CHAPTER I.. The Neutrality of the United States.

THE NEUTRALITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

The neutral attitude assumed by the United States was maintained throughout the war. With reference to any official recognition of the Transvaal as an independent State apart from the immediate purposes of war no action was taken. This view of the situation in South Africa was entirely consistent with the requirements of international law, and, in carrying out the obligations of a neutral to the belligerents, the governmental position was fully justified by a knowledge of the relations which had existed between the Transvaal and Great Britain in the past.

Early in October, before war had actually begun, it was understood that Mr. Pierce, the Orange Free State consul-general in New York, had made every effort to induce President McKinley to request other nations to act with the United States as arbitrators in the dispute between the Governments of the Transvaal and Great Britain, but the close friendship existing between England and the United States and the very friendly attitude assumed by Great Britain during the Spanish-American War made such action impossible. The State Department at Washington announced that in the event of war the Government would maintain an absolutely neutral attitude, and issued instructions early in October to all American consuls in South Africa directing them to secure protection for all neutrals of the United States who had not affiliated politically with either Great Britain or the South African Republics, either by exercising the franchise or otherwise. While those whom this definition did not cover were not to be directly under the protection of the United States, the State Department expressed itself as ready to use its good offices in their behalf in case they were involved in trouble resulting from the war. Such had been the position of the Department in the case of Mr. John Hays Hammond, a citizen of the United States who had been involved in the Jameson Raid, although he had taken part in an expedition which was not officially approved by Great Britain and which was hostile to a Government with which the United States had no quarrel.

On October 8, the day before the Transvaal ultimatum was presented to Great Britain, the British Ambassador in Washington confidentially inquired whether in the event of an attack upon the English forces by the Boers, rendering necessary the withdrawal of the British agent, the United States would allow its consul to take charge of the British interests in the Transvaal. Consent was very properly given on the eleventh that the United States would gladly allow its consul at Pretoria "to afford to British interests in that quarter friendly and neutral protective offices." On the thirteenth this courtesy was acknowledged and the information given that the British agent had withdrawn. On the same day Mr. McCrum was instructed, "with the assent of the South African Republic, to afford to British interests the friendly protective offices usual in such contingencies."

Having thus assumed an attitude entirely in accord with the obligations incumbent upon a neutral, the United States refused to heed the popular demand to urge upon Great Britain its offices as mediator in a matter which directly concerned the British colonial policy. Secretary Hay properly refused to involve the Administration in the complications which would have followed any official interrogation addressed to the British Government with reference to its ultimate intentions in South Africa. Moreover, it was authoritatively stated that any concerted European intervention would not meet with favor in Washington, as such action would only tend to disturb general commercial relations by embroiling most of the nations of the world. Any attempted intervention would certainly have led to a conflict of the Powers, and would have involved questions of national supremacy, disturbed the balance of power, and raised the Chinese question, in which last the United States had an important interest. It was a sound policy therefore upon the part of the United States not to encourage any intervention by European nations in the affairs of Great Britain in South Africa.

This attitude not only reciprocated the friendly feeling shown by England during the Spanish-American War, but was in strict accord with the traditional American policy enunciated by Washington. The acquisition of the Philippines had only served to exemplify the soundness of this doctrine, and the State Department was not in a mood to take the initial steps which might lead to added responsibilities with reference to matters which, in this instance at any rate, were not directly of American concern. The part to be played by the United States was clearly that of an impartial neutral.

In his message to Congress in 1900 President McKinley stated that he was happy to say that abundant opportunity had been afforded in the situation at Pretoria to permit the United States consul there to show the impartiality of the Government toward both the combatants. Developments, however, were to show that things had not gone so smoothly there as was supposed at the time.

On December 8 the President had appointed Mr. Adelbert Hay, son of the Secretary of State, to succeed Mr. McCrum in his position as consul and instructions were sent to him to proceed at once to Pretoria. Mr. Hollis, the American consul at Lorenzo Marques, was directed at the same time to act ad interim at Pretoria after the departure of Mr. McCrum and until Mr. Hay could reach South Africa. On December 18 Mr. Hollis took charge of all British and American interests within the Transvaal while still keeping an oversight of the affairs of the United States in and around Lorenzo Marques.

