; Achilleus preferred by Hippias to Odysseus, veracity to mendacity, 56, 58; contested by Sokrates veracious and mendacious man the same, 57; to hurt wilfully better than to do so unwillingly, 58; Hippias dissents, 60; good man alone does evil wilfully, Sokrates' perplexity, 61; critics on the sophistry of Sokrates, 62.

Hippokrates, iv. 260.

Hobbes on similitude of passions in all, but dissimilarity of objects, i. 452 n.; exercises for students, iii. 80 n., 90 n.; subject and object, 117 n.; analogy of state to individual, iv. 96; cause, i. 139 n., 144; Diodorus' doctrine defended, 143; coincides with Aristotle on motion, 146.

Holiness, what is? i. 439; not what gods love, 445, 448, 454; why the gods love it, 446; how far like justice, ii. 278; not a branch of justice, i. 447; not a right traffic between men and gods, 448; is it holy? ii. 278; the holy, one type in Platonic, various in Xenophontic, Sokrates, i. 454.

Homer, cosmology, i. 2; censured by Xenophanes, 16; Herakleitus, 26; considered more as an instructor than as a poet, ii. 126; and poets, the great teachers, 135; picture in Republic, as really knowing nothing ib., iv. 92; Strabo on, 152 n.; Herakleitus the allegorist, iii. 3 n., iv. 157 n.; Plato's fictions contrasted with, 153 n.; diversity of subjects, ii. 132; inspired by gods, 128; analogy of Magnet, ib.; on friendship, 179; identified by Plato with Homo Mensura, iii. 114.

Homo Mensura, see Relativity.

Homoeomeries, see Anaxagoras.

Homicide, varieties of, iv. 370-4; penalties, 370; Plato follows peculiar Attic view, 374.

Honourable, the, Hippias' lectures at Sparta on, ii. 39; identified with the just, good, expedient, 7; actions conducive to pleasure are, 295; by law, not nature, Aristippus' doctrine, i. 197.

Horace, scheme of life, i. 191 n., 192 n.

Huet, Bp., i. 384 n.

Humboldt, Wm. von, origin of language, iii. 326 n.

Hume, Athenian taxation, i. 242 n.

Hunting, meaning of, iv. 356; how far permitted, 355.

Hutcheson, Francis, iv. 105 n.

Hypothesis, discussion of, distinct from discussion of its consequences, ii. 397, 411; ultimate appeal to extremely general hypothesis, ib.; in Republic, only a stepping-stone to the first principle, 412; provisional assumption of, and consequences traced, exercise for students, iii. 79; illustration, 81.

Ideas, Plato's, differ from Pythagorean Number, i. 10; identified by Plato with the Pythagorean symbols, 348, iii. 71 n., 368; differ from Demokritean atoms, i. 72; the definitions Sokrates sought for, 453; Plato assumed the common characteristic, by objectivising the word itself, ib.; doctrine derived its plausibility from metaphors, 343; soul's immortality rests on assumption of, ii. 412; reminiscence of the, iii. 13; as Forms, ii. 412; the only causes, 396; formal, 408 n.; logical phantoms as real causes, 404 n.; truth resides in, 411; alone exclude contrary, 7 n.; unchangeable, iii. 246 n., iv. 50; Herakleitean flux not true of, iii. 320; partly changeable and partly unchangeable, 228; disguised in particulars, iv. 3 n.; fundamental distinction of particulars, and, 219; alone knowable, 49; opinion, of what is between ens and non-ens, ib.; assumption of, as separate entia, ii. 396, 403; great multitude of, 410; characteristics of world of, iii. 63; Ideas separate from, but participable by, sensible objects, 59; objections, 60-7; the genuine Platonic theory attacked, 68; none of some objects, 60; how participable by objects, 63, 65, 72, iv. 138; not fitted on to the facts of sense, iii. 78; Aristotle partly successful in attempt, 76.; analogous difficulty of predication, i. 169; "the third man," iii. 64 n.; not merely conceptions, 64, 73; not mere types, 65; not cognizable, since not relative to ourselves, ib., 72; gods have Idea of cognition, 67, 68 n.; dilemma, ideas exist or philosophy impossible, 68; intercommunion of some forms, 207, 250 n.; analogy of letters and syllables, 208; what forms, determined by philosopher, ib.; of non-ens, and proposition, opinion, judgment, 213, 214; of Diversum pervades all others, 209; [Greek: tô=n a)popha/seôn], 238 n.; of Animal, iv. 223, 235 n., 263; kosmos on pattern of, 223; action on Materia Prima, 238; of the elements, 239; of insects, &c., iii. 195 n.; of names and things nameable, 286 n., 289, 326 n.; names fabricated by lawgiver on type of, 287, 290, 325; names the essence of things, 324 n.; doctrine about classification not necessarily connected with, 345; of Beauty exclusively presented in Symposion, 18; of Good, approximation of primum amabile, ii. 192; training to ascend to the idea of good, iv. 61, 66; comparison of idea of good to sun, 63, 64; of Good, in Phædon, Anaxagoras' nous, ii. 412; known to the rulers alone, iv. 212; left unsolved, 213; the contemplation of, by dialectic, 75; reluctance to undertake active duties, of those who have contemplated, 70; philosopher lives in region of, sophist in region of non-ens, iii. 208, iv. 48; little said of, in Menon, ii. 253, 254 n.; postulated in Timæus, iv. 220; discrepancy of Sophistês and other dialogues, iii. 244; the idealists' doctrine the same as Plato's in Phædon, &c., ib., 246; Phædrus, Phædon, and Timæus compared, iv. 239 n.; Plato's various views, ii. 404, i. 119; the last, 120; Aristotle on, 360 n., ii. 192, 193 n., 410 n., iii. 76, 245, 365 n., 367, iv. 214 n., i. 120 n.; Sophistês approximates to Aristotle's view, iii. 247; generic and analogical aggregates, ii. 48, 193 n., iii. 365; Antisthenes and Diogenes on, i. 163; the first protest of Nominalism against Realism, 164; see Particulars, Phenomena, Universal.

Ideal, to Plato the only real, ii. 89.

Idealists, iii. 201; meaning of ens, 231; argument against, 204, 225, 244; doctrine of, the same as Plato's in Phædon, &c., ib., 246.

Identity, personal, ii. 11, 25, iii. 6; and contradiction, principle of, 101.

Ignorance, mischiefs of, ii. 12; depend on the subject-matter, 14; to hurt knowingly, better than ignorantly, 58, 59; evil done by bad man unwillingly, by good wilfully, 61; not pleasure, the cause of wrongdoing, 294; mistaking itself for knowledge, the worst evil, iii. 197; see Knowledge.

Imitator, logical classification of, iii. 215; of the wise man, sophist is, 216; poets' mischievous imitation of imitation, iv. 91.

Immortality, beliefs as to partial, ii. 385 n.; popular Greek belief, 427; metempsychosis a general element in all old doctrines, 425 n.; of rational soul only, iv. 243; of all three parts of soul? ii. 385; Plato's demonstration rests on assumption of ideas, 412; includes pre-existence of all animals, and metempsychosis, 414; fails, 423, 428, iii. 15; leaves undetermined mode of pre-existence and post-existence, ii. 424; was not generally accepted, 426; Xenophon's doctrine, 420 n.; Aristotle's, ib.; common desire for, iii. 6; attained through mental procreation, beauty the stimulus, ib.; only metaphorical in Symposion, 17.

Indeterminate, Pythagorean doctrine of the, i. 11; pleasure the, iii. 348; see Infinite.

Indian philosophy, compared with Greek, i. 107, 378 n., 160 n., 162; analogy of Plato's doctrine of the soul, ii. 389 n., 426 n.; Gymnosophists, compared with Diogenes, i. 157, 160 n.; antiquity of, 159 n.; suicide, 162 n.; Antisthenes did not borrow from, 159 n.; antithesis of law and nature, 162.

Indifferent, the, ii. 180, 189.

Individual, analogy to kosmical process, i. 36 n.; tripartite division of mind, iv. 37; analogous to three classes in state, 39; analogy to state, 11, 20, 37, 79-84, 96; Hobbes on, ib.; parallelism exaggerated, 114, 121, 124; dependent on society, 21, 121, 123; four stages of degeneracy, 79-84; proportions of happiness and misery in them, 83; happiness of, through justice, 20, 84, 90; one man can do only one thing well, 23, 33, 97, 98, 183; Xenophon on, 139 n.

Individualism, see Authority.

Inductive and syllogistic dialectic, ii. 27; process of, always kept in view in dialogues of search, i. 406; illustrated in history of science, ii. 163; trial and error the natural process of the human mind, 165; length of Plato's process, 100 n.; usefulness of negative result, 186; the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, iii. 164; verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or possible, 168.

Infanticide, iv. 43, 44, 177; Aristotle on, 202; contrast of modern sentiment, 203.

Infinite, of Anaximander, i. 5; reproduced in chaos of Anaxagoras, 54; Zeno's reductiones ad Absurdum, 93; natural coalescence of finite and, iii. 340, 346, 348 n.; illustration from speech and music, 341; explanation insufficient, 343; see Indeterminate.

Ingratitude, iv. 399.

Inspiration, special, a familiar fact in Greek life, ii. 130, iii. 352, iv. 15; in rhapsode and poet, ii. 127; of rhapsode through medium of poets, 128, 129, 134; of philosopher, 383; see Dæmon; Plato's view, 131; the reason temporarily withdrawn, 132, iii. 11, 309 n.; opposed to knowledge, ii. 136; right opinion of good statesmen from, 241; all existing virtue is from, 242.

Instantaneous, Plato's imagination of the, iii. 100; found no favour, 102.

Interest, forbidden, iv. 331.

Ion, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 124; date, i. 307, 308-9, 311, 312, 315; interlocutors, ii. 124; Ion as a rhapsode, 126; devoted himself to Homer, 127; the poetic art is one, ib.; inspiration of rhapsodes and poets, ib.; inspiration of Ion through Homer, 128; analogy of magnet, ib., 129; Plato's contrast of systematic with unsystematic procedure, ib.; Ion does not admit his own inspiration, 132; province of rhapsode, ib.; the rhapsode the best general, 133; exposition through divine inspiration, 134.

Ionic philosophy compared with the abstractions of Plato and Aristotle, i. 87; defect of, 88; attended to material cause only, ib.; see Philosophy--Pre-Sokratic.

Islands of the Blest, ii. 416.

Isokrates, probably the half-philosopher, half-politician of Euthydêmus, ii. 227, iii. 35; variable feeling between, and Plato, ii. 228, 331 n., iii. 36; praised in Phædrus, 35; compared with Lysias, ib. 38; his school at Athens, 36; teaching of, iv. 150 n.; as Sophist, i. 212 n.; teachableness of virtue, ii. 240 n.; age for dialectic exercises, iv. 211 n.; criticism on other philosophers, iii. 38 n.; on aspersions of rivals, 408 n.; on the poets, iv. 157 n.; contrasted with Plato in Timæus, 217; on Leges, 432; oratio panegyrica, iii. 406 n.; great age of, i. 245.

Italy, slaves in, iv. 343 n.

Jamblichus on metempsychosis, ii. 426 n.

Jason, of Pheræ, iii. 388 n.

Jerome, St., on Plato and Aristotle, i. xv.

Johnson, Dr., on Berkeley, iv. 243 n.

Jouffroy, à priori element of cognition, iii. 119 n.

Judgment, akin to proposition, and may be false, by partnership with form non-ens, iii. 213-4; implied in every act of consciousness, 165 n.

Just, the holy a branch of the, i. 447; and unjust, standard of the better, ii. 3; whence knowledge of it, 4; identified with the good, honourable, expedient, 7; or Good is the profitable--general, but not constant, explanation of Plato, 38; the just, by law, not nature, Aristippus' doctrine, i. 197.

Justice, is it just, ii. 278; varieties of meaning, i. 452 n., iv. 102, 120, 123, 125; derivation of [Greek: dikaiosu/nê], iii. 301 n.; of [Greek: di/kaion], 308 n.; with temperance, the condition of happiness and freedom, ii. 12; and sense of shame possessed and taught by all citizens, 269; how far like holiness, i. 447, ii. 278; opposition of natural and legal, 338, i. 197; what is, iii. 416; unsatisfactory answers of Sokrates and his friends, ib.; is rendering what is owing, iv. 2; rejected, 6; is what is advantageous to the most powerful, 8; modified, 9; is the good of another, 10; necessary to society and individual, injustice a source of weakness, 11; is a source of happiness, 12, 14, 18; is a compromise, 13; good only from consequences, 15, 16, 99; Xenophon on, 114 n.; the received view anterior to Plato, 100; a good per se, 20, 40, 84, 90, 116; and from its consequences, 94, 121, 123, 294; proved also by superiority of pleasures of intelligence, 84; proof fails, 116, 118-21; all-sufficient for happiness, germ of Stoical doctrine, 102; inconsistent with actual facts, 106; incorrect, for individual dependent on society, ib., 123; Plato's affirmation true in a qualified sense, 125; orthodoxy or dissent of just man must be taken into account, 126, 131; in state, 34; is in all classes, 36; is performing one's own function, ib., 37, 39; analogy to bodily health, 40; what constitutes injustice, 367-9; no man voluntarily wicked, 249, 365-7; distinction of damage and injury, 366; relation to rest of virtue, 428; distinction effaced between temperance and, 135; ethical basis imperfect, 127; view peculiar to Plato, 99; Platonic conception is self-regarding, 104; motives to it arise from internal happiness of the just, 105; view substantially maintained since, ib.; essential reciprocity in society, ii. 312, 333, iv. 100, 133; the basis of Plato's own theory of city's genesis, 111; incompletely stated, 112 n.; any theory of society must present antithesis and correlation of obligation and right, 112; Xenophon's definition unsatisfactory, i. 231; Karneades, iv. 118 n.; Epikurus, 130 n.; Lucretius, ib.; Pascal, i. 231 n.

Kallikles, rhetor and politician, ii. 340.

Kallimachus, Plato's works known to, i. 276, 296 n.; issued catalogue of Alexandrine library, 275.

Kant, his Noumenon agrees with Ens of Parmenides, i. 21.

Kapila, i. 378 n.; analogy to Plato, ii. 389 n.

Karneades, on justice, iv. 118 n.

Kepler, applied Pythagorean conception, i. 14 n.; devotion to mathematics, iii. 388 n.

King, see Monarch.

Kleitophon, fragmentary, i. 268, iii. 419, 424; authenticity, i. 305-7, 309, 315, iii. 419 n., 420, 426 n.; posthumous, 420; in Republic tetralogy, i. 406 n., iii. 419, 425; represents the point of view of many objectors, 424; scenery and persons, 413; Sokrates has power in awakening ardour for virtue, 415; but does not explain what virtue is, ib., 421-24; what is justice or virtue, 416; unsatisfactory replies of Sokrates' friends, ib.; Kleitophon believes Sokrates knows but will not tell, 418; compared with Republic, 425; Apology, 421.

Know, Aristotle on equivocal meaning of, ii. 213 n.; to know and be known is action and passion, iii. 287 n.

Knowledge, claim to universal, common to ancient philosophers, iii. 219; kinds of, i. xii. n.; of like by like, 44, iv. 227; Demokritus' theory, i. 72, 76, 80; Zeno, 98; Gorgias the Leontine, 104; Kyrenaics, 199, 204; false persuasion of, the natural state of human mind, Sokrates' theory, 374, 414, ii. 166 n., 218, 243, 263; regarded as an ethical defect, iii. 177; Sokrates' mission, i. 374, 376, ii. 24, 146, 419, iii. 422, iv. 219; search after, the business of life to Sokrates and Plato, i. 396; per se interesting, 403; necessity of scrutiny, 398 n.; Mill on vagueness of common words, ii. 48 n.; omnipotence of King Nomos, i. 378-84**; different views of Plato, iii. 163, 164 n.; evolution of indwelling conceptions, i. 359 n., ii. 249, iii. 17; Sokrates' mental obstetric, 112; attained only by dialectic, i. 396; its test, power of going through a Sokratic cross-examination, ib., ii. 64; genesis of, 391; reminiscence of the ideas, 237, iii. 13, 17; gods possess the Idea of, 67, 68 n.; philosophy the perpetual accumulation of, ii. 112; of good and evil, distinct from other sciences, 168; necessary to use of good things, 205; must include both making and right use 205; no action contrary to, 291; virtue is, 239, 321, 67 n., 149; of what unsolved, 244; to hurt knowingly or wilfully better than unwillingly, 58; analogies from the arts, 59; evil done by good man with, by bad without, 61; as condition of human conduct, Sokrates and Plato dwell too exclusively on, 67, 83; rely too much on analogy of arts, and do not note what underlies epithets, 68; and moderation identical, having same contrary, 280; of self, Delphian maxim, 11, 25; from looking into other minds, is temperance, 12; opposed to divine inspiration, 136; no object of, distinct from knowledge itself, 156; of ens alone, iv. 49; all, relative to some object, ii. 157, 169; is sensible perception, iii. 111, 113, 154, 172 n.; erroneously identified with Homo Mensura, 113, 118, 120 n., 125, 162 n.; objections, sensible facts, different to different percipients, 153; sensible perception does not include memory, 157; argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time, ib.; lies in the mind's comparisons respecting sensible perceptions, 161; difference from modern views, 162; the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, 164; verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or possible, 168; of good, identified with [Greek: nou=s], of other things with [Greek: do/xa], ii. 30; relation to opinion, iii. 167 n., 172, 184 n.; are false opinions possible, 169; waxen memorial tablet in the mind, ib.; distinction of possessing and having actually in hand, 170; simile of pigeon-cage, 171; false opinion is the confusion of cognitions and non-cognitions, refuted, ib.; distinguished from right opinion, ii. 253, 255 n., iii. 168; rhetor communicates true opinion, not knowledge, 172; Plato's compared with modern views, ii. 254; is true opinion plus rational explanation, iii. 173; analogy of elements and compounds, ib.; three meanings of rational explanation, 174; definition rejected, 175; antithesis of opinion and, not so marked in Politikus as Theætêtus, 256; opposite cognitions unlike each other, 336, 396; pleasures of, true, 356, 387 n.; good a mixture of pleasure and, 361; same principle of classification applied to pleasure as to, 382; classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions, 394; its valuable principles, 395; see Relativity, Science, Self-knowledge.

Kosmos, the first topic of Greek speculation, i. ix.; primitive belief, 2; early explanation by Polytheism, ib.; Homer and Hesiod, ib.; Thales, 4; water once covered the earth, notices of the argument from prints of shells and fishes, 18; Anaximander, 5-7; Anaximenes, 7-8; Pythagoras, 12; Pythagorean music of the spheres, 14; Xenophanes, 18, 119 n.; Parmenides, 24, 90 n.; Herakleitus, 32; Empedokles, 39, 41; Diogenes of Apollonia, 64; its Reason, different conceptions of Sokrates and Aristotle, ii. 402 n.; soul prior to and more powerful than body, iv. 386, 419, 421; the good and the bad souls at work in the universe, 386; all things full of gods, 388; soul of, iii. 265 n., iv. 421; its position and elements, 225; affinity of soul of, and human, iii. 366 n.; mythe in Politikus, 265 n.; divine steersman and dæmons, ib.; analogy of individual mind and cosmical process, i. 36 n.; comparison of man to kosmos unnecessary and confusing, iii. 367; free from pleasure and pain, 389; forced conjunction of kosmology and ethics, 391; idea of good rules the ideal, as sun the visible, iv. 64; simile of, absolute height and depth, 87; unchangeable essences of, rarely studied, iii. 361; aversion to studying, on ground of impiety, iv. 219 n.; no knowledge of, obtainable, 220; theory in Timæus acknowledged to be merely an [Greek: ei)kô\s lo/gos], 217; Demiurgus, ideas, chaos postulated, 220; Time began with the, 227; is a living being and a god, 220, 223; Demiurgus produces, by persuading Necessity, 220; process of demiurgic construction, 223; the copy of the [Greek: Au)to/zôon], ib., 227, 235 n., 264; product of joint action of reason and necessity, 238; body, spherical form, and rotations, i. 25 n., iv. 225, 229, 237, 252, 325 n., 388-9; to be studied for mental hygienic, 252; primary and visible gods, 229; secondary and generated gods, 230; construction of man, 243; generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos, with rational soul rotating within, 235; four elements not primitive, 238; action of Ideas on prime matter, 238; Forms of the elements, ib.; primordial chaos, 240; geometrical theory of the elements, ib.; borrowed from Pythagoreans, i. 349 n.; Aristotle on, iv. 241 n.; varieties of each element, 242; contrast of Plato's admiration, with degenerate realities, 262, 264; degeneracy originally intended, 263; recurrence of destructive agencies, 270, 307; change of view in Epinomis, 421, 424 n.

Krates, the "door-opener," i. 173; Sokrates' precepts fully carried out by Diogenes and, 160, 174.

Kratippus, the Peripatetic, i. 258 n.

Kratylus, purpose, iii. 302-8, 309 n., 321, 323, 325 n.; authenticity, i. 316; date, 306, 309, 310, 312; subject and personages, iii. 285; speaking and naming conducted according to fixed laws, 286; names distinguished by Plato as true or false, ib. n.; connected with doctrine of Ideas, 326 n.; the thing spoken of suffers, 287 n.; name, a didactic instrument, made by lawgiver on type of name-form, 287, 312, 329; Plato's idéal, 325, 328 n., 329; compared with his views on social institutions, 327; natural rectitude of names, 289, 300 n., 305 n.; names vary in degree of aptitude, 319; aptitude consists in resemblance, 313; difficult to harmonise with facts, 323; forms of names and of things nameable, 289; lawgiver alone discerns essences of names, and assigns them correctly, 290; proofs cited from etymology, 299, 300 n., 307 n.; not caricatures of sophists, 302, 304, 310 n., 314 n., 321, 323; the etymologies serious, 306-12, 317 n.; counter-theory, Homo Mensura, 291, 326 n.; objection, it levels all animals, 292; analogy of physical processes, unsuitable, 294; belief not dependent on will, 297; first imposer of names a Herakleitean, 301 n., 314-5, 320 n.; how names have become disguised, 312; changes hard to follow, 315; onomastic art, letters as well as things must be distinguished with their essential properties, 313; Herakleitean theory admitted, 317; some names not consistent with it, 319; things known only through names, not true, 320; Herakleitean flux, true of particulars, not of Ideas, ib.; the theory uncertain, implicit trust not to be put in names, 321, 324; compared with Politikus, 281, 329; Sophistês. 331; Timæus, ib.; various reading in, p. 429C, 317 n.

