Chapter Iii.--Realized Morality or the Virtues.

LXIX.

Goodness as Found in Character.

We have treated of the forming of moral ideals, and of the attempt to realize them against the counter attractions of sensible desire. We have now to treat these ideas as actual ends of conduct and thus reacting upon the agent. The good character, considered in relation to the moral struggle, is the one which chooses the right end, which endeavors to be better. The good character in itself is that made by this choice. It is good for the self to choose a due end in an effort caused by contrary allurements. But the very fact of the struggle witnesses that morality is not yet the natural and spontaneous manifestation of character. A wholly good man would feel such satisfaction in the contemplation of the ideal good that contrary desires would not affect him. He would take pleasure only in the right. Every accomplished moral deed tends to bring this about. Moral realization brings satisfaction. The satisfaction becomes one with the right act. Duty and desire grow into harmony. Interest and virtue tend toward unity.

This is the truth aimed at, but not attained, by the hedonistic school. In complete moral action, happiness and rightness know no divorce. And this is true, even though the act, in some of its aspects, involves pain. The act, so far as its quality of rightness is concerned, calls forth unalloyed satisfaction, however bound up with pain to self and to others in some respects. The error of hedonism is not in insisting that right action is pleasurable, but in its failure to supply content to the idea of happiness, in its failure to define what happiness is. In the failure to show those active relations of man to nature and to man involved in human satisfaction, it reduces happiness to the abstraction of agreeable sensation.

A virtue then, in the full sense, that is as the expression of virtuous character, and not of the struggle of character to be virtuous against the allurements of passive goods, is an interest. The system of virtues includes the various forms which interest assumes. Truthfulness, for example, is interest in the media of human exchange; generosity is interest in sharing any form of superior endowment with others less rich by nature or training, etc. It is distinguished from natural generosity, which may be mere impulse, by its being an interest in the activity or social relation itself, instead of in some accidental accompaniment of the relation.

Another way of getting at the nature of the virtues is to consider them as forms of freedom. Positive freedom is the good, it is realized activity, the full and unhindered performance of function. A virtue is any one aspect which the free performance of function may take. Meekness is one form of the adjustment of capacity to surroundings; honesty another; indignation another; scientific excellence another, and so on. In each of these virtues, the agent realizes his freedom: Freedom from subjection to caprice and blind appetite, freedom in the full play of activity.

LXX.

Two Kinds of Virtues.

We may recognize two types of virtuous action. These are:

1. The Special Virtues. These arise from special capacities or special opportunities. The Greek sense of virtue was almost that of "excellence", some special fitness or power of an agent. There is the virtue of a painter, of a scientific investigator, of a philanthropist, of a comedian, of a statesman, and so on. The special act may be manifested in view of some special occasion, some special demand of the environment--charity, thankfulness, patriotism, chastity, etc. Goodness, as the realization of the moral end, is a system, and the special virtues are the particular members of the system.

2. Cardinal Virtues. Besides these special members of a system, however, the whole system itself may present various aspects. That is to say, even in a special act the whole spirit of the man may be called out, and this expression of the whole character is a cardinal virtue. While the special virtues differ in content, as humility from bravery, earnestness from compassion, the cardinal virtues have the same content, showing only different sides of it. Conscientiousness, for example, is a cardinal virtue. It does not have to do with an act belonging to some particular capacity, or evoked by some special circumstance, but with the spirit of the whole self as manifested in the will to recognize duty--both its obligatoriness in general and the concrete forms which it takes. Truthfulness as a special virtue would be the desire to make word correspond to fact in some instance of speech. As a cardinal virtue, it is the constant will to clarify and render true to their ideal all human relations--those of man to man, and man to nature.

LXXI.

The Cardinal Virtues.