Soon after the war had begun Mr. McCrum had reported to Washington, in reply to inquiries with reference to the British prisoners in the hands of the Boers, that it was the wish of the Republican Government that in the future all requests for the payment of money to officers or other prisoners, as well as inquiries regarding their welfare, should come through the regular military channels at the front. The Republic at the same time intimated that it could no longer recognize Mr. McCrum in any official capacity on behalf of Great Britain. The British representative at once suggested that the United States consul be instructed to point out to the Transvaal that such an attitude was a departure from the usual practice in not permitting the American Government to use its friendly good offices on behalf of the English prisoners of war. Lord Salisbury called attention to the fact that during the Crimean War "moneys" for the British prisoners in Russia were distributed through the Danish representatives in St. Petersburg and London; and that during the Franco-Prussian War such small sums of money were handed to the French prisoners in Germany through the British Foreign Office. It was understood as a matter of course that reciprocal privileges would be extended to the Boer prisoners in the hands of the English commanders.

Mr. McCrum, following instructions from his Government, had placed the English view of the situation before the Transvaal authorities before he left Pretoria, and had called their attention to the fact that for them to permit the charitable and humane intervention of the United States consul under the circumstances was the regular course in time of war. But not until Mr. Hollis reached Pretoria was the attitude of the Republic explained. He inquired of the Secretary of State as well as of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs with reference to the attitude he would be allowed to assume toward British interests; to what extent he might act on behalf of British prisoners of war in the Transvaal and Orange Free State; and how far he might exercise the usual consular functions on behalf of Great Britain during the war.

The report was made to Washington "from many official and consular sources that the late British agent at this capital [presumably Mr. Green] was always a thorn in the side of this Government, and that he is, in part, responsible for this present war." It was pointed out that since this was the attitude of the Republican Government there existed at Pretoria a decided aversion to the recognition of any one who might claim to act as a British agent. The Transvaal Secretary of State expressed himself emphatically upon the point: "We got rid of the British agent on the eleventh of October last, and God willing, we will never have another one here." Mr. Reitz even went so far as to express the confident hope that at the close of the war a British minister and British consuls would reside at Pretoria, but he was positive upon the question of receiving any one who was known as an agent of Great Britain. No one who assumed this relation toward the English Government would be acceptable to the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

The attitude which the Republic alleged it had been willing and was ready to assume was an unwillingness to recognize the consul of the United States or any other consular officer as the official representative of the British Government during the war; an objection to the transmission of the official communications of the English Government to that of the South African Republic, or of the official despatches of the English Government addressed to the British prisoners in the hands of the Transvaal, or of "moneys" or funds sent by the British Government to the English prisoners of war. On the other hand the Transvaal authorities were not unwilling to allow the United States consul at Pretoria to perform certain enumerated services in behalf of all British prisoners of war and their friends. No objection was made to the forwarding of letters and papers sent by friends to the prisoners, and, under the supervision of the War Office of the Transvaal, the Republic expressed itself willing to permit the distribution of funds sent to the English prisoners by their friends at home. But it was understood that such services would be reciprocal, and that the Republic would have the right to request similar services of the American consular officers on behalf of the Boer and Afrikander prisoners in the English possessions. The right was reserved to revoke any and all privileges to receive letters, papers, parcels and money, which were enjoyed by British prisoners in the Transvaal, should the fact be sufficiently proved that Boer or Afrikander prisoners in the hands of the English authorities were not receiving kind and humane treatment, or were being denied privileges similar to those enjoyed by British prisoners in the Republic. All concessions on the part of the Transvaal Government would be instantly revoked on these grounds as sufficient reason and cause for such action. The Republican Government asserted that this had been the attitude in accordance with which it had acted from the commencement of the war.