Krete, unlettered community, iv. 277; public training and mess, 279; its customs peculiar to itself and Sparta, 280 n.

Kritias, a fragment, i. 268, iv. 265; probably would have been an ethical epic in prose, 269; in Republic tetralogy, 215, 265; date, i. 309, 311-3, 315, 325; authenticity, 307, iv. 266 n.; subject, 266; citizens of Plato's state identified with ancient Athenians, ib.; Solon and Egyptian priests, ib., 268; explanation of their learning, 271; island Atlantis and its kings, 268; address of Zeus, 269; corruption and wickedness of people, ib.; submergence, 270; mythe incomplete, iii. 409 n.; presented as matter of history, iv. 270; recurrence of destructive kosmical agencies, ib.

Kriton, rhetorical, not dialectical, i. 433; compared with Gorgias, ii. 362; general purpose, subject, and interlocutors, i. 425, 428; authority of public judgment, nothing, of Expert, everything, 420, 435; Sokrates does not name, but himself acts as, expert, 436; Sokrates' answer to Kriton's appeal to flee, 426; Sokrates' principle, Never act unjustly, 427; this a cardinal point, though most men differ from him, ib.; character and disposition of Sokrates, differently set forth, 428; imaginary pleading of the Laws of Athens, ib.; agreement with Athenian democratic sentiment, 430, 432; Plato's purpose in this, 428; attempts reconciliation of constitutional allegiance with Sokrates' individuality, 432; Sokrates characteristics overlooked in the harangue, 431; maintained by his obedience from conviction, ib.

Kyrenaics, scheme of life, i. 188; ethical theory, 195; logical theory, 197; doctrine of relativity, ib., 204; Æthiops, Antipater, and Arêtê, 195; Theodorus on the gods, 202; see Aristippus, Hegesias.

Labour, division of, iv. 138.

Lachês, authenticity, i. 305, ii. 151; date, i. 304, 306, 308-10, 312, 315, 328, 331 n.; subject and interlocutors, ii. 138; dramatic contrast of Lachês and Sokrates, 150; should lessons be received from a master of arms, 138; Sokrates refers to a professional judge, 139; the judge must prove his competence, Sokrates confesses incompetence, 140; marks of the Expert, 141; education--virtue must first be known, 142; courage, 143; example instead of definition, ib.; not endurance, 144; intelligence of things terrible and not terrible, 145, iv. 138; such intelligence not possessed by professional artists, ii. 148; but is an inseparable part of knowledge of good and evil generally, 149; intelligence of good and evil generally--too wide, 146; apparent tendency of Plato's mind in looking for a solution, 147; compared with Theagês, 104; Charmidês, 168; Politikus, iii. 282-4; Republic, iv. 138.

Lactantius, the soul, ii. 425 n.

Land, division of, twelve tribes, iv. 329; perpetuity of lots of, 326, 360; Aristotle on, 326 n.; succession, 328, 404; distribution of annual produce, 361.

Language, natural rectitude of, ii. 89; origin of, iii. 326 n., 328 n., 329 n.; Leibnitz on a philosophical, 322 n.; see Names.

Lassalle, on Herakleitus, iii. 101 n., 159 n., 309 n., 324 n.; Homo Mensura, 297 n.; Kratylus, 306 n., 307 n.; Timæus, iv. 228 n.

Lavoisier, discovery of composition of water, ii. 164 n.

Law, its various meanings, ii. 91, 92 n.; our idea of, less extensive than Nomos (q. v.), i. 380 n., 382 n., ii. 92 n.; and Nature, antithesis of, 333, 338, i. 197; also in Indian philosophy, 162; Sokrates' disobedience of, 434 n.; the lawful is the profitable, ii. 36; the consecrated and binding customs, the decree of the city, social or civic opinion, 76; objection, discordance of, 78; is good opinion of the city, true opinion, or finding out of reality, 77; real things are always accounted real, analogies, 79; of Cretan Minos divine and excellent, extant, 80, 90; to Plato only what ought to be law, is, 88-90, iii. 317 n.; reality found out by the Expert, ii. 87-88; fixed, recognised by Demokritus, i. 73; all proceedings of nature conducted according to fixed, iii. 286; of nature, Mill on number of ultimate, 132 n.; no laws to limit scientific governor, 269; different view, iv. 319; government by fixed, the second-best, iii. 270; test of, goodness of ethical purpose and working, iv. 384; proëm to every important, 321; Cicero coincides, 322 n.; the proëms, didactic or rhetorical homilies, 322; to serve as type for poets, 323; proëm to laws against heresy, 383; of Zaleukus and Charondas, 323 n.

Law-administration, objects of punishment, to deter or reform, ii. 270, iv. 408; general coincidence of Platonic and Attic, 363 n., 374, 374 n., 403, 406, 430; many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy, 411; penalties against contentious litigation, 410; oaths for dikasts, judges, and electors only, 413; thirty-seven nomophylakes, 332; many details left to nomophylakes, 341; assisted by select Dikasts, 362; limited power of fining, 360; necessity of precision in terms of accusation, 413 n.; public and private causes, 339; public, three stages, 340, 415; criminal procedure, 362; distinction of damage and injury, 365; witnesses, 409; abuse of public trust, 412; evasion of military service, ib.; varieties of homicide, 370-2; penalties, 370; wounds and beating, 372, 374, 408; heresy, and [Greek: u(/bris] to divine things or places, 375-386; neglect of parents, 399 n., 407; testaments, 404; divorce, 408; lunacy, 407; poison and sorcery, 407; libels, 409; fugitive slaves, 400; theft, 364, 409; property found, 398; fraudulent traders, 402; mendicants, 409; Benefit societies, 399; suretyship, 415; funerals, ib.

Laws, the, see Leges.

Lectures, Plato's revealed solution of difficulties, an untenable hypothesis, i. 401; differ from dialogues in being given in his own name, 402; of Protagoras, ii. 301; contrasted with cross-examination, 277, 303; dialectic a test of the efficacy of the expository process, i. 358; worthless for instruction, ii. 136, 233 n., iii. 33-5, 49, 52, 54, 337 n.; difference in Timæus and Kritias, 53.

Leges, authenticity, i. 304, 306, 338, iv. 325 n., 389 n., 429; date, i. 313, 315, 324, iv. 272, 413 n.; scene and persons, 272, 277; change in Plato's circumstances and feelings, 273, 320; analogous to Euripides' Bacchæ and Aristophanes' Nubes, 277; Xenophon compared, i. 244; Plato's purpose, to remedy all misconduct, iv. 369; no evidence of Plato's study of practical working of different institutions, 397; large proportion of preliminary discussions and didactic exhortation, 281; soul prior to and more powerful than body, 386, 419; the good and the bad souls at work in universe, 386; all things full of gods, 388; Manichæanism in, 389 n.; good identical with maximum of pleasure and minimum of pain, 292-297, 299-303; at least an useful fiction, 333; justice a good per se and from its consequences, 294; what constitutes injustice, 367-9; no man voluntarily wicked, 365, 367; three causes of misguided proceedings, 366; punishment, to deter or reform, ib., 408; threefold division of good, 428; virtue fourfold, 417; the four virtues the highest, and source of all other, goods, 428; unity of state's end to be kept in view, 417; the end is the virtue of the citizens, ib.; Nocturnal Council to comprehend and carry out this end, 416, 418, 425, 429; and enforce orthodox creed, 419; training of counsellors in Epinomis, 420, 424; basis of Spartan institutions too narrow, 282; Plato's state, a compromise of oligarchical and democratical sentiment, 333, 337; historical retrospect of society, 307-315; frequent destruction of communities, 307; difficulties of government, seven distinct natural titles to, 309; view of the lot, 310; imprudent to found government on any one title only, ib.; illustrated by Argos, Messênê, Sparta, ib.; Persia and Athens compared, 312; monarchy and democracy the mother-polities, ib.; bad training of king's sons, ib.; the Magnetic community, origin of, 274 n.; its [Greek: u(po/thesis], 328 n.; site and settlers, 320, 329, 336; circular form, unwalled, 344; defence of territory, rural police, 335; Spartan Kryptia compared, 336; test of laws, goodness of ethical purpose and working, 284; general coincidence of Platonic and Attic law, 363 n., 374, 374 n., 403, 406, 430; many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy, 411; state's laws, with their proëms, 321; the proëms, didactic or rhetorical homilies, 322; Cicero on, ib. n.; to serve as type for poets, 323; training of the emotions through influence of the Muses, Apollo and Dionysus, 290, 347; endurance of pain in Spartan discipline, 285; drunkenness forbidden at Sparta, how far justifiable, 286; citizens tested against pleasure, 285; Dionysiac banquets, under a sober president, 289; elders require stimulus of wine, 297; precautions in electing minister of education, 338; age, and matter of teaching, 348, 350; the teaching simple and common to both sexes, 351; music and dancing, 291; three choruses, youths, mature men, and elders, 296, 305; elders, by example, to keep up purity of music, 297; prizes at musical and gymnastic festivals, 292, 337; but object of training, war, not prizes, 358; importance of music in education, 305; musical and literary education, fixed type, 292, 338, 349; poets to conform to ethical creed, 292-7; change for worse at Athens after Persian invasion, 313; this change began in music, 314; contrast in Demosthenes and Menexenus, 315 n., 318; dangers of change in national music, doctrine also of Damon, 315; Plato's aversion to dramatic poetry of Athens, 316, 350; peculiar to himself, 317; value of arithmetic, 330 n.; purpose of teaching astronomy, 354; planets, Plato's idea of motions of, ib.; circular motion best, 388, 389; hunting, meaning of, 356; hunting, how far permitted, 355; for religion, oracles of Dodona and Delphi to be consulted, 325, 337; temples and priests, 337; number of sacrifices determined by lawgiver, 357; only state worship allowed, 378; contrast with Sokratic teaching, iii. 148; Milton on, iv. 379 n.; necessity of enforcing state religion, 378; [Greek: u(/bris] to divine things or places, 375; proëm to laws against, 383; impiety, from one of three heresies, 376; punishment, 376-9; majority of Greek world would have been included in one of the three varieties, 381; first heresy confuted, 386; argument inconsistent and unsatisfactory, 388; second confuted, 389; the third the worst, 384; confuted, 391; incongruity of Plato's doctrine, 393; dissent of Herodotus and Sokrates, 394; opposition to Plato's doctrine in Greece, 395; general Greek belief, 392, 394; division of citizens and land, twelve tribes, 329; four classes, property qualification for magistracies and voters, 331; perpetuity of lots of land, 326, 360; Aristotle on, 326 n.; succession, 328; number of citizens, 326, 328; Aristotle on, 326 n.; syssitia, 344, 359; same duties and training for women as men, 195; family ties mischievous, but cannot practically be got rid of, 327; to be watched over by magistrates, 328; marriage, ib., 332, 342, 344, 359, 405, 406; board of Matrons, 345; divorce, 406; treatment of infants, 346; orphans, guardians, 404, 406; limited inequality tolerated as to movable property, 330; modes of acquiring property, 397; length of prescription for ownership, 415; no private possession of gold or silver, no loans or interest, 331; slavery, 342, 400; Aristotle differs, 343 n.; distribution of annual produce, 361; each artisan only one trade, ib.; retailers, regulations about, ib., 401; punishment for fraud, 402; Benefit Societies, 399; Metics, 362; strangers and foreign travel of citizens, 414; electoral scheme, 333; thirty-seven nomophylakes, 332; assisted by select Dikasts, 362; many details left to, 341; the council, and other magistrates, 335; limited power of fining, 360; military commanders and council, 332; monthly military muster of whole population, 358; oaths for dikasts, judges, and electors only, 413; penal ties against contentious litigation, 410; judicial duties, public and private causes, 339; public, three stages, 340, 415; witnesses, 409; distinction of damage and injury, 365; sacrilege and high treason the gravest crimes, 363; abuse of public trust, 412; evasion of military service, 412; homicide, penalties, 370; varieties of, 370-2; wounds and beating, 372, 373, 408; poison and sorcery, 407; neglect of parents, ib.; lunacy, ib.; libels, 409; theft, 364, 409; suretyship, 415; mendicants, 409; funerals, 415; compared with earlier works, 275, 280; Cyropædia, 319; Protagoras, 301; Gorgias, ii. 362, iv. 301-2, 324; Phædrus, ib.; Philêbus, 301; Republic, 298 n., 302, 319, 327, 390, 429; Timæus, 389 n.

Lehrsch, iii. 308 n., 309 n.

Leibnitz, interdependence of nature, ii. 248 n.; agreement with Plato's metaphysics, ib.; pre-existence of soul, ib.; natural significant aptitude of letters, iii. 313 n.; on a philosophical language, 322 n.

Lenormant, iii. 306 n.

Leukippus, i. 65, 66, iii. 243 n.

Lewis, Sir G. C., ancient astronomy, iv. 355 n., 424 n.

Liberty, excess of, at Athens, iv. 312.

Libraries, ancient, i. 270, 278 n., 280, 286; copying by librarii and private friends, 281 n., 284 n.; official MSS., ib.; see Alexandrine, Lykeum, Academy.

Lichtenstädt, iv. 256 n.

Light, Plato's theory, iv. 236.

Like known by like, i. 354 n., ii. 359 n.; friend to like, 359.

Littré, the soul, iv. 257 n.; synthetic character of ancient medicine, 260 n.

Loans, disallowed, iii. 331.

Lobeck, iii. 304 n., 311 n., 312 n.

Locke, atomic doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, i. 70; good identical with pleasure, ii. 306 n.

Logic, influence of Herakleitus on development of, i. 37; of a science, Plato's different from Aristotelic and modern view, 358 n.; objects of perception and of conception, comprised in Plato's ens, iii. 229, 231; concepts and percepts, relative, 75; in Sokrates, the subordination of terms, i. 455; position of Megarics in history of, 131 n.; negative, of Antisthenes' school, 149; Kyrenaic theory, 197; elementary distinctions unfamiliar in Plato's time, ii. 13, 34 n., 235, 319, iii. 190, 222, 229, 241; the dialogues of search are lessons in method, 177, 188; collection of sophisms necessary for a theory of, i. 131; Aristotle first distinguished [Greek: o(mô/numa], [Greek: sunô/numa], and [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], iii. 94 n.; generalisation and division, ii. 27; process of classification not much attended to, iii. 344; definition and division illustrated in Phædrus and Philêbus, 29, 344; names relative and non-relative, 232; connotation of a word, to be known before its accidents and antecedents, ii. 242; logical subject has no real essence apart from predicates, i. 168 n.; logical and concrete aggregates, ii. 52, 53; concrete, its Greek equivalent, 52 n.; opposites, only one to each thing, 13 n.; contraries, the Pythagorean "principia of existing things," i. 15 n.; Herakleitus' theory, 30, 31; are excluded in nothing save the self-existent Idea, ii. 7 n.; judgment, akin to proposition, and may be false by partnership with form non-ens, iii. 213-4; implied in every act of consciousness, 165 n.; Plato's canon of belief, iv. 231; contradictory propositions not possible, i. 166 n.; principle of contradiction, not laid down in Plato's time, iii. 99; logical maxim of, 239; function of copula, i. 170 n.; misconceived by Antisthenes, iii. 221, 232 n., 251 n.; Plato's view of causal reasoning, ii. 253; modern views on à priori reasonings, difference of Plato's, 251; see Fallacies, Predication, Proposition.

Logographers, iii. 27 n., 36 n.

Lot, principle of the, iv. 309, 310 n.

Love, a moving force in Empedokles, i. 38; cause of, desire for what is akin to us or our own, ii. 182; see Eros.

Lucian, worthlessness of geometry, i. 384 n.; on time wasted in philosophic training, 404 n.

Lucretius, on Anaxagorean homoeomeries, i. 52 n.; origin of language, iii. 329 n.; on pleasure, 379 n., 387 n., i. 163 n.; on justice, iv. 130 n.; appearances of gods to men, 155 n.; theology of, 162 n.

Luther, on music, iv. 151 n.

Lykeum, Peripatetic school, i. 269; the library, founded for use of inmates and special visitors, 279 n.; loss of library, 270.

Lykurgus, relation to Plato, i. 344 n.

Lysias, rhetorical powers, iii. 48 n.; Isokrates compared, 35, 37; unfairly treated in Phædrus, 47-8; rivalry with Plato, 408, 410 n., 411 n.; oration against Æschines, i. 112.

Lysis, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 184 n.; date, i. 308-10, 313, 326, ii. 184 n.; subject suited for dialogue of search, 185; problem of friendship too general, 186; debate partly real, partly verbal, 188; scenery and personages, 172; mode of talking with youth, 173; servitude of the ignorant, 176; lesson of humility, 177; illustrates Sokratic manner, ib.; what is a friend, 178; appeal to maxims of poets, 179; likeness and unlikeness, ib., 188 n.; the Indifferent, friend to Good, 180, 189; anxious to escape from felt evil, 180; illustrated by philosopher's condition, 181, 190; the primum amabile, ib., 191; cause of friendship, desire for what is akin to us or our own, 182; good akin, evil alien, to every one, 183; the Good and Beautiful as objects of attachment, 194; failure of enquiry, 184; compared with Cicero De Amicitia, 189 n.; Charmidês, 172, 184 n.

Macaulay, Lord, Theology not a progressive science, ii. 428.

Mackintosh, Sir J., iv. 105 n.

Madness, Plato's view, ii. 129; of philosophers, 383; varieties of, Eros one, iii. 11; see Inspiration.

Magic, Empedokles claims powers of, i. 47; Plato's laws against, iv. 407.

Magnet, analogy to poetic inspiration, ii. 128, 129.

Magnetic colony, see Leges.

Maine, meaning of natural justice, ii. 342 n.; influence of Law in early societies, i. 382 n.

Making and doing, ii. 155.

Malebranche, ii. 404 n., iv. 233.

Mallet, on Sophistês, iii. 245 n.

Malthus, law of population, iv. 201; recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202.

Man, Plato on antiquity of, iv. 307; construction of, 243; the cause of evil, 234; inconsistency ib. n.; see Body, Soul, Immortality.

Manichæanism of Leges, iv. 389 n.

Mansel, Dr., iii. 124 n.

Mantineia, i. 211.

Marathon, iii. 406.

Marbach, i. 132 n.

Mariandyni, iv. 343 n.

Marriage, temporary for guardians, iv. 43, 175-8; object, 198; Plato's and modern sentiments, 192; Aristotle, 188, 198-201; laws in second idéal, 328, 332, 341, 344, 359, 405, 406; board of Matrons, 345; Malthus' law recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202; divorce, 406.

Martin on Timæus, iv.** 218 n., 224 n., 233 n., 424 n.; Leges, 355 n.

Materialists, iii. 203, 223; meaning of ens, 231; argument against, 203, 224, 226, 228; reply open to, 224, 229.

Matter, Aristotle's materia prima, i. 72, iii. 397 n.; [Greek: to\ dektiko\n] of Timæus, ib.; four elements not primitive, iv. 238; prime, action of Ideas on, ib.; Voltaire on, i. 168 n.

Maximus Tyrius, on Plato's reminiscence, ii. 250 n.; variety, iii. 400 n.

Measure, Plato's conception, ii. 112, 117, iii. 260; [Greek: to\ me/trion] of Plato, 397 n.; Platonic idéal, undefined results, ii. 374; Pythagorean [Greek: kairo/s], iii. 397 n.; necessary, to choose pleasures rightly, ii. 293, 357 n., iii. 391; virtue a right estimate of pleasure and pain, ii. 293, 305; courage a just estimate of things terrible, 307; false estimates of pleasures habitual, iii. 353; true pleasures admit of, 357; directive sovereignty of, 391; how applied in Protagoras, ib.; how explained in Philêbus, 393.

Medical Art, analogy of rhetoric to, iii. 31; reducible to rule, ii. 372 n.; physician not bound by peremptory rules, iii. 269; no refined, allowed, iv. 28; Plato's view of, 250; synthetic character of ancient, 260 n.

Megarics, transcendental, not ethical, i. 122; shared with Plato the eristic of Sokrates, 124, 126; logical position misrepresented by historians, 131; negative dialectic attributed by historians to, 371; not peculiar to, 387; the charge brought by contemporaries against Sokrates, 388; fallacies of, ii. 215, iii. 92; sophisms of Eubulides, i. 133; real character of, 135; alleged over-refinement in classification of, iii. 196 n.; not the idealists of Sophistês, 244; controversy with Aristotle about Power, i. 135; Aristotle's arguments not valid, 136-8; Aristotle himself concedes the doctrine, 139 n.; doctrine of Diodôrus Kronus, 140, 143; defended by Hobbes, ib.; depends on question of universal regularity of sequence, 141; sophism of Diodôrus Kronus, ib., 143; Stilpon, 147; Cicero on, 135 n.; Ritter, 129 n.; Prantl, ib., 132 n.; Zeller, 131 n.; Winckelmann, 132 n.; Marbach, ib.; Tiedemann, ib.; Stallbaum, ib.; Deycks, 136 n.; see Eukleides.

Melêtus, reply of Sokrates to, Plato and Xenophon compared, i. 456; Plato's views coincide with, iv. 211, 230 n., 381, 385, 411, i. 113.

Melissus of Samos, i. 93.

Memory, difference of [Greek: mnê/mê] and [Greek: a)na/mnêsis], iii. 350 n.; see Association.

Ménage, on etymology, iii. 303 n.

Menedêmus the Eretrian, i. 148; disallowed negative predications, 170.

Menexenus, its authenticity, i. 316, 338, iii. 412 n.; date, i. 307, 309, 313, 324; anachronism, iii. 411; scenery and persons, 401; funeral harangues at Athens, ib., 404; Sokrates recites harangue learnt from Aspasia, 402; framed on the established type, 405; excited much admiration, 407; probable motives of Plato, ib., 410; contrast with Leges, iv. 315 n., 318; Gorgias, ii. 374, iii. 409.

Menon, date, i. 306-7, 308-10, 313, 315, 325 n., ii. 228 n., 246 n.; purpose, 235; gives points in common between Sokrates and Sophists, 257; scenery and persons, 232; is virtue teachable, ib., 239, iii. 330 n.; plurality of virtues, ii. 233; search for common property, 234; how is process of search useful, 237; Sokrates' cross-examination like effect of torpedo, ib.; analogies, definitions of figure and colour, 235; Menon's definition, refuted, 236; theory of reminiscence, 237; illustrated by questioning Menon's slave, 238, 249 n., 251; metempsychosis, 249; little said of the Ideas, 253, 255 n.; virtue is knowledge, 239; and so teachable, 240; relation of opinion to knowledge, 241, 255 n., 392 n., iii. 172 n.; right opinion of good statesmen, from inspiration, ii. 242; highest virtue teachable, but all existing virtue is from inspiration, ib.; virtue itself remains unknown, ib., 245; Sokrates' doctrine, universal desire of good, 243; compared with Phædrus and Phædon, 249; Protagoras, 244; Politikus, iii. 283; Timæus, Gorgias, Republic, ii. 254 n.