The cardinal virtues are marked by

1. Wholeness. This or that virtue, not calling the whole character into play, but only some special power, is partial. But a cardinal virtue is not a virtue, but the spirit in which all acts are performed. It lies in the attitude which the agent takes towards duty; his obedience to recognized forms, his readiness to respond to new duties, his enthusiasm in moving forward to new relations. It is a common remark that moral codes change from 'Do not' to 'Do', and from this to 'Be'. A Mosaic code may attempt to regulate the specific acts of life. Christianity says, 'Be ye perfect'. The effort to exhaust the various special right acts is futile. They are not the same for any two men, and they change constantly with the same man. The very words which denote virtues come less and less to mean specific acts, and more the spirit in which conduct occurs. Purity, for example, does not mean freedom from certain limited outward forms of defilement; but comes to signify rightness of natures as a whole, their freedom from all self-seeking or exclusive desire for private pleasure, etc. Thus purity of heart comes to mean perfect goodness.

2. Disinterestedness. Any act, to be virtuous, must of course be disinterested, but we may now connect this disinterestedness with the integral nature of moral action just spoken of. Immoral action never takes account of the whole nature of an end; it deflects the end to some ulterior purpose; it bends it to the private satisfaction of the agent; it takes a part of it by making exceptions in favor of self. Bad action is never 'objective'. It is 'abstract'; it takes into account only such portion of the act as satisfies some existing need of the private self. The immoral man shows his partial character again by being full of casuistries, devices by which he can get the act removed from its natural placing and considered in some other light:--this act, for example, would be dishonest, of course, if done under certain circumstances, but since I have certain praiseworthy feelings, certain remote intentions, it may now be considered otherwise. It is a large part of the badness of 'good' people that instead of taking the whole act just as it is, they endeavor to make the natural feelings in their own mind--feelings of charity, or benevolence--do substitute duty for the end aimed at; they excuse wrong acts on the ground that their 'intentions' were good, meaning by intentions the prevailing mood of their mind. It is in this sense that 'hell is paved with good intentions.'

Now it is against this deflection, perversion and mutilating of the act that disinterestedness takes its stand. Disinterested does not mean without interest, but without interest in anything except the act itself. The interest is not in the wonderful moods or sentiments with which we do the act; it is not in some ulterior end to be gained by it, or in some private advantage which it will bring, but in the act itself--in the real and concrete relations involved. There is a vague French saying that 'morality is the nature of things.' If this phrase has a meaning it is that moral conduct is not a manifestation of private feelings nor a search for some unattainable ideal, but observance and reproduction of actual relations. And this is the mark of a disinterested character.

CONCLUSION.

LXXII.

The Practical End of Morality.

Virtues, then, are cardinal, and character is integral, just in the degree in which every want is a want of the whole man. So far as this occurs, the burden of the moral struggle is transformed into freedom of movement. There is no longer effort to bring the particular desire into conformity with a law, or a universal, outside itself. The fitting in of each special desire, as it arises, to the organism of character takes place without friction, as a natural re-adjustment. There is not constraint, but growth. On the other side, the attained character does not tend to petrify into a fixed possession which resists the response to needs that grow out of the enlarged environment. It is plastic to new wants and demands; it does not require to be wrenched and wracked into agreement with the required act, but moves into it, of itself. The law is not an external ideal, but the principle of the movement. There is the identity of freedom and law in the good.

This union of inclination and duty in act is the practical end. All the world's great reformers have set as their goal this ideal, which may be termed either the freeing of wants, or the humanizing of the moral law. It will help summarize our whole discussion, if we see how the theories of hedonism and of Kant have endeavored to express this same goal. Hedonism, indeed, has this identity for its fundamental principle. It holds strongly to the idea of moral law immanent in human wants themselves. But its error lies in taking this identity of desire and the good, as a direct or immediate unity, while, in reality, it exists only in and through activity; it is a unity which can be attained only as the result of a process. It mistakes an ideal which is realized only in action for bare fact which exists of itself.