With reference to the recall of the American consul and the appointment of Mr. Adelbert Hay, it appears that there had been a certain amount of friction between Mr. McCrum and the English censor at Durban concerning the consular mails. In connection with this incident, and a little unwisely it would seem, Mr. McCrum had reported unofficially that his mail had been tampered with by the censor and had been forwarded to him only after Colonel Stowe, the American consul-general at Cape Town, had secured its release. He asserted: "I had the humiliation, as the representative of the American Government, of sitting in my office in Pretoria and looking upon envelopes bearing the official seal of the American Government, opened and officially sealed with stickers, notifying me that the contents had been read by the censor at Durban." And he continues, "when I accepted my post as consul I knew nothing of any secret alliance between America and Great Britain." These charges brought forth in the House of Representatives a resolution which called upon the President to furnish information as to whether the consul's mail had been opened and read by the British censor and, if so, what steps had been taken in the matter. Information was also asked as to what truth there was in the statement that a secret alliance existed between the "Republic of the United States and the Empire of Great Britain."

In response the President reported through the Secretary of State that the Department had been in regular communication by mail and telegraph with Charles E. McCrum, late consul at Pretoria, since his entrance upon the duties of the office. Communications made to him had been answered by him. His despatches forwarded through the consulate at Lorenzo Marques had been regularly received during his incumbency in office. It was pointed out that the only instance of complaint had been in November, when a temporary stoppage of the mails had occurred at Cape Town, against which both Mr. McCrum and the consul at Lorenzo Marques had protested. But arrangements had been then made for the prompt delivery of all the consular mails to the United States consulate at Cape Town by which they were forwarded to the consul at Lorenzo Marques and thence to Pretoria. The delay had continued only a few days and the difficulty had not occurred again. It was pointed out also that this arrangement had been made known to both Mr. McCrum and Mr. Hollis as early as November 16, and that no obstacle had since existed to prevent the unhampered correspondence from Pretoria to Washington. Moreover, the Secretary of State asserted that Mr. McCrum had not officially reported "any instance of violation, by opening or otherwise, of his official mail by the British censor at Durban, or any person or persons whatsoever, there or elsewhere;" he had not so reported since he left Pretoria, although ample opportunity was afforded him to do so by mail or in person when he reported to the Department on his return.

In regard to the second charge made by Mr. McCrum it seemed hardly necessary to say that there was no truth in the statement that a secret alliance existed between Great Britain and the United States; that no form of secret alliance was possible under the Constitution since all treaties required the advice and consent of the Senate. Mr. Hay concluded, however, by emphatically assuring the members of Congress that "no secret alliance, convention, arrangement, or understanding exists between the United States and any other nation."

Mr. McCrum later appeared before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives and stated his side of the case. He declared that while at Pretoria he had understood that the British Government was in possession of the United States cable ciphers but he was unable to affirm this from personal knowledge. He based his belief, he said, upon the fact that when on November 6 he had cabled by way of Durban to the Department asking for leave of absence the incident had been reported to have been published in a Durban paper on the following day, although he had cabled in cipher. He was not able to say, however, whether the fact of his desiring leave was actually published on November 7, as he had not seen the paper, but had heard that the fact had been published. He asserted that the first actual evidence of the opening of his mail was in the case of two opened letters reaching him, but he admitted that he had not reported the matter to the Department. When Mr. Hay mentioned the matter to Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British Ambassador in Washington, the English Government replied that it had no knowledge of the incident, and gave the assurance that if it had occurred it had been contrary to instructions. Colonel Stowe later informed Mr. Hay that two letters from the consulate at Cape Town, one for Pretoria, the other for Lorenzo Marques, had been opened by the censor at Durban, but that Sir Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner, had afterward offered a very satisfactory apology.

In view of these facts the committee of the House, before which Mr. McCrum appeared, made no report, and when Mr. Adelbert Hay reported that he had failed to find on the files of the consulate any evidence of the official mail having been tampered with, the incident was considered closed. Mr. Hay declared that as far as he could ascertain, no interference had occurred in the communication, either telegraphic or postal, between the State Department and the consulate.

