Part 9

And comparative anatomy is not less opposite to Gall’s opinions than is direct experiment itself. I shall not follow him here in the detail of his localizations. How could these localizations have any meaning? He does not even know whether an organ is a fascicle of fibres, or a fibre.

For example; he places what he calls the instinct of propagation in the cerebellum, and what he calls the instinct of the love of offspring, in the posterior cerebral lobes; and he looks upon these two localizations as the very surest in his book.

“I should wish,” says he, “that all young naturalists might begin their researches with the study of these two organs. They are both easily to be recognised,” &c.

What! The cerebellum, so different in its structure from the great brain, is the cerebellum, like the brain, to be considered an organ of instinct? And what is more, is it to be regarded as the organ of a single instinct only, while the brain shall have twenty-six of them?

I have already said that the cerebellum is the seat of the principle that presides over the locomotion of the animal, and that it is not the seat of any instinct.

Gall places the love of offspring in the posterior lobes of the brain. Now, the love of offspring, and especially maternal love, is every where to be found among the superior animals; it is found in all the mammifera, in all the birds. The posterior lobes of the brain, therefore, ought to be found in all these beings. Not at all: the posterior lobes are wanting in most of the mammifera; they are wanting in all the birds.

Gall locates the faculties that are common to both man and animals, in the posterior part of the brain; in the anterior part he places those that are peculiar to man alone. According to this plan, the most persistent portion of the brain will be the posterior portion, and the least persistent the anterior portion. But the inverse of the proposition holds. The parts that are most frequently wanting are the posterior parts, and those that are most invariably present are the anterior parts.

If, from the brain, I pass on to consider the cranium, all the foregoing is found to be of still greater force. How can the localizations that are destitute of meaning as to the brain—how can they, I say, have any meaning as relative to the cranium itself?

The cranium, especially the external surface of it, represents the superficial configuration of the brain but very imperfectly. Gall knows it. “I was the first,” says he, “to maintain that it is impossible for us to determine with exactitude the development of certain circumvolutions, by the inspection of the external surface of the cranium. In certain cases, the exterior lamina of the cranium is not parallel with the internal lamina.” “There are certain species in which there is no frontal sinus; in others, the cells betwixt the two bony laminæ are found throughout the whole skull,” &c. &c.

The cranium represents the convolutions of the brain only upon its inner surface; it does not represent them upon its external superficies. And as to the fibres, as to the bundles of fibres, it does not even represent them on its inner surface; for the fibres are covered with a layer of gray matter, and the bundles of fibres are situated in the interior of the nervous mass.

Gall is aware of all this, and nevertheless he inscribes his twenty-seven faculties upon the skulls. Such confidence surprises one. Nothing is known of the intimate structure of the brain, and yet people are bold enough to trace upon it their circumscriptions, their circles, their boundaries. The external surface of the skull does not represent the brain’s surface, it is admitted; and yet they inscribe upon this surface twenty-seven names, each of which names is written within a small circle, each little circle corresponding to one precise faculty! And what is stranger yet, people are to be found who, under each of these names inscribed by Gall, imagine that there is concealed something more than a name!

Those who, seeing the success of Gall’s doctrine, imagine that the doctrine therefore rests upon some solid foundation, know very little of mankind. Gall knew mankind better. He studied them in his own way, but he studied them very closely. Let us hear his own words:

“In society, I employ many expedients to find out the talents and inclinations of people. I start the conversation upon a variety of topics. In general, we let fall in conversation whatsoever has little or no concern with our faculties and penchants; but when the interlocutor touches upon one of our favourite subjects, we at once become interested in it.... Do you wish to spy out the character of a person, without the fear of being misled as to your conclusions, even though he might be on his guard? Set him to talking about his childhood and boyhood; make him relate his schoolboy exploits; his conduct towards his parents, his brothers and sisters, and his playfellows, and his emulators.... Ask him about his games, &c. Few persons think it necessary to dissemble upon these points; they do not suspect they are dealing with one who knows perfectly well that the basis of character remains ever the same; and that the objects only that interest us change with the progress of years.... Besides, when I discover what it is that a person admires or despises; when I see him act; when he is an author, and I merely read his book, &c. &c. the whole man stands unveiled before me.”

