Part 2

I propose, in this work, to examine phrenology as it appears in the writings of Gall, of Spurzheim, and of Broussais.

My wish is to be brief. There is, however, one great secret in the art of being brief: it is to be clear.

I frequently quote Descartes: I even go further; for I dedicate my work to his memory. I am writing in opposition to a bad philosophy, while I am endeavouring to recall a sound one.

CONTENTS.

I. Of Gall.—Of his doctrine in general 17

II. Of Gall.—Of the faculties 47

III. Of Gall.—The organs 59

IV. Of Spurzheim 96

V. Of Broussais 115

VI. Broussais’s Psycology 121

VII. Broussais’s Physiology 125

VIII. Of Gall 127

Note I. Anatomical relations supposed by Gall to exist between the organs of the external senses and the organs of the intellectual faculties 131

II. Difference between instinct and understanding 133

III. Gall as an observer 137

IV. The animal spirits 139

V. Exaggeration of Broussais, even in phrenology 140

VI. Contractility of Broussais 142

VII. Real labours of Gall as to the brain 143

OF GALL.

OF HIS DOCTRINE IN GENERAL.

The great work in which Gall sets forth his doctrine is well known. That work shall serve as the groundwork of my examination. I shall examine in succession each of the questions studied by the author; merely introducing some slight changes in the order in which they are arranged.

The entire doctrine of Gall is contained in two fundamental propositions, of which the first is, that understanding resides exclusively in the brain, and the second, that each particular faculty of the understanding is provided in the brain with an organ proper to itself.

Now, of these two propositions, there is certainly nothing new in the first one, and perhaps nothing true in the second one.

Let us commence our examination with the first proposition.

I say that in the first proposition, namely, that the brain is the exclusive seat of the understanding, there is nothing new. Gall himself admits this to be the case.

“For a long time,” says he, “both philosophers and physiologists, as well as physicians, have contended that the brain is the organ of the soul.” The opinion that the brain, (as a whole, or such and such parts of the brain considered separately,) is the seat of the soul, is, in fact, as old as learning itself. Descartes placed the soul in the pineal gland, Willis in the corpora striata, Lapeyronie in the corpus callosum, &c. &c.

As to the more recent authorities, Gall quotes Sœmmerring, who says precisely that, “the brain is the exclusive instrument of all sensation, all thought, and all will,” &c. He quotes Haller, who proves (proves is the very expression made use of by Gall himself,) that “sensation does not take place at the point where the object touches the nerve, the point where the impression is made, but in the brain.” He might have quoted many other authorities to the same effect.