The new consul at Pretoria also reported that everything was as satisfactory as could be expected under the circumstances of war, and his official intercourse with the Transvaal Government afterwards fully justified this assertion. The republics displayed a proper attitude toward the consulate not only as representing American interests, but as representing Great Britain during the course of hostilities. Every facility was afforded the American consul for performing his duties. For the efficient service he had rendered in connection with the British prisoners he was publicly thanked by the British High Commissioner, who expressed the feeling of gratitude which he said existed throughout the British Empire for the good work which had been performed by both Mr. Hay and Colonel Stowe, the latter at Cape Town.

While enforcing the obligations of a neutral State by an attitude of strict impartiality toward both belligerents, the United States was not inclined to allow popular sympathy for the Boers to lead to complications with foreign nations over a matter with which it was only remotely concerned. This position was known to the envoys of the Transvaal and Orange Free State before they left Pretoria. Ample opportunity to realize the situation had been afforded them before they left Europe for America after an unsuccessful tour of the capitals of the Continent. Nevertheless, they determined to appeal to the United States, and with this purpose in view arrived in Washington on May 17, 1900. A resolution introduced in the Senate by Mr. Allen of Nebraska on May 19, which would have extended the privilege of the floor to them, was laid on the table, a decision the wisdom of which is unquestionable. The Senate stands before the world as an important part of the treaty-making power of the United States. Such a privilege, if extended to the mission, could have meant nothing to foreign powers but an official reception to the envoys of a government which was not recognized as legitimate by its former conventional suzerain. It was not the part of the Senate to inquire into the substance of the past relations between Great Britain and the Transvaal. Especially was this true since the governmental position had been declared early in the war and nothing had occurred to warrant any alteration in that position. This was the view which President McKinley took of the situation, and the policy of dealing with the problem was that of the strictest neutrality.

On May 21 it was officially announced that the delegates had called by appointment at the State Department. The notice given out to the press read: "They were cordially received and remained with the Secretary of State for more than an hour. They laid before the secretary at much length and with great energy and eloquence the merits of the controversy in South Africa and the desire of the Boer Republics that the United States should intervene in the interests of peace and use its influence to that end with the British Government." The ambition of the envoys on leaving the Transvaal for Europe had been "for the purpose of seeking recognition and intervention," but the success of their mission at Washington was not to be greater than it had been in European capitals. Although Mr. Hay received them courteously their competence to treat directly with the State Department was not recognized. When they realized this fact they appealed directly to the people in the hope of bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear upon the President from that source. He fully realized, however, that under the circumstances no interference was advisable. A departure from this policy would have created a precedent which might later have been appealed to by any European government in behalf of its subjects in this country. As Presidential candidate, however, William J. Bryan, in effect, if not in express terms, promised a mediation that would mean something should the Democrats come into power, and it was hopes created by such utterances which encouraged the Boers to believe that intervention on the part of the United States was a possibility. Even the Senate passed resolutions of sympathy which only held out a vain hope and naturally caused a certain amount of criticism in England. In the end, however, the envoys became convinced that nothing was to be hoped for in the way of dictatorial interference by the United States.

In his message to Congress, in 1899, three months after the war began, President McKinley had been able to declare: "This Government has maintained an attitude of neutrality in the unfortunate contest between Great Britain and the Boer States of Africa. We have remained faithful to the precept of avoiding entangling alliances as to affairs not of our direct concern. Had circumstances suggested that the parties to the quarrel would have welcomed any kindly expression of the hope of the American people that war might be averted, good offices would have been gladly tendered." And in May, 1900, after the interview with the Transvaal delegation, Mr. Hay gave out a statement through his secretary in which it was declared that this entirely correct neutral attitude had been strictly adhered to: "As the war went on the President, while regretting the suffering and the sacrifices endured by both of the combatants, could do nothing but preserve a strict neutrality between them. This has been steadfastly and constantly done, but there never has been a moment when he would have neglected any favorable occasion to use his good offices in the interest of peace." Mr. Hay also pointed to the fact that on March 10, 1900, at the request of the Republics, the United States consul at Pretoria had communicated with his Government with a view to the cessation of hostilities, and that the same proposal was made to European powers through their respective consuls.