Hedonism, as represented by Spencer, recognizes, it is true, that the unity of desire and duty is not an immediate or natural one; but only to fall into the error of holding that the separation is due to some external causes, and that when these are removed we shall have a fixed millenium. As against this doctrine, we must recognize that the difference between want and duty is always removed so far as conduct is moral; that it is not an ideal in the sense of something to be attained at some remote period, but an ideal in the sense of being the very meaning of moral activity whenever and wherever it occurs. The realizing of this ideal is not something to be sometime reached once for all, but progress is itself the ideal. Wants are ever growing larger, and thus freedom ever comes to have a wider scope (Sec. LXV).

Kant recognizes that the identity of duty and inclination is not a natural fact, but is the ideal. However, he understands by ideal something which ought to be, but is not. Morality is ever a struggle to get desire into unity with law, but a struggle doomed, by its very conditions, not to succeed. The law is the straight line of duty, which the asymptotic curve of desire may approximate, but never touch. An earthly taint of pleasure-seeking always clings to our wants, and makes of morality a striving which defeats itself.

The theory that morality lies in the realization of individuality recognizes that there is no direct, or natural, identity of desire and law, but also recognizes that their identification is not an impossible task. The problem is solved in the exercise of function, where the desires, however, are not unclothed, but clothed upon. Flowing in the channel of response to the demands of the moral environment, they unite, at once, social service and individual freedom.

LXXIII.

The Means of Moralization.

This practical end of the unification of desire and duty, in the play of moral interests, is reached, therefore, so far as the desires are socialized. A want is socialized when it is not a want for its own isolated and fixed satisfaction, but reflects the needs of the environment. This implies, of course, that it is bound by countless ties to the whole body of desires and capacities. The eye, in seeing for itself, sees for the whole body, because it is not isolated but, through its connections, an organ of a system. In this same way, the satisfaction of a want for food, or for commercial activity, may necessitate a satisfaction of the whole social system.

But how shall this socialization of wants be secured? It is in answering this question that we are brought again to a point already discussed at length: the moral bearings of intelligence. It is intelligence that is the sole sure means of taking a want out of the isolation of merely impulsive action. It is the passing of the desire through the alembic of ideas that, in rationalizing and spiritualizing it, makes it an expression of the want of the whole man, and thus of social needs.

To know one's self was declared by Socrates, who first brought to conscious birth the spirit of the moral life, to be the very core of moral endeavor. This knowledge of self has taken, indeed, a more circuitous and a more painful path, than Socrates anticipated. Man has had, during two thousand years of science, to go around through nature to find himself, and as yet he has not wholly come back to himself--he oftentimes seems still lost in the wilderness of an outer world. But when man does get back to himself it will be as a victor laden with the spoils of subdued nature. Having secured, in theory and invention, his unity with nature, his knowledge of himself will rest on a wide and certain basis.

This is the final justification of the moral value of science and art. It is because through them wants are inter-connected, unified and socialized, that they are, when all is said and done, the preëminent moral means. And if we do not readily recognize them in this garb, it is because we have made of them such fixed things, that is, such abstractions, by placing them outside the movement of human life.

INDEX.

Absolute--and relative Ethics, according to Spencer 72.

Accountability--See responsibility.

Activity--human, the subject-matter of ethics 1 ff. --the object of desire 21 ff. --the standard of pleasure 45; 50. --equals exercise of function 101. --opposed to mere possession 209; 215; 218; 220. --two sides of 219. --see freedom.

Æsthetic feelings--may be moral 199. --see art.

Agent--moral, one capable of acting from ideas 3. --see person.

Alexander, S.--quoted: on idea of sum of pleasures 46. --referred to: 9; 46; 77; 111; 134; 158; 165; 202; 216; 221; 227.

Altruism--how identified with egoism 59. --reconciled, by Spencer, with egoism 70 ff. --conflicts, at present, with egoism 76. --older moralists termed benevolence 195. --not necessarily moral 107. --not disguised selfishness 109. --may equal charity 125.