Mentiens, sophism, i. 128, 133.

Messênê, bad basis of government, iv. 310.

Metaphor, Herakleitus' exposition by, i. 28, 30, 37 n.; Plato's tendency to found arguments on, 343, 353, n., ii. 337 n., iii. 65 n., 173, 207, 351, 364; doctrine of Ideas derived its plausibility from, i. 343; waxen memorial tablet in the mind, iii. 169; pigeon-cage, 171; souls' [Greek: knê=sis] compared to children's teething, 399 n.; the steersman, iv. 53; Idea of Good in intellectual, as sun in visible, 63; the cave, iii. 257 n., iv. 67-70; analogy of state and individual, 11, 20, 39, 79-84, 96; exaggerated, 115, 121, 124; kosmos, absolute height and depth, 87.

Metaphysics, see Ontology.

Meteorology, of Anaxagoras, i. 58; Diogenes of Apollonia, 64; Sokrates avoided, 376.

Metempsychosis, included in all ancient speculations, ii. 390, 425 n.; belief of Empedokles, i. 46; included in Plato's proof of soul's immortality, ii. 414; theory of, 237, 247, iv. 234; of ordinary men only, ii. 390, 416, 425; mythe, iii. 12, 14 n.; general doctrine in Virgil, ii. 425 n.

Method, revolutionised by Sokrates, i. x; obstetric, 367, ii. 251, iii. 112, 176; Aristotle's Dialectic and Demonstrative, i. 363; see Dialectic, Negative, Inductive.

Metics, admission of, iv. 362; Xenophon on, i. 238.

Michelet, iv. 151 n.

Middle ages, disputations in the, i. 397 n.; views on causation, ii. 409 n.

Mill, Jas., on law of mental association, ii. 192 n.; transmission of established morality of a society, 275 n.; on the moral sense, iv. 128 n.; ethical end, 105 n.

Mill, J. S., on vague connotation of general terms, ii. 48 n.; evils of informal debate, 220 n., 222 n.; definition of fallacy, i. 129; heads of fallacies, ii. 218; fallacies of confusion, Descartes' argument, iii. 297 n.; of Sufficient Reason, earliest example of, i. 6 n.; relativity of knowledge, iii. 128 n.; abstract names, 78 n.; simple objects undefinable, i. 172 n.; comparison of Form with particular phenomena, iii. 64 n.; necessity of Verification, 168 n.; antecedent, consequent, simultaneous, 165 n.; assumption in axioms of arithmetic, 396 n.; axioms of arithmetic and geometry, from induction, iv. 353 n.; ultimate laws of nature, iii. 132 n.; relation of art to science, 43 n.; the beautiful, ii. 50 n.; hostility to novel attempts at analysis of ethics, i. 387 n.; Liberty, 395 n., ii. 367 n.; Sokrates' Utilitarianism, 310 n.; theory of syllogism, 255 n.; approximation to Plato and Aristotle as to ideal state of society, iv. 199 n.

Milton, on Plato's intolerance, iv. 379 n.

Mind, doctrine of Parmenides, i. 26; identified with heat by Demokritus, 75; its seat in various parts of the body, Demokritus, 76; Sokrates' theory of natural state of human, 373; elenchus the sovereign purifier of, iii. 197; Sokrates' obstetric, 112; the self, ii. 11, 25; state of agent's, as to knowledge, frequent enquiry in Plato, 83; Plato's view, an assemblage of latent capacities, 164; knowledge is dominant agency in, 290; usefulness of negative result for training, 186; operation of pre-natal experience on, iii. 13; rhetoric should include a classification of minds and discourses, 32; idéal unattainable, 42, 45; compared to paper, 169, 351; of each individual, tripartite, iv. 37; analogous to rulers, guardians, craftsmen, 39; high development of body and, equally necessary, ii. 422 n.; relation to bodily organs, iii. 159, iv. 387 n.; diseases of, from body, 250; no man voluntarily wicked, 249, 365-8; preservative and healing agencies, 250; treatment of, by itself, 251; rotations of kosmos to be studied, 252; see Reason, Soul.

Minos, authenticity, i. 306-7, 309, 336, 337 n., ii. 82, 93; in Leges trilogy, 91; and Hipparchus analogous and inferior to other works, 82; subject the characteristic property connoted by law, 76, 86; discussed by historical Sokrates, ib.; its meanings, 91; three parts, objections, 76; is good opinion of the city, true opinion, or finding out of reality, 77; real things always accounted real, analogies, 79; only what ought to be law, is, 80, 88-9, iii. 281 n., 317 n.; Expert finds out and certifies truth, ii. 87-9; laws of Cretan Minos divine and excellent, extant, 80, 90; Minos' character variously represented, 81; what does the lawgiver prescribe for health of mind--unanswered, ib.; bad definitions of law, 86; Sokrates' reasoning unsound but Platonic, 88.

Mohl, Prof., on Hafiz, iii. 16 n.

Monad, the Pythagorean, i. 11-12; Platonic form of Pythagorean doctrine, 15 n.; see Number.

Monarchy, and democracy the mother-polities, iv. 312; dissent of Aristotle, ib. n.; monarch a Principal Cause, iii. 266; true government by the one scientific man, 268, 273; no laws to limit scientific governor, 269; idéal attainable only in Saturnian period, 264, iv. 319; distinguished from general, rhetor, &c., iii. 271; aims at forming virtuous citizens, 272; Sokratic ideal differently worked out by Plato and Xenophon, 273; of Atlantis, iv. 268; bad education of kings' son, 312.

Monboddo, on Cartesian and Newtonian theories, ii. 402 n.; on Ideas, 408 n.; mind and body, iv. 387 n.

Monkeys, Galen on structure of, iv. 257 n.

Morality of a society, how transmitted, ii. 274; relation of art to, see Education, Poetry; Ethics.

More, Dr. Henry, emanative cause, ii. 403 n.; metempsychosis, 427 n.; relativity of knowledge, iii. 124 n.

Moses, Plato compared to, iv. 256.

Motion, of atoms, the capital fact of Demokritean kosmos, i. 72; Zeno's arguments, 97; not denied as a phenomenal and relative fact, 102; form of, iii. 209-10, 232, 245 n.; varieties of rectilinear, iv. 225 n.; circular, the best, 225, 388-9; Diodôrus Kronus, i. 145; Aristotle nearly coincides with, 146; and Hobbes, ib.; Monboddo on Aristotle and Plato, iv. 386 n.

Motives, distinction of, ii. 357 n.

Müller, Prof. Max, origin of language, iii. 326 n.; vague use of words, i. 398 n.

Munk, Dr. Edward, i. 311, 320, 401 n.

Music, Pythagorean, of the spheres, i. 14; and speech illustrate coalescence of finite and infinite, iii. 340; Cynics' contempt for, i. 151, 155; Platonic sense, iv. 149; disparaged, ii. 355; education in, necessary for guardians, iv. 23; and dancing, effect on emotions, 347; excites love of the beautiful, 27; importance of, in education, 305; Aristotle on, 151 n., 306; Xenophon, ib., i. 228; Luther, iv. 151 n.; gymnastic necessary to correct, 29; prizes at festivals, 292, 337, 358; three choruses, youths, mature men, elders, 296, 305; only grave allowed, 32, 168, 298 n.; regulated by authority, 292-4, 349; to keep emotions in a proper state, 169; elders, by example, to keep up purity of music, 297; change for worse at Athens began in, 313, 314 n., 318; dangers of change in national, doctrine also of Damon, 315.

Mysticism, religious, in Empedokles, i. 47 n.; mixture in Plato of poetical fancy and religious, with dialectic theory, iii. 16.

Mythe, general character of Plato's, ii. 415, iii. 310, iv. 255 n.; disparaged, in Sophistês, iii. 265 n.; Plato's resemblance to Hebrew writers, iv. 160 n.; Aristotle on blending philosophy with, 255 n.; probably often used by Sophists, ii. 267 n.; of Prometheus and Epimetheus, 267; value of, 276; of Hades in Gorgias, 361; of soul in Phædon, 415; of pre-existent soul, iii. 12, 14 n.; of the kosmos in Politikus, 265 n.; Timæus, 409 n.; Kritias, ib., iv. 268; of departed souls in Republic, 94; the choice of Herakles, i. 177; training by fictions, iv. 24, 154; Plato's view of the purpose of, ib., 303-5; Plato's and Homer's fictions contrasted, 153 n.; retort open to poets, ib., 154 n.; no repulsive fictions to be tolerated about gods or Hades, 25, 154; a better class to be substituted from religion for the existing fictions, 160; poet must avoid variety of imitation, 26, 155; type for narratives about men, 26; fiction as to origin of classes, 30; difficulty of procuring first admission for fiction, 158.

Mythology, prolonged belief in, iv. 152 n.; Xenophanes' censure of, i. 16; Herakleitus', 26; Plato and the popular, 441 n., ii. 415, iii. 265 n., iv. 24, 155 n., 196, 238 n., 325, 328, 337, 398.

Names, relative and non-relative, iii. 232 n.; Pythagorean theory, 304 n., 316 n.; mystic sanctity of, 323 n.; distinction of divine and human, 300 n.; natural rectitude of, ii. 89, iii. 286 n., 300 n., 306 n.; connected with doctrine of Ideas, 286 n., 327 n.; difficult to harmonise with facts, 323; the essence of things, 305 n.; things known only through names, not true, 320; the thing spoken of suffers, 287 n.; forms of names and of things nameable, 289; didactic instruments made by law-giver on type of name-forms, 287, 290, 313; onomastic art, ib.; proofs cited from etymology, 299, 300 n., 307 n.; specimens of ancient etymologies, 307 n., 308 n., 309 n., 310 n., 311 n.; not caricatures of sophists, 302, 304, 306-12, 314 n., 317 n., 321, 324; Plato's idéal, 325, 328 n., 330; compared with his views on social institutions, 327; Homo Mensura the counter theory of language, 326 n.; intrinsic aptitude of, for particular things, 289; consists in resemblance, 313; vary in degree of aptitude, 318; first imposer of, a Herakleitean, 302 n., 314-7, 319 n.; how they have become disguised, 312; changes hard to follow, 315; Herakleitean theory admitted, 310; some names not consistent with it, 319; the theory uncertain, implicit trust not to be put in names, 321, 325; see Language.

Nature, course of, the ultimatum of Demokritus and moderns, i. 73, ib. n.; all proceedings of, conducted according to fixed laws, iii. 286; Greek view of, hostile to philosophical speculation, i. 86; interdependence of, ii. 247; antithesis of law and, 333, 338, i. 197; also in Indian philosophy, 162; [Greek: phu/sei] and [Greek: kata\ phu/sin], iii. 294 n., iv. 309 n.; Aristotle, 387 n.; uncertainty of referring to, ii. 340, iv. 194, i. 162; meaning of law of, ii. 341 n.; Mill on number of ultimate Laws of, iii. 132; no object in, mean to the philosopher, 61.

Necessary truth, iii. 253 n.

Necessity, means Freewill in Plato, iv. 221; kosmos produced by joint action of reason and, 238.

Negative, Plato's view of the, erroneous, iii. 236. 239; predications disallowed by Menedêmus, i. 170.

Negative Method, harshly censured by historians of philosophy, i. 123; preponderated in Plato's age, ib.; erroneously attributed to Sophists and Megarics, 371, 387; the charge brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates, 388; Sokrates and Plato its champions, vii, x, 372; Sokrates the greatest Eristic of his age, 124; first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness, 385, 389 n.; to social, political, ethical topics, 385; the Megarics shared with Plato the negative impulse of Sokrates, 126; Academics, 131 n.; negative and affirmative veins in Plato distinct, 399, 403, 420; the negative extreme in Parmenidês, iii. 71, i. 125; overlooked in Kriton, 433; well illustrated in Lysis, ii. 177; the affirmative prominent in his old age, i. 408; its necessity as a condition of reasoned truth, 91, 371, 373, 387, 395 n., 421, ii. 186, i. 130; a value by itself, iii. 51, 70, 85, 149-50, 176, 184 n., 284, 422; a necessary preliminary to the affirmative, ii. 186, 201; essential to control of the affirmative, iii. 92 n., i. 123; its difficulties never solved, iii. 51; see Dialectic.

Nemesius, relativity of mental and sensational processes, iii. 122 n.

Newton, accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii. 402 n.

Nile, inundation of, explanation of Anaxagoras, i. 58 n.

Nominalism, first protest against Realism, Antisthenes, i. 164; of Stilpon, 167.

Nomos, idea of law less extensive than, i. 380 n., 382 n., ii. 92 n.; omnipotence of King, i. 378, 380, 392 n., 424, ii. 333; Sokrates an exception, ib.; Plato's and Aristotle's theory of politics to resist King, i. 393 n.; Plato appeals to, iv. 24 n.; Epiktêtus, i. 388 n.; common sense of a community, its propagation, ii. 274; no common End among established [Greek: no/mima], iii. 282 n., iv. 204 n.; see Authority, Orthodoxy.

Non-ens, see Ens.

Noumenon of Kant agrees with Parmenidês' ens, i. 21.

Nous, see Reason.

Number, the principle of Pythagoreans, i. 9-12, 14; differs from Plato's Idea, 10; its modern application, ib. n., 14 n.; limited to ten, according to Plato and Pythagoreans, 11 n.; the Greek geometrical conception of, iii. 112 n.; mean proportionals, iv. 224 n.; see Arithmetic.

Oaths, iv. 413.

Objective, and subjective views of ethics, Sokrates distinguished, i. 451; dissent coincident with subjective unanimity, ib.; see Relativity.

Observation, astronomy must not be studied by, iv. 73; nor acoustics, 74.

Obstetric, of Sokrates, i. 367, ii. 251, iii. 112, 176.

Odysseus, ii. 56.

Oken, Pythagoreanism, i. 10 n.

Old Age, iv. 2.

Oligarchy, iv. 79; Plato's second state a compromise of democracy and, 333, 337.

One, in the Many, and Many in the One, aim of philosophy, i. 407; difficulties about many and, iii. 339; see Idea.

Ontology and physics, radically distinct points of view, i. 23 n.; the science of Ens, first appears in the Eleates, 22; reconciliation of physics with, attempted unsuccessfully after Parmenides, 23 n.; Plato blends ethics with, iii. 306; Aristotle's substratum for phenomenology, i. 24 n.; tendency to embrace logical phantoms as real causes, ii. 404 n.; see Ens, Philosophy.

Opinion, public, see Authority.

Opinion, Xenophanes' doctrine, i. 18; Parmenides', 20; Demokritus', 72; embraces all varieties of knowledge save of the Good, ii. 30; right, of good statesmen, derived from inspiration, 242; compared with knowledge, 241, 253, 255 n., iii. 167 n., 181 n.; antithesis less marked in Theætêtus than Politikus, 257; Plato's compared with modern views, ii. 254; the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, iii. 164; distinct from sensation, 166; true, knowledge is, 168; verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or possible, ib.; if false, possible, 169, 181 n., 351; waxen memorial tablet in the mind, 169; false, is the confusion of cognitions and non-cognitions, refuted, 171; wherein different from knowledge, 172; true, not knowledge, communicated by rhetor, ib.; true, plus rational explanation, is knowledge, 173; analogy of elements and compounds, ib.; rejected, 174; intercommunion of forms of non-ens and of proposition, opinion, judgment, 213, 214; akin to proposition, and may be false, by partnership with form non-ens, 214; relation to kosmical soul, iv. 227; its matter, what is between ens and non-ens, 49; two grades of, Faith or Belief, and Conjecture, 67; true pleasure attached to true, iii. 351.

Opposites, only one to each thing, ii. 13 n.

Optimism, ii. 393-6.

Orphans, iv. 406-7.

Orphic canon of life, iii. 390 n., iv. 15; coincidence of Timæus with, 255 n.

Orthodoxy, local infallibility claimed, but rarely severely enforced in Greece, iv. 396; less intolerance at Athens than elsewhere, iii. 277, iv. 126; Sophists conform to prevalent, 56; irresistible effect of public opinion in producing, i. 392, iv. 55; common sense of a community, its propagation, ii. 274; Plato on, i. xi, 342, 392 n., 424, iv. 69 n., 165; probable feelings of Plato, ii. 367; Sokrates in Phædon contrasted with Apology, 421; inconsistently exacted in Plato's state, iii. 277-8, iv. 24, 156, 160, 327, 379, 430; three varieties of heresy, 376; proëm to laws against, 383; first confuted, 386; argument inconsistent and unsatisfactory, 388; second confuted, 389; contradicts Republic, 390; the third the worst, 384; confuted, 391; general Greek belief, 381, 391, 394; incongruity of Plato's doctrine, 393; opposition to Plato's doctrine in Greece, 395; Cicero, 379 n.; Milton, ib.; Bp. Butler, 166 n.; book-burning, 379 n.; see Authority.

Pain, see [Greek: a)lupi/a], Pleasure.

Paley, remarks illustrative of Sokratic dialectic, i. 377 n.

Panætius, style, i. 406 n.; on Phædon, 288, 334 n.; Plato's immortality of the soul, ii. 423 n.; dialogues of Sokratici viri, i. 112 n.

Parmenidês, metaphysical and geometrical rather than physical, i. 23 n., 89; the absolute, 19-24, iii. 104; Herakleitus opposed to, i. 37; ens and non-ens, an inherent contradiction in human mind, 19; ens alone contains truth, phenomena probability, 24; ens erroneously identified by Aristotle with heat, ib. n.; non-ens, iii. 243 n.; opposition to Homo Mensura, 113; phenomena of, the object of modern physics, i. 23 n.; mind, 26; theology, 19, 25; physics, 7 n., 90 n.; two physical principles, 24; doctrine defended by Zeno, 93, 99, iii. 58; relation of Demokritus to, i. 66; with Pythagoras supplied basis of Platonic philosophy, 89; refutation of, in Sophistês, iii. 211, 223; summum genus enlarged by Eukleides, 196 n.; and Sokrates blended by Eukleides, i. 118.

Parmenidês, the, date, i. 309, 315, 316 n., 338 n., iii. 71 n., 244 n.; authenticity, i. 307-11, 320, 327, 338 n., 401 n., iii. 68 n., 69, 88 n., 185 n.; criticism of dialogue generally, 82; its character, 56; purpose negative, 71, 85 n., 85, 93, 97, 108, i. 125; the genuine Platonic theory attacked, iii. 68; attack not unnatural, 71; its dialectic, compared with Zeno's, i. 100; scenery and personages, iii. 58; Sokrates impugns Zeno's doctrine, 59; and affirms Ideas separate from, but participable by, sensible objects, ib.; objections, 60-7; no object in nature mean to the philosopher, 61, 195 n.; ideas, how participable by objects, 63, 72, iv. 138; analogous difficulty of predication, i. 169; not merely conceptions, iii. 64, 74; "the third man," 64 n.; not mere types, 65; not cognizable, since not relative to ourselves, ib., 72; cognizable only through unattained Idea of cognition, 66; which gods have, 67, 68 n.; dilemma, ideas exist or philosophy impossible, 68; exercises required from students, 79; provisional assumption of hypotheses, and their consequences traced, ib.; nine demonstrations from unum est and unum non est, 81, 340; criticism of antinomies, 82, 85 n., 88 n., 99 n.; exercises only specimens of method applicable to other antinomies, 91; more formidable than problems of Megarics, 92; these assumptions convey the minimum of determinate meaning, 94; different meanings of the same proposition in words, 95, 97 n.; first demonstration a Reductio ad absurdum of Unum non multa, 96, 101; second, demonstrates Both of what the first demonstrated Neither, 98, 101; third mediates, 100, 101; but unsatisfactory, 102; Plato's imagination of the Instantaneous, 100; found no favour, 102; the fourth and fifth, 101, 102; the sixth and seventh, 103; unwarranted steps in the reasoning, 105; seventh is founded on genuine doctrine of Parmenidês, 104; eighth and ninth, 106; conclusion compared to enigma in Republic, 108; compared with Sophistês and Politikus, 187 n., 259; Philêbus, 97 n., 340 n., 343; Republic, iv. 138; Euthydêmus, ii. 200.

Particulars, doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 29; the one in the many, and many in one, aim of philosophy, 407; Herakleitean flux true of, but not of Ideas, iii. 320; universals amidst, 257; and universals, different dialogues compared, ib.; difficulties about one and many, 339; natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340; illustration from speech and music, 342; explanation insufficient, 343; no constant truth in, iv. 3 n.; fluctuate, 50; ordinary men discern only, 49, 51; see Phenomena.

Pascal, on King Nomos, i. 381 n.; Cartesian theory, ii. 401 n.; justice, i. 231 n.; authority, iv. 232.

Pathology of Plato, compared with Aristotle and Hippokrates, iv. 260.

Pausanias, the gods jealousy, iv. 164 n.

Peloponnesian war, iii. 406.

Pentateuch, allegorical interpretation of, iv. 157 n.; relation to Greek schemes, 256.

Pentathlos, the, ii. 114; expert of Plato and Aristotle, 119 n.

Percept and concept, relative, iii. 75; prior to the percipient, 76 n.

Perception, doctrine of Parmenides, i. 26; Empedokles, 44; Theophrastus, 46 n.; Anaxagoras, opposed to Empedokles, 58; Diogenes of Apollonia, 62; Demokritus, 77; Plato, iii. 159; different views of Plato, 163; sensible, province wider in Politikus than Theætêtus, 256; knowledge is sensible, 111, 113, 154, 173 n.; identified with Homo Mensura, 123, 162 n.; sensible perception does not include memory, 157; argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time, ib.; knowledge lies in the mind's comparisons respecting sensible perceptions, 161; difference from modern views, 162; objects of conception and of, comprised in Plato's ens, 229, 231.

Pergamus, library of, i. 270 n., 280 n.

Periander, iv. 7.

Perikles, upheld the claims of intellect, ii. 373; rhetorical power, 370, 371.

Peripatetic school at the Lykeum, i. 269; change after death of Theophrastus, 272; loss of library, 270; see Lykeum.

Persian and Spartan kings eulogised, ii. 8; and Athens compared, iv. 312; invasion, 311, 313; customs blended with Spartan in Cyropædia, i. 222; government, 235.

Phædon the Eretrian, i. 148.