The request of the Transvaal was at once despatched to London, and the earnest hope was expressed by the President that a way might be found to bring about peace, with the intimation that he "would be glad to aid in any friendly manner to promote so happy a result." The Transvaal was promptly informed of this action and the United States representative in London communicated the President's instructions to Lord Salisbury. In answer he was requested to "thank the President for the friendly interest shown by him," but it was unmistakably declared that "Her Majesty's Government could not accept the intervention of any power." This reply was communicated to Pretoria, and no further steps were taken, since any insistence upon the part of the United States would have been an unfriendly act.

In justification of the action of the President, in view of the popular feeling that more urgent pressure might have been used to cause the cessation of hostilities, Secretary Hay clearly showed that the United States Government was the only one of all those approached by the republics which had even tendered its good offices in the interest of peace. He called attention to the fact that despite the popular clamor to the contrary the action of the Government was fully in accord with the provisions of the Hague Conference and went as far as that Convention warranted. A portion of Article III of that instrument declares: "Powers, strangers to the dispute, may have the right to offer good offices or mediation, even during the course of hostilities," but Article V asserts, "The functions of the mediator are at an end when once it is declared either by one of the parties to the dispute or by the mediator, himself, that the means of conciliation proposed by him are not accepted." Obviously any further action on the part of the United States was not required under the circumstances, and Secretary Hay seems fully justified in his statement that "the steps taken by the President in his earnest desire to see an end to the strife which caused so much suffering may already be said to have gone to the extreme limit permitted to him." Moreover, had the President preferred not to present to Great Britain the Republic's request for good offices, his action could have been justified by the conditions under which the representatives of the United States at the Hague signed that convention. At that time the express declaration was made that "Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself with questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign State."

The final utterance of the President in regard to the mission of the Boers was the conclusive statement made through Secretary Hay: "The President sympathizes heartily in the desire of all the people of the United States that the war ... may, for the sake of both parties engaged, come to a speedy close; but having done his full duty in preserving a strictly neutral position between them and in seizing the first opportunity that presented itself for tendering his good offices in the interests of peace, he feels that in the present circumstances no course is open to him except to persist in the policy of impartial neutrality. To deviate from this would be contrary to all our traditions and all our national interests, and would lead to consequences which neither the President nor the people of the United States could regard with favor."

The attitude of the United States in the immediate vicinity of the war as well as the manner in which the envoys of the Transvaal were received in Washington rendered criticism impossible with reference to the fulfilment of the obligations of a neutral State. But serious charges were repeatedly made by the Transvaal sympathizers with reference to the use to which American ports and waters were put by British vessels or British-leased transports plying between the United States and South Africa. It was alleged that Great Britain was able to create here a base of warlike supplies, and thus to obtain material aid in her operations against the Boer forces. The probability of the truth of the Transvaal's allegations would seem at first thought to be slight considering the distance of the scene of war from the coasts of the United States, but upon closer inspection these charges become more worthy of belief. That warlike supplies were actually transported from at least one of the ports of the United States under such a systematic scheme as to constitute a base of hostile supplies for the English forces in South Africa, would seem to be established.

Individual commercial transactions with belligerents always occur, and it is not the part of neutral governments to assume responsibility for all such transactions, but the principles of the international law of the present day do require all neutral states to see to it that their respective territories are not made bases for hostile operations.

A few minor incidents showed that the obligations of neutrality would be enforced by the United States when it became apparent to the Government that the neutrality laws were being evaded. In Cincinnati a Frenchman giving his name as Pierrot was summoned before the United States Attorney on a charge of a violation of neutral restrictions. He had been known, it seems, as a recruiting officer for the Transvaal Government, but avowed that he had engaged men only for the Boer hospital corps and not for the army of the Republics. The warning that he must cease enlisting men even for this branch of the republican service proved sufficient in this case, but undoubtedly such recruiting on a small scale continued to evade detection.

Later, the New York courts restrained the steamer Bermuda from leaving the port upon the application of a British subject, who alleged that he had been informed that the Bermuda was carrying contraband to the Transvaal. After a detention of five days the ship was allowed to sail because it was not shown that the allegation had any foundation in fact.