Amusements--moral nature of 133.

Approbation--nature of 161.

Aristotle--quoted: on pleasure 18; on pleasure and character 29; on the mean 136. --referred to: 31.

Art (and Science)--nature of interest in 111. --distinction of fine and useful 112. --interest in, why moral 113 ff. --interest in, really social 118 ff. --life an, 120. --essentially dynamic 126.

Asceticism--means formalism 94. --element of truth in 95. --results when interest is excluded 106.

Aspiration--involved in morality 213; 222.

Autonomy--Kant's conception of justified 149.

Badness--of environment a factor in right action 176; 224. --its source and factors 214. --its relation to goodness 223. --potential and actual 223. --of good people 232.

Bain, A.--quoted: that pleasure is a self-evident criterion 16; his definition of utilitarianism 53; on obligation 140; 141. --referred to: 17; 66; 227.

Barratt--quoted: that all pleasure is individual 14.

Baseness--why badness becomes 219.

Benevolence--see altruism.

Bentham, J.--quoted: pleasure both criterion and motive 15; self-evident criterion 16; all motives good 34 ff.; hedonistic calculus 36 ff.; identity of individual and general pleasure 57 ff.; influence of law 59. --referred to: 53.

Birks--referred to: 66.

Blackie, J. S.--referred to: 66.

Bradley, F. H.--quoted: on pleasure and desire 21; scientific interest not necessarily social 122; on merely individual conscience 189. --referred to: 25; 26; 42; 48; 54; 91; 124; 134; 165; 221.

Browning, R.--referred to: 111.

Butler--Bishop, quoted: on conscience 167. --referred to: 110.

Caird, E.--quoted: on collision of moral ends 88. --referred to: 21; 82; 87; 91; 92; 93; 95; 109; 111; 149; 165.

Calderwood--referred to: 158; 166.

Capacity--its relation to environment 97. --increased by moral action 206.

Carlyle, T.--referred to: 128.

Casuistry--inevitable, if moral end is not wholly social 119.

Character--reciprocal with conduct 9. --the source of motive, desire and moral pleasure 26 ff. --separated from conduct by hedonists 32 ff. --and virtues 227 ff. --see capacity, conduct, interests and motive.

Charity--idea of, involves social inequality 125.

Christianity--ethical influence of 224. --has no specific ethical code 231.

Coit, S.--referred to: 28; 66.

Commands--moral value of: 203.

Common Good--an ethical ideal 51. --not furnished by hedonism 60. --not furnished by Kant 91. --why necessarily involved in morality 117; 217; 222. --demands reciprocal satisfaction of individual and society 127. --its existence postulated by moral conduct 130. --results from exercise of function 168. --constituted by activity 169 ff. --realized in institutions 173. --development of 210. --see institutions and society.

Comprehensiveness--growth of, in moral end 210 ff.

Conduct--defined 3. --relation to consequences 7. --relation to character 9. --an individual system 133. --a social system 136. --how related to character 163. --see activity, consequences, character and motive.

Conflict--of moral ends 88 ff. --morality has an aspect of 151; 227.

Conscience--Bain's idea of 141. --equals consciousness of action 181. --elements in 182. --not a special faculty 183. --kinds of 183 ff. --not merely individual 188.

Conscientiousness--nature of 199. --does not equal introspection 200. --nor application of code 201. --a cardinal virtue 232.

Consequences--moral value of 7 ff.; 84; 114; 160. --excluded from morality by Kantianism 13; 29. --identified with moral value by hedonism 33. --responsibility for 160.

Criterion--hedonistic is pleasure 15. --criticism of hedonistic 31 ff. --two ends to be met by every 32. --of higher and lower pleasures 49 ff. --when pleasure may be a 50. --Mill's really social 63. --Spencer's really social 73. --Kant's nominally formal 79 ff. --the real 132 ff. --its elasticity 135.