Phædon, the, authenticity, i. 334 n.; first dialogue disallowed upon internal grounds, 288; date, 309-313, 315, ii. 377 n.; affirmative and expository, 377; much transcendental assertion, iii. 56; purpose, ii. 382 n.; antithesis and complement of Symposion, iii. 22; scenery and interlocutors, ii. 377; Sokrates to the last insists on freedom of debate, 379; value of exposition, 398; no tripartite soul, antithesis of soul and body, 384; life a struggle between soul and body, 386, 388, 422; emotions, a degenerate appendage of human nature, iii. 389; death emancipates, ii. 386, 388; yet soul may suffer punishment, inconsistency, 415; philosophy gives partial emancipation, 387; purification of soul, 388, i. 159; inseparable conjunction of pleasure with pain, iii. 38-9 71.; pleasures to be estimated by intelligence, 375; pleasures of intelligence more valuable than of sense, ib.; courage of philosopher and ordinary citizens, different principles, ii. 308 n.; the soul a mixture, refuted, 390; soul's pre-existence admitted, ib., iii. 122; soul is essentially living and therefore immortal, ii. 413; proof of immortality includes pre-existence of all animals, and metempsychosis, 414; depends on assumption of Ideas, 412; metempsychosis of ordinary men only, 387, 415, 425; Plato's demonstration fails, iii. 16; not generally accepted, ii. 426; Sokrates' intellectual development, 391; turned on different views as to a true cause, 398; illustration of Comte's three stages of progress, 407; Sokrates' early study, 391; genesis of knowledge, ib.; first doctrine of Cause, rejected, ib., 399; second doctrine, from Anaxagoras, 393, 401, 403; doctrine laid down in Philêbus, 407 n.; Anaxagoras did not carry out his principle, 394, 407; Anaxagoras' nous, as understood by Sokrates, 402 n.; causes efficient and co-efficient, 394, 400; third principle, assumption of Ideas as separate entia, 396, 403, 407, iv. 239 n.; multitude of ideas, ii. 410; the only causes, 396; truth resides in ideas, 411; discussion of hypothesis, and of its consequences, distinct, 397, 411; ultimate appeal to extremely general hypothesis, ib.; Sokrates' equanimity before death, 416, 417; Sokrates' soul--islands of the blest, 416; Sokrates' last words and death, 417; burial, 416; compared with Apology, i. 422 n., ii. 419-21; Symposion, 382, iii. 16-19; Menon, ii. 249; Phædrus, ib., iii. 16-19; Politikus, 262, 265 n.; Republic, ii. 383, 412, 414 n.; Timæus, 383, 407 n., 411-12.

Phædrus, its date, i. 263, 304-10, 313-4, 315, 319, ib. n., 323, 326 n., 327, 330, ii. 227, 228 n., iii. 36 n., 38; ancient criticism on, i. 319 n.; considered by Tennemann as keynote of series, 302; assumptions of Schleiermacher inadmissible, 319, 329 n.; much transcendental assertion, iii. 56; Eros differently understood, necessity for definition, 29; derivation of [Greek: e)/rôs], 308 n.; of [Greek: mantikê\] and [Greek: oi)ônistikê/], 310 n.; Eros, a variety of madness, 11; Eros disparaged, then panegyrised, by Sokrates, ib.; mythe of pre-existent soul, 12, 14 n.; soul's [Greek: knê=sis] compared to children's teething, 399 n.; reminiscence of the Ideas, 13, 17, iv. 239 n.; operation of pre-natal experience on man's intellectual faculties, iii. 13; reminiscence kindled by aspect of physical beauty, ii. 422, iii. 4, 14; debate on Rhetoric, 26; Sokrates' theory, all persuasion founded on a knowledge of the truth, 28; writing and speaking, as art, 27; is it teachable by system, 28; Sokrates compares himself with Lysias, 29; Lysias unfairly treated in, 47-8, 408, 410 n., 411 n.; Sokrates' reason for attachment to dialectic, 258 n.; the two processes of dialectic, 29, 39; exemplified in Sokrates' discourses, 29; essential to genuine rhetoric, 30, 34; rhetoric as a real art, is comprised in dialectic, 30, 34; analogy to medical art, 31; includes a classification of minds and discourses, and their mutual application, 32, 41, 45; books and lectures useless, 33, 34, 49, 51, 53-5; may remind, 33, 50; rhetorician must acquire real truth, 33, 34; theory more Platonic than Sokratic, 38; rhetorician insufficiently rewarded, 33; dialectician alone can teach, 37; idéal, cannot be realised, 51; except under hypothesis of pre-existence and reminiscence, 52; dialectic teaches minds unoccupied, rhetoric minds pre-occupied, 40; Plato's idéal a philosophy, not an art, of rhetoric, 45; unattainable, 42, 46; comparison with the rhetorical teachers, 44; charge against rhetorical teachers not established, 47; compared with Republic, Gorgias, Euthydêmus, ii. 229; Menon, 249; Phædon, ib., 423, iii. 17-8, iv. 239 n.; Symposion, iii. 1, 11, 15, 17-19; Sophistês, 257; Politikus, ib., 265 n.; Philêbus, 398; Timæus and Kritias, 53; Leges, iv. 324.

Phenicians, iv. 330 n., 352; appetite predominant in, 38.

Phenomena, early Greek explanation of, by polytheism, i. 2; doctrine of Xenophanes, 18; Parmenides, 20, 24, 66; of Parmenides, the object of modern physics, 23 n.; of Parmenides contain only probability, not truth, 24; doctrine of Zeno, 93; Leontine Gorgias, 104 n.; Herakleitus, 29; Anaxagoras, 59 n.; Demokritus, 68; Kyrenaics, 197; the Ideas not fitted on to, iii. 78; Aristotle, i. 24 n.; see Particulars.

Philêbus, authenticity, iii. 369 n.; date, i. 307-9, 311-3, 315, iii. 369 n.; peculiarity, 382; illustrates logical partition, 254, 344; merit as a didactic composition, 365, 368 n.; method contrasted with Theætêtus, 335 n.; recent editions, 365 n.; reading in p. 17A, 341 n.; subject and persons, 334; protest against Sokratic elenchus, 335; happiness and good used as correlative terms, ib.; good, object of universal desire, ib., 371, 392 n.; what mental condition will ensure happiness, 335; is it pleasure or wisdom, ib., 337; pleasures, and opposite cognitions, unlike each other, 336, 396; is good intense pleasure without any intelligence, 338; or intelligence without pleasure or pain, 339; such a life conceivable, at least second-best, 349; Plato inconsistent in putting the alternative, 372; emotions, a degenerate appendage of human nature, 389; contrast with other dialogues, 398; good a tertium quid, 339, 361; pleasure, of the infinite, intelligence a combining cause, 347; intelligence the determining, pleasure the indeterminate, 348, iv. 221; intelligence postulated by the Hedonists, iii. 374; analogy of intelligence and pleasure, 360; intelligence more cognate to good than pleasure is, 348, 361; pain, disturbance of system's fundamental harmony, pleasure the restoration, 348; pleasure pre-supposes pain, 349; except in the derivative pleasures of memory and expectation, ib.; desire presupposes a bodily want and memory of previous satisfaction, 350; true pleasures attached to true opinions, 351; can pleasure be true or false, 286 n., 351, 352, 356, 380, ib. n., 382; false pleasures are pleasures falsely estimated, 353, 369 n.; to Plato the absolute the only real, 385; true pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, acquisition of knowledge, &c., 356; pure pleasures admit of measure, 357; directive sovereignty of measure, 391, 393; pleasure not identical with [Greek: a)lupi/a], 353, 377; theory of pleasure-haters, partly true, 354; allusion in [Greek: oi( duscherei=s], 389 n.; intense pleasures connected with bodily or mental distemper, 355, 391; but more pleasure in health, 356; intense pleasures not compatible with cognition, 362; same view enforced by Hedonists, 378, 387 n.; Aristotle on, 376 n.; drama, feelings excited by--[Greek: phtho/nos], 355 n.; pleasure is generation, therefore not an End, nor the Good, 357; Aristippus and Aristotle on, 378 n.; pleasure is an end, and cannot be compared with intelligence, a means. 373, 377 n.; Plato's doctrine not defensible against pleasure-haters, 387, 390 n.; Sokrates differs little from pleasure-haters, 389; gods and kosmos free from pleasure and pain, ib.; comparison of man to kosmos unnecessary and confusing, 367; forced conjunction of kosmology and ethics, 391; difficulties about one and many, 339; natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340; illustration from speech and music, 342; explanation insufficient, 343; classes between one and infinite many often overlooked, 341; Plato enlarges Pythagorean doctrine, 368; but feebly applies, 369; quadruple distribution of existences, 346; varieties of intelligence, classified, 358; dialectic the purest, 360; classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions, 394; difference from other dialogues, 395; rhetoric superior in usefulness and celebrity, 360, 380; arithmetic and geometry are two-fold, 359, 394; unchangeable essences of the kosmos rarely studied, 361; good a mixture, ib.; this good has not the unity of an idea, ii. 407 n., iii. 365; all cognitions included, 362; but only true, pure, and necessary pleasures, ib.; five graduated constituents of good, 364, 397; Plato's in part an eclectic doctrine, 366; blends ontology with ethics, ib.; does not satisfy the tests himself lays down, 371; compared with Euthydêmus, 374 n.; Protagoras, 379, 391; Gorgias, 379-81; Phædrus, 398; Symposion, 370 n., 398; Parmenidês, 97 n., 340 n., 343; Sophistês, 369 n.; Politikus, 263, 369 n.; Republic, 370, 373 n., 395; Timæus, 397 n.; Leges, iv. 301.

Philo, etymologies, iii. 308 n.; hypothetical propositions, i. 145 n.; allegorical interpretation, iv. 157 n.

Philolaus, i. 9.

Philosophers, ancient, common claim to universal knowledge, iii. 219; charged with pride, i. 153 n.; secession from Athens, 111 n.; contrast of philosopher with practical men, ii. 52, 145 n., iii. 183, 274, iv. 51-4; uselessness in practical life due to not being called in by citizens, 54; disparagement of half-philosophers, half-politicians, ii. 224; forced seclusion of, iv. 59; require a community suitable, ib.; philosophical aptitude perverted under misguiding public opinion, 54; model city practicable if philosophy and political power united, 47; divine men, iii. 187; the fully qualified practitioner, ii. 114, 116, 119; not wise, yet painfully feeling ignorance, 181; value set by Sokrates and Plato on this attribute, 190; dissenters, upheld, 375; life, a struggle between soul and body, 386; ascetic life, 388, i. 158; exempted from metempsychosis, ii. 387, 416, 425; rewarded in Hades--mythe in Gorgias, 361; stages of intellectual development, 391; value of exposition, 398; Eros the stimulus to improving philosophical communion, iii. 4, 6; Sokrates as representative of Eros Philosophus, 15, 25; distinguished from [Greek: i)diô/tês], iv. 104 n.; not distinguishable from sophists, ii. 210, 211 n.; alone can teach, iii. 37, 40; as expositors, teach minds unoccupied, as rhetoricians, minds pre-occupied, 39; realisable only under hypothesis of pre-existence and reminiscence, 52; alone grasp Ideas in reasoning, 290 n.; test of, the synoptic view, iv. 76; compared with rhetors, iii. 178; masters of debates, 179; determine what forms admit of intercommunion, 208; live in region of ens, ib.; contemplate unchangeable forms, iv. 48; distinction of ordinary men and, illustrated by simile of Cave, 67-70; distinctive marks of, 51; no object in nature mean to, iii. 61.

Philosophia prima of Aristotle, i. 358 n., iii. 230 n., 382.

Philosophy, is reasoned truth, i. vii-x; Ferrier on scope and purpose of, viii n.; necessarily polemical, viii; modern idea of, includes authoritative teaching, positive results, direct proofs, 366; usually positive systems advocated, iii. 70; difference of ancient and modern problems, 52; chief point of divergence of modern schools, ii. 409 n.; its beginning, i. 375 n., 382, ii. 404, 407 n.; free judgment the first condition for, i. 382, 395 n., ii. 368, iii. 152 n.; negative vein as necessary as affirmative for, i. 130; preponderated in Plato's age, 123; early appearance of a few free thinkers in Greece, 384; brought down from heaven by Sokrates, x; Greek, in its purity, xiv; Greek, characterised by multiplicity of individual authorities, 84, 90, 340 n.; advantages, 90; contrasted with uniform tradition of Jews and Christians, 384 n.; early Christian view of, affected by Hebrew studies, xv n.; polytheism the first form of, 2; Aristotle contrasts "human wisdom" with primitive theology, 3 n.; Indian, 378 n.; compared with Pre-Sokratic, 107; analogy of Greek with Indian, 160 n., 162; difficulties of early, iii. 184 n.; opposition from prevalent views of Nature, &c., i. 86; common repugnance to its rationalistic element, 3, 59-60, 261 n., 279 n., 387 n., 388, 437, 441, iv. 57; encyclopædic character of Greek, iii. 219; new epoch, by Plato's establishment of a school, i. 266; its march up to or down from principia, 403; the protracted study necessary, an advantage, ib.; definition first sought for in Erastæ, ii. 117; the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, 112; a province by itself, 119; the supreme art, 120; to be studied by itself exclusively, 229; claim of locus standi for, 367; relation to politics, 224, 227, 229, 230 n.; comparative value of, and of practical (q.v.) life, 365 n., 368 n., ib., iii. 182, i. 204; antithesis of rhetoric and, ii. 365; issue unsatisfactorily put by Plato, 369; ancient quarrel between poetry and, iv. 93, 152, 309; Aristotle on blending mythe with, 255 n.; gives a partial emancipation of soul, ii. 386; analogy of Eros to, iii. 10, 11, 14; Eros the stimulus to, 18; different view, Phædon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Republic, ib.; antithesis of emotion and science, 61; ideas exist or philosophy impossible, 68; should be confined to discussion among select minds, i. 351; should not be taught at a very early age, iv. 60, 76; studies introductory to, 70-75; difference in Leges, 275 n.; Plato's remarks on effect of, 207; Republic contradicts other dialogues, 207-11; Plato more a preacher than philosopher in Republic, 129, 131; difference between theorist and preceptor, ib.; Plato's altered tone in regard to, in later life, 273.

Philosophy, Pre-Sokratic, i. 1-83; value, xiv; form compared with the Indian, 107; studied in the third and second centuries B. C., 92; importance of Aristotle's information about, 85; Plato's criticism on, 87 n.; relation of early schemes, 86; Aristotle's relation to, 85; abstractions of Plato and Aristotle compared with Ionians, 87; Timæus resembled Ionic philosophy, 88 n.; theories in circulation in Platonic period, 91; Ionians attended to material cause only, 88; defect of Ionic principles, 89; little or no dialectic in earliest theorists, 93; physics discredited by growth of dialectic, 91; new characteristic with Zeno and Gorgias, 105.

Phlogiston theory, ii. 164 n.

Physics, transcendentalism in modern, i. 400 n.; creation out of nothing, denied by all ancient physical philosophers, 52; aversion to studying, on ground of impiety, iv. 219 n., 397** n.; Thales, i. 4; Anaximander, 4-7; Anaximenes, 7; Pythagorean, 12; Xenophanes, 18; Parmenides, 24, 90** n.; his phenomena the object of modern, 23 n.; and ontology, radically distinct points of view, ib.; reconciliation of ontology with, attempted unsuccessfully after Parmenides, ib.; Herakleitus, 27, 32; Empedokles, 38; attraction and repulsion illustrate his love and enmity, 40 n.; Anaxagoras, 49, 57; denied simple bodies, 52 n.; atomic doctrine, 65, 67; early, discredited by growth of dialectic, 91; retrograded in Plato and Aristotle, 88 n.; theories in circulation in Platonic period, 91; Eudoxus, 255 n.; early study of Sokrates, ii. 391; Sokrates avoided, i. 376; Cynics' contempt for, 151; and Aristippus', 192; see Kosmos.

Physiology, of Empedokles, i. 43; Theophrastus, 46 n.; Anaxagoras, 58; Diogenes of Apollonia, 60 n., 62; Demokritus, 76; of Timæus subordinated to ethical teleology, iv. 256; of Plato, see Body; compared with Aristotle and Hippokrates, 260.

Plants for man's nutrition, iv. 248; soul of, ib.

Platæa, iii. 406.

Plato, life, little known, i. 246; birth, parentage, and education, 247, 306 n.; early relations with Sokrates, 248; service as a citizen and soldier, 249; political life, 251; political changes in Greece during life, 1; travels alter death of Sokrates, 253; permanently established at Athens, 254; teaches at the Academy, ib.; received presents, not fees, iii. 218 n.; his pupils, numerous, wealthy, and from different cities, i. 255; many subsequently politicians, 261 n.; Eudoxus, 255; Aristotle, 260; Demosthenes, 261 n.; visits the younger Dionysius, 258, 351, 194 n.; relations with Dionysius, 255; disappointments, 280; varying relations with Isokrates, ii. 331 n., iii. 35; his jealousy and love of supremacy, i. 117 n., 153 n.; alleged ill-nature, 117 n.; antipathy to Antisthenes, 151, 152 n., 165; alleged enmity between Xenophon and, iii. 22 n., iv. 146 n., 312 n.; rivalry with Lysias, iii. 408, 410 n., 411 n.; death, i. 200; Plato and Aristotle represent pure Hellenic philosophy, xiv; St. Jerome on, xv; criticism on early Greek philosophy, 87 n.; relation to predecessors, 91; theories in circulation in his time, ib.; Parmenidês and Pythagoras supplied basis for, 89; relation to Sokrates, 344 n., ii. 303; Pythagoreanism, i. 10 n., 15 n., 87, 344 n., 346 n., 347, 349 n., ii. 426 n., iii. 368, iv. 424 n.; Herakleitus, i. 27, ii. 30; Demokritus, i. 66 n., 82 n., iv. 355 n.; abstractions of Plato and Aristotle compared with Ionic philosophy, i. 87; physics retrograded with, 88 n.; analogy to Indian philosophy, ii. 389 n.; resemblance to Hebrew writers, iv. 157 n., 256; little known of him from his Dialogues, i. 260, 339; personality only in his Epistles, 349; valuable illustrations of his character from Epistles, 339 n.; his school fixed at Athens and transmitted to successors, 265; scarcely known to us in his function of a lecturer and president of a school, 346; lectures at the Academy, never published, 360; miscellaneous character of audience, effect, 348; lectures, 347; De Bono, ib., 349; on principles of geometry, 349 n.; circumstances of his intellectual and philosophical development little known, 323 n.; did not write till after death of Sokrates, 326, 334, 443 n.; proofs, 327-334; variety, 339, 342, 344, ii. 155 n., iii. 26 n., 54, 179 n., 259, 265 n., 400, 420; style, i. 405; prolixity, ii. 100 n., 276, iii. 259, 369 n., iv. 325 n.; poetical vein predominant in some works, i. 343, iv. 153 n.; mixture of poetical fancy and religious mysticism with dialectic theory, iii. 16; comic vein, 410 n.; builds on metaphor, i. 353 n., iii. 65 n., 351, 364; rhetorical powers, 178** n., 392 n., 408, 409, 410; irony, ii. 208; tendency to embrace logical phantoms as real causes, 404 n.; both sceptical and dogmatical, i. 342; his affirmative and negative veins distinct, 399, 400 n., 403, 420; in old age the affirmative vein, 408; altered tone in regard to philosophy in later life, iv. 273, 320, 379, 424, i. 244; intolerance, 423, iii. 277, iv. 157, 159, 379, 430; inconsistencies, i. xiii, ii. 29, 303, 345, 416 n., iii. 17, 172 n., 273, 277, 332, 372, iv. 24, 219, 379-86, 396; absence of system, i. xiii, 340 n., 344, 375; untenable hypothesis that he communicated solutions to a few, xi, 360, 401; assumed impossibility of teaching by written exposition, 349, 357, ii. 56 n.; this assumption intelligible in his day, i. 357; a champion of the negative dialectic, 372; devoted to philosophy, 333; his aim, 406; is a searcher, 375, iii. 158 n.; search after knowledge the business of his life, i. 396; has done more than any one else to interest others in it, 405; anxiety to keep up research, ii. 246; combated commonplace, i. 398 n.; equally with Sophists, laid claim to universal knowledge, iii. 219; anachronisms, i. 335, ii. 20 n., iii. 411; colours facts to serve his arguments, ii. 356 n., 369, iii. 46, iv. 311; probably never read Thucydides, iii. 410 n.; acquiescence in tradition, iv. 230-3, 242 n.; relation to popular mythology, i. 441 n., ii. 416, iii. 265 n., iv. 24, 155 n., 196, 238 n., 325, 328, 337, 398; theory of politics to resist King Nomos, i. 393; reverence for Egyptian regulations, iv. 266 n.; latest opinion in Epinomis, 421 n., 424 n.; agreement of Leibnitz with, ii. 248 n.; see Canon, Dialogue, Epistles, &c.

Platonists, influenced by Pythagoreans, iii. 390 n.; pleasure a form of evil, ib.; erroneous identification of truth and good, 391 n.

Pleasurable, Beautiful a variety of, ii. 45; inadmissible, 45-7; and Good, as conceived by the Athenians, 371; is it identical with good, 289.