Descartes shut himself up in a stove, in order that he might meditate. According to Gall, there is no necessity for one’s shutting himself up in a stove.

Descartes says: “Now I shall shut my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall turn my senses aside; I shall even efface from my memory every image of corporeal objects, or at least, as that can hardly be done, I will repute them as vain and false; and thus, shut up within myself, and contemplating what is within me, I shall endeavour gradually to become more and more familiarly acquainted with my own real nature.”

According to Gall, there is no occasion for this absolute gathering one’s self together within. All that is needful is to look at and touch the skulls of people. Gall’s doctrine succeeded just as Lavater’s did. Men will always be looking out for external signs by which to discover secret thoughts and concealed inclinations: it is vain to confound their curiosity upon this point: after Lavater came Gall; after Gall some one else will appear.

We soon become wearied of a true philosophy, because it is true; because the search after truth, of whatsoever kind, requires strenuous and continual efforts. It is impossible, moreover, always to have the very same philosophy: even the same philosopher cannot be always approved of. Approbation must change its object, especially in France.

It was for the French that Fontenelle wrote these words: “The approbation of mankind is a sort of forced state, which seeks nothing so much as to come to an end.”

Descartes goes off to die in Sweden, and Gall comes to reign in France.

IV.

OF SPURZHEIM.

Spurzheim published two works; the first of which is entitled, “Observations sur la Phrénologie, ou la connaissance de l’homme moral et intellectuel, fondée sur les fonctions du système nerveux:” the title of the second is, “Essai philosophique sur la nature morâle et intellectuelle de l’homme;” and these two works are merely a reproduction of the doctrine of Gall. Spurzheim makes Gall’s book over again—the same book that they commenced together—and abridges it.

Spurzheim tells us how he heard Gall, and having heard him, felt himself drawn to participate in his labours, and propagate his doctrine.

“In 1800, I attended for the first time a course of lectures which M. Gall had from time to time repeated at Vienna for four years. He spoke then of the necessity there was for a brain to give out the manifestations of the soul; and of the plurality of organs; ... but he had not as yet begun to examine into the structure of the brain. From the very first, I found myself much attracted by the doctrine of the brain; and from the period of my first attention to that subject to the present moment, I have never lost sight of it as an object of study. After finishing my studies in 1800, I joined M. Gall, in order to pursue in a special manner the anatomical part of the researches. In 1805, we left Vienna for the purpose of travelling together; from which time, up to the year 1813, we made our observations in common,” &c.

In fact, the two authors, uniting their labours, first published, in 1808, their fine memoir upon the anatomy of the brain, and subsequently, in 1810 and 1812, the two first volumes of Gall’s great work.

In the year 1813 they separated, and that separation even proved useful. Gall, when writing independently, has a freer movement. Had he continued united with Spurzheim, he either would not have written the last chapter of his fourth volume, or he would have written it very differently, and we should not have obtained the definite expression of his doctrine.

That chapter, entitled “Philosophy of Man,” is Gall’s philosophy entire. It is in that chapter that he says what he does understand by faculties, by understanding, by will, &c. &c. and it is there that he defines the faculties of the individual understandings; understanding, a simple attribute of each faculty; will, a simple result of the simultaneous action of superior faculties, &c.

Spurzheim never would have imagined the doctrine: he found it already concocted; he follows it, and in doing so, always hesitates. He did not imagine it; and perhaps never could have had the facilities enjoyed by Gall for carrying it successfully into the world. Gall’s mind was full of address. We have seen his method of studying men. In his great work there is a dominant tone of philosophy; for the doctrine was already established at the period of the publication of that work. When the doctrine was inchoate, Gall’s tone was not quite so grave, for it is above all things necessary to awaken the public curiosity, and the philosophic tone does not answer for that purpose.