Toward the close of November, 1900, a charge of a more serious nature was made. It was reported that a British remount establishment was operating in the United States and had just purchased fifty thousand horses and mules for the British forces in South Africa, and considerable attention to this alleged violation of neutral obligations was drawn by that portion of the press which was in sympathy with the Boers. A resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives calling upon the President to furnish information "whether our ports or waters had been used for the exportation of horses, mules, and other supplies for use in South Africa, and if so, to what extent and what steps had been taken to prevent such a use being made of neutral territory in time of war." The request was also made that full information be furnished with reference to the number of horses and mules which had been cleared from the ports of the United States since the beginning of the war, with a detailed statement of the shipments from each port and the dates of such clearances.

The reply submitted to Congress was that the ports of the United States had been used for the exportation of horses and mules and other supplies for use in South Africa; that between October, 1899, and January 31, 1901, the value of such shipments had amounted to $26,592,692; that no steps had been taken to prevent the "lawful exportation of horses, mules, and other supplies to South Africa;" and that the number of horses and mules shipped from the ports of the United States during this period had been 76,632. It was not practicable, it was asserted, to give the shipments from each port and the dates of such shipments without examining the copies of the manifests of each vessel that had cleared for South Africa. Such an examination and compilation could not be presented to Congress before its adjournment, although copies of the clearance papers were filed with the collectors of the customs at the different ports of the country.

In the same report it was shown that of the entire exports to South Africa during this period a large proportion had been of warlike supplies, if horses and mules for army purposes can be considered warlike in character; 28,598 horses valued at $2,698,827; 48,034 mules valued at $4,611,365. Gunpowder to the value of $1472 had also been exported; other explosives to the value of $7073, and firearms valued at $924, in all $7,310,661 worth of such supplies exported to one or both of the belligerents in South Africa. Possibly the larger proportion of the gunpowder, other explosives, and firearms was run into the Transvaal by way of Delagoa Bay as contraband under the usual risks, or was used for purposes apart from the war, but with reference to the supplies for the British army it would seem that a very free use was made of the ports and waters of the United States. One reason why the English Government was able to supply its armies in South Africa with horses and mules in such large numbers may have been the fact that a better market supply existed in this country, but it is more probable that the evasion of the strictest neutral requirements was easier here than elsewhere. The distance from the scene of war, although it involved an additional cost for transportation, also rendered an evasion of the requirements of neutrality less conspicuous. The supply of horses and mules in the European market was scant, especially in the class of animals which was needed, but it seems obvious that the motive which actuated the purchases was rather the greater ease in evading neutral prohibitions than the desire to secure a better market at a distance of ten thousand miles from the seat of war. Possibly both motives actuated the purchases, but it is nevertheless true that the United States ports were used to a far greater extent than those of any other neutral Government. The last statement is borne out by the Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, which shows that from November, 1899, to June, 1902, inclusive, no fewer than 191,363 horses and mules were shipped from the ports of the United States for the British forces in South Africa, aggregating a total cost to Great Britain of approximately $20,175,775. The entire cost in the United States and elsewhere for such purchases at the end of July, 1902, amounted to $52,000,000 in round numbers. The entire cost incurred within the United States was greater than that incurred in any other country. In Hungary the cost to Great Britain for horses and mules was $8,203,505; in Spain $1,667,695; in Italy $688,690; in the Argentine Republic, the British colonies and elsewhere, $21,284,335.

In view of this undoubted use of the ports and waters of the United States by one of the belligerents in a war toward which a neutral attitude had been declared, it may be inquired how far the condition of affairs was known to the Administration and what opportunity there was for executive action, especially with reference to the allegation made by the Transvaal that the port of New Orleans was used as a base of warlike supplies for the British forces.