Pleasure, an equivoque, iii. 377 n.; meaning as the summum bonum, 338; Plato's various doctrines compared, 385 n.; is the good, ii. 292, 305, 347 n.; agreement with Aristippus, i. 199-201; right comparison of pains and, necessary, ii. 293; virtue a right comparison of pain and, ib., 305; ignorance, not pleasure, the cause of wrongdoing, 294; actions conducive to, are honourable, 295; Sokrates' reasoning, 307; not ironical, 314; not Utilitarianism, 310 n.; theory more distinct than any in other dialogues, 308, 347; but too narrow and exclusively prudential, 309; compared with Gorgias, 306 n., 345-6; Republic, 210, 350 n.; not identical with Good, 345, iii. 380 n., iv. 62; Sokrates' argument untenable, ii. 351; its elements depreciated, 355; arts of flattery aiming at immediate, 357; Expert required to discriminate, 345, 347; science of measure necessary to estimate pleasures, 357 n., iii. 357, 369 n., 376** n., 391, iv. 301; is it good, iii. 335, 337; pleasures unlike each other, 336, 396; is good intense pleasure without any intelligence, 338; life without pain or pleasure conceivable, at least second-best, 349, 372; less cognate than intelligence to good, 339, 347, 361; not identical with [Greek: a)lupi/a], 338 n., 353, 377; is of the infinite, 347; is the indeterminate, 348; pre-supposes pain, 349, 389 n.; except in the derivative pleasures of memory and expectation, 349; is the restoration of the system's harmony, 348; antithesis of body and mind in desire, no true pleasure, 350; true, attached to true opinion, 351; same principle of classification applied to cognitions as to, 382; can they be true or false, 351, 352, 385, 380 n., 382; false, are pleasures falsely estimated, 352, 384; theory of pleasure-haters, partly true, 354; intense, not compatible with cognition, 363; Aristotle on, 376 n.; same view enforced by Hedonists, 378, 387 n.; intense, connected with bodily or mental distemper, 356, 391; but more pleasure in health, 356; feelings excited by drama, [Greek: phtho/nos], 355 n.; true, of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, acquisition of knowledge, 356; of geometry, painless, ib., 387 n.; of intelligence more valuable than of sense, 375 n., 386 n., iv. 85, 89, 118; analogy of cognition and, iii. 360; true, admit of measure, 357, 369 n.; is generation, therefore, not an end, nor the good, 357; Aristippus and Aristotle on, 378 n.; is an end, and cannot be compared with intelligence, a means, 373, 377 n.; good a mixture of pleasure and cognition, 361; only true, pure, and necessary pleasures included in good, 362; gods and kosmos free from pleasure and pain, 389; intelligence postulated by the Hedonists, 374; Plato argues on Hedonistic basis by comparing, 375; both [Greek: a)lupi/a] and pleasure included in Hedonists' end, 377; Sokrates differs little from pleasure-haters, 389; doctrine not defensible against pleasure-haters, 387, 390 n.; of intelligence, the best, and alone pure, iv. 85, 89; of [Greek: philoma/theia] superior to [Greek: philoke/rdeia] and [Greek: philotimi/a], 85, 89, 118; neutral condition of mind intermediate between pain and pleasure, 86; pure pleasure, unknown to most men, 87; more from replenishment of mind than of body, 88; citizens should be tested against, 285; Sokrates the ideal of self-command as to, 288; good identical with maximum of, and minimum of pain, 292-7, 299, 303; at least an useful fiction, ib.; a form of evil, Platonists' doctrine, iii. 390 n.; Speusippus on, 386 n., 390 n.; Kyrenaic theory, i. 196; Antisthenes, iii. 390 n.; Cynics' contempt for, i. 154; Aristotle, iii. 386 n.; Epikurus, ii. 355 n., iii. 387 n.; Lucretius, 387 n.; Cicero, 389 n.; Prof. Bain, 383 n.

Plotinus, i. 376 n., iii. 84 n.

Poets, censured by Herakleitus, i. 26; Xenophanes, 16; the art is one, ii. 127; arbitrary exposition by the rhapsodes, 125; and rhapsodes work by divine inspiration, 127, 129; deliver wisdom without knowing it, 285; the great teachers, 135; really know nothing, ib.; Strabo against, iv. 152 n.; appeal to maxims of, ii. 178; importance of knowledge of, 283; Plato's forced interpretations of, 286, ib. n.; relation of sophists, rhetors, philosophers to, iv. 149; ancient quarrel between philosophy and, 93, 151; Plato's feelings enlisted for, 93; Plato's aversion to Athenian dramatic, 316, 350; peculiar to himself, 317; Aristotle differs, ib. n.; change for worse at Athens began in, 313; censured, ii. 355, iv. 91, 130 n.; their mischievous imitation of imitation, 91; retort open to, 153 n., 154 n.; mischievous appeal to emotions, ii. 126, iv. 92, 152, 349; only deceive their hearers, 91; credibility upheld by Plato, 161; must avoid variety of imitation, 26; orthodox type imposed on, 24, 153, 155, 292-6, 323, 349; to keep emotions in a proper state, 169; Plato's expulsion of, censured, iii. 3; actual place of, in Greek education, compared with Plato's idéal, iv. 149-53; mixture in Plato of poetry with religious mysticism and dialectic theory, iii. 16; poetic vein of Sokrates in Phædon contrasted with Apology, ii. 421; Aristophanes on function of, iv. 306 n.

Political art, its use, ii. 206, iii. 415; Sokrates declares he alone follows the true, ii. 361; society and ethics, topic of Sokrates, i. 376; ethics merged by Sokrates in, ii. 362; treated together by Plato, iv. 133; apart by Aristotle, 138; Plato's and Aristotle's new theory of, to resist King Nomos, i. 393; relation to philosophy, ii. 224, 227, 229, 230 n., 365 n., 368 n., ib., iii. 179, 183, iv. 51-4, i. 181 n., 182; to be studied by itself exclusively, ii. 229; Lewis on ideals, iv. 139 n.; see Government, Monarchy, Ruler.

Politikus, authenticity, i. 307, 316 n., iii. 185 n., 265 n.; date, i. 309, 410, 313, 315, 325; purpose, iii. 188, 253, 257 n., 261; value, 190; relation to Theætêtus, 187; scenery and personages, 185; in a logical classification all particulars of equal value, 195; province of sensible perception narrower in Theætêtus, 256; importance of founding logical partition on sensible resemblances, 255; the attainment of the standard the purpose of each art, 260; necessity of declaring standard, 262; Plato's views on mensuration, 260; Plato's defence against critics, 262; the mythe of the kosmos, 265 n.; causes principal and auxiliary, 266; the king the principal cause, ib.; Plato does not admit received classification of governments, 267; three kinds of polity, 278; true classification of governments, scientific or unscientific, 268; unscientific government, or by many, counterfeit, ib.; of unscientific governments, despot worst, democracy least bad, 270, 278; true government, by the one scientific** man, i. 273, iv. 280, 310 n.; counter-theory in Protagoras, iii. 275; government by fixed laws the second-best, 269; scientific governor, unlimited by laws, 269; distinguished from general, &c., 271; aims at forming virtuous citizens, 272; maintains ethical standard, 273; natural dissidence of gentle and energetic virtues, ib.; excess of the energetic entails death or banishment, of the gentle, slavery, ib.; courage and temperance assumed, 282; compared with Lachês, 282-4; Charmidês, ib.; Menon, 283; Protagoras, 262, 275; Phædon, 262, 265 n.; Phædrus, 257, 265 n.; Parmenidês, 259; Theætêtus, 184 n., 187, 256; Kratylus, 281, 329; Philêbus, 262, 369 n.; Republic, 257 n., 279.

Polybius, on music, iv. 306.

Polytheism, early Greek explanation of phenomena by, i. 2; believed in after genesis of philosophy, 3; hostile to philosophy, 86; substitution of physical forces for, ii. 402; Euripides' Hippolytus illustrates popular Greek religious belief, iv. 163 n.

Population, Malthus' law of, iv. 201; recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202.

Porphyry, on Metempsychosis, ii. 426 n.

Poste, Mr., on Philêbus, iii. 365 n., 369 n., 381 n., 384 n., 390 n., 396 n., 397 n.; abstract theories of Plato and Aristotle compared, ib.

Potential and actual, Aristotle's distinction, iii. 134; ens equivalent to, 204.

Power, controversy of Aristotle with Megarics, i. 135; Aristotle's arguments not valid, 136-8; Aristotle himself concedes the doctrine, 139 n.; doctrine of Diodôrus Kronus, 140, 143; defended by Hobbes, 143; Brown on, 138 n.

Practical life disparaged, ii. 355, iii. 329; and philosophy, ii. 365 n., 368 n., ib., iii. 179, 183, iv. 51-4, i. 181 n., 182; uselessness of philosopher in, due to his not being called in by citizens, iv. 54; condition of success in, ii. 359; influence of belief on, i. 180 n.; Boissier on, 157 n.

Prantl, objection to Homo Mensura, iii. 151 n.; Timæus, iv. 255 n.; Megarics, i. 129 n., 132 n.

Praxiphanes, on Kritias, iv. 265** n.

Prayer, danger of, for mischievous gifts, ii. 12; Sokrates on, and sacrifice, 17, 417, 419; Sokrates prays for undefined favours--premonitions, 28; Sokrates' belief, iv. 394; heresy that gods appeased by, 376, 384; general Greek belief, 392, 394; Herodotus, ib.; Epikurus, 395; Aristotle, ib.

Predicables, iii. 77 n.

Predication, predicate not recognised in Plato's analysis, iii. 235; only identical, legitimate, 223, 232 n., 251; coincidence in Plato, ii. 46 n.; analogous difficulty in Parmenidês, i. 169; error due to the then imperfect logic, iii. 241; misconception of function of copula, 221, i. 170 n.; arguments against, iii. 206, 212, 221; Aristotle on, i. 166, 170; after Aristotle, asserted by Stilpon, 166, 169; Stilpon against accidental, 167; logical subject has no real essence apart from predicates, 168 n.; Menedêmus disallowed negative, 170; see Proposition.

Pre-existence of all animals, included in Plato's proof of soul's immortality, ii. 414.

Pre-Sokratic, see Philosophy.

Priestley, Dr., character of, i. 403 n.

Principle, march of philosophy up to or down from, i. 403; of Thales, 4; Anaximander, 5; Anaximenes, 7; Pythagoreans, 9-12, 14; Parmenides, 24; Herakleitos, 27; Empedokles, 38; Diogenes of Apollonia, 60; defect of the Ionic philosophers, 38.

Prinsterer, G. van, iii. 412 n.

Prodikus, as a writer and critic, iii. 304, 308 n.; less a sophist than Sokrates, 219; the choice of Herakles, ii. 267 n.

Proëms, of Zaleukus and Charondas, iv. 323 n.; didactic or rhetorical homilies, 322; to every important law, 321, 383; as type for poets, 323.

Proklus, borrowed from Rhodian Eudemus, i. 85 n.; interpretation of Plato, xi; on Leges, iv. 355 n.; Kritias, 265 n.; Parmenidês, iii. 64 n., 80 n., 80, 90 n.; Kratylus, 294 n., 310 n., 323 n.; distinction of divine and human names, 300 n.; analysis of propositions, 237 n.

Prometheus, mythe, ii. 267.

Property, private, an evil, iv. 327, 333; perpetuity of lots of land, 326; succession, 405; modes of acquiring, 397; length of prescription, 415; direct taxation according to, 331; qualification for magistracies and votes, ib., 333; limited inequality tolerated as to movable, 330; no private possession of gold or silver, no loans or interest, 331; see Communism.

Prophesy, Plato's theory of liver's function, iv. 246; see Inspiration.

Proposition, analysis of, iii. 213; imperfect, 230, 235; intercommunion of forms of non-ens and of proposition, opinion, judgment, 213-4; no analysis or classification of, before Aristotle, 222; quality of, 235, 248; Plato's view of the negative erroneous, 236, 239; Ideas [Greek: tô=n a)popha/seôn], 238 n.; are false possible, 232; Plato undertakes impossible task, 249; some true, others false, assumed by Aristotle, ib.; hypothetical, Diodôrus Kronus on, i. 145; Philo, ib. n.; contradictory, impossible, 166; the subject, no real essence apart from predicates, 168 n.; see Copula, Predication.

Protagoras, character of, ii. 265 n.; not represented in Euthydêmus, 202; less a sophist than Sokrates, iii. 219; not disparagingly viewed by Plato, ii. 288 n., 290 n., 296 n., 303, 314; relation to Herakleitus, iii. 159 n.; Homo Mensura, 113; see Relativity; combated by Demokritus, i. 82; taught by lectures, ii. 203, 301; [Greek: Peri\ tou= o)/ntos], iii. 153 n.; as a writer and critic, 304, 308 n.; treatise on eristic, i. 125 n.; theory of vision, iv. 237 n.; on the gods, 233 n.

Protagoras, the, date, i. 304-7, 308, 77, 312, 315, 321, 327, 328, 331 n., ii. 228 n., 298 n.; purpose, 277, 278 n.; two distinct aspects of ethics and politics, 299; difference of rhetorical and dialectical method, 300; introduction illustrates Sokrates' mission, 263; question unsolved, 297, 316; scenery and personages, 259; Hippokrates eager for acquaintance with Protagoras, 260, iii. 217 n.; not noticed at the close, ii. 298; Sophists as teachers, 261; danger of going to sophist, without knowing what he is about to teach, 262; visit to Kallias, respect for Protagoras, 264; Protagoras questioned, ib.; is virtue, teachable, 266; intends to train youths as virtuous citizens, ib.; Protagoras' mythe, first fabrication of animals by gods, 267; its value, 276; social art conferred by Zeus, 268, iii. 275; Protagoras' discourse, ii. 269; its purpose, 274; prolix, 275; parodied by Sokrates, 283; mythe and discourse explain propagation of established sentiment of a community, 274, iii. 274; justice and sense of shame possessed and taught by all citizens, ii. 269; virtue taught by parents, &c., 272; quantity acquired depends on individual aptitude, ib.; analogy of learning the vernacular, 273; theory of punishment, 270; combines the two modern theories, 270 n.; why genius not hereditary, 271, 272, 274; Sokrates analyses, 276; how far is justice like holiness, 278; intelligence and moderation identical, having same contrary, 279; Sokrates' reasons insufficient, ib.; Protagoras' prolix reply, 280, 281, 284; Alkibiades claims superiority for Sokrates, 282, 287; dialectic superior to rhetoric, 282; Sokrates inferior in continuous debate, 284; Sokrates on song, and concealed Sophists at Krete and Sparta, 283; Protagoras on importance of knowledge of poets, ib.; interpretation of a song of Simonides, ib.; forced interpretation of poets, 285; poets deliver wisdom without knowing it, 285; Sokrates depreciates value of debates on poets, ib.; colloquial companion necessary to Sokrates, 287; courage differs materially from rest of virtue, 285, 304 n., iv. 283 n.; Sokrates argues that courage is knowledge, ii. 288; Aristotle on, 170 n.; courage a right estimate of terrible things, 296, 307; the reasoning unsatisfactory, 313; knowledge is dominant agency in mind, 290; no man does evil voluntarily, 292; ignorance, not pleasure, the cause of wrongdoing, 294; pleasure the good, 289, 292, 305, 344-50; agreement with Aristippus, i. 199-201; right comparison of pleasures and pains necessary, ii. 293, iii. 391; virtue a right comparison of pleasures and pains, ii. 293, 305; actions conducive to pleasure are honourable, 295; reasoning of Sokrates, 307; not ironical, 314; not Utilitarianism, 310 n.; theory more distinct than any in other dialogues, 308; but too narrow and exclusively prudential, 309-11, 313, 350 n.; reciprocity of regard indispensable, 311; ethical end involves regard for pleasures and pains of others, 312; permanent and transient elements of human agency, 353-5; compared with Menon, 245; Gorgias, 306 n., 345-8, 349-57, iii. 379; Politikus, 262, 275, 276; Philêbus, 380, 391; Republic, ii. 310, 350 n.; Timæus, 268 n.; Leges, iv. 301.

Prudence, relation to rest of virtue, iv. 426; a good from its consequent pleasures, Aristippus' doctrine, i. 197.

Psammetichus, iii. 289 n.

Psychology, defective in Gorgias, ii. 354; great advance by Plato in analytical, iii. 164; classification of minds and aptitudes required in true rhetoric, 32, 43.

Ptolemies, i. 279, 284 n., 285.

Punishment, theory of, ii. 270; combines the two modern theories, ib. n.; a relief to the wrongdoer, 326, 328, 335, iv. 366; consequences of theory, ii. 336; its incompleteness, 363; analogy of mental and bodily distemper pushed too far, 337; objects to deter or reform, iv. 408; corporal, 403.

Pyrrho the Sceptic, i. 154 n.

Pythagoras, life and doctrines, i. 8; metaphysical and geometrical rather than physical, 89; censured by Herakleitus, 26; Demokritus on, 82 n.; antipathy of Herakleitus, iii. 316 n.; see Pythagoreans.

Pythagoreans, the brotherhood, i. 8, ii. 374; absence of individuality, i. 8; divergences of doctrine, 9 n., 14 n.; canon of life, iii. 390 n.; compared with Chinese philosophers, i. 159 n.; Number, differs from Plato's Idea, 10, 348; modern application of the principle, 10 n.; fundamental conception applied by Kepler, 14 n.; Platonic form of doctrine of Monas and Duas, 15 n.; number limited to ten, 11 n.; [Greek: kairo/s], the first cause of good, iii. 397 n.; music of the spheres, i. 14; harmonies, 16; geometrical construction of kosmos, re-appears in Timæus, 349 n.; vacuum extraneous to the kosmos, iv. 225 n.; doctrine of one cosmical soul, ii. 248 n.; metempsychosis, 426 n.; Contraries, the principles of [Greek: o)/nta], i. 15 n.; theory of vision, iv. 237 n.; not the idealists of Sophistês, iii. 245 n.; doctrine of classification, enlarged by Plato, 368; on etymology, 304 n., 316 n., 323 n.; doctrines in Plato, i. 11 n., 16 n., 88, 344 n., 346 n., 347, 349 n., ii. 426 n., iii. 368, iv. 424 n.; Platonists, iii. 390 n.

Qualities, primary and secondary, i. 70, iv. 243 n.; all are relative, ii. 157; no existence without the mind, iii. 73 n.; [Greek: a)lloi/ôsis], 103 n.

Quality of propositions, iii. 235 n., 248.

Quintilian, iii. 311 n.

Ravaisson, M., iii. 242 n.

Realism, first protest against, Antisthenes, i. 164.

Reason, the universal, of Herakleitus, i. 34; is the reason of most men as it ought to be, 35; the individual, worthless, 34; of Anaxagoras, identical with the vital principle, 54; alone pure and unmixed, 51; immaterial and impersonal, 56 n.; two attributive to move and to know, ib.; relation to the homoeomeries, 55-7; originates rotatory movement in chaotic mass, 50; exercised only a catalytic agency, 89; compared with Herakleitus' [Greek: perie/chon], 56 n.; not used as a cause, ii. 394; of Demokritus, produced by influx of atoms, i. 79; relation to sense, 68 n.; alone gives true knowledge, 72; worlds of sense and, distinct, 403; varieties of, classified, iii. 358; dialectic the purest, 360; two grades of, Nous and Dianoia, iv. 66; relation to [Greek: noêto/n], i. 354 n.; the Universal, assigned as measure of truth, iii. 151 n.; relation to kosmical soul, iv. 226; kosmos produced by joint action of necessity and, 237; in individual, analogous to ruler in state, 39; temporarily withdrawn under inspiration, ii. 131, iii. 11; belongs only to gods and a few men, 121 n., iv. 234, 235 n.; is the determining, iii. 348; a combining cause, 347; postulated by the Hedonists, 374; analogy of pleasure and, 360; more cognate than pleasure with good, 339, 347, 361; is it happiness, 335, 337; is good a life of, without pleasure or pain, 338, 349, 372; pleasure an end, and cannot be compared with intelligence, a means, 373, 377 n.; all cognitions included in good, 362; good is not, iv. 62; implication of emotion and, iii. 374; knowledge of good identical with, of other things with [Greek: do/xa], ii. 30; perfect state of, the one sufficient condition of virtue, 149; earliest example of fallacy of Sufficient, i. 6 n.

Reid, on Berkeley, iv. 243** n.; atomic doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, i. 70.

Relation, category of, iii. 128 n.

Relative and non-relative names, iii. 232 n.; and absolute, radically distinct points of view, i. 23 n.; antithetised by Plato in regard to the beautiful, ii. 54; the, of Xenophanes, i. 18; doctrine of Parmenides, 20-24, 66; alone knowable, Zeno, 98, 101; incommunicable, Gorgias the Leontine, 104 n.; doctrine of Anaxagoras, 59 n.; Demokritus, 71, 80; alone knowable, iii. 63, 73; Idea of Good is essentially, iv. 214 n., i. 185; see Absolute, Relativity.

Relativity, perpetual implication of subject and object, iii. 118, 123 n., 122 seq., 128-9, 287 n., i. 204 n.; true both in regard to ratiocinative combinations and percipient faculties of each individual, iii. 118; the doctrine of Sokrates, i. 432, iii. 140 n., 147, 162 n.; in regard to intelligible world, proved from Plato, 121, 125, 227, 322 n., 337 n.; shown more easily than in reference to sense, 122; of some sensible facts, 126, 298, iv. 242; two-fold, to comparing subject, and to another object, besides the one directly described, iii. 127; relations are nothing in the object without a comparing subject, ib.; the facts of consciousness not explicable by independent subject and object, 131; Homo Mensura, formula unpopular, 150; objected to as "Subjectivism," 151; true meaning, ii. 341 n., iii. 116, 137, 143, 292, 297; its counter-proposition, 148; its value, 131, 164 n.; relation to belief on authority, 142, 143, 146, 293; counter-theory of naming, 291, 326 n.; all exposition an assemblage of individual judgments, 139; sentiments of belief and disbelief common, but grounds different with different men and ages, 296; belief not dependent on will but relative to circumstances of individual mind, 297; Homo Mensura, an objection to cognisability of Ideas, 72; identified with Herakleiteanism, 128; Demokritus on, i. 82, iii. 152; Plato's arguments against, 135; identified erroneously by Plato with knowledge is sensible perception, 114 n., 118, 120 n., 125, 162 n.; Plato ignores the proper qualification, 137; the doctrine equalises all animals, 135, 292; analogy of physical processes, 294; not true in the sense meant, 141, 296; it annuls dialectic--not true, 146; the wise man alone a measure, 145; divergences of men, from mental and associative differences, 155; Aristotle on, 128 n., 131 n., 132 n., 149 n., 152; Kyrenaics, i. 197. 204; Hamilton, iii. 133 n.; Dugald Stewart, 156 n.; see Relative.

Religion, Greek, hostile to philosophy, i. 86; mysticism in Empedokles, 47 n.; Xenophanes, 16-18; loose meaning of [Greek: a)/theos], iv. 382 n.; Manichæanism of Leges, 389 n.; Plato's relation to popular mythology, i. 441 n., ii. 416, iii. 265 n., iv. 24, 155 n., 195, 238 n., 325, 328, 337, 398; dissent from his country's, 161, 163; fundamental dogmas, 419; doctrines had emanated from lawgivers, 160; temples and priests, regulations, 337; number of sacrifices determined by lawgiver, 357; sacrilege, gravest of all crimes, 363; heresy, and [Greek: u(/bris] to divine things, or places, 375-86; [Greek: eu)phêmi/a] and [Greek: blasphêmi/a], 350 n.; only state worship allowed, 24, 159, 337, 419, 430; Cicero, 379 n.; Delphi and Dodona to be consulted, 34, 137 n., 325, 337; Xenophon, i. 237; communications common in Plato's age, ii. 130, 131 n., i. 225 n.; see Orthodoxy, Prayer, Polytheism, Sacrifice, Theology.