Darwin, C.--referred to: 78.

Demoralization--involved in badness 220.

Desire--pleasure as end of 16; 18 ff. --defined 19. --how spiritualized 23. --not purely pleasurable 27. --an expression of character 28. --excluded from moral motive by Kant 79. --all or no involved in morality 94. --relation to pleasure 83. --particular, an abstraction 96. --how distinguished from interest 103. --opposed to reason by Kant 147. --when opposed to moral action 148; 155; 213; 216. --how socialized, 237.

Dewey, J.--referred to: 25; 78; 194.

Disinterestedness--equals full interest 107. --an aspect of cardinal virtue 232.

Disposition--Bentham on 35.

Dualism--the Kantian 148 ff.

Duty--see obligation.

Egoism--see altruism.

Empiricism--Spencer's reconciliation with intuitionalism 69 ff.

End--moral: see common good; function; motive.

Environment--defined by relation to capacity 99 ff. --meaning of adjustment to 115 ff. --moral, exists in institutions 171. --badness of, an element in right action 176; 190. --enlarged by moral action 207.

Ethical World--discussed 167 ff. --nature illustrated 168. --relation to moral law 174. --see Institutions.

Ethics--defined 1. --divided 3. --its object according to Spencer 68. --see theory.

Evolution, Theory of--combined with hedonism 67 ff. --not really hedonistic 71 ff. --its real standard objective 72.

Faith--a factor in moral progress 123; 127 ff. --in humanity, meaning of 129. --why demanded in moral action 217; 222.

Feelings--natural and moral 5 ff.; 25 ff.; 87. --sympathetic relied upon by utilitarians 57. --necessary in moral activity 85. --active, equal interests 102. --moral, defined by end 108; see also motive. --value of 195 ff. --moral, not too narrowly limited 199.

Freedom--is object of desire 24. --equals exercise of function 138. --various aspects of 158. --of choice defined 159. --of indifference discussed 161 ff. --actualized in rights 172; 174. --positive, realized in virtues 229.

Function--union of capacity and circumstance in act 103. --freedom found in exercise of 164 ff.

Gizycki--referred to: 66.

God--an external, cannot be the source of obligation 149.

Goethe--referred to: 128.

Golden Rule--identified by Mill with principle of utilitarianism 59. --gives no directions as to conduct 204. --is a concrete statement of ethical postulate 205.

Green, T. H.--quoted: on desire and pleasure 21; on sum of pleasures 43; on nature of happiness 45; on conscientiousness 200; 202; on goodness 215. --referred to: 9; 25; 42; 54; 110; 158; 165.

Grote, J.--referred to: 66; 158.

Guyau--referred to: 66; 143.

Hedonism--defined 14 ff. --its paradox 25. --confuses feeling and idea 26; 43 ff. --summarized 30. --all motives good 33. --its calculus 36. --fails to provide laws 39 ff. --its contrast with Kantianism 82 ff. --its treatment of obligation 140 ff. --is correct in holding rightness to be pleasurable 228. --truth and falsity in 234.

Hegel--quoted: on reflective conscience 188; on merely individual conscience 189.

Hinton, J.--quoted: on altruism 109; on badness 216. --referred to: 202.

Hodgson, S. H.--referred to: 14.

Idealism--when feeble 128.

Ideals--moral, progressive, 206.

Imperative, Categorical--of Kant 147. --of conscience 191.

Impulse--and pleasure 17. --and desire 22. --nature of action from 159. --see desire.

Individuality--defined 97. --not identical with inner side alone 98. --evils of defining from this standpoint 110. --made by function 131. --realized is autonomy 150. --realized is freedom 164. --growth in 210. --see freedom and rights.

Institutions--nature of 169 ff. --sovereignty, rights and law inhere in 171 ff. --influence of, upon conscience 184; 189. --movement of, the source of duties, 194. --see common good and society.