On April 10, 1902, a resolution of the House of Representatives called upon the President for copies of "any report and communication of the Governor of Louisiana, together with all accompanying affidavits, documents and communications concerning the shipments of horses, mules, and other supplies from Louisiana to the seat of war in South Africa." In response a report of Secretary Hay disclosed the fact that on February 1, 1902, a certain Samuel Pearson had appealed to the President against the use to which Great Britain had been allowed to put the ports of the United States in supplying her armies in South Africa. Pearson had affirmed that "the port of New Orleans was being made the basis of military operations and the port and waters for the purpose of the renewal and augmentation of military supplies for the British army." He further alleged that the attention of the courts had been called to the matter and the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Louisiana had declared that the case was not within the cognizance of the court since the matter could be taken up only by the executive branch of the government. In making his plea directly to the President, Pearson asserted that at the port of Chalmette, a few miles below New Orleans, a British post had been established; that men and soldiers had been assembled there and were daily engaged in warlike operations not only for the renewal and augmentation of military supplies, but for the recruitment of men. He alleged that no concealment was made of the facts as he had stated them; that although the English officers did not appear in uniform war was actually being carried on in behalf of the British Government from the territory of the United States. He concluded: "With every respect for the authority of the United States Government, may I not consider your silence or inaction the equivalent of consent for me to stop the further violation of the neutrality laws of this port, or to carry on war here for the burghers."

The President referred the matter to the Mayor of New Orleans with the intimation that a breach of the peace was threatened. The Mayor shifted the responsibility to the Governor of the State on the ground that the acts complained of were alleged to have been committed in the parish of St. Bernard and consequently outside the jurisdiction of the city authorities. Finally, under the orders of the Governor the Sheriff of St. Bernard parish made an investigation and reported that Pearson's statements had been incorrect in a number of points. It was admitted that mules and horses had been and were then being loaded at Port Chalmette for the British Government either directly or indirectly; that the operation was being carried out by local men all of whom were citizens of the United States; that the work was being supervised by Englishmen who might or might not be officers of the British army, although none of them wore the uniform of Great Britain. But the Sheriff positively asserted that a British post with men and soldiers was not established at the port; that no recruiting of men was taking place within the parish; that the only men taken on the ships were muleteers who were employed in the city of New Orleans by the contractors; that these men were taken on board the ships when in mid-stream by tugs which set out from the city wharves.

In a personal interview "General" Pearson made the same charges to the Governor that he had made in his letter to the President. He asked that he be allowed to offer forcible resistance to the shipments to South Africa, and to the enlisting or employing of men as muleteers, who, he alleged, were later incorporated in the British army. This interview took place the day following the Sheriff's letter partially denying the charges to the Governor, and the latter was not disposed to take any action in the matter until proof of the accuracy of the averments was produced, although the facts which were alleged had become widely known.

The attitude of the Administration with reference to Pearson's letter, it was believed by the press, was not of a character to inspire great confidence in the strict performance of neutral duties. To ignore an allegation of so flagrant a character as the breach of neutrality, it was declared, constituted a disregard of American ideals in the interest of British imperialism which could not be excused by jocular references to "General" Pearson's request to the President "to either put an end to this state of affairs or permit me to strike one blow."

It was pointed out that the problem raised by Pearson was not one that might be laughed out of the White House, but was the serious question whether the British Government should any longer be permitted, in violation of American neutrality, to use an American city and port as a base of warlike operations against a friendly people. The newspapers, too, had made public the movements of the English army officers in charge of the shipments. It seems that the base of operations at first used by Great Britain was Southport, but that Chalmette had later been selected. The efficiency of the latter station was reported upon in March, 1902, by General Sir Richard Campbell Stewart of the British army. Everything pertaining to the efficiency of the transportation service was carefully inspected on behalf of the British Government. Colonel DeBergh, who was in command of the remount service in the United States, declared that he had not received orders from the British War Office to discontinue the shipments, and that they would be continued "unless General Pearson and the Boer army drive our garrison away."