Reminiscence, theory of, ii. 237, 249, 252, iii. 13, 17; kindled by aspect of physical beauty, 14; not accepted, ii. 247; Bion and Straton on, 249 n.; purification of soul for, 389; necessary hypothesis for didactic idéal, iii. 52; not recognised in Symposion, 17; nor in Republic training, iv. 207.

Renan, on absence of system in ancient philosophy, i. 340 n.; influence of professorial lectures, 346 n.; Averroism, iii. 68 n.; Kratylus, 290 n.; origin of language, 326 n., 328 n., 329 n.; Almamuns' dream, iv. 213 n.

Republic, date, i. 307, 309, 311-3, 315, 324, ii. 318 n.; title only partially applicable, iv. 96; Kleitophon intended as first book, i. 406 n., iii. 419, 425; Hermokrates projected as last in tetralogy, i. 325, iv. 266, 273; Timæus and Kritias, sequel to, 215, 265; overleaps difficulties of other dialogues, 138; summarised, 1, 95; double purpose, ethical and political, 133, 138; polity and education combined, 185; Plato more a preacher than philosopher in, 129-31; scenery and persons, 2; Kephalus' views about old age, ib.; preponderance of evil, 262 n.; tripartite division of goods, 12, 116; Good, not intelligence nor pleasure, 62; the four cardinal virtues assumed as an exhaustive classification, 135; as constituting all Virtue where each resides, 134; difference in other dialogues, 137; justice an equivocal word, 120, 123-6; Simonides' definition of justice, rendering what is owing, 2; objections, 3; defective explanations, 4; definition rejected, 6; Thrasymachus' definition, justice what is advantageous to the most powerful, 8; modified, 9; ruler qua ruler infallible, ib.; justice the good of another, 10; a good to society and individual, injustice a source of weakness, 11; justice a source of happiness, 12; a compromise, 13; recommended by fathers from its consequences, 15, 16, 99; the received view anterior to Plato, 100; Xenophon on, 114 n.; arguments compared, and question stated, 18; the real issue, 117; justice a good per se, 20, 40, 84, 90; not demonstrated, 116; is performing one's own function, 36, 37; in individual, when each mental part performs its own function, 40; analogy to bodily health, ib.; distinction between temperance and justice effaced, 135; view peculiar to Plato, 99; happiness of just and unjust compared, 14; neutral condition of mind intermediate between pain and pleasure, 86; pure pleasure unknown to most men, iii. 387 n., iv. 87; simile of kosmos, absolute height and depth, 87; more pleasure from replenishment of mind than of body, 88; proved also by superiority of pleasures of intelligence, iii. 375 n., iv. 85, 89; the arguments do not establish the point aimed at, 118-20; a good per se, and from its consequences, 94, 121-3; all-sufficient for happiness, germ of Stoical doctrine, 102; inconsistent with actual facts, 103, 123; individual dependent on society, ib.; essential reciprocity in society, 109; the basis of Plato's own theory of city's genesis, 111; but incompletely stated, 112 n.; any theory of society must present antithesis and correlation of obligation and right, 112; Plato's affirmation true in a qualified sense, 125; orthodoxy or dissent of just man must be taken into account, 126, 131; Plato's ethical basis imperfect, 127; his conception is self-regarding, 3 n., 104; motives to it arise from internal happiness of the just, 105; view substantially maintained since, ib.; each individual mind tripartite, ii. 384, iv. 37; the gentle, tender, and æsthetical emotions omitted, 149 n.; reason, energy, appetite, analogous to rulers, guardians, craftsmen, 39; analogy of city and individual, 20, 37, 79-84, 96; parallelism exaggerated, 114, 121, 124; unity of the city, every man does one thing well, 23, 33, 183; Xenophon on, 139 n.; perfection of state and individual, each part performing its own function, 97; happiness of entire state the end, 98, 139 n.; origin of society, common want, ii. 343, iii. 327 n., iv. 21, 111, 112 n., 133; ideal state--only an outline, 139; a military bureaucracy, 183; type of character is Athenian, Xenophontic is Spartan, 147, 151; Plato more anxious for good treatment of Demos, 183; Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or Aristotle, ib.; Aristotle objects, it is two states, 185, 189; healthy city has few wants, enlargement of city's wants, 22; war, from multiplied wants, ib.; good state possesses wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, 34, 35; fiction as to origin of classes, 30; difficulty of procuring first admission for fiction, 158; this the introduction of a new religious creed, 156; class of soldiers or guardians, characteristics, 23, 25, 298 n.; division of guardians into rulers and auxiliaries, 29; maintenance of city dependent on guardians' habits, character, education, 32, 34, 140, 170, 178; musical and gymnastical education necessary, 23; compared with that of modern soldiers, 148, 180; Xenophon compared, 141-8; musical training excites love of the beautiful, 27; music, Platonic sense, 149; by fictions as well as by truth, 24, 154; ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, 93, 151; Plato fights for philosophy, but his feelings enlisted for poetry, 93; poets censured, 91, 130 n.; Homer not educator of Greek world, 92; Herakleitus the Allegorist on, iii. 3 n.; actual place of poetry in Greek education compared with Plato's idéal, iv. 150-2; poets' mischievous appeal to emotions, 92, 152; their mischievous imitation of imitation, 91; retort open to poets, 153 n., 154 n.; censorship of mythology, 24; religion in connection with state, ib., 159; Delphian Apollo to be consulted for religious legislation, 34, 137 n.; Sokrates of Republic compared with the real, 211; Plato compared with Epikurus, 161; poets must conform to orthodox standard, 24, 153, 155; must avoid variety of imitation, 20; gods cause good only, do not assume man's form, 24; no repulsive fictions tolerated about gods or Hades, 25, 154; a better class to be substituted from religion for the existing fictions, 159; type for narratives about men, 26; only grave music allowed, 26, 168; restrictions on music and poetry to keep emotions in a proper state, 169; gymnastic and music necessary to correct each other, 29; gymnastic imparts courage, ib.; bodily training simple, 28; no refined medical art allowed, ib.; [Greek: sussi/tia] of guardians, 32; their communism, ib., 44, 140, 169; its peculiarity, 179; Plato's view of wealth, 199 n.; the guardians consist of men and women, 41, 46; both sexes to go together to battle, 46; best women equal by nature to second best men, 42, 171-4; same duties and training for women as men, 41, 77; on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187; maintained in Leges, and harmonises with ancient legends, 195; contrast with Aristotle, ib.; no family ties, 32, 174; temporary marriages, 43, 175-8, 194 n.; Plato's and modern sentiments, 192; in Platonic state, influence of Aphrodité very small, 197, 359 n.; infanticide, 43, 44, 177, 203; contrast of modern sentiment, ib.; number of guardians, 178; checks on population, 198-202; Malthus' law recognised, 202; approximation in Mill, 199 n.; scheme practicable if philosophy and political power united, 47; how to be realised, 78, 190 n.; of state and individual, four stages of degeneracy, 78-84; timocracy, 79; oligarchy, ib.; democracy, 80; despotism, 81; proportions of happiness and misery in them, 83; Plato's state impossible, in what sense true, 189; its real impossibility, adverse established sentiments, 191; fails from no training for Demos, 186; perpetual succession maintained of philosopher-rulers, 60; philosophers true rulers, 310 n.; hated by the people, 57; whence pretenders, and forced seclusion of philosophers, 58, 90; distinctive marks of philosopher, 51; the philosopher contemplates unchangeable forms, 48; ens alone knowable, 49; opinion, of what is between ens and non-ens, iii. 184 n., iv. 49; two grades of opinion, Faith or Belief, and Conjecture, 67; and of intelligence, Nous and Dianoia, 66; ordinary men discern only particulars, 49, 51; particulars fluctuate, 50; simile of Cave, iii. 257 n., iv. 67-70; those who have contemplated forms reluctant to undertake active duties, 70; relation of philosopher to practical life, 51-4; simile of the steersman, 53; philosopher requires a community suitable to himself, 59; uselessness of philosopher in practical life, due to his not being called in by citizens, 54; philosophical aptitude perverted under misguiding public opinion, ib.; irresistible effect of public opinion in producing orthodoxy, 55; perversion not due to Sophists, ib.; the Sophists conform to prevalent orthodoxy, 56; studies introductory to philosophy, 61, 70-5, 206; object, 69; no mention of Reminiscence, or of negative Elenchus, 207; age for studies, 76; dialectic and geometry, two modes of mind's procedure applicable to ideal world, 65; geometry assumes diagrams, ib.; dialectic requires no diagrams, deals with forms only, descending from highest, 66; awakening power of arithmetic, 71; stimulus from contradiction of one and many, 72; astronomy must be studied by ideal figures, not observation, 73; geometry conducts mind towards universal ens, 72; acoustics, by applying arithmetical relations and theories, 74; exercises in dialectic, 76; effect of, 207; philosophy should not be taught to youths, 60, 76; opposition to other dialogues and Sokrates' character, 208-12; dialectic the consummation of all the sciences, 75; the standard for classifying sciences as more or less true, iii. 383 n.; the synoptic view the test of the dialectician, 290 n., iv. 76; Idea of Good compared to sun, 63, 64; known to the rulers alone, 212; what Good is, is unsolved, 213; mythe of Hades, 94; compared with Lachês, 138; Charmidês, 136, 138; Protagoras, ii. 310, 350 n.; Gorgias, 353, iii. 380 n.; Phædon, ii. 412, 414 n.; Phædrus, iii. 18; Parmenidês, 108, iv. 138; Sophistês, iii. 18, 242, 257; Politikus, 257, 279; Philêbus, 273, 277 n., 395; Kleitophon, 425; Timæus, iv. 38 n., 234 n., 252; Leges, 195, 275, 280, 298 n., 302, 318, 319, 327, 390, 428 n.

Rest, form of, iii. 206, 209-10, 231, 245 n.

Rhapsodes, as a class, ii. 124; functions, 125, 132, 320; popularity, 126; and poet work by divine inspiration, 127; inspired through medium of poets, 128, 129, 134.

Rhetor, has no real power, ii. 324; aims at flattering the public, 357; practical value of instruction of, iii. 44; the genuine, must acquire real truth, 33, 34; is insufficiently rewarded, 33; guides methodically from error to truth, 40; compared with philosopher, ii. 52, iii. 178; auxiliary of true governor, 271; relation to poets, iv. 150; Plato's desire for celebrity as dialectician, and, iii. 408; see Rhetoric.

Rhetoric, popularly preferred to dialectic, i. 451; how employed at Athens, ii. 373; [Greek: a)kriboli/a] distasteful to rhetors, 278 n.; antithesis of dialectic and, i. 433, ii. 70, 275, 365; deals with the concrete, dialectic with the abstract, 52, 53; difference of method illustrated in Protagoras, 300; superior to dialectic in usefulness and celebrity, iii. 360, 380; superiority of dialectic over, claimed, ii. 282, 285, iii. 337 n.; communicates true opinion, not knowledge, 172; the artisan of persuasion, ii. 319; a branch of flattery, 321, 370; is of little use, 329, iii. 411; and dialectic, issue unsatisfactorily put, ii. 369; view stands or falls with idéal of good, 374; Sokrates' view different in Xenophon, 371 n.; compared with Menexenus, iii. 409; and Leges, iv. 322, 324; Aristotle on, i. 133 n.; Aristeides, 243 n.; Sokrates' theory, all persuasion founded on a knowledge of the truth, iii. 28; as art, 27; is comprised in dialectic, 30, 34; analogy to medical art, 31; theory more Platonic than Sokratic, 39; is it teachable by system, 28; definition and division essential to genuine, 30, 35; should include a classification of minds and discourses, and their mutual application, 32, 41, 45; Plato's idéal a philosophy, not an art, 46; involves impracticable conditions, 41-3, 46; comparison with the rhetorical teachers, 44; charge against its teachers not established, 47; censure of forensic eloquence, iv. 410; rhetorical powers of Plato, i. 433, ii. 356 n., iii. 392 n., 408, 409, 411; see Rhetor.

Ritter, on Sophistês, iii. 244 n., 247 n.; Eukleides, i. 127 n.; Megarics, 129 n.

Rivales, see Erastæ.

Rose, Valentine, on the dates of Plato's compositions, i. 326 n., 329 n.

Royer-Collard, iii. 165 n.

Ruler, of a superior breed in the Saturnian period, iii. 264, 266 n.; a principle cause, 266; scientific alone good, iv. 280; qua ruler infallible, 9; division of guardians into, and auxiliaries, 29; wisdom is seated in, 34; analogous to reason in individual, 39; perpetual succession maintained of philosopher-rulers, 60; alone know the Idea of Good, 212; see Government, Political Art.

Rutherford, iv. 105 n.

Sacrifice, Sokrates on, ii. 17, 417-9, iv. 394; heresy that gods appeased by, 376, 384; general Greek belief, 392, 394; Herodotus, ib.; Aristotle, 395; Epikurus, ib.; number determined by lawgiver, 357.

Sacrilege, gravest of all crimes, iv. 363.

St.-Hilaire, Barthélemy, on Sankhya and Buddhism, i. 378 n.; metempsychosis, ii. 426 n.; fallacies, i. 133 n.

Salamis, iii. 406.

Same, form of, iii. 209, 231, iv. 226.

Sankhya, i. 378 n., ii. 389 n., 426 n.

Salvador, Jacob, iii. 300 n.

Scepticism, of Xenophanes, i. 18; Plato, 342; Greek sceptics, iii. 293 n.

Schleiermacher, on Plato's view of knowledge and opinion, iii. 167 n.; theory of Platonic canon, i. 303; includes a preconceived scheme, and an order of interdependence, 318; proofs slender, 317, 325 n.; assumptions as to Phædrus inadmissible, 319, 329 n.; reasons internal, 319, 337, iv. 431; himself shows the unsafe grounds of modern critics, i. 336; Ueberweg attempts to reconcile Hermann with, 313; theory adopted by Trendelenburg, 345 n.; on relation of Euthyphron to Protagoras and Parmenidês, 443 n.; Menon, ii. 247 n.; Parmenidês, iii. 85 n.; Sophistês, 244 n., i. 127; Kratylus, iii. 303 n., 304 n.; 307 n., 310 n., 321, 321 n.; Philêbus, 334 n., 365 n., 369 n., 398 n.; Euthydêmus, i. 127; Menexenus, iii. 408; Kleitophon, 426 n.; Republic, iv. 38 n.; Leges, 430.

Schneider, on Xenophon's Symposion, iv. 313 n.

School, [Greek: scholê/], i. 121 n., 127 n.; Plato's establishment of, a new epoch in philosophy, 266; of Plato fixed at Athens, 254; and transmitted to successors, 265; its importance for his manuscripts, 266, 267; decorations of the Academy and Lykeum, 209; Peripatetic at Lykeum, ib.; of Isokrates, iii. 35; Eretrian, i. 121, 148; Megaric, 121.

Schöne, on the dates of Plato's compositions, i. 326 n.

Schwegler, on Parmenidês, iii. 86 n.; Homo Mensura, 151 n.

Science, derivation of [Greek: e)pistê/mê], iii. 301 n.; scientia, 302 n.; logic of a, Plato's different from Aristotelic and modern view, i. 358 n.; science of good and evil distinct from others, ii. 161, 168; relation to art, iii. 43 n., 46, 263; antithesis of emotion and, 61, 195, 197 n.; dialectic the standard for classifying, as more or less true, 382; dialectic the consummation of, iv. 75; relation to kosmical soul, 227; see Knowledge.

Self-knowledge, temperance is, ii. 155; what is the object known in, 156; in Charmidês declared impossible, elsewhere essential and inestimable, 167.

Selli, asceticism of, i. 163 n.

Seneca, on the Good, iii. 372 n.; filial ingratitude, iv. 400 n.; Diogenes of Sinôpê, i. 156 n.

Sensation, Empedokles' theory, i. 44; Theophrastus, 46 n.; theory of Anaxagoras, opposed to Empedokles', 58; Diogenes of Apollonia, 62; Demokritus, 71, 76, 77, 80; the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, iii. 164; distinct from opinion, 167; verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or possible, 168.

Sense, derivation of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis], iii. 308 n.; doctrine of Empedokles, i. 44; illusions of, belief of Anaxagoras, 59 n.; defects of, belief of Demokritus, 68 n., 71; Zeno's arguments, 93; Plato's conception of, iii. 164 n.; worlds of intellect and, distinct, i. 403; organs of, iv. 236; principal advantages of sight and hearing, 238; hearing, i. 46, 62, 78; ethical and emotional effects conveyed by, iv. 307 n.; smell, i. 46; pleasures of, true, iii. 356; Homo Mensura, 122; relativity of sensible facts, 126, 154, 298; its verifications recognised by Plato as the main guarantee for accuracy, 155 n., 240; fundamental distinction of ens and fientia, iv. 219; relation to kosmical soul, 227; see Particulars, Phenomena, Sensation.

Serranus, on Platonic canon, i. 302.

Sextus Empiricus, doctrine, iii. 292 n.; no definition of a general word, i. 168 n.; on poets, iv. 24 n.

Shaftesbury, Lord, iv. 105 n.

Simonides, interpretation of a song of, ii. 283; definition of justice, iv. 2, 7.

Slavery, iv. 309, 342, 400; Aristotle differs, 344 n.; evidence of slaves. 410 n.

Sleeman, Sir Wm., grounds of belief among Hindoos, iii. 150 n.

Sleep, doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 34; Plato, iv. 237.

Smith, Adam, Moral Sentiments, iii. 333.

Socher, theory of Platonic canon, i. 306; Parmenidês, 338 n., iii. 88 n., 185 n.; Politikus, ib., 196 n., 265 n.; Sophistês, 185 n., 196 n., 243 n., 244; Philêbus, 369 n.; Kritias, iv. 266 n.

Societies, Benefit, iv. 399.

Society, ethics and politics, topic of Sokrates, i. 376; genesis of, common want, ii. 343, iii. 327, iv. 21, 111, 112 n., 133; social art conferred by Zeus, ii. 268; dissent a necessary condition of its progressiveness, 367 n.; frequent destruction of communities, iv. 307; historical retrospect of, 307-314; see State.

Sokrates, life, character, and surroundings, i. 410 n.; character unparalleled in history, vi; personal appearance and peculiar character, iii. 19; patience, 24 n.; courage and equanimity, 21 n.; compared to Antoninus Pius, ii. 382 n.; proof against temptation, iii. 20, 22, 23, iv. 287, 288; sensibility to youthful beauty, ii. 22 n.; as representative of Eros Philosophus, iii. 15, 25; income, i. 192 n.; procedure of, repugnant to Athenian public, 387, 412, 441, iv. 127; aggravated by his extreme publicity of speech, i. 393; feels his own isolation as a dissenter, ii. 365; accused of corrupting the youths, i. 391 n., 183 n.; Plato's reply, magical influence ascribed to his conversation, ii. 23, iii. 19, 21 n., 24 n., 113 n., 388 n., iv. 412 n., i. 110; influence he claims, enlarged by Plato and Xenophon, 418; disobedience of the laws, 434 n.; imprisonment, 425; indictment, against, 412, 418 n., 437, iv. 230, i. 113; grounds for his indictment, iv. 162 n., 211, 381, 385; reply to Melêtus, Plato and Xenophon compared, i. 456, ii. 421 n.; opposition of feeling between, and the Dikasts, i. 375; trial and death might have been avoided without dishonour, 426 n.; equanimity before death, ii. 417, 418; answer to Kriton's appeal to fly, i. 426; last words and death, ii. 377, 418; general features of character in Apology confirmed, i. 419 n.; character and disposition, differently set forth in Kriton, 428, 431-2; of Apology and Phædon contrasted, ii. 421; the real compared with character in Republic, iv. 211; Plato's early relations with, i. 248; of Xenophon and Plato compared, ii. 37, i. 178, 199; Xenophon's relations with, 206-10; uniform description of, in dialogues of viri Sokratici, 115; brought down philosophy from heaven, x; revolutionised method, ib.; progenitor of philosophy of 4th century B.C., 111 n.; theory of natural state of human mind, 373, 414; false persuasion of knowledge, an ethical defect, iii. 177; omnipotence of King Nomos, i. 378-84; differs from others by consciousness of ignorance, 413, 416; Delphian oracle, on his wisdom, 413; combated commonplace, 398 n.; in reference to social, political, ethical, topics, 376; mission, x, 374, 395, ii. 146, 419, iii. 219, 422, iv. 219, 381; declared in Alkibiadês I. and Apology, ii. 24; imposed on him by the gods, i. 415; his dæmon, 437, ii. 104, i. 115; his experience of it, ii. 102; explains his eccentricity, 105; a special revelation, 110, 130-1; variously alluded to, 106-11; determined to persevere in mission, i. 416; not a teacher, 417, ii. 140, 146, 162, 165, 184, 232, 237, 242; only stimulates, i. 449, iii. 415, 421-24, iv. 52 n.; his excuse, ii. 106; knows of no teacher, i. 417, ii. 225; a positive teacher, employing indirect methods, modern assumption, i. 419; incorrect, for his Elenchus does not furnish a solution, 420; his positive solutions illusory, ii. 26; obstetric, i. 367, ii. 251, iii. 112, 176; the Sokratic dialogue, i. x, xi; usefulness of, ii. 186, 207; effect like shock of torpedo, 237; diversified conversations, i. 182; humbles presumptuous youths, ii. 21; manner well illustrated in Lysis, 177; asserts right of satisfaction for his own individual reason, i. 386, 423, 436, ii. 379; on Homo Mensura, i. 432, iii. 162 n.; his Eristic character, ii. 203; the greatest Eristic of his age, i. 124; followed by Plato and Megarics, ib., 126; resemblance to Sophists, ii. 280, iii. 198 n., 216, iv. 165, 412 n.; Menon gives points in common between Sophists and, ii. 257; the "sophistic art" peculiar to him, iii. 218; negative vein, i. viii, x, 370, 372, 373 n., 375, 387; affirmative and negative veins distinct, 420; charge against him of negative method, by his contemporaries, 371, 388; first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness, 389 n.; to social, political, ethical topics, 376, 385; value and importance of Elenchus, 421; see Negative; introduced search for definitions, ii. 48; authority of public judgment nothing--of Expert, everything, i. 426, 435; does not name, but himself acts as, Expert, ib.; early study, ii. 391; stages of intellectual development, ib.; turned on different views as to a true cause, 398; accused of substituting physical for mental causes, 401; does not distinguish different meanings of same term, 279; not always consistent, 29, 303; sophistry in Hippias Minor, 62; avoided physics, i. 376; the Reason of the kosmos, ii. 402 n.; distinguished objective and subjective views of Ethics, i. 451; proper study of mankind, 122; order of ethical problems as conceived by, ii. 299; not observed by Xenophon, i. 230; and Plato dwell too exclusively on intellectual conditions of human conduct, ii. 67; fruits of virtue, i. 415; Utilitarianism, ii. 310 n., i. 185 n.; belief in the deity, 413, 414; disbelieves discord among gods, 440; principle of making oneself like the gods, ib.; on the holy, difference in Plato and Xenophon, 454; on prayer and sacrifice, ii. 17, 418-9, iv. 394; much influenced by prophecies, dreams, &c., ii. 418 n., 420, iii. 351, iv. 395, i. 225 n.; on death, 422, 429 n.; and Plato, difference on subject of beauty, ii. 54; companions of, i. 111; their proceedings after his death, 116; no Sokratic school, 117; Antisthenes constant friend of, 152; manner copied by Antisthenes, 150, 159 n.; precepts fullest carried out by Diogenes and Krates, 160, 174; and Parmenides, blended by Eukleides, 118; discourse with Aristippus, 175; the choice of Heraklês, 177; the Good and Beautiful, 184.