Interests--are functions on personal side 102 ff. --classified and discussed 104 ff. --social, involve science and art 123 ff. --realized in institutions 170. --their relation to conscience 198. --pure, are virtue 228. --the active element of 218. --the freeing of, the moral goal 233.

James, Sr., H.--referred to: 202.

James, Wm.--quoted: on pleasure and desire 20. --referred to: 77.

Kant--agrees with hedonism as to end of desire 79. --his end an abstraction 84. --his practical ideal that of Mill and Spencer 93. --value of his theory 93. --his theory of obligation 147. --his conception of autonomy 149. --his idea of duty 156. --his conception of practical reason 191. --quoted: on pleasure 47; on pleasure as common good 52; on priority of duty to good 78; on good will 79; his formula for right action 80; illustrations of moral law 80 ff. --referred to: 14; 78; 212; 221; 235.

Kantianism--compared with hedonism 82 ff. --its practical breakdown 90.

Knowledge--moral effect of advance in 207. --socializes wants 237. --see art.

Laurie, S. S.--quoted: on happiness 66. --referred to: 227.

Law--utilitarian use of 58; 61 ff. --Kant's moral, formal 78. --relation to desire 94. --realized in institutions 172; 174. --of the 'is', not merely of the 'ought' 175. --idea of, in general 195. --see obligation.

Lawlessness--involved in morality 216.

Leckey--referred to: 66.

Limitation--the basis of moral strength 128.

Lincoln, A.--anecdote regarding 28.

Lotze--referred to: 16; 166.

Love--the union of duty and desire 154.

Martineau, J.--quoted: on the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus 38. --referred to: 42; 78; 158; 166; 227.

Maurice, F. D.--referred to: 191.

Merit--means social desert 225.

Mill, J. S.--criticizes Kant 91. --his equivoke of pleasure and pleasant thing 20. --his fallacy 56. --introduces quality of pleasure into hedonism 42; 46. --quoted: pleasure self-evident criterion 16; end of desire 17; on rules of morality 39 ff; on moral tribunal 48; on utilitarian standard 53; on importance of law and education 59; on social feeling 63 ff. --referred to: 25; 30; 49.

Morality--sphere of as broad as conduct 2; 154. --not dependent upon an individual's wish 167 ff. --realized in institutions 170. --struggle for private, bad 202. --in the nature of things 233.

Motive--defined 5. --two elements in 10. --determined by character 28. --never bad according to hedonism 33. --formal and legislative according to Kant 80. --not a subjective mood 232.

Norms--in philosophy 1.

Obligation--in conflict with pleasure 76 ff. --how related to function 138. --theories regarding 139. --distinct from coercion 144. --enforced, not created by power 145. --Kantian idea of criticized 148. --does not relate simply to what ought to be, but is not 151; 174 ff. --relation to conscience 183. --how made known 190 ff. --practical value of sense of 196. --must be individualized 197; 201. --when opposed to desire 213; 216. --the union with desire the moral ideal 234. --see desire, law and universal.

Pater--referred to: 66.

Pathological--all inclination, according to Kant 86. --opposed to active 212.

Paulsen--referred to: 67; 111.

Person--is one capable of conduct 97.

Pleasure--an element in activity 24. --not the moving spring to action 26. --sum of, dependent on objective conditions 44 ff. --quality of, similarly dependent 47 ff. --may symbolize action 51. --general, a vague idea 62. --fixed by social relations 65; 77. --not a sufficient guide at present 75. --dependent on self-realization 83. --all right action involves 228. --see desire and hedonism.

Postulate--moral, defined 129 ff. --equals Golden Rule 205.

Problem--moral 3.

Progress--necessary in moral action 135 ff. --moral, nature of 209.

Prudence--not outside moral sphere 105.

Reason--opposed to desire by Kant 147. --Kant's conception too immediate 150. --practical, idea of 191.