The evidence which Pearson was able to place before Governor Heard and which the latter laid before the President seemed to substantiate the fact that at least one of the ports of the United States had been constantly used and was then being used as a base of military transportation to the British forces in South Africa. It was shown that William B. Leonard, of New Orleans, had contracted with Major H.J. Scobell, representing the British Government, for the purchase of mules to be shipped to South Africa for military purposes. The contract had been signed in October, 1899, and during the months from October, 1899, to May, 1900, large numbers had been shipped to South Africa under the immediate direction of British army officers. P.B. Lynch made affidavit that he had been employed as clerk and bookkeeper in the bureau of the British remount service in New Orleans from December, 1899, to September, 1901. He explained the operations of the remount service as well as its methods, and indicated clearly the direct connection of regularly appointed officers of the British army with the purchase and shipment of horses and mules to South Africa. The purchases, it seems, were made at different points in the country and afterward assembled at a place designated by the officer in charge in New Orleans. The British army brand was then placed upon the animals, which were immediately consigned to the British officer in New Orleans but without giving his military title. They were then transferred to ships the charter parties of which were agents of the English Government. It was shown that the ships' agents usually employed muleteers taken on by tugs from the city of New Orleans, and it was proved that the whole operation was controlled by English army officers who were detailed from London or from South Africa for the purpose.

The testimony of Charles J. Cole showed that as foreman in charge of seventy or more men he had made six trips to South Africa in the service of the British Government or of its agents. His testimony was substantiated by certificates for seamen discharged before the superintendent of a mercantile marine office in the British Empire, a British consul, or a shipping officer on board the vessel on which he had sailed. He had been employed on the transports Prah, Montcalm, Knight Bachelor, Montezuma, and Rosetta, all engaged in transporting horses and mules to the British army in South Africa. He testified that the transports were in charge of regular officers of the English army and that from them all orders were received. He also avowed that many of the men were urged and solicited by the officers to join the British army, and were unable to obtain their pay unless they complied with the request.

The affidavit of R.J. Tourres showed that he had served on the ship Milwaukee. He averred that the ship's articles were signed by him before the vice-consul of the British Government; that he was finally referred to an officer of the English army for duty and acted under his orders during the voyage from New Orleans to Cape Town; that when the vessel was not allowed to land its cargo at that place on account of the plague the consignment of horses and mules for the British army was delivered at Durban to English officers in uniform; that he was not allowed to go ashore except upon the condition of signing with the recruiting officer and joining the British army; that during the entire voyage a British military officer in uniform controlled the ship's crew; and that among the men the Milwaukee was known as a transport under the direct command of regularly detailed officers of the English army.

The testimony of a number of other witnesses sworn before the commissioner for the eastern district of Louisiana showed that the wages of the men employed upon the ship Montcalm had been refused by the captain unless they would agree to enlist in the British army, but as American citizens they had refused to enlist and had demanded the wages due them under the ship's articles. August Nozeret, an American citizen, foreman of a corps of muleteers on board the Montcalm, testified that he was told by the ship's officers that the only way to secure his discharge at Port Elizabeth was to have a recruiting officer vouch for his enlisting in the British army; and that he complied with this demand and escaped enlistment only by pretending to be physically unable to count the number of perforations in a card when required to do so as a test of sight at the recruiting office. The affiant was able to say from his own personal knowledge that certified discharges were not given unless the men were willing to enlist in the English army. An abundance of other evidence to the same effect was produced, and it was shown that both the Montcalm and the Milwaukee were under the direct control of the British war authorities. Both had their official numbers painted from their hulls before entering the Portuguese harbor of Beira.

The evidence which was thus placed before the President would seem to show that the spirit at any rate of the neutrality laws of the United States had been violated, and that this violation had been systematically carried out by the British Government and not by individual citizens merely as a commercial venture.

The first section of the neutrality laws which were passed by Congress in 1818 defines the offense of accepting a foreign commission and lays down the penalty for such an offense. The second section forbids any person within the territory of the United States to enlist in a foreign service "as soldier, or as a mariner, or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer." The three following sections prohibit the arming of a vessel to cruise against a people at peace with the United States, or against the citizens of the United States, or the augmentation of the force of any foreign vessel of war. The next prohibits military expeditions of any kind. This section reads:

"Every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begins, or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people, with whom the United States are at peace, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding $3,000, and imprisoned not more than three years."