Soldiers, class of, characteristics, iv. 23; division of guardians into rulers and, 29; Plato's training compared with modern, 148; modern development of military profession, 180.

Solon, on despotism, i. 219 n.; unfinished poem of, subject of Kritias, iv. 266.

Sophisms, a collection of, necessary for a logical theory, i. 131; discussion of popular at philosophers' banquets, 134 n.; of Eubulides, 128, 133; Theophrastus on, 134 n.; Diodôrus Kronus, 141, 143; real character of, 135; of Stoics, 128 n., 138; see Fallacy.

Sophist, meaning of [Greek: sophistê/s], i. 256 n., 391 n., ii. 261, iii. 27 n.; compared to an angler, 191; Plato's definition, 191-4, 196 n.; a juggler, 198; imitator of the wise man, 216; Plato's ironical admiration, ii. 208, 283; no real class, 210, 341 n., iii. 249 n., iv. 136 n., i. 178; Theopompus on profession of, 212 n.; usually depicted from opponents' misrepresentations, 308 n., ii. 210; accused of generating scepticism and uncertainty, 64 n.; negative dialectic attributed by historians to, i. 371; did not first apply negative analysis to the common consciousness, 389 n.; negative dialectic not peculiar to, 387; the charge brought by contemporaries against Sokrates, 388; dialectic contrasted with Sokrates', ii. 197; Sokrates the greatest Eristic of his age, i. 124; Sokrates a, ii. 183 n., 185 n., 188, 199, iv. 165, 412 n.; Menon gives point in common between Sokrates and, ii. 257; in Euthydêmus, 196; not represented by Kallikles, 339; lives in region of non-ens, iii. 208; devoted to the production of falsehood, 215; is [Greek: e)nantiopoiologiko\s] and [Greek: ei)/rôn], 216; those the characteristics of Sokrates, ib.; the "sophistic art" peculiar to Sokrates, 218; their alleged claim to universal knowledge--common to all philosophers then, 219; etymologies in Kratylus not caricatures of, 302, 310 n., 314 n., 317 n., 321, 323; no proof of their etymologising, 304; as teachers, ii. 261; motives of pupils, ib. n., 264 n.; as corruptors of public mind, 288 n.; jealousy of parents towards influential teachers, 265 n.; probably often used illustrative mythes, 267 n.; money-making, 210, ib. n., iii. 27 n., i. 212 n.; not distinguishable from dialectician, ii. 210, 211 n.; raised question of criterion of truth, 246; logical distinctions, 236 n.; did not invent fallacies, 217, i. 133 n.; abuse of fallacies, biddings for popularity, ii. 199; did not deny natural justice, 341 n.; not the perverters of philosophy, iv. 55; conform to prevalent orthodoxy, 56; relation to poets, 150; Demochares' law against, i. 111 n.; Aristippus taught as a, 193.

Sophistês, date, i. 305-11, 313, 315, 324-5, iii. 369 n.; authenticity, i. 307, 316 n., iii. 185 n., 243 n.; purpose, 188, 190, 223, 253, 261, 267; relation to Theætêtus, 187; scenery and personages, 185; in a logical classification all particulars of equal value, 195; definition of angler, 189; sophist compared to an angler, 192; defined, 191-5, 196 n.; a juggler, 198, 200; imitator of the wise man, 216; classification of imitators, 215; philosopher lives in region of ens, sophist, of non-ens, 208; bodily and mental evil, 197; the worst, ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, ib.; Elenchus the sovereign purifier, ib.; is false thought or speech possible, 172 n., 199, 249; falsehood possible, and object of sophists' profession, 181 n., 214; imperfect analysis of propositions, 235, 238; view of the negative erroneous, 237, 239; theories of philosophers about ens, 201; non-ens inconceivable, 200; is ens one or many, 201; difficulties about ens and non-ens equally great, ib., 206; the materialists and the idealists, 203; argument against materialists, ib., 223, 226, 228; reply open to materialists, 224, 230; argument against idealists, 204, 225; their doctrine the same as Plato's in Phædon, &c., 244, 246; no allusion intended to Megarics or Pythagoreans, 244, 390 n.; communion implies relativity, 125, 205; to know and to be known is action and passion, 205, 226, 287 n.; motion and rest both agree in ens, which is therefore a tertium quid, 206; argument against "only identical predication legitimate," ib., 212, 221, 251; Antisthenes meant, i. 163, 165; intercommunion of some Forms, iii. 207, 228, 246 n., 251 n.; analogy of letters and syllables, 207; what forms admit of it, determined by philosopher, 208; of non-ens and of proposition, opinion, judgment, 213, 214, 235; [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n], meaning, 181 n.; five forms examined, 208, 231, 233; Plato's view of non-ens unsatisfactory, 236, 239, 242 n., 248 n.; an approximation to Aristotle's view, 247; different from other dialogues, 242; compared with Phædon, 244, 246; Phædrus, 18, 257; Symposion, 19; Theætêtus, 182 n., 187, 242, 256, 332; Kratylus, ib.; Philêbus, 369 n.; Republic, 242, 257.

Sophokles, Antigone, compared with Apology, i. 429 n.; its popularity, ii. 135 n.; as a general, 135.

Sorites, i. 128, 133, 135 n.

Soul, derivation of [Greek: psuchê/], iii. 301 n.; meaning, iv. 387 n.; prior to and more powerful than body, 386, 419-20; the good and the bad souls at work in the universe, 386; one continuous cosmical, ii. 248 n.; of the kosmos, iii.** 265 n., iv. 220, 421; affinity to human, iii. 366 n.; of kosmos, position and elements of, iv. 225; of plants, 248; doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 34; Empedokles, 44; Anaxagoras, 54; Demokritus, 75; Plato's conception of existence, iii. 205, 226, 229, 231; not tripartite, antithesis to body, ii. 384; Hegel on Plato's view, 414 n.; a mixture, refuted, 390; life a struggle between body and, 386, 388, iv. 234, 235 n.; partial emancipation of, by philosophy, ii. 386; purification of, 388; [Greek: knê=sis] compared to children's teething, iii. 399 n.; pre-existence admitted, ii. 390; mythe, iii. 12, 15 n.; Leibnitz on, ii. 248 n.; pre-existence of, necessary hypothesis for didactic idéal, iii. 52; metempsychosis of ordinary men only, ii. 387, iv. 234; mythe of departed, in Republic, 94; state after emancipation from body, ii. 416; yet may suffer punishment, inconsistency, ib.; three constituent elements of, iii. 232 n.; Galen, iv. 258; are the three parts immortal, ii. 385, iv. 243; no place for tender and æsthetic emotions in tripartite division of, 149 n.; each part at once material and mental, 257; supremacy of rational, to be cultivated, 251; Demiurgus conjoins three souls and one body, 233, 243; Demiurgus prepares for man's construction, places a soul in each star, 233; generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos with rational soul rotating within, ib.; mount cranium on a tall body, 236; seat of, 235-7, 243-7, 259 n.; Littré, 257 n.; abdominal, function of liver, 245, 259; seat of prophetic agency, 246; thoracic, function of heart and lungs, 245, 259 n.; of spleen, 246; vision, sleep, dreams, 236; Aristotle on relation of body to, iii. 389 n.; Monboddo, iv. 387 n.; see Body, Immortality, Mind, Reason.

Sound, Zeno's arguments, i. 96; pleasures of, true, iii. 356.

Space, and time comprised in Parmenides' ens, i. 19; Zeno's reductiones ad absurdum, 94; contents of the idea of, 20 n.

Sparta, unlettered community, iv. 278; law forbids introduction of foreign instruction, ii. 35; Hippias lectures at, 39; mixed government, iv. 310; kings eulogised, ii. 8; customs of, iii. 24 n.; peculiar to itself and Krete, iv. 280 n.; blended with Persian in Cyropædia, i. 222; influence on philosopher's theories, iv. 181; Xenophon's idéal of character, 147, 148, 182; Plato's in Leges, 276, 280 n., 403; basis of institutions too narrow, 282; endurance of pain in discipline of, 285; public training and mess, 279, 280 n., 285 n.; no training for women, censured, 188; infanticide, 203; number of citizens, 327 n.; drunkenness forbidden at, 286; kryptia, Plato's agronomi compared, 336.

Specific and generic terms, distinction unfamiliar in Plato's time, ii. 13.

Speech, conducted according to fixed laws, iii. 286; the thing spoken of suffers, 287 n.; Psammetichus' experiment, 289 n.; and music illustrate coalescence of finite and infinite, 340-3.

Spencer, Herbert, abstract names, iii. 78 n.

Spengel, on Thrasymachus, iv. 7 n.; Kratylus, iii. 309 n.

Speusippus, borrowed from Pythagoreans, iii. 390 n.; on pleasure, 386 n., 389 n.; on the Demiurgus, iv. 255.

Sphere, the earth a, early views, i. 25 n.; Pythagorean music of the spheres, 14; Sphærus of Empedokles, 39.

Stallbaum, on Platonic canon, i. 307, 443 n.; Erastæ, ii. 121; Theagês, 100 n.; Euthydêmus, 202; Protagoras, 314, iv. 284 n.; Theætêtus, iii. 158 n.; Sophistês and Politikus, 196 n., 257 n.; Kratylus, 303 n., 305 n., 310 n., 321, 323 n.; Philêbus, 342 n., 343 n., 347 n., 356 n., 389 n., 398 n.; Menexenus, 408, 409; Republic iv. 106 n.; Timæus, 219 n.; Leges, 188 n., 272 n., 410 n., 431; theory of Ideas, iii. 69 n.; Sophists, ii. 209 n.; Megarics, i. 132 n.

Stars, iv. 229.

State, Lewis on idéals, iv. 139 n.; realisation of idéals, 190 n.; three ends of political constructor, 328 n.; influence of Spartan institutions, on theories, 181; no evidence of Plato's study of practical working of different institutions, 397; Aristeides on, i. 243 n.; citizens willing to be ruled, idéal of Plato and Xenophon, iv. 283 n.; Platonic type of character is Athenian, Xenophontic is Spartan, 147, 148, 182; its religious and ethical character primary, constitution and laws secondary, 284; religion in connection with, 24, 160; and education combined, 185; Plato's ideal, compared with Athens, 430; the Spartan adopted in Leges, 276, 280 n., 403; Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or Aristotle, 183; more anxious for good treatment of Demos, ib.; in Aristotle the Demos adjuncts, not members, of state, 184; model city practicable if philosophy and political power united, 47; perpetual succession maintained of philosopher-rulers, 60; those who have contemplated Ideas are reluctant to undertake active duties. 70; as at present constituted, the just man stands aloof from, 90; ideal, how to be realised, 78, 190 n.; admitted only partially realisable, 327; only an outline, 139; a military bureaucracy, 183; second, a compromise of oligarchical and democratical sentiment, 333, 337; Aristotle objects to Plato's ideal, it is two states, 185; objection valid against his own ideal, 186 n.; Plato fails from no training for Demos, 186; Plato's state impossible, in what sense true, 189; from adverse established sentiments, 191; genesis, common want, ii. 343, iii. 327, iv. 20, 111, 112 n., 133; historical retrospect of society, 307-314; analogy of individual and, 11, 21, 37, 79-84, 96; Hobbes on, ib.; parallelism exaggerated, 114, 121, 123; its [Greek: u(po/thesis], 328 n.; basis of Spartan institutions too narrow, 282; site, 320, 329, 336; circular form, unwalled, 344; influence of climate, 330 n.; wisdom and courage in the guardians, 34; justice and temperance in all classes, 35; class of guardians, characteristics, 23; divided into rulers and soldiers, 29; same duties and training for women as men, 41, 46, 77, 171-4; on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187; maintained in Leges, and harmonises with ancient legends, 195; contrast with Aristotle, 194; [Greek: sussi/tia], 32, 345, 359; communism of guardians, ib., 140, 169; necessary to city's safety, 32, 34, 44, 140, 170-179; peculiarity of Plato's communism, 179; Plato's view of wealth, 199 n.; no family ties, 41, 174, 178; temporary marriages for guardians, 175-8; Plato's and modern sentiments, 192, 194; influence of Aphroditê very small in Platonic, 197, 359; citizens should be tested against pleasure, 285; self-control tested by wine, 289; healthy, has few wants, enlargement of city's wants, 22; from multiplied wants, war, ib.; perfection of, each part performing its own function, 97; one man can do only one thing well, 23, 33, 183, 361; unity of end to be kept in view, 417; end, happiness of entire state, 98, 139 n.; and virtue of the citizens, 417; three classes in, analogous to reason, energy, appetite, in individual, 39; fiction as to origin of classes, 30; four stages of degeneracy, 79-84; proportions of happiness and misery in them, 83; in healthy condition, possesses wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, 34; laws about marriage, 328, 331, 341, 344; Aristotle, 198-201; Malthus' law recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202; number of citizens, 178, 326, 328; limited, Plato and Aristotle, 198-201; Aristotle, 326 n.; approximation in Mill, 199 n.; rearing of children, 43, 44; infanticide, ib., 177; Aristotle, 202; contrast of modern sentiment, 203; citizens of Plato's ideal, identified with ancient Athenians, 266; division of citizens and land, twelve tribes, 329; perpetuity of lots of land, 320, 360; Aristotle, 326 n.; succession, 328; orphans, guardians, 404, 406; limited inequality tolerated as to movable property, 330; no private possession of gold or silver, no loans or interest, 331; distribution of annual produce, 361; state importation of necessary articles, ib.; regulations for retailers, 21, 361, 401; admission of Metics, 362, i. 238; of strangers, and foreign travel of citizens, iv.** 414; slavery, 342; Aristotle differs, 344 n.; direct taxation, according to wealth, 331; four classes, property classification for magistracies and votes, ib.; thirty-seven nomophylakes, 332; military commanders and council, ib.; monthly military muster of whole population, 358; electoral scheme, 333; the council, and other magistrates, 335; Nocturnal Council to comprehend and carry out the end, 418, 425, 429; and enforce orthodox creed, 419; most important magistrate, minister of education, 338; defence of territory, rural police, 335; Spartan kryptia compared, 336; Xenophon's ideal of an active citizen, i. 214; he admires active commerce and variety of pursuits, 236; encouragement of metics, 238; training of citizens, 226; formation of treasury funds, 238; distribution among citizens, three oboli each, daily, 239; its purpose and principle, 240, 241 n.; see Government, Political Art, &c.

Statesmen, ignorant of the true, the ideal, ii. 89; incompetent to teach. 100, 357, 360, 369; the philosopher the fully qualified practitioner, 114, 116, 118; disparagement of half-philosophers, half-politicians, 224; dislike of Sokrates and Sophists, 256; their right opinion, from inspiration, 242; defects of best Athenian, 360; considered by Sokrates as spiritual teachers and trainers, 362; Plato's idéal, 363; relation of philosopher to practical, iii. 179, 183, 273; definition of, 263.

Steersman, simile of, iv. 53.

Steinhart, on Platonic canon, rejects several, i. 309; [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês], iii. 103 n.; Parmenidês, 109 n., 245 n.; Theætêtus, 167 n.; Sophistês, 245 n.; Kratylus, 307 n.; Menexenus, 412 n.

Steinthal, no objective absolute, iii. 296 n.

Stewart, Dugald, on the beautiful, ii. 50 n.; relativity of knowledge, iii. 156 n.; Berkeley, iv. 243 n.

Stilpon, nominalism of, i. 167; only identical predication possible, 166, 168; of Megara, 148.

Stoics, influenced by Herakleitus, i. 27, 34 n.; developed Antisthenes' doctrines, 198; practical life preferable, 181 n.; [Greek: pa/nta au(tou= e(/neka pra/ttein], iv. 106 n.; all-sufficiency of virtue, germ of doctrine in Republic, 102; fate, i. 143 n.; view of Dialectic, 371 n.; style of their works, 406; doctrine of one cosmical soul, ii. 248 n.; notion of time, iii. 101 n.; natural rectitude of signification of names, 286 n.; etymologies, 308 n.; sophisms of, i. 128 n., 138; minute reasons of, 130 n.; Cicero on, 157.

Strabo, value of poets, iv. 152 n.

Straton, theory of sensation, i. 63 n., iii. 166 n.; Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, ii. 250 n.

Strümpell, on Parmenidês, iii. 71 n., 75 n.

Subject, independent object and, do not explain facts of consciousness, iii. 131; perpetually implicated with object, 118, 122 n., 123, 128; in regard to intelligible world, proved from Plato, 121, 125; shown more easily than in reference to sense, 122; Hobbes on, 117 n.; relations are nothing in the object without a comparing subject, 127; see Relativity.

Subjective, of Xenophanes, i. 18; and objective views of ethics, Sokrates distinguished, 451; unanimity coincident with objective dissent, ib.; Plato's reference to objective and, iii. 134.

Subjectivism, an objection to Homo Mensura, iii. 151.

Suckow, on Menexenus, iii. 412 n.; Sophistês and Politikus, 185 n.; Leges, iv. 431, 432.

Suicide, Hegesias, the death-persuader, i. 202; Cynics, and Indian Gymnosophists, 161 n.

Susemihl, on Platonic canon, coincides with Hermann, i. 310; Timæus, iv. 218 n.

Sydenham, on Aristippus and Eudoxus, i. 202 n.; seat of happiness, iii. 372 n.; Philêbus, 376 n.

Syllogistic and Inductive Dialectic, ii. 27.

Symposion, of Xenophon, i. 152; date, iii. 26 n.; compared with Plato's, 22; of Epikurus, ib. n.

Symposion, the, date, i. 307, 309, 311, 312, 324, iii. 26 n.; purpose, ii. 382 n., iii. 8; antithesis and complement of Phædon, 22; contains much transcendental assertion, 56; censured for erotic character, 3 n.; Idea of Beauty exclusively presented in, 18; Eros, views of interlocutors, 9; a Dæmon intermediate between gods and men, ib.; but in Phædrus a powerful god, ib. n., 11 n.; amends empire of Necessity, iv. 222 n.; discourse of Sokrates, iii. 11; analogy of Eros to philosophy, 10, 11; the stimulus to mental procreation, 4, 6; knowledge, by evolution of indwelling conceptions, 17; exaltation of Eros in a few, love of beauty in genere, 7; common desire for immortality, 6; attained through mental procreation, beauty the stimulus, ib.; only metaphorical immortality recognised in, 17; Sokrates' personal appearance and peculiar character, 19; proof against temptation, 20, iv. 287; concluding scene, iii. 19; compared with Xenophon, 22; Phædon, ii. 382, iii. 17-8, 22; Phædrus, 11 n., 11, 15, 16-8; Philêbus, 370 n., 399; reading in p. 201D, [Greek: mantikê=s], 8 n.

Syracuse, the Athenian expedition against, iii. 406.

Syssitia, iv. 280 n., 285 n., 335, 345.

Tacitus, iv. 408 n., i. 245 n.

Taste, Empedokles, i. 46; Demokritus, 78.

Taxation, direct, according to wealth, iv. 331.

Teaching, denied in Menon, ii. 254 n.; [Greek: didachê\] and [Greek: peithô/], distinct, ib., iii. 172 n.; knowledge to be elicited out of untutored mind, how far correct, ii. 249; dialectician alone can teach, iii. 37; idéal unrealisable, 51; books (q. v.) and lectures of little use, 34; proper use of dialectic and rhetoric, 40; of rhetoricians, practical value of, 45; Sokrates' and Aristotle's views, 53 n.; exercises for students, 79, 80 n., 90 n.; parents' jealousy towards influential teachers, ii. 265 n.

Teleology, physiology of Timæus subordinated to ethical, iv. 257; see Ends.

Temperance, [Greek: sôphrosu/nê], ii. 153 n.; as treated by Plato and Aristotle, 170; is self-knowledge, 155; and with justice the condition of happiness and freedom, 12; the condition of virtue and happiness, 358; and intelligence identical, having same contrary, 279; a kind of sedateness, objections, 154; a variety of feeling of shame, refuted, ib.; doing one's own business, refuted, 155; as cognition of cognition and of non-cognition, of no avail for our end, happiness, 159, 160; not the science of good and evil, and of little service, 161; undiscovered, but a good, 162; Charmidês, difficulties unnoticed in Politikus, iii. 282; in state, iv. 34-5; distinction effaced between justice and, 135; relation to rest of virtue, 425.

Tennemann, i. 302.

Thales, philosophy, i. 4; doctrine of eclipses, 6 n.; foretold eclipse, 4 n.; misrepresented by Cicero, ib.