Reformation--possibility of 162 ff.

Relativity--of morals, means what 136.

Responsibility--nature of 160 ff. --of parents and children 203.

Reverence--Kant regards as sole moral feeling 86.

Rights--exist by common will 172.

Rousseau--his influence upon Kant 148.

Royce, J.--referred to: 61; 111.

Rule--moral, not a command 204. --a tool of analysis 204.

Satisfaction--moral, creates new wants 208. --good and bad 217.

Science--nature of interest in 111. --the preëminent moral means 237. --see art.

Schurman, J. G.--referred to: 78.

Self--interest in 105 ff. --involves sympathy 109. --dualism in self, how arises 216. --knowledge of 237.

Selfishness--involved in immorality 216.

Self-sacrifice--its moral nature 222.

Sentimentality--immoral 113. --escape from, only through knowledge 120. --results from abstract idea of duty 157. --refined, equals sensuality 220.

Shakespeare--quoted: on common good 131.

Sidgwick, H.--quoted: on the hedonistic assumption 43; on utilitarian standard 53; on intuitional utilitarianism 54. --referred to: 14; 16; 18; 66; 111; 227.

Society--its moral influence 146; 157. --its relation to obligation 152. --constituted by moral relationships 175. --development of, changes moral ideals 207. --see common good, institutions.

Socrates--author of idea of reflective conscience 188. --initiator of modern ethical spirit 237.

Sorley--referred to: 78; 111.

Sovereignty--exists in common will and good 171. --ultimate possessed in humanity 173.

Spencer, H.--believes in fixed social ideal 73 ff.; 235. --quoted: on pleasure as a necessary effect 68; not immediate object of desire 69; egoism and altruism 70 ff.; on ideal man 73; equilibrium of functions 74; on obligation 142; 143. --referred to: 16; 67; 72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 111; 125; 235.

Stephen, L.--quoted: on feeling as universal motive 27; on sympathy 109 ff. --referred to: 16; 25; 67; 68; 78; 111; 165; 227.

Struggle--when morality is a 212. --changed by Christianity into movement 225. --see conflict.

Sully, J.--referred to: 17.

Theory--ethical and conduct 1. --ethical, sub-divided 13. --ethical, not casuistry 89. --value of 186.

Universal--a, lacking in hedonism 37. --Kant's emphasis of 80. --Kant's, formal 80; 85; 90. --Kant's, leads to conflict 87. --true, equals organization, 88; 90; 96. --bad action cannot be 221. --means a method, not a thing 136. --found in movement of character 234. --see law.

Utilitarianism--is universalistic hedonism 13; 53. --defined by Mill, Sidgwick, Bain, 53. --criticized 54 ff. --assumes social order 63 ff. --combined with evolution 67.

Virtue--change in nature of 211. --correlative to duty 225. --distinguished from merit 226. --is an interest of character 228. --two types of 229. --cardinal 230.

Wants--see desires.

Wilson (and Fowler)--referred to: 67.

Will--Kant's good will 79.

TRANSCRIBER'S CORRECTIONS

page original text correction 17 endquote missing are one and the same thing." 20 want simply sweat-meats; want simply sweet-meats; 24 so that it becoms one factor so that it becomes one factor 35 unless as a sort of suprise unless as a sort of surprise 38 but the the most conscientious but the most conscientious 38 cicumstances were such as circumstances were such as 42 sum of pleasnres sum of pleasures 47 this agreableness is. this agreeableness is. 68 Science of Ehtics, ch. IX. Science of Ethics, ch. IX. 74 endquote missing "members of a society" 83 of well as of hedonism as well as of hedonism 92 without expressily giving up without expressly giving up 124 ordinary chords and and tunes, ordinary chords and tunes, 156 just what what morality demands just what morality demands 183 LVIX. LIX. 192 seems quite superflous seems quite superfluous 251 entry Society missing from index in original