Theætêtus, date, i. 307-10, 313, 315, 324, 325 n., ii. 228 n., iii. 111 n.; purpose, 167 n., 176; value, 177; great advance in analytical psychology, 164; negative result, 176; difficulties not solved in any other dialogue, 180; sophisms in, 158 n.; like Megarics, i. 134 n.; method contrasted with Philêbus, iii. 335 n.; scenery and personages, 110; Sokrates' mental obstetric, 112; what is knowledge, 111; sensible perception, ib., 113, 154, 256; doctrine erroneously identified with Homo Mensura, 113, 118, 120 n., 122, 162 n.; Herakleitean flux, 114, 115, 126, 128; Empedokles' doctrine, 114, 115; Plato's exposition confused, 114; relativity of sensible facts, 126, 154; divergences of men, from mental and associative difference, 155; statesman and philosopher contrasted, 183; the genuine ruler a shepherd, iv. 10; relativity twofold, to comparing subject, and to another object, besides the one directly described, iii. 127; relations are nothing in the object without a comparing subject, ib.; no absolute ens, 129; arguments from dreams, &c., answered, 130; Plato's reference to subjective and objective, 134; Homo Mensura, true meaning, 137, 164 n.; its counter-proposition, 148; Plato's arguments against Homo Mensura, 135; he ignores the proper qualification, 137; the doctrine equalises all animals, 135, 292; not true in the sense meant, 141; the wise man alone a measure, 136; reply, 143; special knowledge required, where future consequences involved, 136; but Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible, 145; it annuls dialectic--not true, 146; sensible perception does not include memory, 157; argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time, ib.; the mind sees not with but through the eyes, 159; the mind makes several judgments by itself, 160; knowledge lies in the mind's comparisons respecting sensible perceptions, 161; difference from modern views, 162; cognition is true opinion--objections, 168, 184 n.; are false opinions possible, 169, 181 n.; waxen memorial tablet in the mind, 169; distinction of possessing, and having actually in hand, knowledge, 170; simile of pigeon-cage, 171; false opinion impossible or a man may know what he does not know, 170; the confusions of cognitions and non-cognitions, refuted, 171; for rhetors communicate true opinion, not knowledge, 172; knowledge is true opinion plus rational explanation, 173; analogy of elements and compounds, ib.; rejected, 175; compared with Phædrus, 18; Symposion, ib.; Sophistês, 181 n., 187, 227, 242, 258, 332; Politikus, 185 n., 187, 256; Kratylus, 332; Philêbus, 335 n.

Theagês, authenticity, i. 306, 309, 319, ii. 98, 100 n., 107; prolixity, 100 n.; analogy with Lachês, 104; its peculiarity, the dæmon, ib.; explains eccentricity of Sokrates, 105; Theagês desires a teacher of wisdom, 99; incompetence of best statesmen for teaching, 100; Sokrates asked to teach--declares inability, 101; excuse, 105; sometimes useful--his experience of his dæmon, 102; Theagês anxious to be Sokrates' companion, 103.

Thebans, iii. 24 n.

Themistius, i. 388 n.

Theodorus, i. 202.

Theology, not a progressive science, ii. 428; primitive, contrasted by Aristotle with "human wisdom," i. 3 n.; see God, Religion.

Theophrastus, friend of Ptolemy Soter, i. 279; banished from Athens, ib. n.; change in Peripatetic school after death of, 272; physiology, 46 n.; combated Demokritus' theory of vision, 78 n.; criticises Demokritean division of qualities, 80 n.; astronomy, 257 n.; Plato's doctrine of earth's position, iv. 424 n.; sophism, Mentiens, i. 134 n.; fate, 143 n._

Theopompus, view of dialectic, i. 450; qualities non-existent without the mind, iii. 74 n.; on profession of Sophist, i. 212 n.; authorship of Plato's dialogues, 112 n., 115.

Theory, difference between precepts and, iv. 131.

Thomson, on Parmenidês, iii. 84 n.

Thonissen, iv. 380 n.

Thracians, iv. 38.

Thrasyllus, on Platonic canon, i. 265; follows Aristophanes' classification, 295, 299; not an internal sentiment, 298; trustworthiness, 299; acknowledged till 16th century, 301; more trustworthy than moderns, 335; classifies in Tetralogies works of Plato and Demokritus, 273 n.; not the order established by Plato, 335 n.; classification of Demokritus, 295 n.; Plato's works--dramatic, philosophical, 289; his principle, 294 n.; incongruity, 294; of Search, of Exposition defective but useful, 361; erroneously applied, 364; coincides with Aristotle's two methods, Dialectic, Demonstrative, 362; sub-classes recognised, 366; the scheme, when principles correctly applied, 365; did not doubt Hipparchus, 297 n.; nor Erastæ, ii. 121; Kleitophon in Republic tetralogy, iii. 419.

Thrasymachus, iii. 419, iv. 7.

Thucydides, pupil of Sokrates, ii. 102; probably never read by Plato, iii. 411 n.; the gods' jealousy, iv. 165 n.; speeches of Perikles, ii. 373 n., 373, iv. 148 n.; Melian dialogue, ii. 341 n., i. 180 n.

Thurot, on Sophists, i. 389 n.

Tiedemann, i. 132 n.

Timæus, date, i. 307, 309, 311-3, 315, 325, iii. 368 n.; sequel to Republic, iv. 215; is earliest physical theory extant in its author's words, 216; how much mythical, 255 n.; relation to old Greek cosmogonies, i. 87, iv. 255 n.; coincidence with Orpheus, ib.; adopted by Alexandrine Jews as a parallel to Mosaic Genesis, 256; physiology subordinated to ethical teleology, 257; Plato's theory, acknowledged to be merely an [Greek: ei)kô\s lo/gos], 217; contrast with Sokrates, Isokrates, Xenophon, ib.; subject and persons, 215; position and character of Pythagorean Timæus, 216; fundamental distinction of ens and fientia, 219; no knowledge of kosmos obtainable, 220; Demiurgus, Ideas, and Chaos postulated, ib., iii. 121; Demiurgus, how conceived by other philosophers of same century, iv. 254; kosmos a living being and a god, 220, 223; Time began with, 227; Demiurgus produces kosmos by persuading Necessity, 220, 238; process of demiurgic construction, iii. 409 n., iv. 223; copy of the [Greek: Au)to/zôon], 223, 227, 235 n., 263; body, form, and rotation of kosmos, 225, 229, 237, 252; change of view in Epinomis, 424 n.; position and elements of soul of kosmos, 225; affinity to human, iii. 366 n.; four elements not primitive, iv. 238; varieties of each element, 242; forms of the elements, 239; Ideas and Materia Prima, iii. 397 n., iv. 239; primordial chaos, 240; geometrical theory of the elements, ib.; borrowed from Pythagoreans, i. 349 n.; Aristotle on, iv. 241 n.; primary and visible gods, 229; secondary and generated gods, 230; Plato's acquiescence in tradition, 230-3, 241 n.; address of Demiurgus to generated gods, 233; preparations for man's construction, a soul placed in each star, 235; construction of man, 243; Demiurgus conjoins three souls and one body, 233; generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos, with rational soul rotating within, 235; mount cranium on a tall body, 236; man the cause of evil, 234; inconsistency, ib. n.; organs of sense, 236; soul tripartite, compared with Phædon, ii. 384; the gentle, tender, and æsthetical emotions omitted, iv. 149 n.; each part at once material and mental, 257; seat of, 259 n.; thoracic, function of heart and lungs, 245, 259 n.; abdominal, function of liver, 245, 259; seat of prophetic agency, 246; function of spleen, ib.; object of length of intestinal canal, 247; bone, flesh, marrow, nails, mouth, teeth, 247; vision, sleep, dreams, 237; advantages of sight and hearing, ib.; mortal soul of plants, 248; plants for man's nutrition, ib.; general survey of diseases, 249; Plato compared with Aristotle and Hippokrates, 260; mental diseases arise from body, 250; no man voluntarily wicked, 249; preservative and healing agencies, 260; treatment of mind by itself, 251; rotations of kosmos to be studied, 252; contrast of Plato's admiration, with degenerate realities, 262, 264; genesis of women and inferior animals from degenerate man, 252; degeneracy originally intended, 263; poetical close, 264; compared with Protagoras, ii. 268 n.; Phædon, 383, 407 n., 411, 412, 422, iv. 239 n.; Phædrus, ib.; Theætêtus, iii. 163; Philêbus, 397 n.; Republic, iv. 38 n., 253 n.; Leges, 276, 389 n.; Epinomis, 424 n.

Time, contents of the idea of, i. 20 n.; and space comprised in Parmenides' ens, 19; Herakleitus' doctrine, iv. 228 n.; Plato's imagination of momentary stoppages in, iii. 100, 102; Aristotle, 103; began with the kosmos, iv. 227; difficulties of Diodôrus Kronus, i. 145; Stoical belief, iii. 101 n.; Harris, i. 146 n.; calendar of ancients, iv. 325 n.

Timocracy, iv. 79.

Tracy, Destutt, Homo Mensura, iii. 292 n.; individualism, 139 n.; origin of language, 328 n.

Trade, see Commerce.

Tragedy, mixed pleasure and pain excited by, iii. 355 n.; Plato's aversion to Athenian, iv. 316, 350; peculiar to himself, 317; Aristotle differs, ib. n.

Trendelenburg, on Platonic canon, i. 345 n.; Philêbus, iii. 398 n.; relativity of knowledge, 124 n.

Trent, Council of, i. 390 n.

Truth, and Good and Real, coalesce in Plato's mind, ii. 88, iii. 391; obtainable by reason only, Demokritus' doctrine, i. 72; the search after, the business of life to Sokrates and Plato, 396; per se interesting, 403; modern search goes on silently, 369; philosophy is reasoned, vii-ix; its criterion, ii. 247; resides in universals, 411, 412, iv. 3 n.; necessary, iii. 253 n.; all persuasion founded on a knowledge of, 28; generating cause of error, 33; dialectic the standard for classifying sciences as more or less true, 383; classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions, 394; its valuable principles, 395; is falsehood possible? 199; is theoretically possible, and its production may be object of such a profession as Sophists, 214; lie for useful end, justifiable, ii. 347 n., iv. 3 n.; Aristotle on, iii. 386 n.; see Mythe.

Turgot, on etymology, iii. 303 n.; Existence, 135 n.; hopelessness of defining common and vague terms, ii. 186 n.

Tyndall, Prof., i. 373 n.

Type gives natural groups, definition classes, ii. 48, 193 n.

Ueberweg, on Platonic canon, attempts reconcilement of Schleiermacher and Hermann, i. 313; the Dialogues, 401 n.; Theætêtus, iii. 167 n.; Sophistês, 186 n., 253, 369 n.; Politikus, 186 n.; Philêbus, 368 n.; Timæus, ib., iv. 255 n.; Menexenus, iii. 412 n.; Ideas, iv. 239 n.

Universals, debates about meaning, iii. 76-7; different views of Aristotle and Plato, 76; definition of, the object of the Sokratic dialectic, i. 452; Sokrates sought the common characteristic, Plato found it in his Idea, 454; process of forming, ii. 27; truth resides in, 411-2, iv. 3 n.; amidst particulars, iii. 257; different dialogues compared, ib.; how is generic unity distributed among species and individuals, 339; natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340; illustration from speech and music, 342; explanation insufficient, 343; see Ideas, One.

Upton, sophism [Greek: Kurieu/ôn], i. 141 n.

Useful, the Good, ii. 30; the Just or Good--general but not constant explanation in Plato, 38; the lawful is the, 36; not identical with the beautiful, 44, 50 n.

Utilitarianism, its standard, ii. 310 n.; doctrine of Sokrates, 349, 354 n.; theory in Protagoras, 308; Republic, iv. 3 n., 12, 14, 104.

Vacherot, i. 376 n.

Vacuum, theory of Demokritus, i. 67; Pythagorean different from Plato's doctrine, iv. 225 n.

Varro, etymologies, iii. 311 n.

Vaughan, Dr., iv. 380 n.

Veron, M., Relativity, iii. 144 n.

Virgil, general doctrine of metempsychosis in, ii. 425 n.

Virtue, identified with knowledge by Sokrates, ii. 67 n., 239, 240, 321; of what, unsolved, 244; Sokrates and Plato dwell too exclusively on intellectual conditions, 67-8, 83; its one sufficient condition, perfect state of the intelligence, 149; is it teachable, 232, 239, 240, 266, 275, iii. 330 n.; Xenophon on, i. 230; plurality of virtues, ii. 233; the highest, teachable, but all existing virtue is from inspiration, 242; problem unsolved, ib.; taught by citizens, 269, 272; quantity acquired depends on individual aptitude, ib.; analogy of learning the vernacular, 273; is it in divisible, or of parts, homogeneous or heterogeneous, 277; no man does evil voluntarily, 292, iv. 249, 365-7; a right comparison of pleasure and pain, ii. 293, 305; temperance the condition of, 358; natural dissidence of the gentle and the energetic, iii. 272; excess of the energetic entail death or banishment, of the gentle, slavery, 273; Sokrates' power in awakening ardour for, 415; but he does not explain what it is, ib.; unsatisfactory answers of Sokrates and his friends, 416; quadruple distribution in city, iv. 34; Platonic conception is self-regarding, 104; motives to it arise from internal happiness of the just, 105; view substantially maintained since, ib.; four cardinal virtues assumed as constituting all virtue where each resides, 134; as an exhaustive classification, 135, 417; difference in other dialogues, 137; the four, source of all other goods, 428; the only common property of, 425; and of vice, 426; of the citizens, the end of the state, 417; Xenophon on motive to practice of, 101 n., 135 n.; Sokrates on its fruits, i. 415; all-sufficiency of, germ in Republic of Stoical doctrine, iv. 102; see Courage, Holiness, Justice, Temperance, Wisdom.

Vision, doctrine of Empedokles, i. 45; caused by images from objects, Demokritus, 78; Plato's conception of the act of, iii. 129 n., 159; Plato's theory, iv. 236; Aristotle on, 237 n.; ancient theories of, ib.; principal advantages of, 237.

Voltaire, iv. 233, i. 168 n.

War, from city's increased wants, iv. 22; class of soldiers, characteristics, 23; both sexes to go together to battle, 46; against Greek enemies to be carried on mildly, 47; Spartan institutions adapted to, 282; military commanders and council, 332; military training of youths, 349; Sokrates on qualities for, i. 133 n.

Water, the Chaos of Hesiod, i. 4 n.; principle of Thales, 4; originally covered the earth, according to Xenophanes, &c., 18; Empedokles, 38; discovery of the composition of, ii. 163 n.

Watt, discovery of composition of water, ii. 163 n.

Wealth, Plato's view of, iv. 199 n.

Wedgwood, H., iii. 326 n.

Weisse, on Timæus, iv. 256 n.

Westermann, on Menexenus, iii. 408 n.

Whately, Abp., on Fallacies, ii. 217.

Whewell, Dr., ii. 48, 193 n.

Wholes, abstract and concrete, ii. 52, 53; generic and analogical, 48, 193 n., iii. 365.

Wilson, Dr. Geo., ii. 163 n.

Winckelmann, i. 132 n.

Wisdom, no positive knowledge of, i. 414, 416; in state, iv. 34-5; what it is, 421, 423; see Knowledge.

Wise, term applied when men know when and how far to use their accomplishments, ii. 15.

Wise man, the Ideal, see Expert.

Women, position of Greek, iii. 1; genesis from degenerate man, iv. 252; inferiority to men, 234, 252; best, equal by nature to second-best men, 42, 171-4; not superior in weaving and cookery, 172 n.; temporary marriages, 43, 175-8; object, 198; Plato's and modern sentiments, 192, 194 n.; influence of Aphroditê very small in Platonic state, 197; both sexes to go together to battle, 46; same duties and training for women as men, 41, 46; same duties and training as men, 77; on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187; maintained in Leges, and harmonises with ancient legends, 196; contrast with Aristotle, 195.

Wordsworth, ii. 250 n.

Writing, see Books.

Wyttenbach, on meaning of Atheist, iv. 382 n.; Plato's immortality of the soul, ii. 423 n.

Xanthippê, iii. 23 n.

Xanthus, i. 19 n.

Xenokrates, iv. 255.

Xenophanes, life, i. 16; doctrines, ib.; unsatisfactory, 18; held Non-Ens inadmissible, ib.; the relative and absolute, 19; infers original aqueous state of earth from prints of shells and fishes, ib.; censured by Herakleitus, 26; scepticism, 18; popular mythology censured, 16; religious element in, ib., 18; the Universe God, 119 n.

Xenophon, date of, i. 207; Sokratic element an accessory in, 206; essentially a man of action, ib.; personal history, 207-12, 215, 220; alleged enmity between Plato and, iii. 22 n., iv. 146 n., 312 n.; antipathy to Aristippus, i. 182 n.; enlarges the influence claimed by Sokrates, 418; Sokrates of Plato and, 178, 199; Sokrates on the Holy, different from Platonic Sokrates, 454; and Plato compared, on Sokrates' reply to Melêtus, 456, ii. 420 n.; Sokrates' character one-sided, iii. 423; discussion of law, ii. 86; the ideal the only real, 88 n.; Sokrates on friendship, 186; natural causes of friendship, 341 n.; view of Eros, iii. 25; [Greek: paiderasti/a], 20 n.; Sokrates' identification of Good with pleasure, ii. 305; Sokrates' doctrine of good, iii. 365; motive to practice of virtue, iv. 99, 101 n., 135 n.; immortality of soul, ii. 420 n.; on filial ingratitude, iv. 399 n.; Sokrates on qualities for war, i. 133 n.; Sokrates' view of rhetoric, ii. 371 n.; relation of mind to kosmos, iii. 368; the gods' jealousy, iv. 165 n.; change in old age, Plato compared, i. 244; contrasted with Plato in Timæus, iv. 219; works, i. 213; analogy with Alkibiadês I. and II., ii. 21; Sokrates' order of problems not observed, i. 230; Symposion of, 152; date, iii. 26 n.; compared with Plato's, 22; Memorabilia compared with Alkibiadês II., ii. 29; debate of Sokrates and Hippias, 34, 37, 49, 66; OEkonomikus, ideal of an active citizen, i. 214; Hieron, contents, 216-20; Sokrates not introduced in Hieron and Cyropædia, 216; Hieron compared with Gorgias, 221; why Syracusan despot taken for subject, 220-2; interior life of despot, 218, 220; Sokratic ideal of government differently worked out by Plato, and, iii. 273; idéal, citizens willing to be ruled, iv. 283 n., i. 215, 218, 225; love of subjects obtainable by good government, 220; Cyropædia, a romance, blending Persian and Spartan customs, 222; compared with Leges, iv. 319; contents, i. 223-35; his experience of younger Cyrus, 222; education of Cyrus the Great, 223; scientific ruler best, 224; Cyropædia does not solve the problem, 225; Cyrus, of heroic genius, ib.; biography, 232; generous and amiable qualities, 234; scheme of government, a wisely arranged Oriental despotism, ib.; position of the Demos, iv. 183; ideal state wants unity, 186 n.; training of citizens, i. 226; Plato's training of guardians compared, iv. 141-7; idéal of character is Spartan, Plato's is Athenian, 147, 151, 182, 276, 280 n., 403; Persian training, 278 n.; details of education, i. 227; its good effects, 228; tuition in justice, 229; definition of justice unsatisfactory, 231; Sokrates on justice, iv. 3 n.; music omitted in education, 305, i. 229; theoretical and practical geometry, iii. 395; relation of sexes, iv. 194 n.; division of labour, 139 n.; inexperienced in finance and commerce, i. 236; admires active commerce and variety of pursuits, ib.; formation of treasury funds, 238; encouragement of Metics, ib.; distribution among citizens, three oboli each, daily, 239; its purpose and principle, 240, 241 n.; visionary anticipations, 241; financial scheme, Boeckh on, 242 n.; exhortation to peace, 243.

Xerxes, iv. 7.

Yxem, on Kleitophon, iii. 419 n.; Hipparchus, ii. 97; Erastæ, 121.

Zaleukus, laws of, iv. 323 n.

Zeller, on Plato, iii. 245 n.; Parmenidês, 84 n.; Leges, i. 338 n., iv. 274 n., 325 n., 389 n., 431-3; Ideas, i. 120 n.; Eukleides, 127 n.; Megarics, 131 n.; Sophists, 389 n.

Zeno of Elea, i. 93; contrasted with earlier philosophers, 105; modern critics on, 101; defended Parmenidean doctrine, 93, 98, iii. 8; the relative alone knowable, i. 98; two worlds, impugned by Sokrates, iii. 59; arguments in regard to space, i. 95; motion, 97; not denied as a phenomenal and relative fact, 102; Sorites, 135 n.; reductiones ad absurdum, 94, 121 n.; not contradictions of data generalised from experience, 100; no systematic theory of scepticism, iii. 93; dialectic, 107; purpose and result, i. 98; carried out by Sokrates, 371; compared with Platonic Parmenidês, 100.

Zeno the Stoic, i. 160; attracted to Athens by perusal of Apology, 418; eclectic, 174; communism of wives, 189 n.

Zenodotus, Alexandrine librarian, i. 274 n.

Zeus conferred social art on men, ii. 268.

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ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS.

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The text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive.

For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used: ) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript. ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta; ê for eta and ô for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.

Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **:

Location Text of scan of 3rd edition Correction ToC p. 272 The heading -- CHAPTER XXXIX. LEGES AND EPINOMIS -- is missing ToC p. 418 Noctural Nocturnal Ch. 35 before extreme extremes fn. 304 Ch. 37 before fn. 18 convinced that "if they convinced that if they Ch. 37 fn. 26 Cyrop. viii. i. 40 Cyrop. viii. 1, 40 Ch. 37 fn. 51 gout goût Ch. 37 fn. 80 proh sancta pro sancta Ch. 37 fn. 136 nsmothe/tês nomothe/tês Ch. 37 fn. 157 )xxxiv. 8, 19) (xxxiv. 8, 19) Ch. 37 fn. 165 a)o/ri ston a)o/riston Ch. 38 3rd sn and character of the Position and character of the Ch. 38 fn. 25 members numbers Ch. 38 fn. 40 that than Ch. 39 p. 299 The one footnote on this page is numbered 3 at the foot, 1 in the text Ch. 39 fn. 93 xxviii. p. 150, seq. xxxvi. p. 100, seq. Ch. 39 p. 303 docrine doctrine Ch. 39 p. 334 possses possess Ch. 39 p. 359 that than Ch. 39 p. 371 weath wealth Index, s.v. Actual iv. i. Index, s.v. Analogy a)nalogi/am a)nalogi/an Index, s.v. Animal A)utozo/zôon Au)to/zôon Index, s.v. Apology i. 429, n. i. 429 n. Index, s.v. Aristotle 189 180 Index, s.v. Art see Poetry see Poets Index, s.v. Cyrus iv. 312; iv. 312, Index, s.v. Death 235, n. 235 n. Index, s.v. Eleatic 234, n. 237 n. Index, s.v. Ethics a)thrô/pina a)nthrô/pina Index, s.v. Knowledge i. 37, 8-84; i. 378-84; Index, s.v. Martin on Timæus, iii. on Timæus, iv. Index, s.v. Physics 241 n. 397 n. Index, s.v. Physics 89 n. 90 n. Index, s.v. Plato 369 n. 178 n. Index, s.v. Pleasure 374 n. 376 n. Index, s.v. Politikus scienific man scientific man Index, s.v. Praxiphanes 268 n. 265 n. Index, s.v. Reid 241 n. 243 n. Index, s.v. Soul kosmos, 265 kosmos, iii. 265 Index, s.v. State 414 iv. 414 Index, s.v. Virtue 330, n. 330 n.